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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis is a comparative history of the post-war European socialist parties, 1943-1948 – 
with a focus on the Czechoslovakian Social Democratic Party and the Polish Socialist 
Party in Eastern Europe as well as the French Socialist Party and the Italian Socialist Party 
in Western Europe. Its foremost aim is to demonstrate that the countries of East and West, 
far from already being divided by an Iron Curtain, faced much the same challenges during 
these first post-war years. Contrary to the conventional historiographical picture of an 
international socialist movement split along Cold War lines, therefore, it draws attention to 
the divergences within and parallels across the two putative ‘blocs’. 
 
To do so, the thesis moves the spotlight away from geo-politics and focuses upon that set 
of problems that really dominated the agendas of the post-war European socialist parties – 
the problems of post-war reconstruction. The thesis addresses socialist attitudes towards 
two of the key dimensions of post-war reconstruction.  
 
Its first part deals with socio-economic reconstruction. This part demonstrates that there 
was often a profound disconnect between socialist leaders in national government and the 
workers at their grassroots. Whereas rank-and-file (socialist) workers berated their leaders 
for their failure to improve the material situation, for their inability to clamp down upon 
the black market, and for the remaining inequalities of post-war life, national party leaders 
scolded workers for their unruliness and for their unwillingness to make sacrifices towards 
the greater political good.       
 
Its second part deals with political reconstruction – more specifically with the question of 
rebuilding democracy. This part demonstrates that, contrary to what many historians of 
post-war (Western) European socialism claim, there was no across-the-board socialist 
conversion to a parliamentary road to socialism. Yet, the fault lines between those parties 
insisting on a strict adherence to the rulebook of political democracy and those advocating 
a radical departure from representative democracy did not divide neatly between East and 
West.  
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Introduction 
 
‘Everything can be done in the first year following the Liberation […]. What is not done in 
the first year will never be done, because by then all the old habits will have been 
resumed.’1  
 
André Philip, 1944   
 
It is now commonplace to argue that the liberation of Europe saw a window of opportunity 
open up. In this narrative, a wave of socio-political radicalism swept the continent in the 
wake of the Second World War. Manifesting itself both in the substantial swing to the Left 
in the first post-war elections and in the rise of revolutionary forms of direct democracy 
through such grassroots bodies as factory councils and liberation committees, this 
radicalism is often understood to have opened the way to a democratic, libertarian, and 
participatory socialism. Yet, this purported window of opportunity was smashed to a close 
once the inexorable forces of the budding Cold War made themselves felt at the national 
level. Between the leaders of the post-war Left – backed, bribed, or bullied by their 
American or Soviet ringmasters – deliberately defusing every wave of popular passions 
and the occupying armies unwilling to see a rival authority emerge under their watch, few 
of the radical aspirations of the liberation remained by 1948. 
 This thesis seeks to shed fresh light on the first post-war years by focusing upon a 
group that, if not neglected completely, is at the very least taken for granted in traditional 
historiography on the post-war period – the European socialist parties.2 The disregard these 
parties are often shown is unwarranted for two reasons. Firstly, socialists were represented 
                                                          
1 Quoted in: Andrew Shennan, Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal 1940-1946, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), p. 292. 
2 The international socialist movement was traditionally made up both of parties calling themselves ‘socialist’ 
and of parties calling themselves ‘social democratic’. For the sake of clarity, this thesis will use ‘socialist’ 
throughout to describe the party family of which both socialist and social democratic parties formed part. It 
will only use ‘social democratic’ where it is dealing with an individual party describing itself in that manner 
(e.g. the Czechoslovakian Social Democratic Party or the German Social Democratic Party).       
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both in their countries’ national governments and in grassroots factory or local bodies for 
most of the post-war era. Secondly, the socialist parties repeatedly refused to dance to the 
tune of the Cold War.  
This is very much the case for the four socialist parties under review in this thesis – 
the Czechoslovakian Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) 
in Eastern Europe as well as the French Socialist Party (SFIO) and the Italian Socialist 
Party (PSIUP)3 in Western Europe. Upon liberation, each of these four parties took office 
in the broad-based national coalition governments, bringing together communist, socialist, 
and anti-fascist centre-right (Christian democratic, peasant, or bourgeois-liberal) parties, so 
typical for post-war continental Europe. Yet, as these coalitions began to disintegrate 
during 1946/47, they resolved upon widely divergent strategies. On the one hand, the 
Italian and Polish socialists, sharing the conviction that the Left should close its ranks to 
prevent fascists from ever taking power again, stood by the socialist-communist united 
front. On the other hand, the Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French socialists, 
increasingly viewing communism as the greater threat to democracy, more and more 
veered towards the parties of the centre-right. What is striking about these divergences is 
that they not only do not fit with the Cold War dichotomies of East versus West and philo-
communist versus anti-communist, but also emerged at a time when the two new 
superpowers were still on speaking terms. If clearly not the result of some premature geo-
political division of the continent, therefore, how can we explain these similarities across 
and differences within the two putative ‘blocs’? 
                                                          
3 From its creation in 1892 to August 1943, the Italian Socialist Party went by the name Partito Socialista 
Italiano (Italian Socialist Party – PSI). In August 1943, after a merger with the resistance group called 
Movimento di Unità Proletaria (Movement of Proletarian Unity – MUP), the party changed its name to 
Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria (Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity – PSIUP). Amid 
fears that the party’s anti-communist wing, which had broken away at the January 1947 PSIUP congress, 
would start using the old name, the PSIUP changed its name back to PSI in 1947. For the sake of clarity, this 
thesis will use the abbreviation PSIUP throughout to describe the post-war Italian Socialist Party. It will only 
use the abbreviation PSI where it is dealing with the pre-war Italian Socialist Party.     
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 This thesis endeavours to address that question by challenging the Cold War 
paradigm still so dominant in scholarly accounts on post-war Europe. Rather than 
teleologically projecting back the Iron Curtain that separated the two halves of the 
continent after 1947/48, it concentrates on that set of problems shared by socialists in East 
and West during the first months and years after liberation – the problems of post-war 
reconstruction. The thesis explores two specific dimensions of post-war reconstruction. Its 
first part is devoted to socio-economic reconstruction, studying the tensions between the 
various production ‘battles’ proclaimed by socialist leaders in government and the 
everyday struggles with insufficient wages, the lack of basic necessities, spiralling 
inflation, and the black market facing rank-and-file (socialist) workers in four industrial 
cities – Plzeň for Czechoslovakia, Łódź for Poland, Lille for France, and Milano for Italy. 
The second part deals with political reconstruction, analysing how distinct national 
political histories and societal structures affected socialist conceptions of democracy. Thus 
moving the spotlight away from post-war European socialism’s divided future to its 
entangled pasts and presents, this thesis for the first time brings together in comparative 
research and analysis the parallel histories of parties thus far considered worlds apart.  
 
Research Questions 
 
The ‘problems of post-war reconstruction’, even if confined to their socio-economic and 
political dimensions, represent a vast interpretative category. For that reason, this thesis 
chiefly explores those aspects of post-war socio-economic and political reconstruction that 
were controversial within and/or amongst the four parties. 
 In socio-economic terms, its focus lies primarily on the grassroots-elites dynamics 
that the material demands of the reconstruction effort generated within each of the four 
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parties. These dynamics, as we will see, constitute one particularly under-researched facet 
of post-war socialist history and are much overdue scholarly analysis. To what extent, 
therefore, can intra-party grassroots-elites dynamics account for the striking differences 
and similarities between the four parties? This main research question for the first part of 
the thesis has been divided in six sub-questions. The first three concern the views taken at 
the grassroots. What were the foremost concerns of rank-and-file (socialist) workers? Did 
they feel these concerns were taken seriously by their provincial and national leaders? And 
how did this affect their attitudes towards the discipline and sacrifice demanded by party 
leaders? The final three concern the views taken by socialist elites. Which socio-economic 
priorities were formulated by provincial and national socialist leaders? To what extent did 
these priorities conflict with those of workers? And how did their interactions with the 
grassroots shape their views of post-war society as a whole?   
 In political terms, the thesis concentrates specifically on the rebuilding of 
democracy. (Western) socialism’s strong identification, both before the Second World War 
and during the Cold War, with a parliamentary and reformist road to socialism has tended 
to obscure the fact that many socialists in East and West were actually calling for 
newfound democracy to take a more revolutionary form in the immediate aftermath of the 
war. To what extent, therefore, can we attribute the striking differences and similarities 
between the four parties to these disparate conceptions of democracy? This main research 
question for the second part of the thesis has been divided in two sets of sub-questions. The 
first set concerns the historical and societal perceptions informing the four parties’ 
understandings of democracy. What political lessons had they drawn from their countries’ 
and parties’ historical peculiarities? And how far did they consider their societies to be 
prepared for the many temptations of democratic politics? The second set concerns the 
pathways to democracy the four parties drew up. To what extent did they place their trust 
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in the traditional institutions of parliamentary democracy? And what role did they see for 
the grassroots participatory bodies that had arisen in the wake of the liberation?             
 
Literature Review 
 
This thesis draws principally upon three interconnected strands of academic literature, 
which will now be dealt with one by one in this literature review. The first section 
addresses international affairs and high politics, discussing historiography on the national 
ramifications of the Cold War in post-war Europe. The second section moves on to social 
relations and low politics, providing an overview of academic accounts on post-war 
reconstruction and its local impact across Europe. The third section assesses to what extent 
the main tenets of these political history and social history approaches have trickled down 
onto scholarship on post-war European socialism and identifies which lacunae still remain 
in this body of literature.   
        
 The Cold War 
 
For at least the first three decades after the onset of the Cold War, writing the political 
history of post-war Europe was a straightforward business. The Soviet Union and the 
United States won the Second World War, carved up the continent in two halves, and set 
about creating regimes after their model in their respective spheres of influence. 
Submerging the continent’s distinctive national features to the great levelling forces of 
Sovietisation in the East and Americanisation in the West, such accounts often portray the 
Europeans as mere bystanders in a story where all the real decisions were made in Moscow 
and Washington.  
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 This is especially true for the earliest academic interpretations of the political 
history of post-war Eastern Europe, in which allusions to a Soviet ‘master plan’ to 
establish communist dictatorships across the region abound. In Hugh Seton-Watson’s 
standard work on the theme, communist takeovers are described as having followed a 
three-stage ‘pattern’ in most of Soviet-dominated Europe: from the ‘genuine coalitions’ 
that came to power at liberation via ‘bogus coalitions’ already clamping down upon the 
anti-communist opposition to the ‘monolithic regime’ that emerged after all social and 
political organisations had been brought into line with communism.4 A similar Soviet 
‘blueprint’ for post-war Eastern Europe is identified by Thomas T. Hammond, this time 
characterised by the use of ‘armed force’ (the pressures exerted by the Red Army), 
‘camouflage’ (initial communist moderation), ‘gradualism’ (the piecemeal ‘salami tactics’ 
with which the communists eliminated their political opponents), and ‘planning’ (the 
communists making sure to occupy key positions within government and mass 
organisations).5 While other historians have allowed for more national varieties upon this 
model,6 the lasting impression traditional historiography on post-war Eastern Europe 
leaves is still that of a determined Stalin instigating, commanding, and micro-managing the 
campaign to Sovietise his sphere of influence. 
 Traditional scholarship on the American role in post-war Western European politics 
is likewise marked by a significant degree of determinism. For all of their debate over 
whether American intervention in the region was essentially benevolent or malevolent, 
                                                          
4 Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, (London: Methuen & Co, 1961), pp. 167-171.  
5 Thomas T. Hammond, ‘The History of Communist Takeovers’, in: Thomas T. Hammond & Robert Farrell 
(eds.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 1-45, 
20-27. The volume’s case studies on the takeovers in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania provide further examples of traditionalist perspectives upon post-war Eastern Europe.       
6 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1967).  
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both those ‘orthodox’7 historians blaming Soviet aggression for the onset of the Cold War 
and their ‘revisionist’8 counterparts pointing the finger at American belligerence adhere to 
a more general plot in which Washington is the key actor in post-war Western Europe. 
This purported American hegemony was achieved primarily through the skilful use of what 
has often been described as ‘dollar diplomacy’ – awarding the cash-strapped Western 
European governments with vital credits in exchange for their political obedience. Even 
before the Marshall Plan formalised its business model, the argument runs, these quid-pro-
quo politics had effectively shackled Western Europe to the American bloc.9 When the 
time was ripe, the United States, wholly in line with its natural disposition to favour the 
Right over the Left ‘wherever it might do so’,10 could effortlessly strong-arm its right-wing 
allies into removing the communists, and with them the last remaining challenge to full 
American preponderance in Western Europe, from government.11 
 Since the opening of the archives in both halves of the continent – from the late 
1970s in Western Europe and after 1989 in Eastern Europe – these superpower-centric 
accounts have come under sustained attack from two directions. On the one hand, there is a 
growing body of literature stressing the tenacity of the national conditions and traditions 
with which the superpowers had to contend. On the other, scholarship nowadays has the 
superpowers themselves coming off not only as flexible but sometimes even as dupable in 
their dealings with various groupings on the continent. Together, these two fresh 
                                                          
7 Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957); Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History, (New York: Harper and Row, 
1967).  
8 Denna Frank Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 2 vols., (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961); 
William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: Delta Books, 1962); Gabriel 
Kolko & Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1972).  
9 Annie Lacroix-Riz, Le choix de Marianne. Les relations franco-americaines, 1944-1948, (Paris: Messidor, 
1985).   
10 Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945, (New York: 
Random House, 1968), p. 446-447.    
11 Alan A. Platt & Roberto Leonardi, ‘American Foreign Policy and the Post-War Italian Left’, Political 
Science Quarterly, 93/2 (1978), pp. 197-215, 198-199. 
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approaches to post-war European history have combined to recast the spotlight upon the 
European centres and to restore agency to European political actors.12 
 This comes to the fore very clearly in the more recent historiography of post-war 
Western European politics, which has performed various u-turns upon the teachings of 
traditional Cold War literature. First of all, it dispels the notion that the United States 
operated in some sort of vacuum. Several case studies have demonstrated that 
‘“Americanisation” must be understood in a local context’.13 Western Europe might have 
been run over militarily and reduced to ruins, but political elites were back to their feet 
quickly to press for the overdue modernisation of their countries.14 To have their hands 
free for this task, they required American security guarantees and financial backing. That 
meant a re-run of 1919, when the United States had turned their back on the continent, was 
to be avoided at all costs and the wavering Americans had to be locked into European 
problems this time around. For post-war France, for example, Irwin Wall has concluded 
that whereas ‘the Americans showed little eagerness to become deeply involved in French 
affairs’, ‘[i]t was the pull of the French, rather than the push outward from Washington, 
that characterized different aspects of American involvement, diplomatic, economic, 
                                                          
12 This broader ‘European turn’ in the historiography of the early Cold War dates back to a series of 
conferences in the 1980s. These conferences were all part of the long-range European research project – 
‘Perceptions of Power in Western Europe between 1938 and 1958’ – which brought together historians and 
political scientists from France, Great Britain, Italy, and West Germany. Amongst the various edited volumes 
that this project brought forth, the most significant from the perspective of this thesis is the product of a 
conference to which more than eighty scholars contributed: Josef Becker & Franz Knipping (eds.), Power in 
Europe: Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-1950, (Berlin/New York: De 
Gruyter, 1986). 
13 The quote is from David Reynold’s review essay: ‘America’s Europe, Europe’s America: Image, 
Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958’, Diplomatic History, 20/4 (1996), pp. 651-661, 657; he refers to 
Reinhold Wagnleiter, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in 
Austria after the Second World War, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). Further 
interesting accounts on the indigenous push and pulls encountered by Americanisation include: Michael 
Ermath (ed.), America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945-1955, (Providence, RI: Berg, 1993); 
Richard Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanisation, (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1993); Volker Berghahn, The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973, 
(Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986).     
14 William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 
1944-1954, (Chapel Hill/London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).   
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political, and military’.15 This has been developed into a more generalised thesis by Geir 
Lundestad, who argues that the American ‘empire’ in post-war Western Europe was 
formed upon local ‘invitation’.16 Once such invitations had been acted upon, however, the 
Americans often found themselves on the receiving end of European machinations. Being 
the paymaster of the Marshall Plan, for instance, turned out to be but a ‘feeble weapon’ as 
participating governments regularly flaunted American free trade provisions in view of 
domestic political reasons.17 
 Far from imposing its will upon a despondent political class in Western Europe, 
then, the United States were forced to tap into national considerations and traditions across 
the region. But local preferences frequently coincided with the broader American agenda. 
Nowhere was this more the case than with Western Europe’s rampant anti-communism. 
Rather than being some continental emulation of McCarthyism, recent studies have 
persuasively argued how much of this anti-communism was home grown and shared right 
across the (non-communist) political spectrum.18 In these circumstances, the Americans 
‘often ignored traditional notions of Left and Right and supported whichever party or 
collection of parties facilitated continued U.S. influence in Europe’.19 In practice, that 
frequently meant co-opting those moderate centrist and socialist politicians who were 
considered best-placed to fight off the communist electoral threat. The historiographical 
focus, accordingly, has shifted from ‘dollar diplomacy’ to ‘labour diplomacy’, with various 
                                                          
15 Irwin Wall, The United States and the Making of Post-War France, 1945-1954, (Cambridge/New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 300. 
16 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From ‘Empire’ by Invitation to 
Transatlantic Drift, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
17 Chiarella Esposito, America’s Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-
1950, (New York: Greenwood, 1994). 
18 Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945-1953, (London: Routledge, 
2004); Alessandro Brogi, A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France 
and Italy, 1944-1958, (New York: Praeger, 2001); Patrick Major, Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-
Communism in West Germany, 1945-1956, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Jussi Hanhimäki, Scandinavia 
and the United States: An Insecure Friendship, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997). 
19 Deborah Kisatsky, ‘The United States, the French Right, and American Power in Europe, 1946-1958’, The 
Historian, 65/3, (2003), pp. 615-641, 616.  
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authors now exploring the Atlantic links of post-war leaders of the non-communist Left.20 
Once again, the main drivers of this story are the Western Europeans, sometimes even 
subverting their American funding for domestic campaigns wholly unrelated to the Cold 
War effort. 
 A similar trend towards endowing national political actors with a far greater stake 
in national political history is discernible in recent scholarship on post-war Eastern Europe. 
To be sure, no historian would claim that Stalin’s dictatorial Eastern bloc was somehow an 
‘empire by invitation’, but few likewise still stand by the old maxims of ‘master plans’ and 
‘blueprints’. The debate about whether Stalin had been planning to establish communist 
dictatorships in his sphere of influence all along is still on-going.21 There is widespread 
agreement, however, that a takeover was not on the menu for 1945 and that the Kremlin 
envisioned its coalition strategy to last for possibly as long as decades. This message was 
lost on many communists on the ground in Soviet-controlled Europe, however, who set 
about creating local as well as national regimes in the Soviet image. In his much-acclaimed 
history of the Soviet Zone of Germany, Norman Naimark describes just how messy and 
uncoordinated the Soviet occupation initially was – with lines of communication often 
blurred, the survival of political pluralism could depend on so random a factor as the mind-
                                                          
20 On the British labourites: Hugh Wilford, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?, 
(London: Frank Cass, 2003). On the Dutch social democrats: Paul Koedijk, ‘The Netherlands, the United 
States, and Anticommunism during the early Cold War’, in: Hans Krabbendam, Cornelis van Minnen & 
Giles Scott-Smith (eds.), Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations, 1609-2009, (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2009), pp. 597-607. On the German social democrats: Julia Angster, Konsenskapitalismus und 
Sozialdemokratie: Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB, (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003). 
21 Whereas some historians tend to agree with Vojtech Mastny’s dictum that ‘nowhere beyond what Moscow 
considered the Soviet borders did its policies foresee the establishment of communist regimes’, others argue 
that the eventual establishment of communist dictatorships across Eastern Europe was always the point of 
departure for the Soviets. The former group includes: Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to 
Cold War, 1939-1953, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and 
Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 21; Vladislav Zubok & 
Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1996); Wilfried Loth, Stalin’s ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Moskau die DDR nicht 
wollte, (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1994). For the latter group: Ronald Raack, Stalin’s Drive to the West: The Origins 
of the Cold War, 1938-1945, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Eduard Mark, ‘Revolution by 
Degrees: Stalin’s National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947’, Cold War International History Project 
Working Paper No. 31, Washington, Feb. 2001; Odd Arne Westad, ‘Introduction’, in: Odd Arne Westad, 
Sven Holtsmark & Iver Neumann (eds.), The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994).  
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set of the local Red Army commander.22 Even where proper channels of communication 
did exist, however, national communists frequently overstepped their mandate in their 
dealings with rival parties. In Poland, for example, Stalin had to intervene personally twice 
to prevent the premature unification of communists and socialists.23 
 But if the perimeters of Soviet plans for post-war Eastern Europe were not even 
clear to many communists themselves, they were certainly not to non-communist political 
actors in the region. Accordingly, there has been a revaluation of the role played by those 
politicians and parties working with the communists and the Soviets in national coalition 
governments. Frequently denounced as either hopelessly misguided or downright traitorous 
in more traditional historiography on post-war Eastern Europe, a recent book on post-war 
Hungary insists that ‘those who sought compromise and attempted to get along with the 
Soviet occupiers were not knaves and fools, but people who had legitimate hopes that 
some degree of Hungarian democracy could be saved’.24 As ‘local politics mattered’ even 
for Stalin, then, the domestic political struggles along the ‘national road to socialism’ merit 
attention.25 Various case studies on this theme have demonstrated how the communists had 
to interact not only with the diplomatic exigencies of the Soviet Union, but also with the 
stubbornness of national constellations and stakeholders across Eastern Europe.26 
                                                          
22 Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).  
23 Harald Moldenhauer, ‘“Ihr werdet Euch dem Sozialismus ohne blutigen Kampf annähern.” 
Kommunistische Blockpolitik und “Gleichschaltung” der Parteien in Polen, 1944-1948’, in: Stefan 
Creuzberger & Manfred Görtemaker (eds.), Gleichschaltung unter Stalin: Die Entwicklung der Parteien im 
östlichen Europa 1944-1948, (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2002), pp. 85-122. 
24 Peter Kenez, Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets: The Establishment of the Communist Regime in 
Hungary, 1944-1948, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1-2. 
25 Norman Naimark, ‘Stalin and Europe in the Postwar Period, 1945-1953’, Journal of Modern European 
History, 2/1 (2004), pp. 28-57, 36.   
26 Vesselin Dimitrov, Stalin’s Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy and Communism in Bulgaria, 
1941-1948, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Bradley F. Abrams, The Struggle for the Soul of the 
Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); Gareth 
Pritchard, The Making of the GDR: From Antifascism to Stalinism, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000); Inessa Iazhborovskaia, ‘The Gomułka Alternative: The Untravelled Road’, in: Norman 
Naimark & Leonid Gibianskii (eds.), The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-
1949, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 123-138. 
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Sovietisation, therefore, was far from a uniform process as significant disparities between 
countries,27 and even between different regions within countries,28 remained. 
 
Post-War Reconstruction     
 
The social history of post-war Europe often has a complicated relationship with Cold War 
political historiography. On the one hand, it seeks to steer clear from its foremost paradigm 
– that public life in early post-war Europe was already completely overshadowed by the 
superpower struggle. Portraying the period between the liberation of Europe over 1943/45 
and the real onset of the Cold War in 1947/48 as a historical era in its own right, it claims 
altogether different forces were at play during these first months and years after liberation 
– forces representing a radical alternative to the restorationist continent, communist in the 
East and capitalist in the West, that would eventually emerge out of the ashes of the 
Second World War. On the other, it attributes the ultimate defeat of these forces very much 
to the superpowers and their national co-conspirators. In this respect, the traditional Cold 
War narrative has left an even more profound mark on post-war Europe’s social history 
than on its political history, as those historians arguing that the revolutionary potential of 
the first years after liberation was limited and that post-war reconstruction was unlikely to 
produce other results than it did are still but a distinct minority. 
 Reconstruction was set in motion locally. In the immediate aftermath of liberation, 
former resistance cells now turned liberation committee or factory council assumed 
responsibility for such vital tasks as food distribution, clearing rubble off the streets, and 
getting paralysed industrial production going again. The autonomy and self-direction of 
                                                          
27 John Connelly, Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech and Polish Higher 
Education, 1945-1956, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
28 Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-1950, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997).  
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such grassroots bodies has exerted a powerful attraction upon many social historians. In 
their view, the discipline shown by workers in plants abandoned by their collaborationist 
owners and the participatory nature of the post-war popular and factory assemblies carried 
the germs of a veritable worker democracy – a decentralised system of worker self-
management fundamentally different from both Western market capitalism and Soviet state 
capitalism. Their foremost case in point has often been Germany, where the Antifa council 
movement is considered to have represented a ‘third way’ out of Americanisation or 
Sovietisation.29 More recently, however, this school of thought has produced various case 
studies on countries likewise affected by an upswing in grassroots activism after 
liberation.30 Almost invariably, such works convey a sense of missed opportunities, as the 
fluidity and ‘radical openness’ of the first post-war years were not capitalised upon to 
create a different Europe.31  
 That this revolutionary transformation failed to come to fruition is often blamed on 
the formidable coalition of superpowers and labour leaders opposing the empowerment of 
grassroots participatory bodies. In keeping with the traditional Cold War account, there is a 
broad body of literature attributing the defeat of post-war Europe’s council movement 
primarily to the malicious intervention of the occupying armies. In the case of the 
Americans, this was very straightforward. Viewing any form of grassroots activism as a 
dangerous affront to property relations and the political status quo, they proceeded quickly 
                                                          
29 Lutz Niethammer, Ulrich Borsdorf & Peter Brandt (eds.), Arbeiterinitiative 1945: Antifaschistische 
Ausschüsse und Reorganisation der Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland, (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1976); 
Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entläβt ihre Kinder, (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1955).   
30 Peter Heumos, ‘Betriebsräte, Einheitsgewerkschaft und staatliche Unternehmensverwaltung: Anmerkungen 
zu einer Petition mährischer Arbeiter an die tschechoslowakische Regierung vom 8. Juni 1947’, Jahrbücher 
für Geschichte Osteuropas, 29/2 (1981), pp. 215-245; Robert Mencherini, La Libération et les enterprises 
sous gestion ouvrière, Marseille, 1944-1948, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1994);  Tom Behan, The Long Awaited 
Moment: The Working Class and the Italian Communist Party in Milan, 1943-1948, (New York: P. Lang, 
1997); Zbigniew Marcin Kowalewski, ‘Give us back our Factories! Between Resisting Exploitation and the 
Struggle for Workers’ Power in Poland, 1944-1981’, in: Immanuel Niess & Dario Azzellini (eds.), Ours to 
Master and to Own: Workers’ Control from the Commune to the Present, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 
2011), pp. 191-209; Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Moment of Liberation: Western Europe (1943-1948), (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming).    
31 Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000, (Oxford/New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 288. 
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to disband the revolutionary bodies that had sprung up at liberation. Often by military 
decree, then, liberation committees were ordered to hand over their weapons and the 
competencies of factory councils were curbed,32 thus nipping in the bud ‘the molecular 
forms of a different and more radical version of post-war reconstruction’.33 The Soviet 
occupiers did obviously not share the intuitive conservatism of their American counterparts 
and many of the revolutionary visions espoused by the post-war popular assemblies 
resonated with long-standing Soviet rhetoric. Yet, following a short-lived interlude of 
tolerance, the Soviets, too, went with their ‘stronger instinct […] to mistrust any 
organisation “from below”’.34 So once compliant local administrations and industrial 
managers had been put in place, they moved swiftly to rid themselves of direct democracy 
and worker self-management by submerging the liberation committees and factory 
councils into communist-dominated mass organisations that were frequently no more than 
transmission belts for the regime.35  
 Still more important a role in the demise of post-war grassroots activism is often 
ascribed, particularly in more recent academic work, to the political and trade union 
leaders of the organised Left in Europe. Other than in the political historiography of the 
period, however, this stronger focus on national political actors has not been matched by a 
commensurate diminution of the leverage imputed to the two superpowers. In fact, 
                                                          
32 Tom Behan, The Italian Resistance: Fascists, Guerillas and the Allies, (London/New York: Pluto Press, 
2009); Dick Geary, “Social Protest in the Ruhr, 1945-49”, in: Eleonore Breuning, Jill Lewis & Gareth 
Pritchard (eds.), Power and the People: A Social History of Central European Politics, 1945-56, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 17-28; Philippe Buton, Les lendemains qui 
déchantent: Le Parti communiste français à la Libération, (Paris: Presse de la Fondation Nationale des 
Sciences Politiques, 1993); Geoffrey Warner, ‘Allies, Government and Resistance: The Belgian Political 
Crisis of November 1944’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 28 (1978), pp. 45-60; Eberhard 
Schmidt, Die Verhinderte Neuordnung 1945 bis 1952. Zur Auseinandersetzung um die Demokratisierung der 
Wirtschaft in den westlichen Besatzungszonen und in der Bundesrepublik, (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1970). 
33 Geoff Eley, ‘Legacies of Antifascism: Constructing Democracy in Postwar Europe’, New German 
Critique, 67 (1996), pp. 73-100, 94. 
34 Gareth Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany, 1945-1989, (London/New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 43. 
35 Jeanette Michelmann, Aktivisten der ersten Stunde: Der Antifa in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone, 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 2002); Christoph Kleßmann, ‘Betriebsräte, Gewerkschaften und Arbeiterselbstverwaltung 
in Polen (1944-1958)’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 29 (1981), pp. 185-214.  
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Realpolitik and the coming of the Cold War remain the exclusive tools for explaining 
political behaviour in most of this scholarship.  
This is very much the case for social and socio-political histories of the post-war 
European communist parties, which invariably portray Stalin as the evil genius behind 
dismissive communist attitudes towards the radicalism at their grassroots. Even though 
their rank and file was forcefully represented in the revolutionary liberation committees 
and factory councils, returning communist leaders arrived with clear instructions not to get 
embroiled in any undertakings that might disquiet the Soviet Union’s Western allies.36 
Instead, they were to showcase Stalin’s good faith by cold-shouldering every manifestation 
of popular radicalism, accepting a moderate economic programme, and committing fully to 
the reconstruction effort.37 The concomitant discourses of production ‘battles’ and labour 
discipline put the communists on a collision course with their working-class supporters,38 
who increasingly took matters into their own hands in the wildcat strike movement that 
swept Europe’s industrial centres between 1945 and 1947.39 When Stalin’s relations with 
the West turned sour and the communists were finally allowed to change tack, it was too 
late to heal these wounds as the purported revolutionary moment had by and large passed. 
                                                          
36 Silvio Pons, ‘Stalin and the European Communists after World War Two (1943-1948)’, Past and Present, 
210, Supplement 6 (2011), pp. 121-138. 
37 Alessandro Brogi, Confronting America: The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in 
France and Italy, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Wolfgang Mueller, ‘Soviet Policy, 
Political Parties, and the Preparation for Communist Takeovers in Hungary, Germany, and Austria’, East 
European Politics and Societies, 24/1 (2010), pp. 90-115; Natalia Naumanova, ‘Moscow, the Parti 
Communiste Français, and France’s Political Recovery’, in: Andrew Knapp (ed.), Uncertain Foundation: 
France at Liberation, 1944-47, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 160-183; Martin Mevius, 
Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism, 1941-1953, 
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
38 On the Hungarian communists: Mark Pittaway, The Workers’ State: Industrial Labor and the Making of 
Socialist Hungary, 1944-1958, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), pp. 60-65. On the 
French communists: Darryl Holter, The Battle for Coal: Miners and the Politics of Nationalization in France, 
1940-1950, (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 81-112. 
39 Peter Heumos, ‘State Socialism, Egalitarianism, Collectivism: On the Social Context of Socialist Work 
Movements in Czechoslovak Industrial and Mining Enterprises, 1945-1965’, International Labor and 
Working-Class History, 68 (2005), pp. 47-74; Herrick Chapman, State Capitalism and Working-Class 
Radicalism in the French Aircraft Industry, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
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Some scholars even go so far as identifying communist duplicity with the ‘betrayed 
revolution’ of the first post-war years.40     
This particular historiographical strand is very pervasive. Practically every textbook 
on post-war Europe now opens with a section or chapter on the continent’s initial 
radicalisation and its subsequent pacification at the hands of the Allies and the Left, before 
moving on to the coming of the Cold War. Often on the basis of meticulous grassroots 
research, however, some historians have challenged this new paradigm. Contrary to the 
familiar picture of widespread popular radicalisation, these authors have stressed that the 
overwhelming majority of Europeans emerged from the war exhausted, depoliticised, and 
disinterested in new participatory structures.41 Their research has underlined the deep gulf 
between the hard core of activists within liberation committees and factory councils – so 
often the focal point of social historical studies of post-war Europe – and the population as 
a whole. In his ground-breaking work on German Schwarzenberg – the unoccupied ‘no 
man’s land’ between the American and Soviet Zones where the Antifa’s had free reign for 
a couple of months – Gareth Pritchard has documented the mutual resentments between the 
region’s inhabitants and their new rulers: whereas the anti-fascists loathed the 
unquestioning support for Hitlerism amongst large swathes of the public, the locals often 
viewed the anti-fascists as usurpers who were to blame for the dismal material situation. 
As such ‘social divisions’ between the minority that had actively resisted fascism and the 
majority that had tolerated or even supported it were replicated across the country, it was 
                                                          
40 This theory of a communist-betrayed revolution is particularly strong in the historiography on post-war 
Italy: Guido Quazza, Resistenza e storia d'Italia: problemi e ipotesi di ricerca, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1976); 
Pietro Secchia, La resistenza accusa 1945-1973, (Milano: Mazzotta, 1973). But even while taking an all-
European perspective, Mark Mazower has argued that ‘many former partisans and members of the 
underground were left with the feeling that their cause had been betrayed’: Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: 
Europe’s Twentieth Century, (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1999), p. 211.   
41 Martin Conway, The Sorrows of Belgium: Liberation and Political Reconstruction, 1944-1947, 
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding Poland; Steven Fielding, 
Peter Thompson & Nick Tiratsoo, England Arise! The Labour Party and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). 
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clear that post-war Germany ‘could have either antifascism, or […] democracy, but it 
could not have both’.42  
This focus on existing social relations has become the defining characteristic of 
those social histories that seek to get away from the Cold War explanatory framework. 
Rather than presenting the moment of liberation as some sort of Zero Hour at which the 
world could be remade from below, these studies point both to the continuities with the 
interwar period and to the far-reaching social change wrought by war. Jan T. Gross, for 
example, has suggested that the ‘social consequences’ of the Second World War had paved 
the way for a communist takeover in Eastern Europe well before the Red Army set foot in 
the region. As the predominantly Jewish and/or German urban mercantile bourgeoisie had 
been wiped out by racial extermination and population transfers respectively and the state 
had already been assuming considerable control over the economy through expropriation 
and planning during the German occupation, the new communist-dominated governments 
were certainly operating in fertile ground.43 Building upon Gross’ thesis, other scholars 
have added such dimensions as the failure of the interwar state and the demographic 
transformation wrought by the First World War to the equation44 – all leading to the 
conclusion that ‘no conservative reconstruction was actually possible after the war’.45  
But where all of these historians stop short of claiming that post-war Eastern 
Europe would also have gone communist without Soviet interference, Martin Conway’s 
work on post-war Western Europe has been accredited with demonstrating ‘very 
                                                          
42 Gareth Pritchard, ‘Schwarzenberg 1945: Antifascists and the “Third Way” in German Politics’, European 
History Quarterly, 35/4 (2005), pp. 499-522, 514. Pritchard has recently also published a monograph on 
post-war Schwarzenberg: Gareth Pritchard, Niemandsland: A History of Unoccupied Germany, 1944-1945, 
(Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
43 Jan T. Gross, ‘Social Consequences of War: Preliminaries to the Study of Imposition of Communist 
Regimes in East Central Europe’, East European Politics and Societies, 3/2 (1989), pp. 198-214.  
44 Bradley F. Abrams, ‘The Second World War and the East European Revolution’, East European Politics 
and Societies, 16/3 (2002), pp. 623-664. 
45 This was Mark Mazower’s conclusion during a Balzan Workshop on Europe’s post-war reconstruction. 
See: Jessica Reinisch, ‘Comparing Europe’s Post-War Reconstructions: First Balzan Workshop, Birkbeck 
College, London, 28 October 2005’, History Workshop Journal, 61/1 (2006), pp. 299-304.  
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powerfully how the stability of Western European politics around a Christian Democratic 
model of democracy can be explained without significant reference to the Cold War’.46 
According to Conway, both those historians lamenting the political leaders of the post-war 
Left for failing to act upon the widespread socio-political radicalism and their counterparts 
praising those same leaders for channelling the revolutionary sentiments amongst their 
rank and file work from the mistaken assumption that the working class emerged 
strengthened from the Second World War. After a war of attrition in which industrial cities 
were hit particularly hard and years of repression by regimes (those imposed by the 
German occupiers as well as their authoritarian predecessors in many countries) 
specifically targeting the Left, he argues, the working class was bound to lose out relative 
to other social groups. As power within post-war society resided chiefly with those 
segments producing food or having the means to buy it, an alliance between rural interests 
and the urban middle classes constituted the lasting consequence of the Second World 
War.47   
 
European Socialism 
 
The historiography on the post-war European socialist parties has passed through roughly 
the same stages as more general political and social histories of post-war Europe. Whereas 
earlier literature divulges a strong impression of socialist marginalisation at the hands of 
the superpowers, more recent accounts have underlined the considerable room for 
manoeuvre the parties held in both their national and international dealings. What is 
                                                          
46 Holger Nehring, ‘What was the Cold War?’, The English Historical Review, 127 (2012), pp. 920-949.  
47 Conway has developed this thesis over various articles and books that have now culminated in a 
monograph on post-war Belgium: Martin Conway, The Sorrows of Belgium. See also Martin Conway & 
Peter Romein, The War on Legitimacy in Politics and Culture 1936-1946, (Oxford/New York: Berg, 2008);  
Martin Conway, ‘The Rise and Fall of Western Europe’s Democratic Age, 1945-1973’, Contemporary 
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striking about this particular academic body, however, is just how profoundly even 
contemporary scholarship remains captive to the traditional Cold War conceptual binaries 
of East versus West, pro-communist versus anti-communist, and dictatorship versus 
democracy. It is these strongly normative academic preconceptions of how a socialist party 
is supposed to behave that seem to have stood in the way of a social historical approach to 
post-war European socialism. 
The socialist parties have long been depicted as the losers of the post-war era in 
both halves of the continent. If socialists had good cause to be ‘euphoric’ about their 
prospects at the liberation – Léon Blum’s well-known claim that socialism was ‘the master 
of the hour’ is often quoted in this context48 – they had been driven onto the defensive 
towards the end of the decade. In Western Europe, socialist parties had either become 
junior partners within coalitions dominated by the Christian democrats or were on their 
way out of government altogether. In Eastern Europe things were worse still, as socialist 
parties were browbeaten into mergers with the communists – not to return onto the political 
scene before the collapse of the Iron Curtain. A generation of historians has attributed 
these socialist woes squarely to the Cold War. With the local superpower being ill-deposed 
to socialism in the West and to democracy in the East, they argued, European socialism’s 
destiny was sealed as soon as the Cold War took off in earnest. In Western Europe, the 
Americans were alleged to have favoured the Christian democrats – doing all in their 
power to dilute the unity and leverage of the post-war labour movement both by 
intervening directly to curb its influence and by endeavouring to ‘bribe and cajole’ 
socialists into alliances with the Right.49 In Eastern Europe, meanwhile, the Soviets were 
                                                          
48 Dietrich Orlow, Common Destiny. A Comparative History of the Dutch, French and German Social 
Democratic Parties, 1945-1969, (Oxford/New York: Berghahn Books, 2000). 
49 The quote is from: Geoff Eley, ‘Back to the Beginning: European Labor, U.S. Influence and the Start of 
the Cold War’, International Labor and Working-Class History, 40 (1990), pp. 91-102, 100. Other works 
suggesting strong American meddling in Western European social democracy include: Ronald Filippelli, 
American Labor and Postwar Italy, 1943-1953: A Study in Cold War Politics, (Stanford: Stanford University 
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held to have masterminded and coordinated the entire crusade against socialism – 
prohibiting pre-war socialist leaders from returning to positions of power and having their 
place taken by (crypto-) communist agents who were to gradually undermine socialist 
independence from within.50 This left Europe’s socialists with a choice between being 
side-lined by the superpowers and selling out to them, both detrimental to their influence 
and popularity for years to come.  
As so many of the Cold War commonplaces on post-war Europe, these premises 
have by and large unravelled under closer archival scrutiny. First and foremost, more 
recent and more thoroughly researched histories of the post-war European socialist parties 
portray their relations with the regional superpower as far less of a one-way street. In fact, 
both the Americans and the Soviets were quite accommodating towards the socialists so as 
to keep them on board in the struggle against their real enemies – the rival superpower and 
its (perceived) national agents. As long as they vouched for a minimum of conformity in 
this vital strategic question, then, there was real leeway for the socialist parties to win 
concessions in other spheres.  
Thus, in exchange for their adherence to an electoral bloc that would exclude the 
‘enemies of Poland’s independence’ (i.e. the Polish Peasant Party, on which the Americans 
had pinned their hopes), Stalin granted the Polish socialists that there would be no more 
communist meddling in their inner-party affairs, that they would be able to run their own 
election campaign, and that there would be a more equitable division of ministerial posts in 
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50 Arguably the most influential work on post-war Eastern European social democracy to be published during 
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the next government.51 A similar sacrifice of national communist interests to the greater 
Soviet good was discernible elsewhere. In Hungary, for example, the supreme commander 
of the Red Army seemingly gave the green light for an inner-party palace revolution 
against the pro-communist leadership of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party. While 
anti-communists in national politics, however, its independence-minded orchestrators were 
on message about the need for communist-socialist unity on the international level and 
about the countless vices of ‘American imperialism’.52 It follows that the traditional 
historical picture of post-war Eastern European socialism’s progressive infiltration by 
(crypto-) communists has been turned upside down: after having verged very close on 
communism at the moment of liberation, it is held these days, socialist parties across the 
region adopted increasingly autonomist positions as the years went by.53   
With such misgivings about communism surfacing even in socialist parties where 
the pre-war right wing had largely been sidelined, it should come as little surprise that the 
Western European socialists often needed little American encouragement to embrace anti-
communism. There is now a broad body of literature documenting just how deep the anti-
communism within many Western European socialist parties ran.54 Socialist leaders not 
                                                          
51 Robert Spałek, ‘Między pragmatyzmem a zdradą. Zawłaszczenie PPS w Kraju (1944–1948)’, in: Robert 
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of 1947’, European History Quarterly, 36/3 (2006), pp. 350-370.    
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pragmatyzmem’, p. 205    
54 Tony Insall, Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship, 
1945-1951 (Oslo: Unipub, 2010); Jill Lewis, ‘Worker Protest and the Origins of the Austrian Social 
Partnership, 1945-1951’, in: Eleonore Breuning, Jill Lewis & Gareth Pritchard (eds), Power and the People: 
A Social History of Central European Politics, 1945-56, (Manchester, 2005), pp. 42-56. Vibeke Sørensen, 
Denmark’s Social Democratic Government & the Marshall Plan, 1947-1950, (Copenhagen: Museum 
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only enthusiastically participated in anti-communist campaigns served up by the 
Americans,55 but sometimes even took the lead themselves to shield their parties from 
right-wing attacks of the ‘all roads of socialism lead to Moscow’ type.56 Their admiration 
of New Deal economics and their generally more internationalist outlooks, moreover, 
frequently rendered the socialist parties more receptive to Atlanticism than the nationalist 
Right. Far from being continuously thwarted by the United States, then, many post-war 
Western European socialists figured amongst their ‘favored clients’.57 
But if superpower attitudes towards the European socialist parties were primarily 
inspired by pragmatism, there must have been more to their post-war undoing than the 
coming of the Cold War. For that reason, more recent scholarship has often represented the 
socialists as accessories to their own misfortunes. In an article on the history of the Eastern 
European socialist parties, André Gerrits argues that the ‘image of impotence and 
victimisation’ cultivated in so many accounts published during the Cold War is not so 
much wrong as overly one-sided – leaving out ‘the sometimes paralyzing political 
indecisiveness and divisiveness during the first crucial years of the interbellum, the 
compromising collaboration with the region’s authoritarian regimes in the decade which 
followed, the level of dissension within most parties after the Second World War, and, as a 
result, how much social democratic parties contributed to their own demise’.58 
Historiography on the post-war Western European socialist parties has likewise seen 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Tusculanum Press, 2001); Jim Philips, ‘Labour and the Cold War: The TGWU and the Politics of Anti-
Communism, 1945-1955’, Labour History Review, 64/1 (1999), pp. 44-61. 
55 See, for example, the contributions to: Giles Scott-Smith & Hans Krabbendam (eds.), The Cultural Cold 
War in Western Europe, 1945-1960, (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
56 This was the famous slogan the West German Christian democrats used to scare the electorate off voting 
SPD. A strong example of post-war social democrats taking the lead in anti-communist campaigns is to be 
found in the Netherlands, where the social democrats were amongst the instigators of an attempt to dissolve a 
communist city council and giving all local power to its appointed social democratic mayor. See: Susanne 
Keesman, ‘The Communist Menace in Finsterwolde: Conspiring against Local Authorities? A Case Study on 
the Dutch Battle Against Communism, 1945-1951’, Historical Social Research, 38/1 (2013), pp. 211-231.  
57 Deborah Kisatsky, ‘The United States’, p. 625. 
58 André Gerrits, ‘The Social Democratic Tradition of East Central Europe’, East European Politics and 
Societies, 16/1 (2003), pp. 54-108, 56. 
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increasing attention for the frailties contained in the socialist position both before and after 
the war – including the unresolved spats between revolutionaries and reformists,59 the 
organisational weaknesses vis-à-vis the communists,60 and the failure to break loose from 
the working-class electoral ghetto.61 
Scholarship on the post-war European socialist parties has thus mirrored more 
general histories of the post-war continent in substituting superpower-centric accounts for 
narratives doing more justice to the national traditions that explain party attitudes. Yet, this 
allowance for diverse national experiences has only gone so far, as parties deviating from 
the dominant model of anti-communist, governmental and reformist socialism still tend to 
be dismissed as crypto-communist. This already becomes abundantly clear in 
historiography depicting the post-war international socialist movement, which often 
alludes to an insurmountable gulf between the ‘Marshall socialists’ of the West and the 
‘Molotov socialists’ of the East.62 Despite one contribution arguing that transnational 
socialist relations cannot be reduced to such black-and-white terms,63 the overwhelming 
understanding remains that the Eastern European socialist parties were ‘nothing but front 
organisations of the Communists’,64 who were completely in cahoots with the Soviet 
Union,65 and of whom the Western European socialists had wanted to rid themselves all 
along.66 But even within the two blocs, there are strong tendencies to distinguish between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ socialists. In Western Europe, the Italian Socialist Party has often been 
described as an ‘anomaly’ for refusing to take up anti-communism, having itself ostracised 
                                                          
59 Alexander De Grand, ‘“To Learn Nothing and to Forget Nothing”: Italian Socialism and the Experience of 
Exile Politics’, Contemporary European History, 14/4 (2005), pp. 539-558. 
60 Paolo Mattera, Storia del PSI: 1892-1994, (Rome: Carocci, 2010). 
61 Dietrich Orlow, Common Destiny. 
62 This terminology was originally coined by Rolf Steininger, Deutschland und die Sozialistische 
Internationale nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1979).  
63 Peter Heumos, Europäischer Sozialismus. 
64 Dietrich Orlow, Common Destiny, p. 141. 
65 Guillaume Devin, L’Internationale Socialiste. Histoire et sociologie du socialisme international (1945-
1990), (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993), pp. 19-29.  
66 Sørensen, Denmark’s Social Democratic Government, pp. 53-59.  
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from power along with the communists, and not partaking in the West’s ‘social democratic 
moment’ as a consequence.67 In Eastern Europe, at the same time, the Polish socialists 
have been charged with being ‘compliant’ and ‘conformists’ in relation to their efforts to 
talk the centrist leaders of the Czechoslovakian Social Democratic Party into a united front 
with the communists along ‘the leftist-socialist, revolutionary political line’.68 
What seems to be the implicit assumption here – that revolutionary socialism is 
somehow anathema to the socialist tradition – is also what seems to have underlain the 
dearth of studies taking a grassroots approach to post-war European socialism. Whereas 
the sudden restraint practiced by communist leaders is considered to have caused real 
disillusionment amongst their rank and file,69 socialist reformism is often taken to be so 
self-evident that it should have come as a surprise to no-one.70 Yet, even in existing 
literature there are hints that things might not have been as straightforward during the first 
post-war years. For one thing, the socialist parties seem to have emerged much radicalised 
from the Second World War. Their first post-war party programmes often went further 
than those put forward by the communists, especially on such socio-economic issues as 
nationalisations and land reform.71 What is more, socialists frequently appear to have taken 
a considerably more positive attitude towards worker self-management than their 
                                                          
67 On the anomaly theory, see: Giovanni Sabbatucci, Il riformismo impossibile: Storia del socialismo 
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communist counterparts. In many countries, it were socialist leaders pressing for the 
empowerment of the newly constituted works councils, sometimes even in direct 
opposition to the communists.72 What is lacking, however, is a study systematically 
analysing the relations between rank-and-file workers and party leaders within post-war 
European socialism. This thesis represents an attempt to fill that void in the existing 
literature.    
 
Concepts & Methods 
 
To do so, the thesis draws upon a comparative historical research framework. Its approach 
is situated between the ‘universalising’ and ‘variation-finding’ approaches identified by 
Charles Tilly in his classic four-pronged model of historical comparisons.73 On the one 
hand, it seeks to explain the historical phenomenon of post-war European socialism with 
reference to varieties in national experiences and social structures (variation-finding). On 
the other, it points to similarities between socialist parties sharing such experiences and 
structures, even where they might seem unlikely bed-fellows in view of their diverse geo-
political locations (universalising). The purpose of comparisons in this context is to 
perform what Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt have described as ‘de-
familiaris[ing] the familiar’. ‘When examined in the light of observable alternatives’, they 
argue, ‘a specific development can lose the “matter of course” appearance it may have 
possessed before’.74 By looking for such alternatives across the Iron Curtain that certainly 
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still exists in the academic body on post-war European socialism, the thesis endeavours to 
de-familiarise the East-West matter of courses dominating its historiography and to 
revaluate party histories that have been misinterpreted or misconstrued to fit this box. 
 Thus working from the assumption that there was a pan-European playing field 
during the first months and years after liberation, the thesis borrows conceptual tools from 
current research on post-war reconstruction. In his summary of the contributions to the 
recent Balzan Project on the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, Mark 
Mazower suggests that the Cold War dichotomy between the two halves of the continent 
might in fact have ‘obscured the variety of national experiences in Europe immediately 
after the war’ and questions the extent to which ‘either “West” or “East” Europe existed 
before the Cold War helped reify them and fill them with meaning’. The topic of post-war 
reconstruction, as ‘a common set of responses to a common set of challenges’ across the 
two purported blocs, provides a way out of this polarity.75 Reconstruction should be 
understood broadly here to include various processes of rebuilding that were felt all over 
the continent. In an earlier article, Mazower has identified commonalities between East and 
West both in socio-economic – the wave of industrial unrest caused by austerity-driven 
reconstruction programmes – and political – the broad-based coalition governments that 
took power upon liberation gradually giving way to more exclusive constellations – 
developments.76 On a more general level, Naimark has argued that ‘[s]trike movements, 
electoral struggles, street clashes, and the initiatives of political parties, personalities, and 
diplomats, both in the East and the West, have to be figured into the calculus of post-war 
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European developments’.77 Both at the grassroots and in government, socialists were often 
right at the heart of these developments.     
 The thesis explores the role socialist parties played in the post-war reconstruction of 
Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, and Poland on the basis of the hermeneutic interpretation of 
archival as well as published sources. The research for the thesis was conducted at two 
levels: local and national. To reconstruct the views taken by rank-and-file (socialist) 
workers, grassroots archival and library research was conducted in one industrial 
city/region for each of the four countries: Lille for France, Łódź for Poland, Milano for 
Italy, and Plzeň for Czechoslovakia. The criteria for selecting these particular cities were 
two-fold. Firstly, each of these four cities had been major socialist strongholds before the 
war and by and large remained so in the face of far stronger communist competition 
following the liberation.78 Secondly, these cities each found themselves at the centre of 
regions with long traditions of industrial unrest, which certainly continued into the post-
war years.79     
                                                          
77 Norman Naimark, ‘Stalin and Europe’, p. 55. 
78 In post-war Lille (and the North of France more generally) and Milano, the socialist vote vis-à-vis the 
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socialists (34.1%) finishing well ahead of the communists (23.5%) in Milano in the June 1946 parliamentary 
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137, 124-125.           
79 The coal mining region in the North of France had been a hotbed of strike activity right from the celebrated 
miners’ strike in Anzin of 1884 (which had ushered in the legalisation of trade unions) and remained one of 
the foremost centres of the strike waves that swept post-war France. Milano, for its part, had been at the 
forefront of the factory occupations and strikes after the First World War (during the so-called biennio rosso 
of 1919-20)  and was the scene of many (mostly spontaneous) agitations and strikes in the first post-war 
years. Łódź was home to an entrenched labour community that made it into the most strike-prone city in 
post-war Poland. And the Plzeň working class, above all the workforce at the Škoda Works, retained its 
interwar syndicalist traditions to become one of the main strike centres in post-war Czechoslovakia. On post-
war industrial unrest in the four countries/regions, see, e.g.: Robert Mencherini, Guerre froide, grèves rouges: 
Parti communiste, stalinisme et luttes sociales en France: Les grèves "insurrectionnelles" de 1947-1948, 
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 During this local research, a wide variety of materials, pertaining both to 
local/regional socialist parties and the local working class more broadly, was consulted. 
Things were most straightforward in Łódź, where the local party archives were preserved 
and broad use could be made of the protocols of PPS factory circles. As for Lille, the 
archives of the SFIO’s Northern Federation have likewise survived, but these were 
unavailable for the duration of the project on account of re-inventarisation. For that reason, 
the thesis relies on the detailed reports of local SFIO meetings in the industrial Nord-Pas-
de-Calais region, produced by police and prefecture observers and informers, which have 
been preserved in the provincial archives of France’s Northern Department. In Milano and 
Plzeň, on the other hand, no archives of the local party branches remained. In the Milanese 
case, this was made up for by a study of both the PSIUP weekly in Sesto San Giovanni (the 
industrial district on the outskirts of Milano) and the correspondence between the Milano 
province Chamber of Labour (the most important provincial trade union organisation) and 
the internal commissions (company-based trade union bodies) at various Milanese 
factories. With regard to Plzeň, an even more extensive assortment of sources was drawn 
upon, including the protocols of its post-war revolutionary city council, materials on the 
factory council at the Škoda Works, documents on the post-war Plzeň ČSSD in the local 
communist archives, and issues of the provincial ČSSD newspaper. Where possible, the 
findings on the local level were supplemented by relevant materials (e.g. the 
correspondence between local party branches and the national party leadership) found 
during the research on the national level.     
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 The prime aim of the national research, however, was to determine the attitudes 
socialist leaders took towards socio-economic and political reconstruction. To that end, 
research was conducted both in (national) party archives and in the private archives of 
various post-war socialist leaders. Party archives were drawn upon to examine the reports 
of party leadership meetings, the protocols of party conferences and/or congresses, and 
party programmes. The private papers of party leaders – amongst them Zdeněk Fierlinger 
and Bohumil Laušman (ČSSD), Daniel Mayer (SFIO), Lelio Basso and Pietro Nenni 
(PSIUP), and Stanisław Szwalbe and Henryk Wachowicz (PPS) – were studied for the 
articles, speeches, and tracts they produced, for their personal correspondence, and for 
materials relating to their period at the top of the party. Special attention, finally, was given 
to party publications, both to (national) party newspapers and to theoretical party journals, 
as these were frequently a treasure trove for intra-party discussions on socio-economic and 
political reconstruction. 
         
Chapter Structure 
 
The thesis consists of two parts: one on socio-economic and one on political 
reconstruction. Each part comprises three chapters and is followed by a short Part 
Conclusion. In order to provide the most essential background information about the four 
parties and countries, which, after all, represent a highly unusual combination of cases, 
these six analytical chapters are preceded by an introductory context chapter (Chapter 1). 
This chapter first outlines the foremost post-war socio-political developments in the four 
countries, with special reference to the role played by their socialist parties. It then moves 
on to briefly address the pre-war histories of the four parties, from their inception in the 
late nineteenth century to their temporary demise in the face of fascism. 
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 Chapter 2 deals with socio-economic reconstruction from a bottom-up perspective. 
It analyses the sentiments amongst rank-and-file (socialist) workers in and around post-war 
Lille, Łódź, Milano, and Plzeň. In doing so, it identifies three worker grievances that were 
shared right across the four cities: a deep-seated discontent over the insufficient supply of 
everyday essentials, a stark outrage over the countless abuses of the black market, and a 
widespread bewilderment about the remaining socio-economic inequities under 
governments in which their leaders participated.    
 Chapter 3 introduces the views taken by provincial and national party leaders. It 
explores the arguments that went behind their calls for workers to muster industrial 
discipline, to make sacrifices towards the reconstruction effort, and to participate in the 
‘battle for production’. In doing so, it lays bare a profound divide between socialist elites 
and their grassroots over the nature of socialism.  
 Chapter 4 moves from the material to the moral aspects of socio-economic 
reconstruction. It sets out how, for party leaders, worker unruliness was part of a larger 
‘moral crisis’ afflicting post-war society. If socialist leaders in each of the four countries 
agreed that the experience of dictatorship, occupation, and war had generated this crisis, 
however, the chapter highlights that it was in their distinct appraisals of the depth of 
societal ‘demoralisation’ that the four parties began to diverge. 
 Chapter 5 outlines the experiences and perceptions that informed socialist attitudes 
towards political reconstruction. It explains how very different sets of historical 
vicissitudes shaped the four parties’ views about political and social alliances. It 
subsequently illustrates how these views lay at the root of their opposite conceptions of 
democracy: with the Czechoslovakian social democrats and French socialists embracing 
‘bourgeois’ democracy and the Italian and Polish socialists advocating a ‘new’ or ‘popular’ 
democracy.    
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 Chapter 6 delves deeper into socialist perspectives on the three principal institutions 
of bourgeois democracy – elections, parliaments, and constitutions. In doing so, it exposes 
a deep rift between the two sets of parties: whereas the Czechoslovakian social democrats 
and French socialists saw elections, parliaments, and constitutions as sacred principles of 
democratic politics, the rulebook of bourgeois democracy was designed to perpetuate 
bourgeois domination for the Italian and Polish socialists. 
 Chapter 7 elaborates further on what was, for the Italian and Polish socialists at 
least, the defining characteristic of popular democracy – direct grassroots participation in 
political and economic decision-making. It demonstrates how the question of popular 
participation in public life, through such grassroots bodies as liberation committees and 
factory councils, constituted another bone of contention between the four parties: whereas 
the Italian and Polish socialists viewed popular participation in grassroots bodies as a 
crucial stepping stone towards democratising society, the Czechoslovakian social 
democrats and French socialists often dismissed grassroots participatory bodies as 
unrepresentative and wholly self-serving. 
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Chapter 1: The National Road to Socialism 
 
In early post-war Europe, talk of ‘national roads to socialism’ was rife. The conception that 
the road towards socialism, far from being the same always and everywhere, had to respect 
national traditions and histories was communist in origins. In their efforts to dis-associate 
themselves and their parties from the feared Soviet model, communist leaders across 
Europe professed their willingness to work within national political systems and with non-
communist national actors. For all of the academic debate as to whether this outreach was 
genuine,1 we must not lose sight of the fact that the notion of a ‘national road to socialism’ 
was not limited to communism. Indeed, a wide variety of left-leaning individuals took up 
the premise of a road to socialism that would not repeat the bloody excesses of the Soviet 
experience.2  This was certainly true for many socialists, who eagerly embraced the idea of 
a socialism taking its inspiration from national experiences, traditions, and circumstances 
rather than universal schemes.3  
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Zentral- und Osteuropas in Prag vom 7.-9. Dezember 1946’ in: Peter Heumos (ed.), Die Konferenzen der 
sozialistischen Parteien Zentral- und Osteuropas in Prag und Budapest 1946 und 1947, (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner, 1985), p. 71. Similar sentiments were expressed by leading Western European socialists. See e.g. 
Lelio Basso, ‘La via italiana del socialismo’, Avanti!, 26 November 1947.  
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=fc1fe3ea2c5115d51c21338b2360bb67 (last consulted: 22 
March 2015).   
33 
 
 This chapter provides the necessary context for the six analytical chapters by 
exploring the various national circumstances in which socialists and social democrats in 
post-war Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, and Poland operated. In the first place, it addresses 
post-war political developments within the four countries and the four parties. Starting 
from the formation of the post-war coalition governments, it identifies the key issues, 
debates, and turning points for each of the four countries and elaborates on the socialist 
attitudes towards these. Subsequently, the chapter places these attitudes in a broader 
context by briefly delving into the pre-war histories of the four countries and parties. From 
the nineteenth-century political and socio-economic climate in which the four parties came 
into being right to the moment of their countries’ liberation, it reconstructs the experiences 
and traditions that shaped the socialists’ responses to their post-war challenges. For it is 
only from the perspective of their pre-war vicissitudes that we can begin to make sense of 
what drove the four parties in opposite directions after the Second World War.                   
 
The Rise and Fall of the Post-War Coalition 
 
The mainstay of the national road to socialism was a broad-church governmental coalition, 
consisting of all anti-fascist parties. The shared experience of wartime resistance as well as 
the national unity required for the reconstruction effort, the rhetoric of the day went, 
warranted the broadest possible political cooperation. The coalitions that rose to power 
upon liberation in each of the four countries and by and large remained in place until 1947, 
accordingly, brought together communists and socialists with a wide variety of (usually 
three or four) centrist, liberal, peasant, and Catholic and Christian democratic parties. 
Finding compromise amongst such a diverse group of parties was always going to be a 
challenge, however, and so it proved. In the face of ever-increasing tensions between the 
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communists on the one side and the centre-right on the other, the socialists often found 
themselves right in the middle holding the balance of power. 
 
The Provisional Governments 
 
With the communists still moderate in their political behaviour in the immediate aftermath 
of the liberation, though, the fault lines were initially rather different. In fact, it was 
frequently the socialist parties who were on the extreme left of the provisional 
governments that were installed in the wake of liberation. Especially in the two Western 
European cases, the socialists consistently found themselves outvoted and (near-) isolated 
in their demands for a more radical economic and/or political settlement. 
This was very much the case in post-liberation Italy. After the September 1943 
armistice between the Anglo-American Allies and the Italian Kingdom, a military 
government was formed under Mussolini’s former Chief of Staff Pietro Badoglio. The new 
government, consisting exclusively of erstwhile fascists and accountable to a monarch who 
had supported fascism all along, quickly ran into conflict with the political-military 
umbrella organisation of the Italian resistance – the National Liberation Committee (CLN). 
The six parties represented in the CLN – the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Italian 
Socialist Party (PSIUP), the Action Party (PdA), the Christian Democratic Party (DC), the 
Democratic Labour Party (PDL), and the Italian Liberal Party (PLI) – initially rejected any 
cooperation with Badoglio and the King.4  
All of this changed, however, when communist leader Palmiro Togliatti, upon his 
return to Italy in April 1944, announced that the PCI would be setting aside its objections 
to the monarchy for the duration of the war and seek to join the Badoglio government. This 
                                                          
4 Silvio Pons, ‘Stalin and the Italian Communists’, in: Melvyn P. Leffler & David S. Painter (eds.), Origins of 
the Cold War: An International History, (New York/London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 205-220, 207.   
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announcement came as a ‘cold shower’ to the socialists, who, in spite of a unity of action 
pact with the communists, had not been informed of the pending volte-face beforehand.5 
Yet, the PSIUP grudgingly followed the PCI into government and, for a brief period, it 
appeared that things were moving the resistance’s direction.  
Upon the liberation of Rome in June 1944, Badoglio was replaced by Ivanoe 
Bonomi (PDL), the president of the CLN, as a new government including all of the six 
CLN parties took office. As it turned out, though, the liberal Bonomi was opposed to any 
socio-economic radicalism and set about to restore the unreformed and unpurged fascist 
bureaucratic apparatus.6 Exasperated by the near-complete lack of administrative purges 
and the police’s heavy-handed crackdown on peasant land occupations in the Southern 
Italian countryside, the PSIUP provoked a governmental crisis. In late November 1944, the 
CLN passed a socialist motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister. But Bonomi refused 
to even meet with the CLN and instead tendered his resignation to the King. Outraged by 
this snubbing of the resistance, the PSIUP refused to join any government that would not 
explicitly recognise the institutional role of the CLN.7 Once again, however, the 
communists left their official partners in the cold and joined the second Bonomi 
government alongside the three moderate parties (the DC, the PDL, and the PLI).     
The liberation of Northern Italy in the spring of 1945 offered the PSIUP fresh 
hopes. In the aftermath of the partisan insurrections in several of the North’s large cities, 
demands for far-reaching socio-economic reforms and a thorough purge returned with a 
vengeance. This more radical ‘wind from the North’8 made Bonomi’s position untenable 
                                                          
5 Mattera, Storia del PSI: 1892-1994, pp. 126-127.   
6 Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988, (London/New York: 
Penguin Books, 1990), p. 53.   
7 For a more detailed account of the socialist demeanour during the crisis of the first Bonomi government, 
see: Simone Neri Serneri, Resistenza e democrazia dei partiti: I socialisti nell’Italia del 1943-1945, 
(Manduria/Bari/Rome: Piero Lacaita, 1995), pp. 440-447. 
8 It was with reference to this vento del Nord that PSIUP leader Pietro Nenni initially demanded the position 
of Prime Minister for the socialists: Francesco Malgeri, La stagione del centrismo: politica e società 
nell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra (1945-1960), (Soveria Manelli: Rubbettino, 2002), p. 14.    
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and, in June, a six-party ‘government of the resistance’ under former partisan commander 
Ferrucio Parri (PdA) came into being. Yet, the programme that Parri drew up – which 
included ‘a serious purge’ and such ‘socialist-influenced economic proposals’ as wealth 
redistribution and currency reform – found little favour with the Allies and the Italian 
liberals.9 By November, the PLI withdrew from the government. The socialists still tried to 
save Parri by suggesting that the liberal ministers would be replaced in a new five-party 
government. But as the DC and the PDL rejected this outright and the PCI remained non-
committal, Parri resigned.10  
The demise of Parri spelt the end of the more radical aspirations of the liberation. 
Under the new six-party government led by Alcide De Gasperi (DC), in which the liberals 
‘obtained a stranglehold over economic policy’11 and which saw the anti-fascist purge 
result in ‘a disastrous failure’,12 the PSIUP adopted a strictly defensive stance. Placing all 
its hopes on the elections to the Constituent Assembly, which, after painstaking 
governmental negotiations, had finally been scheduled for June 1946, the party primarily 
sought to avoid further political crises.  
In France, by comparison, the interlude between the liberation and the first post-war 
elections was much shorter, but it was a similarly frustrating period for the French 
socialists. In the wake of the August 1944 liberation of Paris, General Charles De Gaulle 
formed a government of ‘national unanimity’. It brought together anti-fascist politicians 
and parties from right across the political spectrum – with the French Communist Party 
(PCF) and the French Socialist Party (SFIO) on the left, the newly-founded (Catholic) 
                                                          
9 Spencer Di Scala, Renewing Italian Socialism: Nenni to Craxi, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1988), p. 
29.  
10 A succinct summary of the collapse of the Parri government can be found in: Gabriella Fanello Marcucci, 
Il primo governo De Gasperi (Dicembre 1945 - Giugno 1946): Sei mesi decisivi per la democrazia in Italia, 
(Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004), pp. 24-32.     
11 Di Scala, Renewing Italian Socialism,  p. 29.   
12 Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, p. 92.  
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Popular Republican Movement (MRP) and the Radical Party (PRS) in the centre, and a 
series of mostly non-party liberals and moderates on the right.  
Much like their Italian counterparts, the French socialists were frequently ill at ease 
with the countless compromises that ‘national unanimity’ entailed. As early as January 
1945, the SFIO leadership observed ‘a malaise within the country and the government’, 
reflected in an insufficient purge, the absence of a governmental programme, sluggish 
nationalisations, disagreements over the financial politics, the continuation of state 
subsidies for faith schools, and the ‘anti-constitutional’ practices of De Gaulle.13 During 
the first months of 1945, though, the socialists lacked both the authority and the allies to 
press their views on these questions. 
This was especially true for socio-economic questions. A commitment towards 
nationalisations was part of the ‘action programme’ of the umbrella organisation of the 
French resistance – the National Council of the Resistance (CNR) – which had been 
underwritten by all the main parties and by General De Gaulle in March 1944.14 Yet, the 
socialists quickly found the nationalisation drive – after the initial wave of ‘punitive’ 
expropriations of collaborationist owners in the immediate aftermath of liberation – 
wanting. The chief culprit, in the SFIO’s view, was De Gaulle, who wanted to postpone 
any further nationalisations until after elections had been held. But in reality, as Augustin 
Laurent pointed out, the socialists were ‘isolated’, as both the PCF and the MRP supported 
the General.15 The SFIO was likewise on the losing side of the debate on economic 
planning. The socialists supported Pierre Mendès France – the Radical Minister of the 
National Economy – in his proposals for a state-directed economy with strong wage and 
                                                          
13 Martine Pradoux & Gilles Morin, ‘Daniel Mayer et la SFIO, 1944-1958’, Matériaux pour l’histoire de 
notre temps, 51/52 (1998), pp. 24-32, 26. 
14 The programme has been published in: Claire Andrieu, Le programme commun de la Résistance: Des 
idées dans la guerre, (Paris: Éditions de l’Érudit, 1984), pp. 168-175.     
15 ‘Comité Directeur’ [26 February 1945], Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste, Paris [hereafter 
OURS], ‘Procès-verbaux des réunions du Comité Directeur du congrès de Paris, 9-12 novembre 1944 au 37e 
congrès national, 11-15 aout 1945’, p. 83. 
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price control.16 It was the laissez-faire policies advocated by liberal Finance Minister René 
Pleven, however, that won the ‘all-important backing’ of both General De Gaulle and the 
communists17 – effectively putting on hold socialist aspirations of indicative planning at 
least until the October 1945 elections. 
If the essential dynamics were very much the same in the two Eastern European 
cases, the major issues facing their socialists were of a different nature. The post-liberation 
socialists in Czechoslovakia and Poland, like their counterparts in France and Italy, were 
frequently on the far left of the post-war coalition governments – their demands for 
nationalisations and land reform going much further than those of the communists.18 With 
large-scale industrial and rural expropriations swiftly implemented in their countries, such 
socio-economic issues were far less contentious for the Czechoslovakian social democrats 
and the Polish socialists. Their struggle, in the immediate aftermath of liberation, was 
above all one for legitimacy. 
The Czechoslovakian Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) suffered heavy losses 
during the war years.19 The party that took office in the provisional Czechoslovakian 
government – alongside the Czechoslovakian Communist Party (KSČ), the Czech National 
Socialist Party (ČSNS), the (Catholic) Czech People’s Party (ČSL), and the Slovak 
Democratic Party (DS) – was in many ways unrecognisable compared to the interwar 
ČSSD. Its incoming chairman and the provisional government’s Prime Minister, Zdeněk 
Fierlinger, had never even held a position within the party. As the former Czechoslovakian 
                                                          
16 On Mendès France’s plans: Philip Nord, France’s New Deal: From the Thirties to the Post-War Era, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p 103. 
17 Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic 1944-1958, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 
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ambassador to the Soviet Union, however, he did command the trust both of the 
communists and of President Edvard Beneš (ČSNS).20  
In fact, the communists had shown a strong preference for representatives of the 
ČSSD’s pre-war left wing during crucial wartime talks in Moscow, propelling such 
relatively unknown social democrats as Bohumil Laušman and Evzěn Erban – the new 
Minister of Industry and the Secretary General of the united trade union movement 
respectively – to positions of real power.21 If the new ČSSD leadership was initially very 
close to the communists, though, it was not necessarily out of touch with the party 
grassroots. The October 1945 ČSSD congress confirmed several pro-communists in 
leading positions and the principle of cooperation with the communists was shared right 
across the party.22     
The post-liberation leadership of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) experienced far 
greater difficulties in establishing its legitimacy. These difficulties had their origins in the 
dispute over the rightful Polish government. In February 1943, the Kremlin had severed 
diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London exile over the controversy 
surrounding the Soviet massacre of Polish officers in the Katyń forests.23 Moscow then 
proceeded quickly to set up what was effectively a rival government in exile – the heavily 
communist-dominated Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN). The PKWN 
formed the provisional Polish government that took office in Soviet-liberated Lublin in 
August 1944. The Lublin government was notionally a coalition – of the newly-founded 
                                                          
20 There is much debate as to whether Fierlinger, who was instrumental bringing about the June 1948 merger 
of the ČSSD and the KSČ, was a communist double agent all along. The who’s who of twentieth-century 
Czechoslovakian history even claims that he had been collaborating with the NKVD – the Soviet Union’s 
secret service – since the mid-1930s: Milan Churaň, Kdo byl kdo v našich dějinách ve 20. století, (Prague: 
Libri, 1994), p. 111.   
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(communist) Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) as well as three left-wing and centre-left parties 
with roots in interwar Poland: the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the Democratic Party (SD), 
and the People’s Party (SL). In reality, though, the leaders of the three non-communist 
parties had often been hand-picked by the PPR and were completely subservient to the 
communists and the Soviet Union.       
This was certainly true for the Lublin PPS. Its leader – Edward Osóbka-Morawski – 
had been part of a left-wing splinter group of the mainstream PPS underground 
organisation Freedom, Equality, Independence (WRN). He was amongst the very few 
Polish resisters who were willing to work with the communists in the first place. In May 
1944, as part of a communist-socialist delegation, he made his way to the territories 
liberated by the Red Army. Visiting Moscow that same month, he joined forces with pro-
communist Polish socialists who had spent the war in the Soviet Union and was promptly 
appointed as Prime Minister of the PKWN by Stalin.24 Dominated by fellow-travellers 
who had been on the radical left of interwar socialism, then, the Lublin PPS initially bore 
little resemblance to the pre-war PPS. Small wonder, its legitimacy was fiercely contested 
by both the London PPS and the WRN, which denounced the Lublin PPS leadership as 
usurpers of the Polish socialist tradition and branded the party the ‘false’ or 
‘concessionary’ PPS.25  
Towards the end of 1944, though, things began looking up both for the Lublin PPS 
and for the Lublin government. In November, Stanisław Mikołajczyk – the Prime Minister 
of the London government – resigned his post in frustration over his fellow ministers’ 
reluctance to compromise with the Lublin government and the Soviet Union. Several 
London socialists followed in his footsteps and together they entered into negotiations with 
the Lublin parties. In June 1945, these negotiations led to the creation of a new government 
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– the Provisional Government of National Unity – in which Mikołajczyk became Deputy 
Prime Minister, leading London socialist Jan Stańczyk became Minister of Labour, and 
two further interwar political heavyweights took up ministerial roles. Even if the 
communists and their partners very much remained in control, the new government was 
sufficiently representative for the Western Allies to recognise it as the legitimate 
government of Poland – effectively ending any hopes the London government might still 
have enjoyed of returning to Poland.          
The legitimacy of the Lublin PPS, meanwhile, was strengthened considerably by 
the inclusion of former Londoners. What is more, the WRN dissolved itself in February 
1945.26 Much of the WRN’s rank and file seems to have subsequently decided to join the 
Lublin PPS, which saw its membership rise spectacularly in the first half of 1945. 
Whatever the origins of the membership surge, it was certainly accompanied by a more 
independence-minded mood within the Lublin PPS.27 This became very clear at the party’s 
July-August 1945 congress, where the party leadership failed in its attempt to push through 
a new party programme and former WRN member Josef Cyrankiewicz replaced former 
Muscovite Stefan Matuszewski as the party’s Secretary General.28 Unlike the two other 
non-communist parties that had been part of the PKWN, then, the Lublin PPS managed to 
wrest itself from complete dependency upon the communists. Together with the PPR and 
Mikołajczyk’s new Polish Peasant Party (PSL), it was to become one of the three key 
forces in post-war Polish politics.    
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First Electoral Tests 
 
The provisional period came to an end with the first post-war parliamentary elections. 
Compared to the last pre-war elections, these elections witnessed a strong left-wing surge 
in each of the four countries. For socialist parties, though, the results were mixed. To be 
sure, with right-wing parties, liberal parties especially, suffering heavy losses, the socialists 
were now able to govern without those liberals who had often been their strongest 
adversaries in the provisional governments. At the same time, however, it was the 
communists rather than the socialists who turned out to be the main beneficiaries of the 
post-war swing to the Left. Gradually abandoning their post-liberation moderation, 
moreover, the communist parties began urging socialists to unite with them against the 
Right – forcing the four parties to show their hands for the first time.  
 Almost three years after Allied troops first set feet on Italian soil, national elections 
were finally organised. In certain respects, these elections, which took place on 2 June 
1946, were a success story for the Italian socialists. The PSIUP became the largest force on 
the Left in the freshly-elected Constituent Assembly, winning 20.7% of the popular vote 
and 115 seats to the PCI’s 18.9% and 104 seats. The socialists were likewise on the 
victorious side of the institutional referendum, held on the same day as the parliamentary 
elections, in which more than 54% of the electorate voted to replace the monarchy with a 
republic. At the same time, however, the elections were a major defeat for the Italian Left. 
The combined Left – even if we include such centre-left parties as the Action Party and the 
Italian Republican Party (PRI) – fell well short of a parliamentary majority. Both the 
PSIUP and the PCI, moreover, were dwarfed by the Christian democrats – the DC winning 
35.2% of the vote and 207 seats.  
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 In the new De Gasperi government that was formed in the aftermath of the elections 
– a four-party coalition of the PCI, the PSIUP, the DC, and the PRI – the Christian 
democrats thus remained very much in charge. The PSIUP’s new Minister of Industry – 
Rodolfo Morandi – experienced this first-hand. By contemporary European standards, his 
proposals were far from radical. Widespread nationalisation programmes, by that time 
well-underway in a string of countries in East and West, were not on the table in post-war 
Italy to begin with. Yet, even Morandi’s moderate agenda – which included the legal 
recognition of factory councils and a modicum of state intervention in industrial financing 
and planning – was consistently voted down by the centre-right parliamentary majority. 
The ‘fourteen points’ – a series of planning measures and economic controls to combat 
rampant inflation and speculation, which Morandi presented to the Council of Ministers in 
March 1947 – did not even make it that far.29 ‘[W]ithin fifteen days’, Morandi lamented to 
the PSIUP Directorate, De Gasperi had created a situation in which the fourteen points ‘no 
longer have value’.30   
 In these circumstances, just as many other Western European socialist parties were 
moving away from the communists, the PSIUP decided to renew its Unity of Action Pact 
with the PCI in October 1946.31 According to the PSIUP’s foremost post-war leader, Pietro 
Nenni, the pact was to re-affirm left unity in the face of the DC.32 But for the right wing of 
the party, led by Giuseppe Saragat, the alliance with the ‘totalitarian’ PCI would 
necessarily result in the PSIUP’s progressive subjugation to and eventual liquidation by the 
communists. Matters came to a head after the PCI made substantial gains at the PSIUP’s 
expense in November 1946 local elections. In a newspaper interview that had the effect of 
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an ‘atomic bomb’, Saragat denounced the party leadership for harbouring secret desires to 
merge with the PCI.33 To settle the debate once and for all, an extraordinary PSIUP 
congress was called to Rome’s Città Universitaria in January 1947. When, at that 
congress, the motion put forward by Nenni and Lelio Basso, Saragat’s main adversary in 
the PSIUP leadership, won the backing of 65% of the delegates, Saragat and his supporters 
left for the nearby Palazzo Barberini. There, they founded the Italian Socialist Workers’ 
Party (PSLI), which, over the next couple of months, was to wean from the PSIUP fifty-
two of its parliamentarians.34 
 The first parliamentary elections in post-war France also saw the three large 
currents of communism, socialism, and Christian democracy take approximately three-
quarters of the popular vote. Unlike in Italy, however, there was almost nothing between 
the three parties in the October 1945 elections to the Constituent Assembly: the PCF 
emerged as the largest party with 26.1% of the vote, the MRP followed in second place 
with 25.6%, and the SFIO came third with 24.6%. If the elections returned communists and 
socialists with an overall majority, nothing much seemed to change initially as the 
Assembly re-elected General De Gaulle as Prime Minister. Yet, De Gaulle quickly became 
embroiled in a bitter struggle with the parties dominating the Assembly. At stake was the 
nature of the new constitution. De Gaulle, viewing strong parliaments as arenas of 
crippling indecision and petty party squabbles, favoured a presidential system with large 
powers for the executive. The three main parties, conversely, by and large wanted to retain 
the parliamentary system of the pre-war Third French Republic.35 After the parliamentary 
groups of the PCF and the SFIO had united to demand a 20% reduction of the military 
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budget, De Gaulle, complaining that ‘the exclusive regime of the parties’ had reappeared, 
resigned in January 1946.36 
 A new tripartite government of the PCF, the SFIO, and the MRP was then formed 
by the socialist Felix Gouin. During its six-month tenure, the new government 
implemented many of the socialist-supported socio-economic policies that the provisional 
government had rejected: the gas, electricity, and (most of the) insurance sectors were 
nationalised, whilst the SFIO’s André Philip set about to realise a state-directed economy 
as the new Minister of the National Economy and Finance. The three parties could not 
agree on the new constitution, however. The PCF and the SFIO, mindful of how the upper 
house had obstructed left-wing governments before the war, were proponents of a 
unicameral system in which all power lay with the directly elected Assembly and the 
President would take a largely ceremonial role. The MRP, on the other hand, called for the 
powers of the Assembly to be counterbalanced by an indirectly elected upper house and for 
the President to be given real powers. By virtue of their parliamentary majority, 
communists and socialists managed to put their version of the constitution before the 
country in the May 1946 constitutional referendum. But the MRP fought a successful anti-
communist campaign for a no-vote, leading the constitutional project to be defeated by 
10.5 million to 9.4 million votes.37             
In the elections to a fresh Constituent Assembly that followed in June, the MRP 
(28.2%) gained, whereas the PCF (25.9%) and the SFIO (21.1%) lost ground. A new 
tripartite government – led this time by Georges Bidault (MRP) – was to arrive at a 
compromise over the constitution. This revised constitutional project, which provided for a 
weak upper house and a President with some powers, was adopted by 9.0 million to 7.8 
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million votes (on a turnout of just 68%) in October 1946.38 On the basis of the new 
constitution, elections to the National Assembly were held in November. In these elections, 
the last parliamentary elections for five years, the PCF (28.3%) obtained its best ever 
result, overtaking the MRP (26.0%) and leaving the SFIO (17.9%) well behind.   
 By that time, the SFIO’s steady electoral slide had already resulted in the demise of 
its post-liberation Secretary General Daniel Mayer. A close ally of the SFIO’s pre-war 
leader Léon Blum, Mayer had sought to broaden the party’s appeal by reaching out to 
Christians and the lower middle classes.39 But in a party strongly attached to its proletarian 
character and fiercely anti-clerical in its outlook such designs met with much suspicion. 
The lack of electoral success sealed Mayer’s fate. At the August 1946 SFIO congress, Guy 
Mollet, whose successful pitch for the party leadership revolved around a re-affirmation of 
the party’s traditional revolutionary rhetoric and a renunciation of anything suggesting that 
the SFIO had become ‘a party of the system’, replaced him as Secretary General. If Mayer 
had warned that a victory for Mollet would amount to a major success for the 
communists,40 the reality was that his election did not essentially change the party’s 
course.41 Much like Mayer, Mollet was quick to turn down communist overtures for PCF-
SFIO unity of action. And when the new party leadership tried to whip its parliamentary 
group into supporting the PCF candidate for the Prime Ministry after the November 1946 
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elections, ‘the fierceness of the reactions’ was such that the leadership decided to retreat 
and give its parliamentarians a free vote.42 
 In Czechoslovakia, the electoral divide between communists and social democrats 
was even more pronounced. In the May 1946 parliamentary elections, the KSČ came out as 
the largest party by far with 38.0% of the popular vote, whilst the ČSSD finished last out 
of the five parties that had been part of the provisional government with a mere 12.3%.  
Abysmal as the ČSSD’s result may have been, however, the parliamentary elections did 
see the social democrats emerge as kingmakers in Czechoslovakian politics. With its 
thirty-seven parliamentary deputies, after all, the ČSSD was in a position to provide both 
the communists and the three centre-right parties with a majority. In the new government 
under KSČ leader Klement Gottwald, which was made up of the same five parties that had 
formed the provisional government, the ČSSD leadership set about to make the most of its 
role as ‘balance-tipper’.43 
 The party, accordingly, abandoned its post-liberation politics of extremely close, 
almost unquestioned cooperation with the communists. After the elections, this more 
autonomous line vis-à-vis the KSČ won the support of a clear majority in the ČSSD 
leadership. In fact, only the ‘left-wing group’ of now Deputy Prime Minister Zdeněk 
Fierlinger still favoured the old formula of ‘no struggle on the Left’.44 But both the 
‘centrists’ around returning Minister of Industry Bohumil Laušman and the ‘right wing’ led 
by Minister of Food Václav Majer called for the ČSSD to more emphatically underline its 
independent character.45 That did not mean, however, that the party turned its back on the 
communists altogether: the stronger demarcation between communism and social 
democracy on the left was to be matched by a commensurate demarcation between the 
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ČSSD and the three parties to its right and, especially for the centrists, the communists 
very much remained the preferred partners.46 Yet, with the possibility of conflicts with the 
KSČ no longer ruled out, the social democrats quickly found themselves at loggerheads 
with the communists.    
 For the ČSSD responded to the increasingly authoritarian conduct of communist 
leaders at the head of key governmental departments and the trade union movement. The 
social democrats’ complaints about the communists chiefly revolved around three issues. 
In the first place, they protested against the state of affairs at the Ministry of the Interior, 
where KSČ minister Václav Nosek was steadily expanding the communist hold over the 
security forces by centralising command structures and making overtly political 
appointments. Secondly, they expressed serious misgivings about the methods used by the 
communist Minister of Agriculture Julius Ďuriš, who repeatedly reverted to street and 
village campaigns to force the KSČ’s ever more radical proposals on land reform through 
parliament. Thirdly, they sharply condemned ‘the communist terror against social 
democrats’ in factories, which sometimes went as far as attempts to liquidate entire ČSSD 
factory organisations.47 This more and more heavy-handed demeanour on the part of the 
communists had two effects upon the ČSSD: it increasingly drove the party into the arms 
of the three centre-right parties, with which the social democrats voted to amend or defeat 
significant parts of the legislation put forward by Nosek and Ďuriš, and it completely pitted 
the social democratic grassroots against the communists. These twin developments 
strongly affected ČSSD attitudes when socio-political polarisation reached new heights in 
the second half of 1947. 
 If political relations in Czechoslovakia only truly came under strain after the 
elections, Poland had effectively been divided in two camps before parliamentary elections 
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were finally held in January 1947. When the Provisional Government of National Unity 
came into being in mid-1945, the communists had still indicated that elections would be 
held as soon as possible – with early 1946 mentioned as likely at the time. Yet, over 1945 
and 1946, the PPR and the PPS kept pushing the date for elections forward. For both 
communists and socialists were acutely aware of their weakness vis-à-vis the Polish 
Peasant Party. The November 1945 elections in Hungary, a country with a social structure 
similar to that of Poland, had seen a peasant party that was in many ways the mirror image 
of the PSL win an absolute majority. In Poland, where elections were likely to turn into ‘a 
plebiscite’ on the Soviet Union,48 prospects for the parties most closely associated with the 
new order were, if anything, even bleaker. 
 To neutralise the electoral threat from the PSL, communists and socialists first 
suggested that all (legal) parties, rather than presenting separate lists, would run the 
elections as a common bloc. In February 1946, the PPR and PPS leaderships published a 
joint proposal for the creation of a ‘bloc of six’ – consisting of the four Lublin parties as 
well as the PSL and the small (Christian democratic) Labour Party (SP). It soon became 
apparent, however, that the parties could not agree on how parliamentary seats would be 
distributed after the elections. The original communist-socialist proposal stipulated that the 
four ‘larger’ parties (the PPR, the PPS, the SL, and the PSL) would each receive an equal 
number of seats and the two ‘smaller’ parties (the SD and the SP) a lower number. Well 
aware that this would guarantee the PPR and its vassals in the SL and the SD a 
parliamentary majority, the PSL demanded instead that, in line with the social make-up of 
Poland, three-quarters of the seats would be awarded to ‘representatives of the 
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countryside’.49 This was an unacceptable condition for the communists as well as the 
socialists, though, and the negotiations broke down in mutual recriminations.       
 In March 1946, the communists decided to postpone the elections again. In their 
place, a ‘popular referendum’ was called for June 1946, in which the Polish people were 
asked whether they approved the abolition of the upper house (question 1), whether they 
approved nationalisations and land reform (question 2), and whether they approved the 
new Polish-German border along the Oder-Neiße line (question 3). Both communists and 
socialists campaigned for a yes-vote on each of these three questions. Yet, the PSL urged 
its supporters to vote no on the first question, effectively turning the referendum into a 
showdown between the two opposing camps. The communists certainly did all in their 
power to obtain the ‘three-times-yes’ they so desired: the referendum campaign saw a 
massive propaganda effort for a yes-vote and those calling for a (partial) no-vote met with 
administrative obstruction and police intimidation.   
 Despite all this, as many as 80% of voters may have voted no on the first question, 
with the second question possibly also defeated.50 Although the communists, assisted by 
falsification ‘experts’ from the Soviet Union, made sure that the official results gave the 
yes-camp a clear victory on each of the three questions (68% on question 1; 77% on 
question 2; and 91% on question 3), the real outcome spoke volumes about the prospects of 
the Lublin parties in parliamentary elections. Chiefly on the initiative of the PPS, therefore, 
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socialists and communists renewed their offer of an electoral ‘bloc of six’ in the aftermath 
of the referendum.51 But the PSL remained unwilling to join the bloc on the terms set by 
the PPR and the PPS and, by late September, the four Lublin parties announced that they 
would run the January 1947 elections on a common list – as the ‘Democratic Bloc’.  
The months that followed witnessed the increasing polarisation of Polish society. In 
November, the PPR and the PPS entered into a united front agreement, the text of which 
committed the two parties to an eventual merger.52 The PSL, meanwhile, became the 
subject of ‘mass repression’,53 which included the arrest of countless, frequently local and 
provincial, party leaders, a search of the party headquarters by the security services, and 
the repeated police interrogation of party activists. The election itself, finally, took place in 
an atmosphere of intimidation – with Democratic Bloc agitators forcing their way into 
millions of homes during the campaign and factory workers and local communities being 
led to the polling station collectively to cast their vote before the eyes of such agitators on 
election day.54 In these circumstances, the parliamentary elections in Poland, which, after 
due falsification, returned the Democratic Bloc with 80.1% of the popular vote, were no 
more than a farce. 
 
The Endgame 
 
The kind of left-right polarisation that came early to Poland gradually took hold across 
continental Europe. During 1947 and 1948, the post-war grand coalitions were 
reconstituted on a narrower basis in each of the four countries. At least three 
(interconnected) factors were at play in the demise of the post-war coalition. In the first 
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place, the coalitions were already crumbling under their own weight. As conventional 
politics steadily gained the upper hand over the immediate needs of the reconstruction 
effort, it became increasingly difficult to find common ground amongst the unlikely 
bedfellows that made up the post-war coalitions. Secondly, the coalitions were rattled by 
various forms of social unrest as 1947 progressed. Strikes, street campaigns, and large 
demonstrations, often instigated by those same actors that had preached moderation and 
national unity in the aftermath of liberation, all contributed to putting relations between the 
parties under strain. Thirdly, the coming of the Cold War was accompanied by fresh 
pressures upon governments in East and West. As the Americans began to push for the 
communists to be removed from government in Western Europe and the Soviets instructed 
the communists to consolidate their hold on power in Eastern Europe, the four parties had 
to decide where their allegiance lay. 
 In Italy, the impetus for the denouement of the grand coalition definitely came from 
the Christian democrats. In the same November 1946 local elections that had seen the PCI 
overtake the PSIUP for the first time, the DC suffered bad losses. Support for the party had 
more than halved compared to the June parliamentary elections, whilst the neo-fascist and 
populist Front of the Common Man made spectacular gains. The Vatican and the business 
community then started to press De Gasperi to remove the Left from his government.55 But 
the Prime Minister, who still needed communists and socialists to back (and share the 
blame for) the unfavourable peace treaty that the Italian government would have to sign at 
the Paris Peace Conference in February 1947, did not consider the time ripe just yet.56 In 
the absence of any governmental agreement on economic policy, however, inflation 
remained rampant and, as a consequence, the Christian democrats kept losing support. 
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After another disastrous round of local elections for the DC in April, and buoyed by the 
removal of the PCF from the French government in early May, De Gasperi finally resigned 
on 13 May 1947. 
 Following a brief interlude during which the liberal Francesco Saverio Nitti failed 
to obtain a majority for a new government, De Gasperi then set about to form a coalition 
without the PCI and the PSIUP. Yet, his preferred partners on the centre-left, the 
republican PRI and Saragat’s PSLI, refused to join. This forced De Gasperi to form a 
minority DC-only government, which needed the support of the combined Right (including 
the Front of the Common Man) to get its programme through parliament.57 The new 
government’s policies reflected this transformed support base. Luigi Einaudi, the liberal 
Minister of the Budget charged with bringing inflation under control, swiftly implemented 
an austerity programme that, in its reliance on the free market, was in many ways the polar 
opposite of Morandi’s fourteen-point agenda. Although the ‘Einaudi line’ succeeded in 
bringing down inflation to much lower levels, its severe credit restrictions quickly saw 
business investment drying up.58  
The resulting rise in unemployment further aggravated already tense social 
relations. Mass lay-offs unleashed a wave of mostly spontaneous worker protests and 
strikes during the autumn of 1947, which were met with an increasingly heavy-handed 
response from the Minister of the Interior Mario Scelba (DC). Ever since taking office in 
February 1947, he had been purging all levels of the police of former partisans. The 
officers who took their place were told to clamp down forcefully on every manifestation of 
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left-wing radicalism.59 And so they did. In the context of Scelba’s endeavours to ‘conquer 
the streets’, which saw the notorious riot police repeatedly opening fire upon industrial or 
rural agitations, Lelio Basso even spoke of ‘a veritable fascist danger’.60   
In this climate of mounting socio-political polarisation, the PSIUP drew ever closer 
to the PCI. It was the socialists, who, in November 1947, proposed that the two parties 
would run the April 1948 parliamentary elections on a common list.61 After successful 
experiences with common lists in several local elections, both communists and socialists 
were confident that they would be able to defeat the DC by presenting a united front – and, 
in December 1947, the Popular Democratic Front (FDP) was formed. The first months of 
1948, however, witnessed a sharp upswing in Christian democratic fortunes. As the first 
Marshall Aid began to arrive, the material situation improved. During the election 
campaign, moreover, the DC benefitted greatly from the backing of both the Vatican and 
the United States.62 The PCI and the PSIUP, meanwhile, were forced on the defensive by 
the February 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia. After the PSIUP leadership had 
justified the events in Prague as a ‘popular revolution’ and sent a congratulatory telegram 
to Fierlinger, the international socialist movement formally endorsed Saragat’s Socialist 
Unity list against that of the FDP.63  
All of these factors came together to turn the April 1948 parliamentary elections 
into a particularly traumatic experience for the PSIUP. Whereas the DC won 48.5% of the 
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vote and an absolute parliamentary majority, the FDP lost almost a quarter of those who 
had voted communist or socialist in June 1946 and only obtained 31.0%. Worse still for the 
socialists, the overwhelming majority of votes cast for the FDP had gone to communist 
candidates, leaving the PSIUP with just 41 parliamentarians against 140 for the PCI. The 
rupture with mainstream Western European social democracy that was already very much 
on display during the election campaign, moreover, quickly proved beyond repair. When 
even the new, more autonomist party leadership that was briefly in charge after the election 
defeat refused to renounce the Unity of Action Pact, the PSIUP was first suspended and 
then expelled from the international socialist movement, with the PSLI taking its place. It 
was not until the PSIUP abandoned its alliance with the PCI after the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956 that the party would manage to escape from its domestic and 
international ostracism. 
In France, by contrast, the events of 1947 and 1948 made sure that the socialists 
would remain at the heart of government for most of the next decade. In just how pivotal a 
position the SFIO found itself already became very obvious during the protracted 
negotiations following the November 1946 parliamentary elections. After both Maurice 
Thorez (PCF) and Georges Bidault (MRP) failed to obtain a parliamentary majority to 
form a new government, eyes turned towards the socialists. To break the deadlock, the 
SFIO leadership convinced Léon Blum, in old age and poor health, to put himself forward 
as Prime Ministerial candidate of a transition government. Whilst the Assembly almost 
unanimously invested Blum with the power to form a government, he was unable to put 
together a coalition. As the largest party, the PCF demanded one of the three ‘grand 
ministries’ (Interior Affairs, Foreign Affairs, or Defence), but the MRP refused to join the 
government if Blum were to give any of these posts to the communists. The only option 
that commanded majority parliamentary support, then, was a temporary single-party SFIO 
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government to address pressing economic issues whilst seeing the newly-founded Fourth 
Republic through the elections to the Presidency and the Speaker of the National 
Assembly. 
As soon as these offices were filled, Blum resigned. In the new government 
subsequently formed by the socialist Paul Ramadier – a four-party coalition of the PCF, the 
SFIO, the MRP, and the Radical Party (by that time re-branded as the RGR) – the 
communists did obtain one of their prized ministries: with François Billoux becoming 
Minister of Defence (though he was immediately stripped of any command over the armed 
forces by the creation of three separate Ministries for War, for the Air Force, and for the 
Marine). And it was on military questions that the first cracks in the coalition quickly 
appeared. By March 1947, the PCF made it clear that it could no longer support the 
colonial war France was waging in Indo-China. Ramadier then called a confidence vote, in 
which the communist ministers voted for the government and the remainder of the PCF 
parliamentary party abstained. The coalition survived, but the episode convinced leading 
socialists that a rupture with the communists would be ‘inevitable’ sooner or later.64  
They would not have to wait long. When, in late April, a Trotskyite-inspired strike 
broke out at the Renault factory, the communist-dominated trade union confederation 
(CGT), after unsuccessfully trying to quell the strike, found itself forced to come out in 
favour of the strikers’ wage demands. Ever since the liberation, the CGT, in an effort to 
showcase the communists’ good faith, had done all in its power to hold back strikes. Yet, 
in a situation of decreasing working-class living standards, by mid-1947 they were at half 
their 1945 levels, this had come at the price of alienating a growing part of the communist 
industrial clientele.65 The Renault strike was the final straw. Faced with the prospect of 
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losing (further) control of the working class, the communists revoked their support of the 
government’s wage restraint policies. Ramadier did not wait long to call a new confidence 
vote, which he won handsomely, but in which the communist ministers, along with the 
PCF parliamentary party, voted against their own government. In an extraordinary session 
of the Council of Ministers on 4 May 1947, the Prime Minister expelled the communist 
ministers from his government – bringing an end to the tripartite experiment in post-war 
France. 
The question of how to proceed divided the SFIO. Amongst socialist ministers and 
parliamentarians, there was strong support for moving ahead with a centrist government of 
the SFIO, the MRP, and the RGR. A majority in the Mollet-led SFIO Directorate, 
however, wanted Ramadier to resign and the SFIO to press for a new single-party socialist 
government. To resolve the matter, an extraordinary session of the SFIO’s National 
Council was called for 6 May. Opening the session, Mollet reiterated the foremost 
argument that had won him the party leadership: that an exclusive socialist coalition with 
the MRP and the Radicals would estrange the SFIO from its working-class roots. This time 
around, however, that argument was trumped by the more urgent considerations put 
forward by Ramadier, Blum, and a series of socialist ministers. With delegates voting by 
2529 to 2125 for the Ramadier government to remain in office, the National Council 
heeded their warnings that a socialist exit from the government would see the country 
descend into chaos, see inflation spinning out of control, and endanger the Republic 
itself.66     
This perceived danger to the Republic had everything to do with General De 
Gaulle’s return to the political scene. After his January 1946 resignation, De Gaulle had 
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remained silent for almost six months – offering no comment on the constitutional project 
that was defeated in the May referendum. Following the June elections to the Constituent 
Assembly, however, he presented his outline for a presidential constitution at a mass rally 
in Bayeux. Over the next year-and-a-halve, this type of mass political gathering was to 
become the trademark Gaullist intervention in public life.67 The most significant of these 
came in Strasbourg in April 1947, where De Gaulle announced the founding of his own 
political movement: the Rally of the French People (RPF). This new formation, with the 
aim of propelling De Gaulle to power on the wings of a new constitution, took France by 
storm during the first months of its existence. Within a couple of months, it boasted 
400.000 members, second only to the PCF. And in the October 1947 local elections, it 
made spectacular gains: winning 38% of the vote and seeing its candidates become mayor 
in a quarter of cities with more than 9000 inhabitants (including Bordeaux, Lille, Marseille, 
and Rennes). Buoyed by the result, De Gaulle called for the immediate dissolution of 
parliament, for fresh parliamentary elections, and a revision of the constitution.68 
To make matters worse for the government, the RPF offensive coincided with a 
PCF offensive. In the first months after their removal from government, communist 
leaders, expecting a rapid return to office, had still urged caution – seeking to restrain the 
strike wave of the summer of 1947 and even taking a moderately positive attitude towards 
the Marshall Plan when it was first unveiled. All of this changed, however, after the PCF 
attended the founding conference of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) – 
effectively a new Communist International for those six Eastern European and two 
Western European communist parties deemed sufficiently significant by Stalin – in 
September 1947. At this secret meeting, during which the French and Italian communists 
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came under severe attack for their ‘parliamentarian illusions’ and for having allowed 
themselves to be removed from government, the Soviets signalled the end of the national 
road to socialism.69 In line with these fresh Soviet instructions, the PCF made it clear that 
it would not be joining any more coalition governments, whilst embarking on a press 
campaign vilifying the socialists as ‘imperialist lackeys’. It was this newfound rhetorical 
bravado, rather than some insurrectionary design on the part of communist leaders, that led 
a fresh strike wave in November and December 1947 to spin rapidly out of control.70  
Irrespective of the PCF’s real intentions, though, socialist leaders certainly believed 
they were dealing with a communist insurrection. When the Ramadier government 
collapsed at the height of the strike wave, therefore, far fewer socialists had qualms about 
renewing the coalition with the MRP and the Radicals than six months before.  In fact, the 
conception of ‘the Third Force’ – a centrist coalition of those parties committed to 
parliamentary democracy, simultaneously fighting off the communist challenge on the Left 
and the Gaullist challenge on the Right – was now also taken up by Mollet. In the new 
government under Robert Schuman (MRP), accordingly, the SFIO would cement its 
position as ‘party of the system’. Jules Moch, the incoming socialist Minister of the 
Interior, immediately mobilised the riot police and the army against the strikers and 
managed to defeat the strike wave by mid-December. By restoring order, the government 
won a double victory: it had seen off a communist ‘insurrection’ and had proven to the 
nation that France could be governed without General De Gaulle.71 Thus stabilised, the 
Third Force coalition would remain in office until 1951. 
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Czechoslovakian politics entered a similarly stormy phase in the summer of 1947. 
For, much like their French and Italian counterparts, the Czechoslovakian communists 
suddenly found themselves confronted with the Soviet disavowal of the moderate line they 
had followed up to that point. After first having accepted an invitation to the Paris 
conference on the Marshall Plan, the Czechoslovakian government was forced into a 
humiliating retreat by Stalin personally in July 1947. At the founding conference of the 
Cominform, moreover, the KSČ became the object of much criticism in the slipstream of 
the PCI and the PCF – with one delegate going as far as arguing that the Czechoslovakian 
communists had already missed their chance to take power and would meet the same fate 
as their French comrades. In these circumstances, the KSČ leadership decided to go on the 
offensive in August 1947.72 
This offensive found its first expression in the far more radical and populist 
approach the communists took to socio-economic questions. There was ample scope for 
such a politics, as, by mid-1947, the Czechoslovakian economy was stalling, the food 
situation worsening, and the working class becoming increasingly restless. The 
communists did all in their power to play to worker sentiments: instigating a series of 
violently anti-Semitic strikes against returning state-managed companies to their rightful 
Jewish owners and proposing a special ‘millionaires’ tax’ to prevent the state-sanctioned 
price of grain from going up. The bitter and confrontational street campaigns that 
frequently accompanied these communist initiatives much alarmed the ČSSD leadership. 
At a meeting of the party presidium in early September, Laušman claimed that the KSČ 
seemed determined on following the path already taken by the other Eastern European 
communist parties. ČSSD Secretary General Blažej Vilím, for his part, argued that the 
KSČ wanted to create ‘an atmosphere of fear’ in order to win a majority in the May 1948 
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parliamentary elections. Once again, only those on the Left of the party leadership struck a 
more conciliatory tone, attributing the recent communist excesses to a feeling of isolation 
to which the ČSSD had itself contributed.73  
Even if most other leaders roundly rejected this reasoning, the ČSSD leadership did 
sanction three of its left-wingers to begin talks with the communists. The delegation of 
three – consisting of Deputy Prime Minister Zdeněk Fierlinger, trade union leader Evžen 
Erban, and Deputy ČSSD Chairman František Tymeš – entered into the talks with strict 
instructions, though. At the very least, the KSČ had to speak out for democracy and stop 
the ‘terror’ against social democrats in factories. Any agreement between the KSČ and the 
ČSSD, moreover, had to be the extended to the National Socialists of the ČSNS. On 11 
September, the two delegations reached an agreement in principle, which committed the 
two parties to concerted action in the ‘millionaires’ tax’ controversy, to continued 
cooperation with all governmental parties, and to a revival of the wartime ‘Socialist Bloc’ 
of the KSČ, the ČSSD, and the ČSNS. Yet, before the ČSSD leadership and parliamentary 
group had signed off on the agreement, the KSČ published it.74 The result was a huge 
backlash. The ČSNS vehemently attacked the social democrats for having succumbed to 
communist pressure for ‘a Marxist bloc’. Minister of Food Václav Majer, the foremost 
leader of the ČSSD’s right wing, tendered his resignation and could only be convinced to 
stay on by a joint plea of the entire presidium except for Fierlinger and Deputy Speaker of 
Parliament Oldřich John. At the local and provincial level, moreover, several ČSSD 
branches began calling for Fierlinger’s head.      
In this atmosphere, the ČSSD’s November 1947 congress turned into a showdown 
between the left-wingers who had by and large been in charge since 1945 and those 
faithful to the party’s pre-war traditions. The centre and the right wing of the ČSSD now 
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united behind Laušman’s bid to oust Fierlinger as party chairman. What had already 
become obvious at the pre-congress meetings of provincial ČSSD departments was 
confirmed at the congress, as Laušman defeated Fierlinger by 283 to 182 votes.75 What 
was more, as Denis Healey, attending the congress as British Labour Party representative, 
pointed out, the incoming party presidium ‘contains in a large majority supporters of an 
independent line to the Communists’. With the much-maligned Erban voted off the party 
leadership altogether, the ‘only outstanding party leader’ still supporting Fierlinger was 
John.76  
The new ČSSD leadership, however, was at pains to stress that the personal 
changes would not alter the party’s course.77 During the months that followed Laušman’s 
election, then, the social democrats stuck to the line they had pursued since the 
parliamentary elections: advocating co-operation with the communists as a matter of 
principle, but often siding with the three centre-right parties in practice. This line was soon 
to become untenable, though. After defeats in separate disputes about wages and land 
reform had already prompted the KSČ to convene mass worker and peasant meetings, the 
Council of Ministers of 13 February 1948 was rattled by another bombshell: the 
communist-dominated Ministry of the Interior had dismissed eight borough commanders in 
the Prague police force for no other apparent reason than that they were not communists. 
As Interior Minister Nosek was (conveniently) ill,78 however, the communist ministers 
refused to even discuss the matter. In response, the ministers of the four other parties 
united to pass a decree instructing the Interior Ministry to reinstate the commanders. When 
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no action had been taken by 20 February, the ministers of the three centre-right parties 
tendered their resignations to President Beneš.           
Events then started to unfold quickly. The communists pressured the social 
democrats to join them in a majority left-wing government. But the ČSSD refused, calling 
instead for reconciliation between the five parties that had governed Czechoslovakia since 
the liberation. Yet, the KSČ was not about to throw away the tactical advantage it had been 
gifted by the three centre-right parties and took the governmental crisis to the streets. The 
communists wasted no time in calling mass meetings across the country and creating 
‘action committees’ in factories, communities, and institutions. Within a matter of days, 
the press of the three centre-right parties had been paralysed, demonstrations in favour of 
the centre-right were forbidden, and action committees prohibited anti-communist 
ministers (including Majer) access to their own offices. Even in this atmosphere of overt 
intimidation, though, the ČSSD persevered in its refusal to help the KSČ to a majority for a 
left-wing government. On the evening of 24 February, therefore, communist activists and 
social democratic left-wingers occupied the ČSSD headquarters. Gottwald then presented 
Laušman with an ultimatum: if he did not reverse his decision, the communists would 
move ahead forming a government without the social democrats. In these circumstances, 
Laušman capitulated. That same night, Majer’s right wing was excluded from the ČSSD 
leadership, whilst Fierlinger’s left wing returned with a vengeance. The following day, 
President Beneš accepted the resignation of the centre-right ministers and swore in a new, 
communist-controlled government.79  
The ‘Prague Coup’, as the February 1948 events in Czechoslovakia came to be 
known, spelt the end for both Czechoslovakian democracy and the ČSSD. The widespread 
purge that followed the coup saw independent politicians in the Czech non-communist 
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parties replaced by communist stooges and the Slovak Democratic Party outlawed. All 
legal parties then ran the May 1948 parliamentary ‘elections’ on a common list, which 
obtained 89.2% of the vote. The next month, the ČSSD and the KSČ officially ‘merged’ 
into a single working-class party. With the great majority of former ČSSD members barred 
from the new party80 and the KSČ not even bothering to change its name, however, the 
fusion is more properly described as a hostile take-over.                 
In post-war Poland, as we have seen, communist suppression had been a major 
factor in political life all along. In the wake of the rigged January 1947 parliamentary 
elections, there was a brief reprieve in the persecutions as more than 25.000 military and 
political prisoners were released under a post-election amnesty. But from May onwards, 
the repression returned with fresh vigour.81 Several socialists outside the PPS, especially 
those who had been part of the wartime WRN underground organisation, were now 
actively targeted by the security services. And the clampdown on the PSL, or at least on 
those of its functionaries and leaders unwilling to join the newly-created communist-
backed ‘PSL-Left’ breakaway party, continued likewise. Fearing for his life, Stanisław 
Mikołaczyk fled Poland in October 1947. 
The liquidation of the PSL as an independent political force meant that the PPS 
remained the only credible counterweight to the communists in Poland. This was reflected 
in  a membership surge. After its membership had rocketed from 500.000 to 660.000 in the 
space of just a month-and-a-half, the PPS even began a new membership drive under the 
slogan: ‘PPS – party of a million’.82 This was part of a far more self-assured attitude on the 
part of the socialists in the aftermath of the elections. The months following the elections, 
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accordingly, witnessed increasing ‘discussions and polemics’ between the PPR and the 
PPS over ‘political, economic and ideological problems’.83 
These communist-socialist arguments, however, often did not run along the same 
lines as in Czechoslovakia. To be sure, the PPS, much like the ČSSD, called for the 
empowerment of parliament and for cross-party control over the security services.84 Yet, in 
many ways, these were moot points: the PPR and its two vassal parties had a solid 
parliamentary majority and the socialists had acquiesced in Poland effectively becoming a 
police state during the election campaign. What still hung in the balance, though, was the 
economic future of Poland and it was on this issue that major conflicts developed between 
the PPR and the PPS.           
The ‘Polish road to socialism’, in its original communist-supported conception, 
foresaw a mixed, three-tier economy consisting of a state, a cooperative, and a private 
sector. By mid-1947, however, the communists set about to roll back the two sectors that 
did not fall directly under the control of the state. Under the guise of a government 
offensive against ‘speculation’ and ‘high prices’, the communist-dominated Ministry of 
Industry unleashed the ‘battle for trade’: a series of tax hikes and repressive measures 
directed at shopkeepers and tradesmen, the ‘aim of which was the elimination of private 
wholesale trade, a drastic reduction of private retail trade, and a subjection of cooperative 
trade to state control’.85   
Yet, the socialists, who had considered the three-tier economy to be a permanent 
feature of socialist Poland and who were particularly strongly represented in the 
cooperative movement, quickly disowned the ‘battle for trade’. In its first public rebuttal of 
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a communist scheme since the liberation, the PPS claimed that the material shortages and 
high prices were to be addressed by revising investment plans rather than by curbing 
private trade.86 This was part of a larger dispute between the two parties: where the 
communist-led Ministry of Industry backed heavy investment in capital goods and fast 
industrialisation after the Soviet model, the socialist-led Central Planning Office (CUP) 
had consistently favoured consumer-goods-producing medium and light industries in its 
funding decisions.  
Of course, the balance of forces in post-war Poland was such that the socialists 
could never win the ‘battle for trade’ and, by early 1948, the communists forced the CUP 
leadership to resign. Yet, the strength of the socialist reaction to the communist plans 
belies the assertion that the PPS, having turned its back on the PSL and signed a Unity Pact 
with the PPR in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, effectively surrendered to the 
communists. In fact, the PPS was probably at its most autonomous during its December 
1947 congress. In what was widely regarded as a rebuff of communist pressure for a 
merger, Josef Cyrankiewicz – who had become Prime Minister and PPS leader after the 
January 1947 elections – exhorted that ‘the PPS is and will remain indispensable to the 
Polish nation’; in response, the congress rose to sing the party anthem.87 Socialist leaders 
were confident that this line had the backing of Stalin, who, in his role as ‘arbitrator’ 
between the PPR and the PPS, had repeatedly come out in favour of the socialists.88 They 
might well have been right at the time. But in the changed international context after the 
Prague Coup, Stalin demanded complete loyalty in his sphere of influence. Upon his return 
from a state visit to Moscow in March 1948, Cyrankiewicz announced that the time for a 
communist-socialist merger had come. Even then, socialist resistance to a fusion appears to 
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have been so strong that the ‘unification congress’, originally scheduled for the summer, 
had to be postponed and the new Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) could only be 
established in December 1948.89     
 
From the Nineteenth Century to the Second World War 
 
This discussion of the first post-war years clearly brings to light parallels and differences 
between the four parties that cannot be explained through the traditional Cold War 
narrative. From the perspective of their pre-war histories, however, the roots of these 
similarities and differences become much clearer. To begin with, the four parties came into 
being in very diverse socio-economic settings. France and the Czech lands, on the one 
hand, were advanced industrial economies: in the nineteenth century they had witnessed 
strong industrial development, rapid urbanisation, and a spectacular drop in illiteracy. Italy 
and (what was to become) Poland, on the other hand, by and large remained backward 
rural economies: industrialisation only came late and in a very uneven manner, primitive 
and semi-feudal farming was still the norm in agriculture, and overall illiteracy hovered 
around 50%. These very different societal structures provide the background for the 
divergent political histories of the four parties and countries between the late nineteenth 
century and the Second World War.  
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Founding Divisions 
 
When the four parties came into being, however, these divergences were not directly 
obvious. In fact, each of the four parties initially modelled themselves after German social 
democracy in their political behaviour: theoretically and rhetorically, they were committed 
to a revolution and to the dictatorship of the proletariat, but, in practice, they frequently 
worked within the parliamentary system and with non-worker parties to achieve reformist 
or nationalist goals. Yet, in the first decade of the twentieth century, often in an atmosphere 
of heightened socio-political tensions, this reformist consensus came under pressure from 
more radical socialists looking to press ahead with the revolution.    
 The early history of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) exemplifies this trend. 
Established in 1892 by the reformist lawyer Filippo Turati, the PSI initially fought much 
the same battles as the left-liberal Radical Party: for universal suffrage, for progressive 
taxation, and for the eight-hour working day. The PSI urged its supporters to vote for non-
socialist, centre-left candidates in run-off second ballots and repeatedly entered into 
(parliamentary and non-parliamentary) alliances with centre-left bourgeois parties, 
although both Turati (in 1903) and his fellow reformist leader Leonida Bissolati (in 1911) 
stopped short of accepting an offered ministerial post.90  
But the sharp deterioration of industrial relations in the aftermath of the 1907 
economic crisis strengthened the hand of socialist ‘intransigents’ – the intra-party minority 
that had rejected the reformist policy of working within the system all along. The Italo-
Turkish War over Libya of 1911-1912 brought matters to a head. The reformist majority 
split over the war, allowing the intransigents to take control at the October 1912 congress 
of the PSI. Those reformist leaders who supported the war (including Bissolati and the 
PSIUP’s later nemesis Ivanoe Bonomi) were expelled from the PSI and founded the Italian 
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Reformist Socialist Party (the precursor of the PDL). The intransigents or ‘maximalists’ 
were now firmly in charge and would remain so for the duration of the First World War.91  
 If the political context was completely different in France, the internal dynamics 
within its socialist movement were very similar. France having known (male) universal 
suffrage since 1848 and having been a parliamentary Republic with the corresponding set 
of constitutional rights and freedoms since the 1870s, the struggles of its socialists in many 
ways differed from those of their counterparts in more authoritarian systems.  
Yet, the question of participation in the ‘bourgeois’ political system divided the 
French socialists all the same. When, in 1899, leading socialist Alexandre Millerand took 
up a ministerial post in the centre-left ‘Government of Republican Defence’ that came to 
power at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, the socialist movement split in two separate 
parties.92 The French Socialist Party, led by Jean Jaurès, supported alliances with 
bourgeois Republicans and took part in the cross-party Left Bloc coalition that won the 
1902 parliamentary elections. The Socialist Party of France, in contrast, rejected any form 
of cooperation with non-proletarian forces, its leader Jules Guesde claiming that the 
proletariat would ‘abandon its own struggle’ if it set about defending the ‘Republic of its 
masters’.93 It was only after the intervention of the Second International, which prohibited 
reformist alliances at its 1904 Amsterdam congress that the two parties merged into one. 
Established in 1905, the SFIO immediately withdrew its support from the Left Bloc 
government, erecting a barrier between socialism and bourgeois Republicanism that was to 
survive well into the interwar years. 
 In the Czech lands, the national question added a further dimension to the struggles 
between moderate and radical socialists. The founding of the Czech Social Democratic 
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Workers’ Party (ČSDSD) in 1887 was the result of a compromise between the reformist 
and revolutionary wings of the clandestine Czech socialist movement in the Habsburg 
Empire. Moderation certainly prevailed within the new party, though. Even if the ČSDSD, 
which was an autonomous organisation within the larger setting of the Austrian Social 
Democratic Workers Party at the time, did not renounce its ultimate revolutionary aims, its 
focus was firmly on achieving its objectives through legal means – with demands for 
universal suffrage once again taking centre stage. Sure enough, the ČSDSD did very well 
in the elections to the Habsburg Imperial Council, becoming the largest force in the Czech 
lands in both elections (in 1907 and 1911) that were fought on male universal suffrage.  
Yet, parliamentary representation presented the party with a fresh dilemma: was the 
ČSDSD going to cooperate with its social democratic comrades from other Habsburg 
nations or with its national compatriots in bourgeois Czech parties? When the ČSDSD first 
entered the Imperial Council in 1897, its delegates had still denounced bourgeois demands 
for renewed Czech statehood as an effort ‘to dig up old privileges’.94 Much like social 
democratic parties in other countries, however, the ČSDSD took up increasingly nationalist 
positions during the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1910, it even defied a Second 
International ruling by taking the Czech trade unions out of the unitary Austrian trade 
union movement – effectively breaking all ties with its Austrian mother organisation.95   
The national question was of even greater significance in pre-war Polish socialism. 
Their nation still carved up as a result of the Austrian, German, and Russian partitions, the 
question of whether the struggle for national independence or the struggle for a proletarian 
revolution was to be prioritised divided the Polish socialists. The first socialist party in the 
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Polish territories – The Proletariat (founded in 1882) – was a revolutionary organisation 
with links to Russian anarchist groups, but it was quickly quashed by the Tsarist 
authorities. When the PPS was created in 1893, accordingly, a more nationalist line was 
adopted. Its leader, Józef Piłsudski, ruled that Polish socialists could only cooperate with 
Russian revolutionaries if they supported Polish claims for independence. The result was a 
split with revolutionary Polish socialists (including Rosa Luxemburg), who, viewing 
nationalism as a diversion from the proletariat’s real struggles, established the Social 
Democratic Party of the Polish and Lithuanian Kingdom (SDKPiL) in 1894.  
The question of (non-)cooperation with Russian revolutionaries, however, was to 
remain the foremost bone of contention within the pre-war PPS. After the crushing of the 
1905 rebellions in various Polish cities (part of the revolutionary wave that hit the Russian 
Empire during that year), the party split in two. The Piłsudski-led PPS – Revolutionary 
Fraction wanted to continue the struggle for Polish independence by terrorist and para-
military means. Yet, the PPS – Left, led by a group of younger socialist leaders, was 
looking to build alliances for an empire-wide revolution against Tsarism.96       
 
Revolution and Schism 
 
The (consequences of the) First World War intervened in a decisive manner in these 
divisions within the pre-war socialist movement. On the one hand, the extension of 
democratic rights and freedoms in a series of (newly independent) states strengthened 
reformist beliefs about the need to work within the system. On the other, the existence of 
the Soviet Union provided the revolutionaries with a clear focal point and model to 
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emulate. In these circumstances, a schism between the two wings of the socialist 
movement became all but inevitable. 
 The Italian case demonstrates this clearly. By all accounts, the PSI emerged from 
the war as a revolutionary party. Taking its lead from developments in the Soviet Union, 
the radical PSI leadership called for the immediate creation of a socialist Republic and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat.97 There certainly seemed to be ample appetite for radical 
social change: the PSI became the largest party by far in the November 1919 parliamentary 
elections with 32.4% of the vote and the biennio rosso (two red years) of 1919-20 saw 
widespread factory and land occupations.  
 As it turned out, however, the PSI’s revolutionary rhetoric was not matched by 
commensurate action. For one thing, there was a deep rift between the revolutionary 
slogans espoused by the PSI leadership and the reformist beliefs of many socialist 
parliamentarians and trade unionists. But even the more radical leaders, educated in the 
classical Marxist notion that a proletarian revolution would develop spontaneously, ‘had no 
idea how to lead a revolution’.98 At the January 1921 PSI congress in Livorno, therefore, 
the extreme left pressed for the PSI to become a vanguard communist party in the Leninist 
sense. Yet, a majority rejected Lenin’s Twenty-one Conditions of admission to the 
Communist International (Comintern), which demanded the expulsion of ‘proven 
reformists’ like Turati. The left wing broke away immediately to form the PCI. In October 
1922, the reformists followed suit to found the Unitary Socialist Party (PSU). Just as 
fascism was in the ascendancy, then, the socialist movement split three ways.  
 The back story to the schism within the SFIO is completely different. Unlike their 
Italian counterparts, who had consistently voted against war credits, the French socialists 
had supported the French war effort all along – even participating in the government for 
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the first three war years. After the war ended, moreover, socialist leaders, far from 
embracing revolutionary rhetoric, tried to restrain strikes and focused fully on the 
upcoming parliamentary elections. Yet, the November 1919 elections, in which the SFIO 
gained votes but lost seats, were a bitter disappointment for the socialists. The resulting 
disillusionment with parliament contributed to the balance within French socialism 
swinging ‘sharply to the left’.99 At its December 1920 congress in Tours, accordingly, the 
SFIO became the only major European socialist party to vote for adhesion to the 
Comintern. 
 The (moderate) minority at Tours broke away and continued as the SFIO. Even if 
the party was now devoid of its most radical elements, it did not fundamentally change its 
attitude towards (peacetime) governmental participation. To be sure, the socialists entered 
into victorious electoral coalitions with the Radicals in 1924 and 1932, but these coalitions 
never saw the socialists taking ministerial responsibility. It would take a perceived fascist 
challenge to the Republic for the SFIO to abandon its ‘refusal of power’ in the mid-
1930s.100 
 The interwar ČSDSD, in contrast, very much became a party of government. Its 
nationalist wing having taken control over the party leadership during the war, the ČSDSD 
supported Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk – Czechoslovakia’s ‘founding father’ – in his quest for 
national independence and participated in the provisional Czechoslovakian government 
that came to power in November 1918. The first post-war ČSDSD congress formulated a 
set of reformist demands, including the nationalisation of large companies and the 
introduction of universal health care. Yet, the governmental coalition with bourgeois 
parties was denounced by the ČSDSD’s emerging Bolshevik wing. Unity was just about 
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preserved until the April 1920 parliamentary elections,101 which saw the ČSDSD becoming 
the largest party by far with 25.7% of the vote. 
 When the ČSDSD renewed its coalition with bourgeois parties after the elections, 
however, the Bolsheviks went into open opposition: refusing to vote for the programme of 
the incoming coalition government under the social democrat Vlastimil Tusar and pressing 
for the acceptance of Lenin’s Twenty-one Conditions. Moderate leaders now seriously 
feared they would lose control to the Bolsheviks at the September 1920 party congress. 
Eleven days before the congress was supposed to take place, therefore, the ČSDSD left the 
government and postponed its congress until December. The Bolsheviks then called their 
own congress, at which they founded the party that was to become the KSČ. The schism 
severely weakened the ČSDSD: the party lost a third of its parliamentarians, most of its 
working-class membership, and dropped to 8.9% of the vote in the 1925 parliamentary 
elections.102 Yet, after returning to government in September 1921, the ČSDSD cemented 
its role as one of the five parties ruling interwar Czechoslovakia – but for a three-year spell 
between 1926 and 1929, the party was to remain in government until 1938. 
 Newly independent Poland saw rival communist and socialist parties emerge too. 
For at least two reasons, though, its communist-socialist struggles lacked the salience of 
those in the three other cases. Firstly, the Polish socialist movement had already split 
before the war. The PPS – Revolutionary Fraction changed its name back to PPS in 1913, 
while the PPS – Left and the SDKPiL merged to form the Polish Communist Party (KPP) 
in 1918. Secondly, the Polish-Soviet war of 1919-21, during which the Polish army under 
Jósef Piłsudksi eventually fought off the Red Army, ‘ensured that an overwhelming 
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majority of Poles rejected empathically the blandishments of Bolshevism for the remainder 
of the interwar period’.103  
 Unhampered by a bruising internecine fight, then, the interwar PPS practised 
moderation right from the outset. The socialists were fully committed to a democratic and 
parliamentary road to socialism and presented reformist demands: the nationalisation of 
some industrial and agricultural sectors, universal access to education, and state 
pensions.104 Even though Piłsudski cut all ties with the PPS in his effort to present himself 
as standing above the parties, the socialists initially supported his May 1926 military coup. 
It was only when Piłsudski subsequently installed a dictatorship that the PPS began to 
reconsider the reformist politics it had pursued up to that point.  
 
Facing Fascism 
 
During the interwar years, parliamentary democracy came under right-wing pressure in 
each of the four countries. This pressure was uneven: whereas Italy and Poland succumbed 
to fascist or authoritarian dictatorships in the 1920s, parliamentary democracy survived in 
interwar Czechoslovakia and France. Yet, the (perceived) fascist challenge to democracy 
prompted all four parties to seek allies on the Left. This process received a strong boost 
when the Comintern adopted its popular front strategy in 1934, leading communist parties 
across the continent to abandon their earlier sectarianism and seek broad-based anti-fascist 
alliances with socialist and centre-left parties. The coalitions formed in the second half of 
the 1930s, then, foreshadowed the governments that would rise to power after the Second 
World War. 
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Fascism had its origins in Italy. If the radicalism of the biennio rosso had not 
ushered in a proletarian revolution, it had certainly frightened the Italian middle and upper 
classes. Amongst these groups, there was an increasing desire for a return to industrial and 
rural order. Exactly this was offered by Benito Mussolini’s fascist ‘squads’, the para-
military groups, often led by ex-servicemen, that viciously broke strikes, intimidated 
landless rural labourers, and burnt down local socialist offices. The squads’ October 1922 
‘March on Rome’ propelled Mussolini to power. In the April 1924 parliamentary elections, 
which saw overt terrorisation and massive fraud, his National Fascist Party (PNF) won a 
smashing victory. After Giacomo Matteotti, the PSU’s leader, spoke out against the 
electoral abuses, he was murdered, probably at Mussolini’s behest. In the aftermath of the 
‘Matteotti crisis’, which repulsed many of Mussolini’s erstwhile centre-right allies, 
Mussolini proceeded to set up a full dictatorship.105 By 1926, all opposition parties had 
been outlawed, their press organs banned, and many of their leaders were languishing in 
prison.  
Those socialists who managed to escape reconstituted their parties in French exile. 
Convinced that the labour movement’s split had much weakened the Left vis-à-vis 
fascism,106 PSI leader Pietro Nenni set about to reconcile its warring factions. In July 1930, 
the PSI and the PSU merged. This was followed in August 1934 by the Unity of Action 
Pact with the PCI, which was to remain in force until the liberation. Post-war Italian 
socialism’s ‘unitarian’ outlook received its final impulse by the PSI’s August 1943 merger 
with Lelio Basso’s clandestine Movement of Proletarian Unity (MUP) – resulting in the 
creation of the PSIUP. 
The 1930s likewise saw the French Left pull together. The Radical-SFIO coalition 
that had won the May 1932 elections proved very unstable. With the two parties 
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advocating opposite policies in the face of the Great Depression, governments fell in rapid 
succession. Worse, several leading Radicals became embroiled in a corruption scandal, 
sparking a series of increasingly violent demonstrations by extra- and anti-parliamentary 
right-wing leagues. These culminated in ‘the February 1934 crisis’: a right-wing riot in 
Paris that left fifteen death and hundreds wounded. Widely interpreted by the French Left 
as a fascist coup attempt,107 the crisis prompted its three major parties to join forces. The 
anti-fascist ‘vigilance committees’ formed in the wake of the crisis had already brought 
together communist, socialist, and Radical intellectuals. In July 1934, the PCF and SFIO 
leaderships followed by entering into a Unity of Action Pact. The next year, communists, 
socialists, and Radicals agreed a common electoral programme. The resulting Popular 
Front won the May 1936 parliamentary elections. Having emerged as the largest party in 
both votes and seats, the SFIO entered a peacetime government for the first time – its 
leader Léon Blum becoming Prime Minister.  
In spite of its impressive list of social reforms, the Popular Front government 
brought the socialists many ‘disillusions’.108 The communists, offering only parliamentary 
backing, refused to join the government and quickly began attacking Blum over a string of 
domestic and international policies.109 What was worse, facing a right-wing majority in the 
Senate, Blum was unable to address France’s economic problems. After the upper house 
had blocked his strongly interventionist investment programme, Blum resigned in April 
1938. The Radicals subsequently formed a new government with right-wing backing, 
which reversed many of the Popular Front’s social reforms. Having long been a dead letter, 
moreover, the communist-socialist Unity of Action Pact came to a definite end upon the 
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announcement of the Nazi-Soviet pact in August 1939. In the ‘phoney war’ after the 
subsequent German invasion of Poland, the SFIO played a much-diminished role in French 
politics. The depth of socialist despondency at their defeat and isolation became obvious 
after the fall of France, when the great majority of SFIO deputies present at the National 
Assembly’s session in Vichy on 10 July 1940 voted in favour of suspending the Third 
Republic’s democratic constitution and according General Philippe Pétain dictatorial 
powers to produce a new one – thereby contributing to the creation of the collaborationist 
Vichy France. 
The threat of fascism did not lead to rapprochement between communists and social 
democrats in interwar Czechoslovakia. From 1935 onwards, the KSČ did make some 
overtures towards a united or popular front with the ČSDSD and the National Socialists of 
the ČSNS. Yet, compared to communist outreaches elsewhere, these overtures were half-
hearted at best and dismissed as a ruse by the social democrats and National Socialists. In 
fact, the ČSDSD always viewed the ČSNS, with which it formed the left wing of the five-
party coalition that governed Czechoslovakia for most of the interwar period, as its ‘natural 
ally in the effort to preserve the democratic character of Czechoslovakia’.110  
As the 1930s progressed, Czechoslovakia’s democratic character came under 
pressure from both within and abroad. The Great Depression hit the Sudetenland 
particularly hard, fuelling nationalist resentments amongst its majority-German population. 
In the 1935 parliamentary elections, the radical nationalist Sudeten German Party (SdP), 
financially backed by Nazi Germany, became the second strongest party in 
Czechoslovakia. The following years witnessed the SdP and Hitler formulate an ever-
increasing set of demands upon the Czechoslovakian government. This campaign 
culminated in the September 1938 Munich Conference, where British and French 
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governments sought to appease Hitler by effectively signing over the Sudetenland to 
Germany. The loss of the Sudetenland, followed quickly by further territorial concessions 
to Hungary and Poland, spelt the end for the First Czechoslovakian Republic. In the short-
lived Second Republic, the ČSDSD and the left wing of the ČSNS merged into the 
National Labour Party, conceived mainly as a bulwark against the increasingly 
authoritarian tendencies of the appeasing right-wing government that had taken office after 
Munich. But it was to no avail. In March 1939, Hitler first forced Slovakia to declare 
independence and then ordered his troops to march into the Czech lands – thus creating the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. 
In interwar Poland, parliamentary democracy had collapsed long before the Nazis 
imposed their will upon the country. Presenting itself as a national revival against a 
dysfunctional and corrupt parliamentary system, Piłsudski’s 1926 coup was part of a 
broader European backlash against parliamentarism.111 The PPS initially welcomed the 
coup, expecting that its erstwhile leader would enact radical socio-economic reforms. But 
Piłsudski had no such intentions. In fact, his Sanacja (purification) regime quickly won the 
backing of landowners and industrialists by ruling out any further land reform and 
clamping down forcefully on strikes. In the face of the government’s rightward thrust and 
its increasingly repressive nature, the PPS joined forces with peasant and Christian 
democratic parties to form the Centrolew (centre-left) parliamentary opposition group in 
1929. Yet, in the run-up to the November 1930 parliamentary elections, prominent 
Centrolew leaders, six of them socialists, were arrested on trumped-up conspiracy charges. 
In ‘an atmosphere of intimidation’, the Sanacja then won a majority in the elections, whilst 
the Centrolew leaders were convicted in a show trial.112 
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Their defeat at the hands of what had now become a fully fledged dictatorship 
prompted many PPS leaders to move away from their reformist convictions. Over the 
course of the 1930s, the socialists embraced a more leftist agenda. In economic terms, the 
PPS drew a sharp line between the ‘worker control’ enshrined in socialisations and the 
‘state capitalism’ represented by nationalisations. Such ‘young Turks’ as Oskar Lange and 
Julian Hochfeld, who would be amongst the foremost socialist theorists during the post-
war years, no longer viewed the parliamentary road to socialism as viable, moreover. Even 
if most socialists still rejected their viewpoints, the new PPS programme of 1937 did allow 
for a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat.113 This opened the way for an alliance with 
the communists and, from the mid-1930s, the PPS leadership set aside its objections to 
‘limited cooperation’ with the KPP in a popular front.114  
 
Conclusion 
 
The four parties thus embarked upon ‘the national road to socialism’ with widely divergent 
back stories. In large part, these divergences went back to their very different experiences 
with ‘bourgeois’ parliamentary democracy during the interwar years. For the Italian and 
Polish socialists, on the one side, parliamentary democracy within the framework of 
bourgeois capitalism had proven itself to be very fragile indeed. The advent of fascism, 
explained PSIUP Directorate member Sandro Pertini at the party’s April 1946 congress, 
had ‘shown that freedom, if it does not have those social reforms associated with socialism 
at its core, can be obliterated in the space of an afternoon’.115 For the Czechoslovakian 
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social democrats and the French socialists, on the other, parliamentary democracy had 
proven itself to be the best guarantee for personal rights and freedoms. The broader 
political consensus around these freedoms, which included non-proletarian centrist parties, 
convinced them that it was possible to work for socialist change from within the 
‘bourgeois’ political system.      
 It was not merely these conflicting political ‘lessons’ from the interwar years 
guiding the four parties on their post-war trajectories, however. The socialists also drew 
wider implications from their countries’ longer-term socio-economic development. For 
each of the four parties, as we will discuss in far greater detail in the three chapters on 
political reconstruction, based their political views on historically informed perceptions of 
the societies they operated in. Before we move on to these questions, however, we will turn 
our attention to socio-economic reconstruction, starting with the immediate concerns 
amongst rank-and-file (socialist) workers. In their struggle for everyday survival, after all, 
such ‘political’ concepts as democracy took on a wholly different, and strongly 
subsistence-related, connotation.  
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Part 1: Socio-Economic Reconstruction 
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Chapter 2: Bread, Butter, and Egalitarianism  
 
As the Second World War drew to a close, worker grumbles about their provisions began 
to sound louder. During a May 1944 meeting of the Comité Social – the body created to 
guarantee cordial worker-management relations in the corporatist society envisioned by the 
Vichy regime – at the Lever soap factories in Lille’s Haubourdin district, several workers 
filed a complaint about the meals being served in their factory canteen. They were unhappy 
about the insufficient rations of potatoes, as they did not like the split peas that had been 
used to complement the menu that day. But the committee chairman was quite clear that 
‘the current circumstances no longer allow for such abundance as to satisfy all the tastes’, 
calling on workers to resign themselves ‘to eating whatever can be found’.1  
 Indeed, such demands for appetising food would seem increasingly presumptuous 
once occupation made way for liberation. Contrary to a widespread popular belief that 
working-class living standards would improve dramatically after the cessation of 
hostilities, the material conditions actually grew worse for many workers during the first 
post-war years as various factors combined to their disadvantage. Firstly, the chaos 
surrounding the immediate aftermath of liberation brought industry to a standstill across 
continental Europe. Secondly, the destruction of infrastructure as well as the paucity of 
natural resources seriously affected supply lines even after industrial production had 
resumed. Thirdly, the devastation of machinery and the severe shortage of (skilled) labour 
wrought by war kept overall industrial output well below pre-war levels until the late 
1940s. All of this was compounded still further by the two brutally cold winters of 1945/46 
and 1946/47, which drove the working class to the edge both physically and mentally. In 
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these circumstances, workers were often completely preoccupied with the quest for such 
scarce commodities as food, coal, or clothing. 
 This chapter sets out to demonstrate that such immediate bread-and-butter concerns 
always outweighed longer-term political demands for (socialist) workers in post-war Lille, 
Łódź, Milano, and Plzeň. That is not to argue that the largely socio-economic agenda 
advanced by the European working class was somehow not ‘political’. Actually, this 
chapter analyses the endless list of complaints (socialist) workers levelled against their 
political leaders: their utter failure to improve worker living standards, their powerlessness 
in the face of rampant inflation, their complete inability to clamp down upon the 
flourishing black market, and their general disinterest in the everyday predicament of their 
own rank and file. Yet, this was all a far cry from the struggles for self-management so 
often associated with the post-war European working class. Instead, its more properly 
‘political’ demands were always closely connected to its material grievances. The real 
programme of the working class, then, was definitely its egalitarianism. The ‘moral 
economy’ was strong in each of the four cities: if reconstruction was going to be a long and 
painstaking process, its hardships were to be shouldered collectively with the strongest 
backs bearing the heaviest burden.   
 
The Supply Side 
 
The extent to which lacking access to basic necessities trumped all other considerations 
amongst the post-war European working class is borne out by the concepts dominating 
their vocabulary. Worker discourses in post-war Lille, Łódź, and Milano were packed with 
demands for a better ravitaillement, aprowizacja, and alimentazione respectively – 
designating either ‘supply’ or simply ‘food’ in each case. In Plzeň, the material situation 
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was initially more tolerable,2 with the ČSSD daily claiming victory in the battle for bread 
by the autumn of 1945.3 But even with food more readily available, workers increasingly 
complained about excessive drahota – the prohibitively high prices at which first 
necessities had to be bought. It was this combination of severe shortages and dwindling 
purchasing power that tormented, unnerved, and more and more outraged workers. For 
despite socialist leaders’ promises to the contrary, things were not getting better for their 
rank and file as the first post-war years went by. 
 It was not long before it dawned upon workers that the sufferings of occupation 
were to continue into liberation. If food and fuel were already hard to come by in the final 
months of the war, they were in even shorter supply after fighting was over. At first, this 
still seemed to be related to the direct exigencies of war and troop movements. In the North 
of France, liberation was reported to have been a ‘hard awakening’ for those people who 
had expected their problems to disappear and ravitaillement to re-normalise. It had taken 
the German Ardennes counter-offensive for them to realise that the war was still ongoing 
and that equipping the frontline remained the number one priority.4 In Plzeň, meanwhile, 
there was widespread worker concern and discontent about the Americans (the city was 
liberated by General George Patton’s Third U.S. Army in May 1945) moving food out of 
the city to supply their forces.5 But as direct hostilities receded further into the background, 
it became clear that these difficulties were not of a momentary nature. By July 1945, 
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Milanese workers were taking to the streets in a hunger march, carrying signs with such 
slogans as ‘reduction of the cost of living’, ‘bread and work’, ‘our children are hungry’, 
‘price control’, ‘we want an immediate devaluation’, ‘protect our interests against those 
starving the people’, and ‘struggle with the black market’. Patience with those in power 
(including socialists) was already running thin, the local PSIUP press reported, as ‘all 
things human have a limit’.6 
 But it quickly emerged that the new rulers were unable to deliver upon even the 
most basic demands of the working class. In the Łódź region alone, there had been twenty 
strikes protesting the terrible state of aprowizacja by August 1945.7 At a meeting of 
socialist workers in the city’s public transport shops that month, one worker lamented that 
the reigning chaos demonstrated the government was not up to its task. After all, winter 
was approaching fast and still the working class had not been supplied with coal. 
Demanding compensatory payments to fill up the holes in his household budget, another 
worker illustrated his predicament graphically. Where his new-born should be a source of 
parental joy, he argued, it was quickly developing into ‘a tragedy’. As his entire income 
was swallowed up by buying baby food on the free market, ‘what should he and the rest of 
his family live on?’.8 Similarly, local socialists in Roubaix were soon to voice their 
discontent about their own party’s Minister for Provisions in the first De Gaulle 
government – Paul Ramadier.9 So meagre were the rations handed out by his ministry that 
he was rapidly nicknamed ‘Ramadan’ or ‘Ramadiète’ across the region.10  
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 This pattern of rank-and-file workers reproaching their leaders for failing to provide 
for their everyday necessities would repeat itself over and over again during the months 
and years to follow. The common charge was that political and trade union leaders were so 
immersed in high politics and macro-economic management now that they were finally in 
(shared) power that they had lost sight of the real problems besetting the very people they 
were representing. And these problems were real enough. Not only did the lacking supply 
of food, coal, and clothing cause starvation and freezing, but the prices of those few goods 
that were available were spiralling dangerously out of control. In these circumstances, 
workers were often at a loss as to why their wages were held back or even dropping.  
 In fact, working-class living standards had been falling right from liberation. In 
each of the four cities, workers complained bitterly that wages and prices were completely 
out of balance and getting worse. In Lille, a popular saying went that ‘whereas salaries take 
the staircase, prices take the elevator’,11 as the cost of living had risen by 35% and wages 
only by 25%.12 In Plzeň, there was strong criticism of the Supreme Pricing Authority, 
which calculated the prices for a whole range of provisions. Based upon its estimates, the 
government had increased wages in December 1945, but reality had quickly caught up. 
With incessant price rises wiping out the entire increase within a matter of months, 
workers in the metal sector faulted the organ both for setting its projections too low and for 
failing to include the prices of water, electricity, and gas in its calculations.13 Whereas the 
combination of relentless price increases and static (or rising below-inflation) wages 
caused serious anxieties amongst the Milanese working class as well,14 the situation was 
arguably worst in Łódź. There were repeated testimonies of wages either coming down or 
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being paid belatedly in the face of unbridled price hikes.15 In that situation, even vital 
necessities were often beyond the reach of workers, with coal and foodstuffs all but 
impossible to acquire on an average salary.16 
 Small wonder, then, that workers were demanding something far-reaching to 
change this state of affairs. According to the internal commission at Milano’s tram 
manufacturing and repairing Teodosio, the continuous hikes in the cost of living had made 
the food situation so precarious that workers were no longer able to work productively. In 
these circumstances, a 10% salary increase would not do anymore – the trade unions 
should instead aim for a 40%  raise.17 Such generous pay packages were, however, not 
forthcoming. Quite the contrary, in their efforts to break the vicious cycle of wage and 
price rises, governments in each of the four countries increasingly relied on wage restraint. 
There was much resentment over unfulfilled promises regarding pay increases and bonuses 
amongst such diverse groups as miners in Plzeň,18 tire makers in Milano,19 and 
functionaries in Łódź.20  
But the issue was most thorny in France, where salaries were blocked for a 
prolonged period in 1946 while the cost of living kept going up. At a regional meeting of 
the SFIO in Cambrai, emotions over the government’s price and incomes policy ran high. 
Where the delegate from Lille’s Santes commune was still polite describing the control of 
wages and not prices as ‘a mistake’ and calling for an attack on profit margins instead, his 
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1946], APŁ, DK PPS Tramwaje, 13, fos 39-40. 
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colleague from Pérenchies condemned the party for not living up to socialism whilst 
branding the salary policy ‘criminal’. The representative from Tourcoing summed up the 
general mood demanding that not the Franc, but the purchasing power of workers would be 
defended.21 
 In all four countries, the newly unified trade union movement had been imputed 
with the task of defending working-class interests in questions of living standards and 
wages. But, as workers in the four cities were soon to find out, trade union leaders toed the 
government line rather than vice-versa. Although the Central Council of Trade Unions 
(ÚRO) tried its best, an editorial in the Plzeň ČSSD press argued, ‘we would be lying if we 
were to say that its interventions with the president, the government, and the political 
parties have made much of a difference’.22 In the North of France, at the same time, a 
growing number of workers were refusing to pay their monthly membership dues to the 
CGT. It is clear, one of them lamented, ‘that the directives of the CGT leadership make it 
impossible for us to have a go at some of our demands’. Where trade union officials kept 
harping on about the need for sacrifices to rebuild the country, ‘it must not be the case that 
all sacrifices are made by workers’.23  
Local socialists often used such worker grievances as a stick with which to beat 
communist trade union leaders. A brochure published by the SFIO sections in Denain and 
Bouchain criticised the communists for ‘their complete disinterest vis-à-vis the trade union 
movement at the sole benefit of a political party’. During the last strike at the Cail furnace 
works, ‘political arrivals’ had ordered strikers to make up for lost hours. Since when, the 
brochure asked, ‘were struck hours recovered? Where was the time that trade union leaders 
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demanded the integral payment of lost hours as a pre-condition for a return to work?’.24 
Similarly, local social democrats in Plzeň accused their Provincial Trade Union Council 
(KOR) of only fighting the KSČ’s political struggles. Rather than staging factory walkouts 
on such partisan issues as the ‘lenient’ sentences handed to the collaborationist leaders of 
the wartime Protectorate government or the re-election of Plzeň’s communist mayor,25 it 
should re-direct its energies towards the cost of living crisis.26 For many workers were 
complaining that the KOR was doing all sorts of things that could easily be left to political 
parties, whilst forgetting what really dominated working-class concerns – the question of 
drahota.27 
Not that socialist leaders were beyond grassroots reproach for their attitudes 
towards trade unionism. Reflecting upon the subordinate role of trade unions, local 
socialists from Sesto San Giovanni (Milano) pointed to their national leaders. Where they 
might have the best of intentions towards the trade union movement, ‘the road to hell is 
paved with good intentions’. Concrete support was needed, as trade unions had grown into 
the ‘Cinderella’ of present-day Italy. Never publishing any articles dealing with ‘trade 
unions, their function, and above all their indispensability’, the national PSIUP newspaper 
Avanti! (run by the party leadership) was severely criticised. After all, workers would 
happily forsake all treatises on political processes to finally read something that related to 
their vital problems. Was ‘it impossible to clear out half a column’ for that?28 
Far from empowering the trade unions, however, socialist (and communist) leaders 
increasingly employed them as transmission belts for government policy.29 Workers were 
quick to identify their unions with the authorities and worse. Claiming that everyone who 
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spoke out against the fact that the collective agreements had only been to the benefit of the 
industrialists was censured, one Milanese socialist argued that it had been exactly these 
types of injustices that had created worker discontent with and distrust towards the fascist 
unions.30 The negotiating positions taken by trade union bodies were also a major source 
of dissatisfaction amongst Łódź socialists. Complaints focused on such diverse issues as 
the unfairness of collective agreements for simple workers,31 on union inability to reach 
collective agreements in the first place,32 and on union support for a prolongation of the 
working day.33 By mid-1946, socialist workers in Łódź’s textile industry were wondering 
where the trade unions were, asking who was fighting their corner, and petitioning trade 
unionists to show some interest in their lives.34 Less than a year later, their counterparts in 
the city centre concluded that trade unions were powerless in questions of pay drops.35 
Feeling abandoned by its traditional organizations, the working class increasingly 
took matters into its own hands. Agitations, (wildcat) strikes, and theft were the order of 
the day in industry, as workers were desperate to improve their standard of living. Out of 
the four cities, the situation was definitely least volatile in Plzeň,36 but even here there 
were several agitations demanding a pay increase to cope with unbearable drahota.37 Łódź, 
on the other hand, was the strike capital of Poland and possibly Europe, with over 500 
strikes between 1945 and 1948. Not only were the overwhelming majority of these inspired 
by economic concerns, but even those strikes that historiography describes as ‘political’ 
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quickly developed a bread-and-butter character.38 Although the big strike wave that swept 
the city in September 1947 had its origins in a workplace conflict over the introduction of 
multi-machine work at the I.K. Poznański cotton mill, its rowdy meetings were marked by 
claims that life was harder now than it had been before the war or even during the 
occupation. And while officially an outcry against the alleged maltreatment of Poznański 
strikers by the authorities, the solidarity strikes that subsequently broke out across the city 
had strong subsistence overtones as well. Especially amongst Łódź’s large female 
workforce, many complained about low earnings, bread tasting like clay, children starving, 
and the threat of tuberculosis.39 
Theft from the workplace, which was ‘endemic’ in several post-war European 
industrial centres,40 was a further manifestation of worker despair. A worker at Milano’s 
tractor-producing Motomeccanica called upon the government to no longer hand orders to 
firms laying off workers, as in the current situation of mass unemployment even ‘honest 
people become black marketers, thieves, etc. to feed themselves and their families’.41 
Similarly, one socialist employed in the Łódź public transport system remarked that the 
theft of coal by railway workers was a sign of their bitterness. The worker, he argued, 
demanded ‘that something was done for him’, for the ‘sad reality’ was that the worker was 
‘treated like a beggar’ by ‘his own comrades in leading positions’.42  
Grassroots socialists in the North of France likewise berated their leaders for 
simply not comprehending the ordeal the working class went through. When, at the first 
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post-war congress of the SFIO’s Northern Federation, its leader and SFIO Executive 
member Augustin Laurent identified the constitutional question as the most urgent problem 
of the day, denounced the strike movement as ‘motiveless’, and admonished socialist 
workers to play a more positive role in the run-up to the next elections, a local delegate 
swiftly rebuked him. While he agreed with Laurent on the importance of drawing up a new 
constitution, there were ‘other problems’ to which SFIO ought to devote its attention. 
Above all, this concerned the problem of ravitaillement, which formed the central concern 
for the bulk of the electorate and to the amelioration of which the party should immediately 
commit itself.43 
If the disregard socialist leaders seemed to show for the woes tormenting their rank 
and file initially met with such constructive criticism, the mood at the grassroots rapidly 
soured. Whilst still expressing understanding for the fact that their government was 
completely immersed in the business of post-war reconstruction, miners in Plzeň were 
already warning that it would be hard for them to make their peace with further delays to 
promised improvements in pay and food provision by mid-1945.44 In the North of France, 
meanwhile, local socialists were much bewildered at the SFIO’s acquiescence of the 
economic policies implemented by liberal minister René Pleven – at that time combining 
both the Finance and National Economy briefs in the first De Gaulle government. Fingered 
by grassroots socialists as a representative of those notorious ‘200 families’ that had 
dominated inter-war France,45 Roubaix’s socialist mayor Victor Provo condemned Pleven 
for ‘nothing but copying the measures that [Raymond] Poincaré [the conservative who 
served three terms as France’s Prime Minister in the 1920s] had adopted in 1925’. As this 
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could only lead to ‘public debt rising and living standards dropping every day’, it was 
about time that Pleven devised some new fiscal measures that would hit the rich.46 
Socialists in Milano expressed a similar exasperation with same old laissez-faire 
economics. Franco Mariani, the foremost socialist trade unionist in the region, declared in 
1946 that it had been a ‘fundamental mistake’ for the government to sacrifice every form 
of market discipline at the altar of free trade. In the face of severe problems with 
alimentazione, ministers had ‘preferred to do nothing’, expecting the issue ‘would solve 
itself’. The opposite had been the case and therefore it was imperative to arrive at ‘a 
controlled economy’.47  
But even under more interventionist regimes, workers found ample cause for 
dissatisfaction. When the SFIO’s André Philip took over at Finance and National Economy 
in the Gouin government, his efforts to clean up the nation’s finances by exerting tight 
control over prices and wages created considerable turmoil in socialist ranks. If socialist 
workers were already disgruntled about the government-warranted price hikes of tobacco 
and coal,48 matters came to a head over the 25% wage increase suddenly demanded by the 
CGT in the run-up to the June 1946 parliamentary elections. Brushed aside by socialist 
leaders as no more than a communist election stunt, rank-and-file party members saw more 
merit in the proposal. At a meeting of the local SFIO section in Cambrai, grassroots 
socialists castigated the party leadership for its ‘passivity’ and ‘procrastination’ in 
questions of prices and wages.49 Had the socialist press organs really ‘considered it 
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appropriate to interview workers and almost have them say that a 25% raise would be 
unwelcome’?50  
This form of patronising was all the harder to accept from parties and governments 
claiming to rule in the name of the working class. The last thing workers needed, an 
editorial in the Plzeň social democratic press read, was ‘prestige or flattery – that they are 
spoken about as if they have power and dominate the situation’. What the working class 
did require was an improvement of their living standards: cheap clothing and shoes for 
their children, new homes and furniture for their youngsters, all those things they ‘put off 
buying for six years’. The clothing reserves had reached rock bottom – ‘we need to return 
to the living standards of the last years of the First Republic as soon as possible’.51 
As the longed-for amelioration in the supply situation failed to materialise, 
grassroots socialists invoked the memory of the interwar years, for better or (more often) 
worse, with increasing frequency. Addressing the social ills of post-war Poland, one Łódź 
socialist compared current times to the period when the country was ruled by the Sanacja 
dictatorship.52 The Sesto San Giovanni PSIUP expressed similar sentiments in an open 
letter to the national PSIUP leadership in August 1946. After giving an exposition of all the 
causes underlying the miserable living conditions of the working class, it concluded: ‘The 
worker is patient and has been waiting for a year-and-a-halve for someone or something to 
change this state of affairs. Nothing! Like before, worse than before. We cannot continue 
like this’. In devoting all their energies to the peace negotiations, which were going to be 
decided by the imperialist powers anyway, political leaders had ignored ‘the harsh realities 
of our internal situation, the truth about the conditions of the working masses’. They 
should take an interest in the concerns of the working class and remember that there was ‘a 
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certain limit where people stop reasoning, close their eyes, and vent the anger that has been 
brewing in their hearts’.53 
 
The Dark Side 
 
More than anything, this grassroots resentment concerned their leaders’ seeming diffidence 
in the face of those sinister forces seeking to profit from working-class misery. With so 
many shortages, the widespread opportunities to make a quick gain often proved 
irresistible for those people with access to scarce goods and services. The black market 
was not just about peasants selling off their surpluses at outrageous prices – it was a vast 
system encompassing entire businesses or sectors, frequently in connivance with either the 
authorities or the workforce, committing massive frauds. Nor was speculation the only 
wrongdoing that caught the worker’s eye. From the shameless incompetence, indifference, 
and wastefulness at the top to the nepotism that saw some workers getting more than their 
fair share at the bottom, there were all sorts of scandals that beggared working-class belief. 
One common theme clearly emerges, though: that of the honest and diligent worker 
suffering at the hands of those having only personal gain on their minds. 
 In order to guarantee an equitable division of first necessities, all four countries 
adopted a rationing regime. In reality, however, workers frequently complained that rations 
were neither even-handed nor sustainable. There were several protestations that workers or 
other vulnerable groups were short-changed in or even excluded from the distribution of 
various goods. Socialist workers in Łódź’s city centre argued that their provision of 
coupons did not suffice. Bread had been rationed, but the worker also needed cereals, peas, 
and other foodstuffs. Moreover, despite personal hygiene being crucial in the struggle 
                                                          
53 Esecutivo PSIUP Sesto San Giovanni to Direzione PSIUP, Vice Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 
Nenni, and Gruppo Parlementare PSIUP, Sesto Proletaria, 28 August 1946. 
97 
 
against diseases, workers had been left out of the allotments of soap altogether.54 Similarly, 
socialist workers in Cambrai expressed their bemusement that already better-off peasants 
received additional supplements of butter, oil, and sugar.55 In Plzeň, finally, there were 
many complaints that, unlike workers, tradesmen, artisans, students, and housewives 
taking care of young children, the ill as well as pensioners had not been awarded with ‘P3’ 
coupons for bread, fats, and meat by the Ministry for Food. Josef Janouš – the ČSSD 
spokesman for supply in the city council – recommended intervening with Prague so that 
every household would at least have one of these coupons.56 
 Even if coupons were forthcoming, however, workers had plenty of grievances 
about the abuses of rationing and distribution. First of all, these concerned the size of 
rations. Socialists in the North of France initially blamed their government’s passivity for 
small rations. Once Paris came to grips with ravitaillement and finally cracked down on 
the distributional organisms of Vichy, the rations could certainly be enlarged.57 But such 
improvements were often a long time in coming. By the summer of 1947, socialist city 
guards in Łódź were still arguing that their coal rations were insufficient. Winter was 
approaching again and ‘nobody cares whether guards have something to keep them warm 
after they return from service’.58 
 Secondly, what little supplies workers received in return for their coupons were 
often of questionable and decreasing quality. The combination of severe ingredient 
shortages for and substantial profit margins on everyday essentials led to the widespread 
diluting of foodstuffs. Amongst Milanese workers, there was intense unease about the 
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dropping nutritional value of bread. Whilst workers understood that the paucity of flour 
made a return to higher sifting levels impossible, they demanded that the new 80% level 
would be observed. This was part of a more general indignation over the ‘rarefaction’ of 
several vital necessities, especially the sugars indispensable for babies. If the city 
authorities were not going to live up to their protective duties in this respect, it was 
imperative that ‘special surveillance squads’ were formed to exert a ‘capillary control’ over 
the distribution process ‘in the interest of the more healthy part of the Milanese 
population’.59 
 Thirdly, rations were sometimes entirely fictitious, as workers were unable to cash 
in their coupons. In Plzeň, drahota had turned into such a problem by April 1946 that 
countless workers on low wages, pensioners, and families with many children could not 
afford to buy all the products they were entitled to according to the rationing system. As a 
consequence, workers earning below the average working-class income of 2000 Crowns a 
month often failed to meet the state-prescribed daily calorie intake.60 How then, the local 
ČSSD press asked, were these people supposed ‘to pay for clothing, shoes, and rent’?61 
But even when the worst cost of living problems were in the past, some workers still felt 
cheated by rationing outcomes. Across the Plzeň region, women workers complained 
bitterly about shops being empty by the time they had finished their shifts. The preferential 
permits that had awarded working women a ‘right to buy’ were no good, as shopkeepers 
had chosen to ignore these and allow their stocks to sell out. Instead, women trade union 
representatives called for no new satin coupons to be handed out until all women had spent 
theirs and subjecting those cueing up in front of stores to controls.62  
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 Finally, distribution centres were often hotspots for all sorts of tampering with 
rations and coupons. This was especially true for the rations provided by the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) that was active in three of the 
four cities (Łódź, Milano, and Plzeň). As its aid packages were frequently dispersed to 
factories before being passed on to workers, those presiding over the issue of rations were 
in a position that was at the same time crucial and corruptible. In Plzeň, there were ČSSD 
misgivings about several factory council members, whom they accused of deliberately 
withholding UNRRA allotments in their personal interest.63 If the Plzeň social democrats 
wanted (part of) the factory council out of the UNRRA distribution process, the Łódź 
socialists wanted it in. Its cross-party nature, socialist textile workers argued, was the only 
guarantee that the raffles of UNRRA allocations would not be ‘won’ exclusively by PPR 
members.64 Such charges of party-political favouritism were likewise levelled at local 
communists in the North of France. In communes under communist direction, the 
allegation went, ‘T-coupons’ designated for blue-collar workers had been granted to white-
collar workers and even to young girls.65 
 It is indicative of the considerable power wielded by those able to get their hands 
on products at some point in the distribution chain. Grassroots activists in each of the four 
cities much resented the countless middlemen taking a cut between the production and 
consumption of goods for driving up prices. During a meeting with Edward Osóbka-
Morawski, a delegation of the Łódź provincial PPS pressed their Prime Minister on the 
question of trade control and returned with assurances that ‘abuses and speculation’ would 
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be exterminated.66 Similarly, workers in Milano demanded that ‘the illegal trafficking of 
goods, artificial price hikes, and the smokescreen around products’ would come to an 
end.67 Socialists in the North of France, for their part, identified ‘the disappearance of the 
intermediaries between producers and consumers’ as a pre-requisite for the 25% price drop 
championed by their national leaders.68 
 But the adverse effects of distribution go-betweens were undoubtedly most keenly 
felt in Czechoslovakia. Petitioning ÚRO to intervene with the government against ‘all 
parasites in our economic life’, Plzeň railway workers claimed their living standards had 
been hit twice by these ‘distribution mooches’. Not only did their cut add further to the 
already excessive costs of living, but their lavish spending on luxury items also pushed up 
inflation still higher.69 In a similar vein, Ladislav Cígler, the foremost ČSSD trade unionist 
in the region, protested against the ‘absurdity’ of fruit needlessly going bad during its 
prolonged storage at ‘collection points’. If swift action was not taken, he concluded, Plzeň 
might well follow in the footsteps of Slovakia, where the ‘added value’ of official 
distribution intermediaries had gotten so out of control that beef and eggs were cheaper on 
the black market than at state-licensed shops.70 
 Workers certainly never felt they were getting a bargain when taking recourse to 
the black market. As much as they resented having to deal with the ‘vampires’ operating 
on this shady scene,71 however, it was often the only way to add sufficiently to that being 
provided via official channels (both rations and the products sold on the free market) for 
their families to get by. The authorities’ inability to root out the countless abuses of the 
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black market, then, caused more widespread disillusionment amongst workers than 
shortages, prices, and wages ever did. For unlike the force majeure of war and 
reconstruction associated with the problems on the supply side, there was no excuse for 
failing to protect the working class against those growing rich at their expense. 
 At a base level, worker grievances about the black market constituted a backlash 
against peasant ascendancy across post-war Europe. Their direct access to food not only 
shielded peasants from the hunger so often suffered by the urban working class, but also 
gave them a powerful economic tool if they managed to keep their produce out of the 
official distribution channels. Indeed, the most common accusation workers brought 
against peasants was that of subverting or withholding food earmarked for the city, with a 
view to selling it at a much-inflated price on the black market. Whereas factory workers in 
Sesto San Giovanni held peasants responsible for their starvation,72 local socialists in Łódź 
noted how peasants ‘exploited the moment’ by not sending to the city those ‘first 
necessities for which the worker was languishing’.73 Accordingly, there were many calls 
for more thorough controls over the rural economy. As statistics clearly demonstrated that 
the production of milk had not fallen since liberation, a leader in the Plzeň ČSSD press 
suggested the city authorities implemented a broad range of measures to guarantee ‘that 
milk coupons could be abolished and that there will be sufficient quantities of butter for 
our children’.74 Socialists in the North of France went one further, favouring ‘exemplary 
sanctions’ against those peasants defaulting on their obligations to provide milk at the new 
state-regulated price.75 
                                                          
72 X, ‘La rivoluzione continua’, Sesto Proletaria, 19 July 1945.  
73 ‘Protokół z ogólnego zebrania Koła PPS w Panstwowej Fabryce Nr. 2, Ł.Z.P.W’ [7 May 1947], APŁ, DK 
PPS Śródmieście Lewa, 14, fo. 40. 
74 Dr. Kotyk, ‘Hospodaření mlékem. Nízké dodávky mléka měly by se zvýsit’, Nový Den, 3 August 1945. 
75 ‘Le Parti Socialiste: Département du Nord’, [reference date: 28 February  1946], ADN, CRR, 19 W 37108 
1. 
102 
 
 It was, however, not just such immediate subsistence concerns that underlay 
working-class hostility towards the peasantry. There was a distinct feeling that the balance 
between worker and peasant as well as urban and rural interests needed redressing badly. 
During the war, argued a ČSSD representative in the Plzeň city council, the collection of 
milk had still proceeded in an orderly fashion. But in the freedom that had accompanied 
liberation, many on the countryside had ‘spotted an opportunity to loosen discipline’. From 
various villages and communities, milk was either arriving in a miserable state or not 
reaching the city at all.76 Similarly, socialist textile workers in Łódź wondered why 
villages were still being equipped with limitless supplies of textiles. Had the assumption 
not been that providing the peasantry with indispensable industrial goods would be met 
with a commensurate price drop for agricultural products?77 If Łódź socialists were 
bemused that peasants received something for nothing, their counterparts in Cambrai were 
outraged when the French government proposed a ‘revalorisation’ of wheat and milk. 
Amid several claims that peasants were ‘exploiters’, who had emerged enriched from the 
war, one delegate illustrated the contrasts between worker ‘misery’ and peasant ‘opulence’ 
vividly. ‘Before the war’, he declared, ‘there were men and pigs. Now there are pigs and 
men: the former eat wheat, the latter bran’.78 
 The black market did not stop at peasants taking advantage of worker desperation, 
though, but quickly drew in wide sections of post-war society. By late 1945, Mariani 
lamented that ‘the most shameless speculation and profiteering has permeated all 
groups’.79 What is more, products often found their way to the black market via an 
intricate web involving several of these groups. If bakers in Monza closing their shops at 
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11am after selling all of their bread on the black market might still have been working on 
their own,80 the same could certainly not be said for those people subverting raw materials 
or finished products from industrial sites. The Plzeň ČSSD press repeatedly called upon 
workers to keep their eyes open for the defrauding of goods from their factories – workers, 
after all, ‘definitely did not work for some to grow rich easily off their labour’.81 But, as 
time went by, it became increasingly clear that pockets of the working class were 
embroiled neck-deep in the illicit trails of goods. Whether it were these truckers shipping 
59m³ more coal than indicated on their bill of lading82 or that factory council allowing 
thousands of metres of textile to disappear to Slovakia,83 some workers certainly seemed to 
have a stake in keeping the black market up-and-running.  
Things were exactly the other way around in Milano, where employers were 
accused of facilitating the speculative practices of their workforce. The internal 
commission at Pirelli castigated the ‘immorality’ of other local companies’ failure to 
observe new regulations restricting the working week to 40 hours. Overtime being paid in 
kind, this measure had been put in place to stem the flow of products to the black market. 
Yet, far from reducing hours, some firms had prolonged the working week to 60 or even 72 
hours – giving their workers products with a street value of between 700 and 800 lire in 
return.84  
Where the black market might have enabled a segment of the working class to 
‘squander not inconsiderable sums’ gambling in bars,85 it constituted a horrible aberration 
for the great majority of workers. ‘Illegal trade’, a socialist in the Łódź textile sector 
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argued, should be forbidden for it allowed ‘elements who never work’ to ‘live well’.86 The 
contrasts between the sumptuous lifestyles afforded by speculators and the daily anguish of 
the working class were an affront to many workers. A conference of ČSSD factory 
organisations from Plzeň district demanded that the 2% living off the black market would 
be made to work. ‘Filling bars’ and ‘spending dizzying amounts’, after all, their behaviour 
‘provokes others, i.e. those who strive for fulfilment of the government’s Two Year 
Plan’.87 More and more, this toxic combination of black market extortion and speculator 
extravagance drove workers to extremes. Calling for ‘a firm BASTA to the wild and 
greedy speculation that is running rampant and could lead us to wholly unintended 
actions’, a resolution adopted by socialist trade unionists at Milanese train manufacturer 
TIBB already seemed to hint at retributive action.88 
What rank-and-file activists really wanted, however, was for their leaders to finally 
make the full force of the law bear upon the black market. Observers noted a strong 
upswing in satisfaction amongst socialists in the North of France after François Tanguy-
Prigent, the SFIO’s new Minister for Agriculture, launched a campaign wishing ‘death on 
the bloodsuckers of the black market’. But even with slogans like that, there was a distinct 
feeling that the party faithful wanted to ‘go further still than their representatives in terms 
of the reforms to enact’.89  
In fact, grassroots socialists frequently berated their national leaders for failing to 
follow through on their hawkish rhetoric regarding the black market. Despite official 
government propaganda being full of militaristic hyperbole of battles with high prices, 
speculators, and the like, socialists in Łódź found the Commission for Combating 
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Extortion left much to be desired.90 To add insult to injury, workers were unpleasantly 
‘surprised’ by that same government raising train fares right in the middle of the 
campaign.91 Milanese socialists were likewise left disillusioned by anti-speculative 
measures that had looked promising on paper. When ‘our party […] had sensed the 
overriding need to squeeze prices, to sort out the flow of raw materials, and to take action 
against the black market’ in its economic programme, the local PSIUP in Sesto San 
Giovanni wrote, ‘workers had enjoyed a moment of confident satisfaction’. But once they 
realised that ‘the proposals did not have an adequate application in practice’, workers had 
‘shaken their heads revealingly’.92  
Local socialists often attributed the ineffectiveness of such initiatives to the 
leniency that the authorities showed profiteers. According to Robert Coutant, who played a 
key role in the rebuilding of local SFIO sections in the North of France, many of the 
continuing ravitaillement problems were due to the fact that there had been no thorough 
crackdown on the distributive organisms of Vichy – notorious for their involvement in the 
black market during the war. ‘[S]ome examples’ should have been set at the moment of 
liberation, he told a meeting of socialists in Pecquencourt, by handing its high 
functionaries ‘criminal rather than administrative penalties’.93 While Milanese workers 
demanded a more ‘drastic’ approach towards the black market as well,94 the outrage over 
caught black marketeers getting away with a slap on the wrist was definitely greatest in 
Plzeň. Reports in the ČSSD press repeatedly decried the sentences pronounced by the 
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provincial authorities as a joke – receiving a 1000 Crown fine for making a 12000 Crown 
profit on the black market would ‘only make the profiteer crave further frauds’.95 The hunt 
for speculators, moreover, seemed to be systematically obstructed from above. Local social 
democrats were baffled as to why the police action to detect speculators and put them to 
work was going to be stopped, why arrested speculators were not named-and-shamed, and 
how factory managers sanctioned for fraud could be re-hired.96 When another factory 
manager got an already small fine halved, fingers were pointing towards the KSČ. ‘How 
many people [...] in Prague’ was he ‘cooperating with’?97 
Increasingly, then, workers were left with the impression of a ruling class primarily 
concerned with closing ranks on itself. This was borne out by the various scandals 
revealing those in responsible positions simply not to care about the plight of the working 
class. There were instances of shocking negligence: the burning of great quantities of 
wheat and shoes in Limoges, while ‘a part of the French population cannot feed and clothe 
itself properly’.98 There were cases of deliberate market manipulation: industrialists in 
Milano stockpiling their goods pending further inflation99 and employers’ organisations 
calling on those few businesses that had lowered prices to re-raise them in 
Czechoslovakia.100 And there was blatant cronyism: despite the housing situation being 
‘tragic’ in Łódź,101 occupancy controls on the homes of industrial directors were being 
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blocked by the PPR.102 All things considered, those with ‘money as only motherland’ 
definitely seemed to be running the show yet again.103 Or, as workers at Škoda put it: ‘We 
know very well that within certain groups in our country, thanks to the unscrupulous price 
hikes, a new capitalist class is growing’.104   
 
The Other Side         
 
To nip this burgeoning capitalism in the bud once and for all, the working class demanded 
a levelling of the playing field first and foremost. There had been a widespread expectation 
that income inequalities would decrease or wither away under democracy, a concept 
workers associated with economic equality at least as much as with political freedom. 
Where elections might have propelled the Left into (shared) political power with relative 
ease, however, making good the economic imbalances between rich and poor proved a 
much harder task. Increasingly restless about the static or even widening gap between the 
haves and have-nots of post-war society, rank-and-file activists began questioning their 
leaders. How could those enriched by war be let off lightly, whilst the working class was 
bearing the brunt of post-war reconstruction? Why were the better-off able to profit from 
government social schemes, whereas workers on the state’s payroll got a terrible deal? But 
working-class egalitarianism went far beyond a mere resentment of business fat cats. For 
even within the working class, there were all sorts of jealousies. Whether it was workers in 
other factories, sectors, or regions bringing home more, the grass always seemed to be 
greener on the other side. 
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 Right from liberation, local socialists made it quite clear where the funds for 
reconstruction ought to be found. The SFIO’s Deputy Federal Secretary for Pas-de-Calais, 
for example, told socialists in Avion that the 280 billion deficit in the government’s budget 
should be made up for by the confiscation of the great fortunes amassed during the war. If 
the government continued to refuse this, he went on under laud applause, ‘the working 
class would find itself forced to take to the streets’.105 ‘Taking the money there where it is’ 
quickly became a recurring theme in socialist rhetoric across the North of France, as the 
party was not about to make ‘the underlings’ pay.106 Similarly, a socialist worker in Sesto 
San Giovanni insisted the inevitable sacrifices that lay ahead for liberated Italy should be 
shouldered in a proportional manner. The working class would contribute its sweat to the 
reconstruction effort, but he who had amassed 10 million should give at least half of that to 
the state.107  
In both countries, however, calls for a requisition of (war) profits were largely in 
vain. By late 1946, a worker at Motomeccanica was still demanding state controls over 
‘excess profits’, for it could not be the case that the worker was paying for ‘a war wanted 
by capital [whilst] capitalists were making billions each month’.108 Socialists in the North 
of France, for their part, were soon to bemoan not only the fact that ‘the working masses 
have paid, are paying, and will be paying the costs of war’,109 but also the half-hearted 
nature of those expropriation measures the government did enact. They widely denounced 
the nationalisation of the mines as a ‘caricature’, falling well short of what workers had 
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expected.110 Allowed to keep receiving their dividends and to stay on as finance directors, 
former owners certainly appeared to be hanging on to ‘their share of the spoils’.111  
Where confiscations and nationalisations at once cut deeper and took a broader 
scope in post-war Eastern Europe, relations between workers and management were hardly 
transformed overnight. In fact, concerns that nothing much had changed were already 
voiced during an August 1945 meeting of the Łódź provincial PPS. While one delegate 
questioned the gap between the 190 points (which could be traded for goods in the 
rationing system) earned by managers at the Horak textile factory and the 47 points their 
workforce received, another pointed out that railway directors addressed their workers in a 
language that reminded of the pre-war reaction.112  
Both in form and in substance, then, despised capitalist practices proved far more 
persistent than workers had anticipated in the wake of liberation. Workers in Plzeň 
repeatedly vented their frustration at managerial abuses past and present, which their trade 
unions seemingly condoned. Whereas workers at the Willy Geyer garment factory disputed 
KOR’s acquiescence in the return of an ‘asocial’ pre-war owner to management,113 their 
counterparts at Škoda called upon ÚRO and the government to go after those ‘without a 
conscience who had made millions off the labour of their employees’ since 1945.114 Even 
party leaders acknowledged that such unrepentant self-indulgence on the part of those in 
charge of now-nationalised industry had bred much bad blood. Speaking in the PPS 
Central Committee, party chairman Kasimierz Rusinek listed the reasons for working-class 
opposition to the government. In his view, little had changed since the war – the 
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administrative apparatus in industry was distrusted and whilst industrial managers had 
made no concessions regarding their living standards, workers got nothing.115 
In each of the four cities, therefore, rank-and-file activists demanded the divide 
separating rich and poor was narrowed one way or another. Many at the grassroots 
favoured income levelling. Signalling how much bitterness the huge varieties in earnings 
generated amongst the working masses, one socialist representative in the Łódź area 
wondered what had happened to the PPS. Having always struggled for income 
equalisation, after all, the party seemed to have ‘ignored’ the question since liberation.116 
In a similar vein, social democrats in Plzeň called on those standing at the helm of public 
institutions or nationalised companies to set the right example. As nobody could argue the 
working class was living in prosperity, those on ‘fairy-tale’ salaries should show some 
‘sobriety’ too.117 
Apart from such moral appeals upon parties or individuals, rank-and-file activists 
also urged their governments to use the levers at their disposal in a more progressive 
manner. Internal commissions across Milano united to prevent their city authorities from 
retrieving a new ‘family tax’ from workers on fixed wages. Branding it ‘immoral and anti-
social’ that the burden of post-war reconstruction fell almost exclusively on the shoulders 
of the working class, they called for a tax on ‘every form of luxury and extravagance’ 
instead.118 Socialists in the North of France went even further, proposing income tax, 
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‘which hits workers above all’, would be scrapped altogether and be replaced by a levy on 
‘fortunes and enrichment’.119 
If rank-and-file socialists would occasionally applaud their leaders’ initiatives to 
soak the rich,120 however, they far more frequently derided government interventions for 
coming up short in redistributive intent. The ČSSD in Plzeň joined its counterpart from 
Brno in opposing the strong shift from direct to indirect taxation in the government’s 1947 
budget. Making no difference between rich and poor, the government was reminded, 
indirect taxes on daily necessities had always been contested ‘by socialists of all colours 
when the bourgeoisie still held a majority before Munich’.121  
What social policy was introduced by the state, moreover, activists often 
condemned for favouring the rich at least as much as the poor. Socialists in Cambrai 
remonstrated against the plan to provide all consumers with 300 grams of bread at a rate 
fixed by income and a further amount of bread at a higher price. ‘It is workers’, one of 
them exhorted, ‘who are the largest consumers of bread and who would, once again, be 
bearing all the costs were the Council of Ministers to pass this measure’.122 Łódź workers 
found the system stacked against them to an even greater extent. Denouncing the fact that 
all sorts of allowances of bonuses were available to senior officials whilst ‘the lower 
functionary was starving’, a worker in the city’s public transport shops pointed to ‘the 
intelligentsia’. Having shed its blood for the freedom of the motherland, he argued, it 
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should be the working class to receive such assistance. But the intelligentsia had exploited 
all the ‘old habits’, forcing the worker to ‘renounce everything’.123  
 More contentious still than the perks bestowed upon white-collar workers, though, 
was the preferential treatment (allegedly) meted out to segments of the working class. First 
of all, there was much rancour that some workers seemed to be better off by virtue solely 
of where they lived. These questions often revolved around rural dwellers coming into the 
city to work. On the one hand, the extras granted to workers already taking home an urban 
wage to a place where the costs of living were much lower needed explaining.124 It was 
perfectly understandable, the urban workforce at the Falck metal plant in Sesto San 
Giovanni argued, that workers commuting from the surrounding villages were favoured in 
the distribution of bicycle covers. But why had workers living in villages, where supply 
was ‘much easier and less costly’, not been excluded from the distribution of food 
packages?125  
On the other, workers from outside the city frequently felt penalised just for 
residing on the countryside. Workers dwelling beyond the Łódź borders repeatedly 
questioned why they were left out of food or coal rations.126 In the North of France, 
meanwhile, there was much anger that the wartime distributive distinctions between rural 
and urban communities remained in force. The socialist section in rural Paillencourt passed 
a motion stressing the discontent caused by the smaller rations accorded to its workers. 
After all, many rural communities had not been blessed with potato seeds, whilst gardens 
                                                          
123 Protokoł zwyczajnego Koła P.P.S. przy Zarzadzie Miejskim, Wydziale Technicznym, Oddziale 
Pómiarow’, [16 August 1945], APŁ, DK PPS Śródmieście Prawa, 10, fos 5-6.   
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were often larger in urban communities. It would even happen that ‘in the same factory [...] 
at the same table, urban workers do have potatoes for dinner whereas “rurals” do not’.127  
 If such inequalities within one and the same factory generated much worker spite, 
colleagues did unite over the fringe benefits enjoyed by workers at other industrial sites. 
Miners’ representatives in the Plzeň region complained that, where miners at the Stříbro 
pits had been receiving food and tobacco supplements, their counterparts at Křimice had 
not. Such discriminating practices would certainly lead to discontent and discord, ‘for 
miners desire all to be measured by the same standards’.128 Expressing their surprise at the 
raise awarded to the workforce at nationalised gas companies, socialists in Cambrai voiced 
similar objections. If there was ‘a subsistence minimum for them’, they insisted, ‘the same 
advantages’ should be extended ‘to all other categories’.129  
Such demands notwithstanding, workers at smaller plants remained particularly 
vulnerable to being overlooked in the distribution of advantages. Asking why they had not 
been provided with cheap shoes, workers at a 72-employee Łódź factory were told that 
scheme only applied to establishments employing at least 250.130 Workers at Milano’s 
Amilcare Pizzi printing shop felt neglected at the favour of larger enterprises as well. 
Despite announcements regarding the distribution of food, clothing, or shoes in Avanti! or 
Unità (the PCI daily), the internal commission wrote, smaller factories were left in the dark 
about the specifics. It urged the trade union authorities to also inform companies without a 
canteen of pending hand-outs, in order not to disillusion ‘those who, plagued by need, 
believe to find help, [but] end up with a fistful of flies’.131 
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 The single worst-off group in each of the four cities, however, did not work in 
industry, nationalised or otherwise. It was the blue-collar workers employed by the state, 
such as railway workers, road builders, or postmen, who got the worst deal by far. Public 
sector workers often pointed out how bad their pay and conditions were in comparison 
with their counterparts in factories. In a memorandum to the ČSSD and the ČSL, manual 
labourers for Plzeň province demanded their wages and contributions would be levelled 
with those of industrial workers. It was beyond belief, after all, that ‘the physically 
exhausting work of constructing and maintaining highways was valued disproportionally 
lower than far lighter work in warm factory halls’.132 Socialist city workers in Łódź 
likewise raised the question of ‘unequal pay for the same work in different institutions’. 
After one worker lamented that the family allowances received by city workers were up to 
five times lower as elsewhere, another castigated the practice of handing out different types 
of coupons to different workers for creating ‘two categories of citizens’.133 So dire was the 
material situation of public sector workers that even their opposite numbers in industry 
wanted something to be done. Calling attention to the ‘absolute remunerative inferiority’ of 
state employees, especially railroad and postal workers, socialists at TIBB insisted the 
entire working class should show solidarity with public sector workers in their negotiations 
with the Italian government.134 
 Public sector workers certainly needed all the support they could get, for they often 
felt utterly deserted by their political and union leaders. State employees in the Milano area 
warned that the ‘inconceivable abandonment’ of and the ‘congenial disinterest’ in their 
cause on the part of regional trade union leaders was about to drive them ‘into open 
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struggle’ with the trade union authorities.135 Governments, too, were frequently accused of 
taking their own people for granted. There were reports of ‘a serious discontent’ amongst 
socialist public sector workers in the North of France, who claimed that ‘their spirit of 
discipline had been abused to make them bear heavy sacrifices’.136 Plzeň social democrats 
likewise underlined public employees’ dedication to the republic at liberation. Witnessing 
‘the pomp’ of official cars, banquets, and foreign travel relished by the mushrooming civil 
service, however, they increasingly came to view the official reasons for holding back their 
wages as ‘mere excuses and evasions’.137 These disparities between the happy few at the 
top of the state apparatus and the needy many at its bottom, also deplored in the North of 
France,138 caused much bewilderment coming from governments boasting their democratic 
and egalitarian character. Whilst lambasting ÚRO for its lack of interest in their ordeal, a 
meeting of Plzeň region road builders noted how their beliefs that ‘the lowest categories of 
workers’ would be helped out first and foremost ‘in a democratic state under popular 
government’ had been disappointed.139 
In their protests against the remaining inequalities of post-war society, workers 
drew increasingly on such allusions to the state’s own rhetoric. A government ‘calling 
itself democratic’, public sector workers in Sesto San Giovanni argued, could not afford to 
disregard ‘one of our most sacred rights, the right to life’.140 But workers often understood 
democracy to mean much more than merely such elementary rights. A worker in Łódź 
asked how it could be justifiable ‘in a democratic system’ that a manager earned 120% of 
what his subordinates made.141 The claim that ‘Poland [was] now a democratic country’ 
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was used by workers elsewhere in the city to attack the ‘especially privileged’ position of 
Jews. Everyone being equal in a democracy, there could be no ‘superior citizens’, who, by 
virtue of the ‘special grants’ meted out by ‘the Jewish community’ and their strong 
representation in trade and industrial management, were able ‘to drive limousines and dine 
in the best restaurants’.142  
Such manifestations of luxury were particularly poignant in the ‘popular’ 
democracies of Czechoslovakia and Poland, as they flew directly in the face of government 
slogans. In view of the official propaganda that there was no longer a bourgeoisie in 
People’s Poland, one socialist worker wondered who it was ‘driving around in limousines 
at Piotrkowska [Łódź’s main shopping street] and buying all the luxurious products that a 
worker can only dream about’.143 Further West, however, workers faulted governments for 
not delivering upon their egalitarian premises all the same. Calling for an end to the 
‘injustice’ of rural and urban communities, socialists in the North of France reminded their 
leaders ‘that, amongst the three words that symbolise the Republic, there is EGALITY!’.144 
For many rank-and-file activists, then, the post-war state had failed on its own 
terms. To be sure, the Left was in (shared) power, but many of the expectations of what 
that would entail, raised and cultivated during the interwar and war years, had been 
disappointed. As early as August 1945, one worker commented to the Milanese trade union 
authorities that the hopes of the liberation – including the levelling of the most evident 
income inequalities and providing state employees with a wage sufficient to avoid 
starvation – had not been realised. Seeing prices multiply relative to wages every day, 
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moreover, it was an affront to the working class to witness countless people still living in 
luxury.145  
If these remarks, accompanied as they were by an appeal on the government to do 
more, might yet be read as constructive criticism, there was more resignation in a 
retrospective commentary carried by the Plzeň ČSSD press in October 1946. ‘When we 
wrote incendiary articles and rebelled against the economic order during the economic 
crisis’, it goes, ‘we imagined a time would come when the small man [...] was to receive a 
proper and fair wage for his work’. Talking to workers today, the article continues, an 
altogether different reality revealed itself: ‘We have shortages, we live badly. We 
understand that we emerge from a horrible war and that everything cannot be changed 
overnight. We do not begrudge anyone, and we have suffered the necessary sacrifices, but 
we regret that these sacrifices have not been distributed evenly over everyone’.146    
 
Conclusion   
 
We have seen in this chapter that conditions and concerns on the ground in the four cities 
were roughly similar. To be sure, the material situation in Plzeň was initially slightly 
better, meaning that worker protests there lacked the sense of utter desperation they often 
exhibited in Lille, Łódź, and Milano. But these were differences in degree rather than kind 
and, especially after the supply situation in Czechoslovakia took a turn for the worse in 
1946, grassroots discourses in the four cities became almost indistinguishable in their 
denunciations of the shortages or unaffordability of everyday necessities, of the shameless 
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profiteering by so many with access to food, and of the complete lack of egalitarianism in 
post-war society.  
If the main thrust of socio-economic reconstruction met with near-universal 
condemnation amongst rank-and-file (socialist) workers, however, their bread-and-butter 
grievances do not correspond to the politicised agenda that historiography has typically 
ascribed to the post-war European working class. In fact, workers themselves often 
presented their demands as non-political. That the communist-socialist organised workers’ 
meetings in the run-up to the first factory council elections in post-war Łódź were 
‘extremely stormy’, then, had little to do with the issue of worker self-management. ‘A 
strong turmoil erupts when a worker takes to the stage and begins to shout that his children 
are hungry’, noted a PPR report of such meetings; ‘then a more general cry develops […] 
“we are fed up with political talk, we want to eat”’.147 Just how deep the rift between the 
political rhetoric of provincial and national socialist leaders and the attitudes taken at the 
party grassroots ran becomes very clear in the next chapter.     
                                                          
147 Quoted in: Wojciech Górecki, ‘Strajki robotnicze w Łodzi w latach 1945-1947’, in: Jerzy Eisler & 
Krystyna Kersten (eds.), Polska 1944/45-1989: studia i materialy II, (Warsaw: Instytut Historii Polska 
Akademia Nauk, 1997), pp. 93-121, 98. 
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Chapter 3: Discipline, Sacrifice, and Production 
 
Upon a February 1946 visit to Plzeň, ČSSD Minister of Industry Bohumil Laušman 
championed the ‘new social order’ that was under construction in post-war 
Czechoslovakia. He argued that the state was moving ahead both socially and 
economically – the hunger still suffered by many across large parts of the country after 
liberation having been overcome and exports picking up. To be sure, there were complaints 
about prices and wages. Nobody was perfect and the government might have made 
mistakes, but its monetary reforms had secured the purchasing power of the currency, the 
Crown, and averted the dreadful inflation running rampant in other countries. However 
‘terrible’ it might have been to slash departmental budgets by 35 billion Crowns, it had 
been the only way to prevent the nation from becoming ‘a beggar’. The nationalisation of 
banking and industry, moreover, had laid the groundwork for a flourishing economy. Now 
all that was needed was ‘work, work, and more work!’.1 
 In a nutshell, this sums up how socialist leaders countered the grievances amongst 
their rank and file. Sure enough, times were hard and were going to remain so for the 
foreseeable future. But the austerity packages introduced by each of the four governments 
had been absolutely necessary to stave off the looming disasters of mounting debt and 
spiralling inflation. What made these rounds of cuts different from the ones implemented 
to such catastrophic effect before the war, furthermore, was that they were based upon a 
sustainable economic model. The short-term sacrifices demanded of the working class, 
then, would come to the rescue not of capitalists, but of the reconstruction effort, the 
nation, and ultimately workers themselves. In order for these sacrifices to be worth their 
while, however, it was imperative that workers would not engage in self-defeating 
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agitations against the very institutions that were fighting their corner. Rather than 
constantly finding fault with their unions, parties, and governments, they were to abide by 
the labour movement’s discipline and produce to the full of their abilities. 
 This chapter endeavours to reveal just how strong this productivist ethos was within 
post-war European socialism’s leading circles. Party leaders often presented more 
production as the answer to all the bread-and-butter woes of the working class, whether it 
concerned shortages, price hikes, or wage restraint. But as working-class living standards 
kept dropping, party leaders’ promises that workers would soon reap the fruits of their 
discipline and sacrifice began sounding more and more hollow. It was not just exhaustion 
and exasperation, however, that pitted the working class against the production campaigns 
propagated with increasingly militaristic rhetoric by their leaders. The entire premise that 
seemed to lie behind the drive to raise industrial output – that the working-class 
contribution to reconstruction somehow fell short and that it was workers who had to walk 
the extra mile yet again – caused deep resentment at the grassroots. To make matters 
worse, the means by which governments sought to achieve their production targets often 
flew right in the face of worker egalitarianism, adding further weight to the perception of 
an elite utterly out of touch with the aspirations of its rank and file. 
 
Discipline and Sacrifice 
 
Historians have often suggested that the post-war European socialist parties were 
considerably softer on manifestations of worker discontent than their communist 
counterparts. They tend to contrast the extremely harsh view that communist leaders took 
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of the unrest at their grassroots – denouncing strikes as ‘a weapon of the [capitalist] trusts’2 
and scolding workers for absenteeism, theft, and their unwillingness to work3 – with the 
supposedly more sympathetic attitudes socialist parties assumed towards the plight of their 
rank and file.4 Yet, as so many of the academic claims about the post-war socialist parties 
and the working class, such assertions tend to be based more on anecdotal evidence (e.g. 
socialist support for individual strikes and agitations) than grassroots research. A more 
systematic analysis of grassroots-elite relations within the four parties under review in this 
thesis reveals how socialist leaders frequently found themselves at loggerheads with their 
rank and file too.  
To be sure, socialist leaders often showed a remarkable deal of understanding for 
manifestations of worker despair. A worker who has to spend double his income to 
survive, PPS Trade Union Secretary Lucjan Motyka declared, will arrive at the conclusion 
that he has to steal – ‘we put him on that road of demoralisation’.5 Far be it from party 
leaders, therefore, to take too harsh a view of the disenchantment amongst their rank and 
file. It was very easy, PSIUP Minister of Industry Rodolfo Morandi exhorted to a crowd in 
Milano, to tell the masses that their impatience was not going to change ‘the iron limits of 
reality’. Nor was it difficult for those not affected by ‘the mortifications’ of the working 
class to dispassionately calculate the costs and time of post-war reconstruction. But behind 
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such ‘accusations and criticisms’ all too often levelled against workers was ‘a mind 
without understanding, a heart without a pulse’.6 
 For all of their compassion for the predicament of their rank and file, however, 
socialist leaders frequently claimed there was precious little they could do to improve the 
lot of the working class. They often claimed that only time could heal the severe 
disruptions wrought by war. Speaking to local socialists in Valenciennes, Augustin Laurent 
acknowledged that people had expected better from liberation. But he was quick to 
dissociate any ‘inefficiencies’ or ‘ineptitudes’ on the part of the authorities from this 
‘deception’ – the ‘fifth column’ of former Vichyists still perceived to dominate the state 
apparatus was ‘not as pernicious as some would have believe’. ‘The true evil’ was that ‘we 
are lacking wagons, locomotives, flatboats, lorries, that our ports are destroyed’. Natural 
resources, moreover, were ‘notoriously insufficient’, meaning that ‘even if collection was 
organised well, our rations would still not suffice’.7 Motyka also stressed that there were 
no quick fixes for governments to contrive their way out of their socio-economic woes. 
Whilst readily conceding that much of working-class opposition was the result of the 
government’s economic plan to return production to profitability ‘in a very short period’, 
he immediately underlined that even ‘the most wise, the most thought-through plan could 
not come to terms with the resistance of popular nerves’.8 
 The common response to such worker nervousness was that party leaders could not 
work miracles. Socialist leaders warned workers not to listen to those suggesting the new 
governments were at fault for the absence of material improvements. The local PSIUP 
weekly in Sesto San Giovanni drew socialists’ attention to the fact that many of the people 
                                                          
6 ‘Discorso pronunciato dal Ministro Rodolfo Morandi al Teatro Nuovo’ [16 March 1947], Istituto Nazionale 
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bemoaning how much worse things were now than under fascism had been collaborating 
with the Germans during the war.9 Politicians promising the earth were likewise to be 
distrusted. Contrary to what some politicians were pretending, socialists in the North of 
France were told, everything could not be ameliorated ‘by the wave of a magic wand’. 
Instead, the measures taken ‘without fear of unpopularity’ by André Philip represented the 
only way out of the ‘very critical situation’ in which the country found itself.10 
 More and more, however, socialist leaders felt workers themselves needed a reality 
check. Working-class demands, local and national party leaders lamented with increasing 
frequency, showed no appreciation whatsoever of the daunting task facing those at the 
helm of the reconstruction effort. Ivan Hollman, the ČSSD’s Social Affairs and 
Repatriation spokesman in the Plzeň city council, derided how ‘many people’ reverted to 
‘excessive simplifications’ in economic issues. Apparently convinced that ‘the flick of a 
magic wand’ could see ‘machines repaired and replaced, the flow of raw materials 
restored, and markets opening up to our products’, they ‘reduced the problems of 
managing enterprises to the question of wage adjustments’.11 A local chairman of the Łódź 
PPS likewise told off socialist workers complaining about the lack of coal and high prices. 
Urging workers not to ‘exaggerate about small matters’, he described such hardships as ‘a 
victory for the country’. In any case, the new government could hardly be blamed for 
working-class sorrows, as it had only been in office for a short period and had inherited a 
country in ruins.12  
The Milanese trade union authorities also invoked the ‘immense ruins we face’ to 
dispel worker illusions that ‘everything was possible’. It would be absurd, a declaration 
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underwritten by communist, socialist, and Christian democratic union representatives 
insisted, for those who had for years cheered on fascism’s criminal war politics to now 
think that trade union bodies could perform ‘the miracle of multiplying bread’. If labour 
representatives were going to ask employers to contribute more towards the economic 
recovery and to show more humanity towards the misery of the masses, it continued, ‘we 
also have to be able to say no to workers when we think that is necessary’.13  
 It was definitely in questions of wages that socialist leaders turned down their 
workers most often. Even if party leaders agreed that some groups were hit 
disproportionally hard in the post-war state’s social settlement, they were still reticent to 
countenance wage increases for fears of a domino effect. This was very much the case for 
the demands put forward by the more bereaved public sector workers. Although he 
admitted that some, if not all, railway workers were worse off than others in the state’s 
employment, Jules Moch cautioned against giving in to their biddings. Should the 
government award railway workers a raise, after all, ‘we will be bombarded with demands 
of the same order by mine, gas, and electricity workers, and after that the private sector’.14 
In a similar vein, ČSSD Chairman Zdeněk Fierlinger expressed his delight that the 
Czechoslovakian government had been able to close ranks against fresh wage demands 
made by public sector workers. If these had become the subject of ‘a new party fight’, he 
argued, there would have been a real danger of ‘restlessness’ amongst factory workers 
feeling they were entitled to a pay rise as well. That would ‘mean a further increase of all 
economic indices, a considerable hindrance for our export, and we would have been in a 
chaotic situation’.15 
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 Pietro Nenni also sketched a descent into chaos when he discussed ‘the terrible 
problem of salaries’ in the PSIUP Central Committee. Under the threat of a general strike, 
he informed his fellow party leaders, the government was negotiating a wage increase for 
state workers. An agreement binding the government to spending an extra 36 billion lire on 
those in its employment seemed within reach, but Nenni remained far from convinced. Not 
only did he fear that this was no more than a makeshift solution to be ‘eaten up’ by price 
hikes within a matter of weeks, but he also worried about the wider repercussions. What if  
private sector workers would be encouraged to go on strike too? That could set off a ‘chain 
reaction’, in which ‘we lose control over money and risk moving towards an inflation of 
the German type’.16 
Socialist leaders constantly raised the sceptre of inflation to defend their socio-
economic records. A SFIO propaganda brochure, published at the time of the salary 
blockade, described inflation as ‘a mortal danger for the country’. The document went on 
to list the ‘calculation-defying’ price situation in early 1920s Germany, where bread had 
been sold for 95 billion Reichsmark one day, only for its price to rise still further to 120 
billion the next. The sole groups that stood to gain in such a situation were ‘merchants and 
traders who retain goods, industrialists who possess equipment and raw materials, and 
speculators who have gold’. For workers and small rentiers, on the other hand, inflation 
signified ‘the disappearance, pure and simple, into total misery’.17 
 Much more than low wages or living standards, then, party leaders cited inflation as 
the true enemy of the working class. The PSIUP leadership repeatedly associated 
inflationary economics with right-wing politics. During the cross-party negotiations on the 
composition of the second De Gasperi government, the socialist delegation made it quite 
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clear that it was opposed to the reinstatement of the ‘definitely inflationist’ liberal 
Epicarmo Corbino as Treasury Minister.18 But labour representatives were in the firing line 
for acquiescing to inflation-boosting measures all the same. Ludovico d’Aragona, for 
example, soon to be named the PSIUP’s Minister of Labour and Social Security in the 
same government, questioned the general 10% raise agreed by industrialists and unions for 
interfering with the deflationary politics of the government.19 
 Such across-the-board pay increases, especially those mechanically connected to 
the price level, were almost universally counselled against by socialist leaders. A 
‘mechanical’ wage rise would not see working-class well-being improving, socialist 
workers in Łódź were told, for it would be accompanied by just as ‘automatic’ a price hike. 
And for the ‘misfortunes’ inflation caused the worker, one only had to look at the 
development of working-class wages and living standards after the First World War.20  
That did not stop workers from demanding that their salaries would be linked to the 
prices of daily necessities, though. Speaking in the SFIO Executive, Under-Secretary of 
State for the National Economy Albert Gazier identified the need to ‘detoxify’ those 
‘comrades who are not making our task easier’. The party should not commit itself to the 
‘sliding scale’ of wages and prices, he continued, for wage increases were the number one 
reason for the inflation that had hit France since the liberation.21 By the same token, ČSSD 
leaders credited their rejection of a premature price-matching wage raise with seeing off 
the threat of inflation in post-war Czechoslovakia. If the government had heeded calls to 
link wages to prices in the immediate aftermath of the liberation, Laušman explained to a 
ČSSD provincial congress in Olomouc, inflation would certainly have followed suit. But 
                                                          
18 ‘Riunione della Direzione’ [10 July 1946], ISRT, Fondo Foscolo Lombardi, Partito Socialista Italiano, 
Direzione Nazionale, Busta 4, Fasc. 20. 
19 ‘Riunione della Direzione’ [9 July 1946], ISRT, Fondo Foscolo Lombardi, Partito Socialista Italiano, 
Direzione Nazionale, Busta 4, Fasc. 20. 
20 ‘Protokół z zebrania Koła P.P.S. przy Wiedza’ [13 December 1947], APŁ, DK PPS Śródmieście Lewa, 14, 
fo. 71. 
21 ‘Comité Directeur’ [7 June 1946], OURS, ‘Réunions du Comité Directeur du 21 août 1945 au 21 août 
1946’, p. 224. 
127 
 
because the government had chosen to ‘swim against the tide’ and ‘settle the monetary 
question’ first, wages could now be brought into line with prices.22  
 Safeguarding the value of the national currency by balancing the books was indeed 
part and parcel of socialist leaders’ efforts to keep inflation down. For if spiralling prices 
on the domestic level were bad already, worse still was the progressive incapacitation to 
procure vital raw materials, machinery, and consumer goods from abroad on account of a 
weak exchange rate.  
SFIO leaders were particularly adamant that achieving budget equilibrium and 
stabilising the currency provided the only way out of the working class’ woes. According 
to Moch, at that time Minister of Transport of Public Works in the Ramadier government, 
the rescue of the Franc was a pre-condition ‘for the amelioration of ravitaillement’.23 
Speaking at a socialist rally in Lille, SFIO Secretary General Guy Mollet likewise 
identified fiscal consolidation with working-class interests. Calling on rank-and-file 
activists ‘to restore the truth’ about the unpopular measures taken by the government, he 
argued that ‘only a return to budget equilibrium and the rescue of the Franc’ could ‘prevent 
a bankruptcy from which the working classes would be the first to suffer’.24 At the height 
of the strike wave that would bring an end to tripartisme, Philip set out what that would 
mean in practice. After lamenting the ‘complete rift’ between ‘public opinion’ and ‘the 
reality of the situation’, he described the huge balance of payments deficit as ‘the supreme 
reality’ in France. With two-thirds of the country’s gold reserves already projected to be in 
foreign hands by the end of the year, a wage rise would destroy any hope of getting a loan 
from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – which would leave 
France ‘forced to accept the political and economic conditions of the Americans’. The 
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accompanying inflation, moreover, would amount to ‘the total suicide of the working 
class’. For the situation may have been ‘tragic’ in France, it was ‘catastrophic’ there 
‘where they have let things go’ in inflation-ridden Hungary and Italy. ‘We have to prevent 
our comrades’, Philip concluded, from embarking upon that ‘dangerous road’.25  
That Italy was ‘heading for a catastrophe’ was something that Morandi fully 
acknowledged. Addressing the PSIUP Directorate in March 1947, he painted an extremely 
grim picture of the country’s economic outlook. There were ‘neither hopes nor illusions 
about the possibilities of curbing the costs of living, of reducing unemployment, [and] of 
improving the conditions of workers’. But giving in to the sweeping pay rises demanded 
by workers offered no solution, as these would spark a ‘severe inflation’ for which workers 
would end up ‘also paying the price’. Quite the contrary, if the PSIUP were to carry ‘the 
full responsibility of government’ it would ‘have to draw up a plan that subjected the 
working classes to a rigorous discipline’.26  
The problem for each of the four parties, of course, was that they did not run single-
party governments. And as the hardships of post-war life certainly did not meet working-
class expectations of socialism, socialist leaders felt a distinct need to reassure workers that 
their coalitions were still on course to a brighter tomorrow. ‘We need to give the worker 
some perspectives’, Motyka declared, by talking about ‘those achievements that are in the 
nearest future’.27 Lelio Basso, at that time Deputy PSIUP Secretary, was more elaborate. 
The masses, he argued, wanted to know ‘for what and for whom they were working and 
suffering’. If there was going to be yet ‘another winter of misery, of cold, and of hunger’, 
the working class should be made plain what would follow after that. ‘It is for a general 
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directive that the country is waiting, [...], it is a political motto that could cause the 
psychological shock required for the masses to overcome the deadlock of the situation’.28 
The changed political context was one such incentive for the working class to 
endure hardships. That it would not be possible for workers to enjoy ‘a full bowl at home’ 
and that their ‘sitting rooms were going to be cold’, a ČSSD leader of the Plzeň KOR 
wrote, represented ‘a test’ of their ‘mental maturity’. It would be ‘very harmful for our 
democracy’, which was now built upon ‘healthy foundations’, if the working class failed to 
appreciate that such ‘renunciations’ still lay ahead and disturbed ‘the normal functioning of 
companies for trivial reasons’.29 Whilst asking their rank and file for patience in socio-
economic questions, PSIUP leaders in Sesto San Giovanni likewise alluded to newfound 
democracy. Being both the ‘inheritors’ and ‘insolvency practitioners’ of ‘the bankrupt 
fascists’, after all, the popular parties could not ‘perform miracles’. A ‘single miracle’ 
‘could and should be hoped for’, though: ‘the Constituent Assembly, from which alone 
working people can expect the resolution of their most urgent problems’.30 
More frequently, however, socialist leaders justified the sacrifices they demanded 
of the working class with reference to the transformed socio-economic relations. The state 
having assumed a far greater role in economic life, they often claimed, the proceeds of 
worker sufferings would henceforth fall to the working class itself. Insisting that the case 
against wage increases was temporal rather than absolute, Mollet called for SFIO party 
propaganda ‘to accentuate the planned economy to make workers accept sacrifices’.31 With 
the economy not only planned but also largely in the state’s hands in post-war Eastern 
Europe, socialist leaders there went further in their affirmations that the adversity the 
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working class was currently living through served an altogether different purpose than their 
pre-war hardships. Speaking at the first post-war PPS congress, Under-Secretary for 
Labour and Social Security Eugenia Pragierowa declared that ‘the knowledge’ that ‘he is 
working for himself and not for someone else’s private gain’ certainly constituted ‘a moral 
boost’ for the worker.32 Laušman likewise insisted that both ‘the function’ and the ‘moral 
purpose’ of work had changed fundamentally from the liberal-capitalist period. ‘If we 
therefore have to talk about what we have done for the working man’, he told a conference 
of ČSSD factory organisations, ‘we actually have to explain what the working man has 
done for himself’.33 
The nation itself constituted a final cause to which party leaders urged workers to 
sacrifice their immediate needs. Milanese trade union leaders, according to Franco 
Mariani, were doing all in their power to instil ‘a spirit of sacrifice for the salvation of 
Italy’ amongst their working-class constituents.34 Calling on miners to raise production and 
refrain from strikes, SFIO Minister of Industrial Production Robert Lacoste likewise 
pointed to the national interest. The lack of coal represented ‘a veritable national danger’, 
he argued, meaning miners’ diligence was crucial ‘for France to live’.35 
As we have seen, though, such appeals on workers were largely unsuccessful as 
agitations and wildcat strikes continued to hit industrial centres. Socialist leaders were 
quick to bemoan the pointless and ultimately self-defeating character of these worker 
protests. Laurent complained that workers, by not allowing their national leaders ‘a day of 
respite’, were repeating their pre-war mistakes – when Léon Blum’s incoming Popular 
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Front government had struggled with an unremitting strike movement.36 Such internal 
discord within the labour movement, after all, could only benefit its right-wing and 
capitalist enemies. In this respect, Frantisek Macháček, the ČSSD’s Education, Health 
Care, and Hospitals spokesman in the Plzeň city council, warned workers of those 
‘collaborators of the deceased plutocracy’ now taking ‘tremendously radical’ attitudes. 
Deliberately inciting the working class to ‘struggles [...] for perpetual wage increases, for 
the reduction of working hours, for all possible perks’ they knew full well nationalised 
companies could not grant, these elements were seeking to bring the nationalised sector in 
such dire straits that it would ‘collapse’ and ‘former capitalists would be called in as 
saviours’.37  
Despite such occasional references to the sinister forces at play in worker protests, 
however, both the ČSSD and the SFIO by and large interpreted spontaneous agitations and 
strikes as a socio-economic problem. It was only when the communists started backing and 
fomenting strikes over the course of 1947 that the two parties began viewing worker unrest 
as a political challenge to their governments and democracy itself.38   
For PPS and PSIUP leaders, on the other hand, there had been political 
connotations to manifestations of worker discontent all along. PPS leaders felt particularly 
strongly about strikes. Jan Stefan Haneman, one of the socialist architects of the Lublin 
government, lashed out at a congress delegate from Poznań who had claimed that ‘there 
was no other choice’ for workers but to strike. The working class, Haneman admonished, 
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should understand that they were now ‘producing for themselves, for the country, for the 
motherland, [and] for democracy’. In these circumstances, it was ‘a crime’ for workers to 
strike, just like it was ‘a crime for party members not to oppose’ strikes.39  
Making no sense from the perspective of the working class, therefore, PPS leaders 
often interpreted strikes as an attempt at undermining popular democracy by the remnants 
of the pre-war ‘reaction’. Its ‘access to the democratic press’, argued Edward Osóbka-
Morawski at a joint meeting of the PPS and PPR leaderships, allowed ‘the reaction’ to stir 
resentments over all sorts of alleged inequities in industrial life.40 Henryk Wachowicz – the 
leader of the Łódź PPS – subsequently pointed out just how successful these efforts had 
been. Caused by ‘reactionary forces’ active in the area, he informed the meeting, the recent 
strikes in Pabianice (near Łódź) had assumed a political character and were ‘targeted at the 
government’. That the Scheibler and Grohmann textile factory, ‘the pride of the Łódź 
PPR’, had even been hit by strikes offered further ‘evidence’ of ‘the political substrate of 
strikes’.41  
 The PSIUP leadership was likewise obsessed with the political fallout of agitations 
at its grassroots. Though the majority of party leaders rejected suggestions that wildcat 
strikes had somehow been concocted by adherents of the neo-fascist Front of the Common 
Man,42 they were constantly at pains to remind the working class that ‘uncoordinated’ 
agitations would seriously compromise the political struggles being fought out in their 
name. Socialist leaders often invoked the lessons of 1919, when the radicalism enshrined 
in strikes and factory occupations had split the labour movement and driven the horrified 
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middle class straight into the open arms of fascists, in this context. ‘Rash blows, 
uncontrolled and unadvised actions, [and] isolated and sporadic agitations’, warned an 
article urging Sesto San Giovanni socialists to show ‘trade union discipline’, carried a 
double risk. Whilst offering ‘the bourgeoisie vast possibilities at reinforcement’ and 
‘counter-manoeuvring’, the concomitant ‘dysfunctional disagreement’ within the working 
class could ‘lead to tragic situations like in 1919’.43 Addressing a rally in Torino, Nenni 
likewise imparted on workers that they should have ‘the courage’ not to strike. For even if 
the motives for workers to stage a walkout were ‘profoundly felt to be in defence of their 
own interests’, strikes still constituted a ‘distraction’ from the ‘battle for power’ in which 
the working class was involved. The recent strike at Fiat’s Mirafiori plant had been 
‘wrong’, accordingly, because it had ‘threatened to exacerbate our relations with other 
classes, which are already difficult enough by themselves’.44 
 Behind the closed doors of the PSIUP Central Committee, Nenni explained just 
how crucial it was that relations with the party’s non-proletarian coalition partners would 
not be pushed past the tipping point. ‘If we go and talk to workers at Fiat in the capacity of 
men of government and tell them that they must not abuse strikes, that they have to wait 
for certain situations, because that constitutes the only way to preserve their parties the 
possibility to arrive at the Constituent Assembly and give the country a democratic 
solution’, he insisted, ‘we are listened to today’. But should the Left be forced to leave 
government and change its rhetoric, he continued, ‘we would be heading for a situation 
reminiscent of 1919, with strikes [...] multiplying from week to week [...] creating an 
infernal situation’. That was a prospect ‘to despair of’, he concluded, to be accepted ‘only 
once every other solution has been ruled out’.45 
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 So all-overwhelming was its fright of losing control over the situation yet again that 
the PSIUP leadership remained extremely wary of strikes and agitations even after the 
party had been removed from government. As the political temperature rose during the 
autumn of 1947, several leaders began sounding alarm over grassroots agitations 
‘discredit[ing] the labour movement’. Basso lamented that there were ‘communists and 
socialists who behave like there will be a revolution within fifteen days’. In reality, they 
had allowed themselves to be ‘manoeuvred by [Mario] Scelba [the DC’s Minister of the 
Interior in charge of dealing with the agitations] onto a terrain that he prefers’. According 
to Vannuccio Faralli, who had been the PSIUP’s Under-Secretary for Industry in the third 
De Gasperi government, the situation in industry was ‘grave’ too. Workers were ‘not being 
paid’, causing ‘violent strikes’ to erupt. If this was ‘not remedied’, he declared, ‘we will be 
faced with more serious cases’. In such circumstances, former Minister for the Postal 
Service Luigi Cacciatore noted, it was unfortunate that neither the socialists nor the 
communists had a clear ‘objective’. Rather than getting ‘carried away by the situation’, he 
concluded, ‘we need to dominate it and impose discipline upon the socialist masses’.46  
 It was this purported lack of discipline that accounted for socialist leaders’ growing 
disillusionment with their own rank and file. During the massive rally celebrating the 
decrees for the nationalisation of Czechoslovakian industry in October 1945, Fierlinger 
already pointed out that popular democracy had accorded workers ‘important duties’ 
alongside ‘important rights’. Amongst those duties were the need to ‘maintain working 
discipline everywhere’ and the improvement of ‘working morale’.47 As the months and 
years went by, however, party leaders increasingly found working-class discipline and 
morale to be on the wane rather than on the rise. By November 1946, Laurent was 
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deploring ‘the absence of political maturity and moral awareness’ within the working class, 
who were showing ‘neither a sense of effort nor trade union spirit’.48 In the aftermath of 
the big Łódź strike wave of September 1947, Wachowicz came to an even harsher verdict 
on the working class. ‘Over the last two weeks’, he looked back, ‘the whole party had to be 
mobilised to convince the worker that he is not allowed to strike, because strikes always 
have a political character and are directed against the government and the system’. Even 
though the strikes had ended, however, there was no escaping the fact that workers’ 
‘attitude to work was often dismissive’. In view of ‘these weaknesses within the working 
class’, he lamented, ‘we cannot say that the majority [...] wants to work honestly’.49   
 
The Battle for Production 
 
Party leaders condemned low morale and poor discipline with such exasperation because 
of their detrimental effects on the productivist campaigns that socialist parties co-launched 
and co-championed in three of the four countries. Socialist leaders in Czechoslovakia, 
France, and Poland constantly stressed that working harder, longer, and in a more targeted 
manner represented the only way to improve the lot of the working class. In case workers 
themselves were unable to muster the resolve to achieve that, they were to be encouraged 
by all sorts of monetary bonuses and other inducements. But the disparities these created, 
both between skilled and unskilled labour and between well-supplied and poorly supplied 
industries, were the cause of much resentment amongst workers. The ‘battle for 
production’, consequently, quickly developed into a clash between two conceptions of 
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socialism: an egalitarian conception held at the grassroots and a more performance-based 
conception held by party leaders.  
The leaders of the PSIUP, conversely, rarely talked about production. This was due 
in part to the altogether different set of socio-economic problems facing post-war Italy. 
Instead of being so short of manpower that its government had to overburden the 
workforce with demands, it was desperately seeking to prevent mass unemployment 
amongst ex-servicemen and those formerly earning their living in the war industry. But the 
PSIUP’s disinterest in productivism was also inspired by reasons more peculiar to Italian 
socialism. After all, the basic productivist argument – that more production would greatly 
assist economic recovery – held for post-war Italy too. Both communist and Christian 
democratic (trade union) leaders, accordingly, repeatedly banged the drum for 
productivism.50 For socialist leaders, however, economic problems always played second 
fiddle to political problems.51 Much like its efforts to restrain strikes, then, the PSIUP’s 
endeavours to mobilise workers to go and work where the state needed them most were 
motivated more by concerns over the political stability than over the economic prosperity 
of the nation. 
 For the other three parties, though, political and economic concerns often 
converged in productivism, as production itself was increasingly politicised. The Plzeň 
ČSSD, as well as the other parties forming the local coalition, called upon its supporters to 
herald the launch of the Two Year Plan by sacrificing a free Sunday to come and assist in 
the harvest of potatoes and sugar beets in October 1946.52 Addressing socialist textile 
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workers at Łódź’s Poznański factory, PPS Central Committee member Stanisław Rybicka 
similarly defined the socialist ‘role in the reconstruction of the motherland’ by work. The 
‘difficult economic circumstances’, he declared, ‘force us to intensive labour, to giving the 
maximum, and to be an example for others’.53 But it was the French socialists who came 
closest to formulating a full-fledged ideology of production. ‘The production effort’, an 
official organ of the SFIO’s Northern Federation wrote, ‘takes an authentically 
revolutionary value in these decisive days’. As it was not possible ‘to build socialism until 
the forces of production will be in full swing’, it was crucial ‘for socialism [...] to 
reconstitute these forces as soon as possible’.54 
 Accordingly, party leaders frequently propagated increased production as a panacea 
for the problems of both the working class and their governments. The ‘basic source’ of 
high prices, a leader in the Plzeň ČSSD press read, ‘is the imbalance between national 
income and national production’. That meant that all manpower that was ‘expendable 
elsewhere’ had to be directed towards productive work. Whereas it had been ‘a good thing’ 
under the occupation for people to avoid deportation to the Reich by taking refuge in office 
work, things were ‘different today’. What was needed at present was for all available hands 
‘to go there where new goods, new objects, new products, [and] new commodities are 
actually being created, because that is the only way for the nation to grow richer’.55  
In emphasising ‘the imperious necessity to produce’,56 the SFIO also identified the 
everyday concerns of workers with national interests. ‘If we want to regain a high standard 
of living and effectively place ourselves in international competition’, a party brochure on 
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production argued, ‘we have to [...] produce, and produce more’. Both the ‘problem of 
ravitaillement’ and the ‘financial problem’ were linked to the ‘problem of production’, 
after all, and ‘as long as the latter has not been resolved, the two others cannot be resolved 
either’. ‘The state has to secure the working class a decent standard of living’, the brochure 
concluded, ‘but, in return and to allow France to recover and re-take its place amongst the 
great nations, the working class has the duty to put all of its productive forces at the service 
of the nation’.57 
More and more, however, socialist leaders felt that workers were failing to keep up 
their end of the bargain. According to Stanisław Szwalbe, the vice-president of the PPS 
Central Committee, efficiency was lacking from Poland’s productive apparatus. Whilst he 
acknowledged that this was due in part to the ills of popular supply, he also lambasted 
labour discipline. In the Łódź industry, for example, the number of workers not showing 
up for work had reached 20%. The ‘unprofessional attitude’ many workers displayed 
towards both the work floor and raw materials, moreover, had turned into an ‘epidemic’. In 
order to prevent production in nationalised and cooperative factories from worsening and 
becoming more expensive, he admonished, factory management, factory councils, and 
trade unions should make sure of three things. Firstly, they had to ascertain ‘that there was 
no excess of manpower within their factories’, as the desolate ‘Recovered Territories’ in 
Western Poland were crying out for workers, and that labour was more properly organised. 
Secondly, they had to ‘control labour efficiency, i.e. to rule on the work floor’. Thirdly, 
                                                          
57 ‘La nécessité de produire’, Arguments et Ripostes, Bulletin Intérieur du Parti Socialiste (S.F.I.O.), 1 May 
1946, OURS. Emphasis in original. Serge Berstein points out that the ‘conviction that economic recovery 
was the prerequisite for any return to “power”’ was ‘widely shared’ amongst political parties in post-war 
France. On the SFIO in particular, he argues that it was its ‘obsessive preoccupation with economic 
reconstruction’ that prompted the party to demand a reduction of the military budget – ushering in the 
political row that was to lead to General De Gaulle’s resignation in January 1946. See: Serge Berstein, 
‘French Power as seen by the Political Parties after World War II’, in: Josef Becker & Franz Knipping (eds.), 
Power in Europe: Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-1950, (Berlin/New 
York: De Gruyter, 1986), pp. 163-184, 171-172. 
139 
 
they had to use piece rates ‘so extensively that initiative and productivity on the part of the 
individual worker are genuinely and seriously rewarded and the lack thereof punished’.58 
It was these three guiding principles – that labour had to be deployed in accordance 
with the nation’s socio-economic requirements, that workers had to be chastened into 
giving the reconstruction effort their utmost, and that performance counted for more than 
anything – that shaped party leaders’ attitudes towards the working class during the battle 
for production.  
Socialist leaders frequently defended those measures directly related to the 
reconstruction effort as a necessary but temporal evil. This was the case for the extra hours 
they ordered workers to put in. The ČSSD struggled to honour its long-standing pledge to 
reduce the Saturday shift in the mines to six hours. By December 1946, its parliamentary 
party put forward a proposal to cut back the miner’s working week to 46 hours on average 
over a four-week period. The ‘exceptional economic circumstances’ in which the country 
found itself, though, warranted that this would entail three eight-hour Saturdays followed 
by one free Saturday for the foreseeable future.59 Where the French socialists had delivered 
substantial improvements in labour conditions during the interwar period, the demands of 
the reconstruction effort forced them to backtrack too. Nowhere was this more painful than 
with the suspension of that flagship social policy of the Popular Front government – the 
law guaranteeing the 40-hour working week. But ‘the ruins, the lack of food, [and] the 
shortage of clothing and various provisions’ wrought by war, Laurent told socialists in 
Cambrai, had left the government with no other choice. ‘We have to produce above all’, he 
argued, and that was why ‘we find ourselves under the obligation, for the sake of 
rebuilding the country, to demand 48 hours of labour from workers’. The ‘law of 40 hours’ 
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remained ‘an immutable principle’, however, that would ‘enter into force again as soon as 
the circumstances allow it’.60    
  Party leaders tended to describe the piece rates and other performance-related 
bonuses that made up an increasing part of the working-class wage package as being of a 
purely transitory nature too. For socialist leaders, though, there were also more properly 
ideologically motivated considerations at play in this context. Stakhanovism, the Soviet-
born movement of challenging workers to and rewarding them for outperforming their 
norms in ‘competitions of labour’, was always a delicate issue for socialists, because of its 
obvious communist connotations. But party leaders were certainly never proponents of the 
blanket egalitarianism, which understood socialism to mean no income differences 
whatsoever, that many at their grassroots demanded. Even leading Italian socialists 
appeared to agree here, as PSIUP trade union secretary Fernando Santi attested to upon his 
return from a visit to the Soviet Union. Noting how the basic wage of the Soviet worker 
could be supplemented with a whole range of bonuses if production targets were met, he 
concluded that income levelling in the Soviet Union had definitely not taken the 
proportions that ‘many fear and some naively hope’.61 
 Out of the three parties that were engaged in the battle for production, the PPS was 
certainly most enthusiastic about Stakhanovism. The government was ‘on its way to a 
better future’, Rybicka told socialist textile workers in Łódź, and ‘to that end’ it was 
organising ‘labour competitions and a whole series of other noble rivalries’.62 Several 
speakers at the second post-war PPS congress stressed that it was imperative for socialist 
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workers to partake in labour competitions. As a revolutionary vanguard party, Central 
Committee Secretary Włodzimierz Reczek declared, the PPS ‘should participate 
prominently in labour competitions’. That ‘movement’, after all, ‘will decide not only over 
our living standards, but also over the direction of our politics’.63 Justice Minister Henryk 
Świątkowski likewise underlined just how much was at stake in labour competitions. The 
party wanted its members to ‘prevail’ in labour competitions, he argued, ‘to execute the 
Three Year Plan [...], increase the strength and democratic sovereignty of our Polish state, 
and thereby also raise the living standards of the working class’. ‘The labour race for 
Poland’, then, represented ‘the only way’ for party members ‘to increase the prestige of the 
PPS, [and] reinforce its historic role in the construction of People’s Poland, a free and fair 
Poland’.64 
 The ČSSD took a more ambiguous attitude towards the exclusively target-based 
production methods so common to Stakhanovism. Evaluating the first five months of the 
Two Year Plan at a conference of ČSSD managers of nationalised companies, Laušman 
deplored that targets were too often being fulfilled at the expense of the standard and 
marketability of the produce. ‘It makes no sense’, he declared, ‘to stockpile one’s 
warehouses with goods [whilst] having no idea whether and where these will be sold’ or 
‘to strive to execute the plan in terms of quantity and at the same time compounding 
quality’. Yet, Laušman quickly qualified this statement for those industrial sectors vital to 
the reconstruction effort. In the production of coal, energy, and iron, he argued, ‘we must 
today still execute the plan in terms of quantity and forgive shortcomings in quality’.65  
It was in such heavy industries that social democrats did seem to favour 
Stakhanovite production. Ladislav Cígler revelled in the ‘amazing performance’ of 
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individual miners in Ostrava, who had managed to fill up to 24 wagons of coal a shift.66  
An article in the Plzeň ČSSD press sang the praises of Stakhanovism more explicitly. The 
significance of Stakhanovite production in mining and manufacturing, it insisted, went 
well beyond the increased output generated by workers actually outperforming their norms. 
Not only had their example often ‘encouraged others to higher performances’, but the 
experiences of the Soviet Union also taught that ‘Stakhanovists often came up with new 
techniques of labour, with new ideas, with minor or major improvements in the workflow’. 
The ‘key issue in our production’, it continued, ‘lies in increasing the average 
performance’. And ‘one of the means’ to that end was ‘performance competition, a race, 
[to decide] who produces more, produces more than the others, produces more than 
another company’.67 
The SFIO, on the other hand, was officially opposed to Stakhanovism. According 
to Robert Coutant, the performance bonuses that the MRP and the PCF wanted to include 
in the wage package of public sector workers were ‘wrong’. The SFIO had ‘always fought 
against this principle’, he argued, which was ‘likely to cause dissensions amongst 
functionaries’. To adopt this method, would amount to embarking on ‘a road paved by 
Lenin: Stakhanovism’.68 Touring the North of France in October 1946, SFIO Executive 
member Suzanne Charpy repeatedly condemned Stakhanovism too. Her criticisms were 
directed at the communists and ‘their great slogan of production’ above all.69 Unlike the 
PCF, she professed, the SFIO was opposed to ‘production at any price’. ‘We socialists’, 
after all, ‘are against piecework, which requires a continuous human effort that risks to 
wear down health; we are, furthermore, adversaries of the system of individual 
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performance bonuses, which inevitably constitute a divisive factor and create a toxic 
climate amongst workers’. It was important for party members ‘to shed light on these 
practices inspired by Russian methods’.70 
But it is worth noting that these and other attacks on the Stakhanovite dispositions 
of the SFIO’s political rivals were all made during the campaign for the November 1946 
parliamentary elections.71 As we will see, moreover, Charpy was far from a typical 
socialist leader. Other party leaders, operating in different contexts, took a more positive 
view of performance bonuses. Philip, having returned as Minister of the National Economy 
after the elections, explained how living standards could not rise until production picked up 
and concluded that ‘there remains only one solution: increasing production by all means, 
especially by collective performance bonuses’.72 The about-face would be complete after 
the PCF had been removed from government, with socialist leaders seeking to make a 
greater part of working-class wages performance-dependent in the face of communist 
opposition. By September 1947, the then Minister of Labour Daniel Mayer informed the 
SFIO Executive that, ‘under the pressure of the CGT’, the government had been forced to 
drop planned performance bonuses. A general 11% salary increase had come in the place 
of ‘two provisions of a revolutionary character’.73 
Whatever the theoretical exactitudes of their parties’ attitudes towards 
Stakhanovism, though, the bulk of the socialist rank and file resented the practical 
consequences of the introduction of more performance-based production methods. Firstly, 
this concerned the human costs of the incessant demands placed upon the working class. 
There was much anxiety over working conditions. SFIO groups in the mines wanted 
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security to be improved, as deadly accidents were ‘frequent’.74 The chairman of Škoda’s 
factory council expressed similar worries upon welcoming communist Minister of Labour 
and Social Welfare Jozef Šoltesz to the plant. While there had been thirty accidents per 
million worked hours at the height of the occupation, he pointed out, the commensurate 
number, even though nobody was being chased to work anymore, had now risen to forty-
six. He concluded that nationalised companies desired ‘that attention would be devoted to 
maximum protection at work’.75 
Workers often associated the absence of such proper safeguards with Stakhanovite 
or other productivist campaigns. It could not be the case, a PPS factory circle leader in 
Łódź declared, that the labour race led to ‘the murderous destruction of machine and 
man’.76 Writing in the propaganda leaflet of the SFIO group in the Ledoux mines (near 
Valenciennes), a socialist miner’s delegate was more elaborate. In an article entitled ‘From 
Production ... to the Cemetery’, he railed against ‘scientific’ production methods ‘that pay 
very little attention to the health of our miner comrades’. The ‘longwall’ mining method, 
enabling miners to excavate much longer faces of coal by means of a conveyor belt, 
resulted in ‘poor ventilation, the heating of the site so harmful to health, bad gasses and the 
accumulation of dust, which can cause explosions and carbon monoxide poisoning’. The 
‘Bedeau[x] system’ of meticulously calculated individual performance bonuses had to be 
replaced by collective pay, moreover, which was ‘more humane for allowing the weak to 
eat like the strong’.77 
The disparities that piece rates generated between workers were the second main 
protest levelled against performance-based production. Workers often complained that 
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whether or not they were able to meet their targets depended on a whole range of factors 
beyond their reach. The workforce in Plzeň area sugar refineries turned down ÚRO’s offer 
of wage supplements to be paid upon ‘outperformance’, arguing that there was ‘no 
question of outperformance in their sector because of the shortage of materials’.78 This was 
also ‘the terrible objection’ against the collective performance bonuses frequently 
championed by the SFIO leadership, as Moch readily acknowledged. As production 
increases were linked to the supply of raw materials, he noted, it was ‘not possible to 
favour one industrial sector without that being to the detriment of another’.79  
Still more grievous, though, were discrepancies in the equipment and supply 
amongst colleagues. There was particular anger over the preferential treatment of the first 
Stakhanovists in Łódź.80 Textile workers in the city’s Ruda Pabianicka district went on 
strike when factory management started sequestering power from their spinning machines 
in order to facilitate two Stakhanovite ‘volunteers’ who had accepted multi-machine work. 
These measures, the district PPS wrote, had come at the ‘wrong moment’ completely, as 
the lacking electricity supply already had 70% of spinners sitting idly by. Nevertheless, the 
arriving trade union officials threw their full weight behind factory management.81 
 The state prioritising performance over working-class well-being and living 
standards at least as much as the capitalist, then, workers rapidly lost the will to make 
sacrifices towards the new economic order. Though condemning strikes and strikers, 
Mollet called upon his fellow party leaders to take heed of ‘the profound dissatisfaction’ in 
worker communities, where ‘misery, difficulties, and a sentiment of injustice’ reigned. 
Worse still was that ‘workers have the impression that the directed economy requires all 
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efforts on their part without the government having the possibility to demand the same 
efforts of other segments of the population’.82 An editorial in the Plzeň ČSSD press 
likewise voiced misgivings over what had come in the place of ‘the capitalist production 
anarchy’. ‘We have to be watchful’, it admonished, ‘that the system [capitalism] that 
caused unemployment and the waste of forces and values could not return under the pretext 
that other experiments have not worked, that it is the only possible production system’. 
Thus far, after all, ‘the worker profits little from the invocation of his power’.83  
 In such circumstances, workers would find it harder and harder to summon the 
productivist enthusiasm demanded by their party leaders. A report on the maltreatment of 
electric welders at the railways in Plzeň flagged this up. Having seen promised 
improvements in labour conditions come to nothing and their hourly wage supplements 
cut, they had complained to their factory council. But not only did the factory council give 
them no explanation whatsoever and hint at even further supplement reductions, a welder 
pointing out that no-one would be willing to undertake heavy labour against such 
conditions was thrown out of the meeting and fired within a matter of days. ‘Electric 
welders’, the report insisted, ‘are fully aware of their duties and their desired performance, 
and want to work for the reconstruction of the republic, sometimes even harder than lies 
within their power’. In order for them to fulfil their duties, however, welders were entitled 
both to ‘a just salary’ and to being treated ‘like colleagues’. ‘If we ask workers to increase 
performance’, after all, it was a ‘necessary precondition’ that they were ‘at peace and 
satisfied at work’.84  
 In very similar terms, a delegate from Łódź expressed his disgust at claims that 
workers did not want to work at the first post-war PPS congress. As a worker’s party, he 
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argued, ‘we know our workers, we know that they are patriotic [...], that the Polish worker 
does everything to raise labour productivity, [and] gives the state his all’. Yet, ‘the other 
side of the medal’ was that nationalised factories were ‘very frequently’ still being led by 
those pre-war owners who did ‘not understand the new reality’. ‘How is it possible to 
demand enthusiasm of the worker’, he wondered, ‘if the attitude the manager takes towards 
the worker has not changed one jot’? More than that, those in charge of the state sector 
locally also seemed to have retained their friends in high places. ‘One mr. Géra’, the 
delegate lamented, had been removed from high office for embezzlement by the local 
authorities, only for him to ‘return two days later with an even greater mandate from the 
Ministry [of Industry]’.85 
The constant allegations of wanting labour morale also left rank-and-file workers 
feeling frustrated. The ‘persistent talk of the lack of labour morale’ should stop, a 
resolution adopted by the Assembly of the West Bohemian ČSSD avowed, as it had been 
‘established that the vast majority of workers work diligently and completely dependably’. 
The shortcomings in certain industrial sectors, hence, had not been caused by aversion 
upon the part of the working class, ‘but rather by the unwillingness to remove those 
ailments that burden performance’.86 Amongst those ailments were such technical 
problems as the excess of people involved in non-productive work and the deficient 
organisation of economic life,87 but crucially also the state’s failure to stand up for 
workers. The fact that some roads remained untraveled in the struggle to lower prices, 
Cígler pointed out to the Czechoslovakian National Assembly, ‘does not create an 
atmosphere conducive to a rise in labour morale’. People found it ‘incomprehensible’, for 
example, that the government appeared unable ‘to crack down upon the black market’. 
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There would be ‘much more enthusiasm and dedication towards work’, he declared, if the 
government acted ‘hard and relentless against all hampering the economic construction of 
our republic’.88  
Coutant likewise affirmed that the state had to come through for the working class 
first and foremost, rather than the other way around. ‘Miners are often criticised for the 
lack of coal’, he told socialists in the North of France, ‘but we do not take into account that 
they are malnourished’. The ‘efforts demanded of the working class’, he maintained, 
should be matched by ‘a struggle against the financial and economic oligarchies’ thus far 
‘insufficient’.89 
 For many at the grassroots, then, the battle for production only served to highlight 
everything that was unfair about the post-war state: where governments constantly 
squeezed workers to do more for less in deteriorating conditions, they seemingly left the 
better-off in peace. What was worse, their national leaders gave the impression not to be 
bothered by inequality. The disagreement over ÚRO’s and the Czechoslovakian 
government’s unanimous decision to pay out a flat Christmas bonus to all workers in the 
public, nationalised, and private sectors illustrated the rupture between local and national 
perspectives. While the government indicated it considered income levelling 
‘undesirable’,90 Cígler, on behalf of the Plzeň KOR, faulted the decision for ‘ignor[ing] the 
weakest in society’.91 Such income differences within the working class were indeed often 
the hardest to swallow. The wage increases meted out to workers in some companies, 
admonished Josef Janouš to the Plzeň city council, risked repeating the ‘wage terms’ of the 
occupation. These had generated ‘different categories’ of workers, with some being 
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‘supplemented’ and others ‘marginalised’. There had been, he remembered, ‘a wilful 
promotion of dissension’.92  
 Yet, party leaders proved quite prepared to put labour movement harmony on the 
line to reward workers willing or able to be mobilised for the reconstruction effort. 
Socialist leaders were often at pains to stress that far too many man hours were wasted on 
non-productive or non-essential work. Whereas Osóbka-Morawski called for the ‘de-
bureaucratisation’ of the Polish state apparatus by directing superfluous public servants to 
productive work,93 Moch bemoaned the difficulties in relocating French workers ‘from 
dormant industries to more active industries’.94  
But the shortage of productive and skilled labour was definitely greatest in 
Czechoslovakia, and the lengths to which its political and economic elites went to address 
this shortage certainly bred most bad blood amongst the working class too. Firstly, this 
concerned the outrageous remunerations for those contributing their scarce skills to the 
reconstruction effort. The Plzeň ČSSD press ran an angry article about ‘the not isolated 
case’ of bricklayers. Already earning 2000 Crowns per week, the same as the average 
worker brought home each month, bricklayers had often been lured away from Plzeň with 
promises they could get double that amount in the deserted regions on the Hungarian 
border. No longer welcome at their former firms when such promises fell through, 
however, they did not take another, lower-paid job. Instead, ‘they form the so-called 
“reserve of scarce crafts” and wait until they find a Maecenas, [...] who provides them with 
a royal wage’. The article called upon the Office for Labour Protection to have a look not 
only at the ‘black wage’ thus earned by bricklayers, but also at the employers able to pay 
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such wages.95 If the authorities were sent for in this instance, though, they were the driving 
force behind some of the other grievances over the preferential treatment given to those 
lending themselves to the government’s productivist campaigns. This was the case for the 
‘brigades’, made up of workers from various sectors, that were sent to the mines to assist in 
the production of coal. Miners complained bitterly that they required permanent rather than 
temporal reinforcement and that brigadiers’ labour morale left much to be desired. What 
seemed to frustrate miners most, though, was that brigadiers had immediately gained 
access to their generous and hard-fought social security system. More than anything, this 
left them with the impression that brigadiers ‘did not come to help, but to devour their 
bread’.96  
 If the Czechoslovakian programmes to circulate labour still presupposed 
voluntarism, the Italian socialists allowed their workers no such luxury. Mariani, for 
example, was adamant that ‘all bricklayers, carpenters, navvies, [and] peasants owning 
land’ were obliged ‘to leave plants to go and work there where manpower is in demand’. 
‘All those having the possibility to survive otherwise (merchants, small proprietors, 
artisans, etc.)’, moreover, had to vacate factory jobs or lose every state subsidy. Mariani’s 
main concern, however, was not so much raising output as to offset the worst effects of 
looming mass unemployment. With the sceptre of joblessness rearing its ugly head now 
that the post-liberation ‘blockade of layoffs’ was drawing to an end, he noted, it was 
imperative to ‘make all those workers absorbed by the war industry in exceptional times 
return to their original crafts’.97 The jobs opening up as a result would go some way 
towards not only shielding the established workforce from redundancy but also 
reintegrating those proletarians having left industry altogether during the war. It was this 
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latter group, consisting of ex-servicemen, former resisters, and returning prisoners of war, 
that PSIUP leaders feared most. Mindful as always of the lessons of the interwar years, 
Nenni agonised over what lie ahead for those several millions of partisans and veterans 
experiencing so many difficulties accommodating to post-war life. ‘Here unfortunately’, he 
warned the PSIUP Central Committee, ‘is a human repository that could lend itself to new 
adventures of a squadrist [referring to the para-military squads that had conducted a 
campaign of intimidation against the socialist movement in the early 1920s] character’.98 
  
Conclusion 
 
We have seen in this chapter that the attitudes socialist leaders took towards the working 
class were very similar across the four countries. To be sure, the PSIUP did not glorify 
production in the same manner that the ČSSD, the SFIO, and the PPS did, but this had 
more to do with the specific Italian socio-economic situation and the political pre-
occupations of its leaders than with any greater receptiveness towards the concerns 
amongst its rank and file. In fact, whether it concerned performance-related pay or labour 
mobilisation, the Italian socialists placed much the same demands on workers as their 
Czechoslovakian, French, and Polish counterparts.      
Behind the many parallels between the four parties that this chapter has exposed, 
however, the contours of some of the divergences that will become far more pronounced in 
the following chapters already emerge. These divergences manifest themselves primarily 
in the four parties’ contradictory interpretations of strikes, agitations, and other examples 
of worker indiscipline. ČSSD and SFIO leaders viewed such expressions of industrial 
discontent, however untimely or self-defeating, as socio-economic problems first and 
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foremost. The PPS and PSIUP leaderships, on the other hand, tended to explain 
uncontrolled worker ferments as a direct political challenge to newfound democracy.      
 None of this, though, supports the claim that the post-war European socialist parties 
were in any way ‘soft’ on the working class. Much like their communist counterparts, 
socialist leaders in the four countries took a very dismissive attitude towards the grievances 
at their grassroots – castigating workers for failing to understand what was in their own 
interest, for their shocking indifference towards the reconstruction effort, and for being 
very unruly. There was a profound mismatch, then, between local and national 
perspectives. In the run-up to the first post-war PPS congress, Osóbka-Morawski warned 
local socialist representatives that their ‘small problems’ should not blind them to the 
bigger picture. Especially amongst those new to the party, he argued, many did ‘not 
appreciate the current situation [and] think that the most important problems are the small 
problems of the local area’. That was not what the party congress was supposed to be 
about. ‘The point is that we consider the general problem that besets us, the problem of 
reconstruction’.99        
 
                           
                                                          
99 ‘Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z obrad Rady Naczelnej P.P.S.’ [28 June 1945], AAN, Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna, Rada Naczelna, 2032/1, 235/II/4, fo. 35. 
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Chapter 4: The Morale of the Story 
 
In his keynote address to the first post-war PPS congress, Edward Osóbka-Morawski 
discussed what ‘the abomination’ of fascism had left behind in post-war Poland. Even 
though ‘we have survived the great disease, one might say epidemic, of fascism’, he 
declared, it had taken ‘the horribly bloody sacrifices’ of the Second World War for ‘people 
to understand the criminal goals and methods of fascism’. That people were now turning 
away from fascism, moreover, did not mean ‘that we have cured this cursed disease 
completely’. For Hitlerism and fascism might ‘lie in ruins, […] still much fascist venom 
remains in the hearts and minds of the people’. This venom needed to be ‘destroy[ed] and 
exterminate[d]’, as ‘it might spread again like an epidemic to the detriment of humanity’. 
‘The full moral reconstruction of society’, therefore, ‘just like the [material] reconstruction 
of the devastated country, constitutes one of the most important issues of the peacetime 
era’.1  
 Historians do not typically associate the struggle for the ‘moral reconstruction’ of 
post-war society with socialist parties. Insofar as historiography has dealt with the theme at 
all, it nearly always portrays moral reconstruction as something that Christian individuals 
and organisations, either in the Allied countries or on the ground in continental Europe, 
obsessed over.2 Yet, post-war reconstruction certainly carried a strong moral dimension for 
many socialist leaders too. According to both local and national socialist leaders in each of 
                                                          
1 XXVI Kongres [August 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2090, 235/I-12, fos 34-35. 
2 See e.g. Francis Graham-Dixon, ‘A “Moral Mandate” for Occupation: The British Churches and Voluntary 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 144-156; Peter Romijn, ‘“Pastors and Perpetrators”: 
Dutch Churches and the Reintegration of Nazi Collaborators’, Journal of European Studies, 26/4 (1996), pp. 
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the four countries, the experience of dictatorship, war, and occupation had brought to light 
and generated a profound moral crisis. This moral crisis had come in many different shapes 
and forms. Firstly, it had motivated many to throw in their lot with the fascists. Secondly, it 
had disoriented those social constituencies, such as women or youngsters, with no 
experience of democratic politics. Thirdly, it had bred a spirit of selfishness amongst large 
swathes of the masses. 
This chapter addresses these three aspects of the purported post-war moral crisis to 
demonstrate that moral reconstruction was a key concern for each of the four parties. For 
all of their essentially analogous rhetoric of moral decay, however, there were actually 
considerable differences in what socialist leaders considered to be the mainstay of the 
moral revival that they so heartily desired. For the Italian and Polish socialists, the question 
of moral reconstruction was of acute political significance. In order to prevent their 
countries from succumbing to dictatorship once again, they insisted, it was imperative that 
the purge of fascists and collaborators would be ruthless and the moral re-education of 
society comprehensive. If the French socialists and Czechoslovakian social democrats 
were more relaxed about the political morality of their populations, they were certainly not 
about what they perceived as the unsavoury socio-economic habits that the occupation had 
left within the body public. Now that the war was over, they argued, it was about time that 
the working class started putting the collective good before their personal gain. At the 
crossroads of political and socio-economic reconstruction, then, the question of moral 
reconstruction begins to reveal what really divided the four parties. 
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The Reckoning 
 
For socialist leaders, the starting point for the moral reconstruction effort was the purge of 
those people they held responsible for the lapse of morals to begin with. Amongst the 
parties represented within the post-war coalition governments, the socialists were 
frequently the most strenuous advocates of a full-fledged purge of all those associated with 
interwar fascism or the occupational regimes. This purge had to take place on three levels. 
Firstly, it was to affect the socialist movement itself, with the past behaviour of those 
seeking to (re-)join the post-war socialist parties having to be beyond any conceivable 
reproach. Secondly, it was to bring to justice those fascist and collaborationist underlings 
who committed atrocities with impunity before and during the war. Thirdly, it was to usher 
in a sweeping clean-up of the state apparatus, where those who had sustained the 
authoritarian, fascist, or occupational regimes had to be removed. All departing from a 
similar set of principles, though, differences between the four parties quickly emerged as 
the purge did not always proceed as desired. 
 These differences were due in part to the fact that the shake-up at the top of public 
life was at the same time more severe and more widespread in post-war Eastern Europe. 
Many of the region’s foremost collaborators decided not to await the arrival of the Red 
Army and to leave for the West in the final days of the war. Millions more ethnic Germans 
or Hungarians, whose ancestors had often lived in this part of Europe for centuries, were 
caught up in the forced population movements out of Czechoslovakia and Poland. And a 
significant number of those with nowhere to go fell prey to the ‘wild retribution’ that the 
new rulers did so little to stop during the first weeks and months of freedom.3 On the face 
                                                          
3 Benjamin Frommer, National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar 
Czechoslovakia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 33-62.   
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of it, therefore, the purge was swift as well as comprehensive in post-liberation 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
 The same could certainly not be said of the retributive action in France and Italy. It 
did not take long for socialists in both countries to start expressing their perplexity at the 
sluggish pace and narrow scope of the purge. Little more than two months into the 
liberation of Milano, a letter to the local socialist press wondered ‘which are the obscure 
forces that hinder the purge and justice’. Some of the ‘prime culprits, instigators, and 
agents’ of fascism, after all, had been able to ‘escape scrutiny’ and ‘save their face’ solely 
by virtue of having disowned Mussolini after the Allied landings of 1943.4  
The redemption of those having only turned their back on fascism at the eleventh 
hour likewise caused profound commotion within the post-war SFIO. To ‘repeated 
applause’, SFIO Executive member Louis Noguères railed against those ‘bastards who 
have voted for the Vichy Government [but] presently call themselves resisters’ at a  party 
meeting in Avion. The appointment as Minister of State in the first De Gaulle government 
of Jules Jeanneney, the Radical who had been the speaker of parliament during the early 
stages of the occupation, attracted his particular condemnation. He criticised De Gaulle for 
claiming that all that counted was what people thought today, not what they had thought on 
10 July 1940 – when a parliamentary majority had granted Phillipe Pétain full powers. ‘I 
will never tolerate them [erstwhile Vichy supporters]’, Noguères concluded, ‘because they 
have committed treason and should be removed from French political life’. That was ‘a 
point on which we cannot compromise’.5 
 This intransigence on the urgency to eliminate all those tainted by fascism from 
political office was one question on which socialists leaders and their rank and file did see 
eye to eye. The ‘problem of the purge’, Daniel Mayer explained to the first post-war 
                                                          
4 Jaurey Capiluppi, ‘Chi sono?’, Sesto Proletaria, 12 July 1945.  
5 Commissaire du Police to Directeur des Reseignements Generaux [Réunion organisée par le Parti Socialiste 
à Avion], 20 February 1945, ADN, CRR, 19 W 37108 1. 
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congress of the SFIO, ‘is a problem that distresses us all’. Socialist leaders, therefore, 
warned the government that there was ‘a barrier between the government and the people of 
this country, and that barrier has been there for too long: it concerns this entire Vichy 
administration which still remains in its place within certain ministerial departments’.6  
Having refused to join the second Bonomi government, the Italian socialists went 
further in their denunciations of the purge. Bonomi himself already ‘compromised by 
fascism [when he was Prime Minister in 1921-22, Bonomi had given the fascist squads 
free rein]’, Lelio Basso pointed out, he was hardly ‘the man most suitable’ for making ‘a 
clean break with the fascist past’. Worse, ‘the reactionary clique of [Raffaele] De Courten 
[one of the foremost Navy Commanders under Mussolini, who went on to serve as post-
fascist Italy’s Navy Minister between 1943 and 1946] and [Giovanni] Messe [who had 
been Mussolini’s Field Marshall during the Second World War, and was appointed Chief 
of Staff of the Allied ‘Co-Belligerent’ Army shortly after the 1943 Italian armistice]’ had 
made abundantly clear its ‘intentions not to take a single step towards democracy, not to 
take seriously the purge, [and] to still tolerate fascism in many of its aspects’. This 
tolerance had not only allowed many former fascist leaders to ‘continue to live 
undisturbed’, but had also resulted in the ‘very slow’ and ‘negligible’ renewal of the 
diplomatic corps and the maintenance of ‘a large part of the bureaucratic-police apparatus 
of fascism’.7 
 That the purge had to stretch well beyond the fascist elites and affect all foot 
soldiers who had placed themselves at their service was a principle that all four parties 
could agree on in theory. Yet, they quickly parted company when it came to the practical 
                                                          
6 ‘Parti Socialiste – SFIO: Congrès national extraordinaire des 9, 10, 11 et 12 novembre 1944’, FJJ, p. 29.  
URL: http://flipbook.archives-socialistes.fr/index.html?docid=49328&language=fra&userid=0  
(last consulted: 22 March 2015).   
7 Lelio Basso, ‘Atene e Roma’, Avanti!, 10 January 1945.  
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implementation of this principle. For the PPS and the PSIUP, on the one hand, only a 
thorough cleansing of political life and the state apparatus would do, even if that meant 
violating due constitutional process in the short term. The ČSSD and the SFIO, on the 
other, increasingly came to view the purge itself as the problem, abused as it was by the 
communists to fight personal and political vendettas. 
This divergence between the two sets of parties already manifested itself in the 
attitudes they took towards their own organisations. To be sure, socialist leaders in each of 
the four countries were frequently adamant that there was no way back for members who 
had in any way collaborated with fascists. The SFIO threw out all 90 socialist 
parliamentarians who had voted for Pétain in 1940, even those who built up an impeccable 
Resistance record later on,8 whilst also showing no mercy on popular local leaders having 
initially thrown in their lots with Vichy.9 The argument for excluding numerous pre-war 
socialist leaders, united in the WRN Resistance organisation, from the post-war PPS went 
back even further. Their crimes originated in the interwar years, when they had failed to 
mobilise the masses against the 1926 Piłsudski coup d’état and acquiesced in the 
authoritarian 1935 Constitution. The ‘fundamental criterion’ by which the post-war PPS 
ought to condemn WRN leaders, insisted Henryk Wachowicz therefore, was that they had 
‘collaborated with Polish fascism’.10 
 But if socialist leaderships were united in their desire to take resolute action against 
(former) party representatives blemished by collaboration, however short-lived or atoned 
                                                          
8 For discussions of the various ‘cases’, see the protocols of the November 1944 extraordinary SFIO 
congress: ‘Parti Socialiste – SFIO: Congrès national extraordinaire des 9, 10, 11et 12 novembre 1944’, FJJ, 
pp. 256-280. URL: http://flipbook.archives-socialistes.fr/index.html?docid=49328&language=fra&userid=0 
(last consulted: 22 March 2015).  
9 During a reunion of the SFIO in Lille’s Mons-en-Baroeul district, a ‘rumour’ developed after the 
declaration that one Mr. De Goedt had been excluded from the party. The meetings’s president was 
implacable, however, reading out a March 1941 letter in which De Goedt had praised Pétain. Commissaire du 
Police Godec to Commissaire Regional de la République à Lille, 26 January 1945, ADN, CRR, 19 W 37108 
2.  
10 ‘Protokół posiedzenia Komisje Programowo-Statutowej’ [15 June 1945], Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 
XXVI Kongres, 2029, 295/I-7, fos 3-7.  
159 
 
for, the political purge quickly took on a different meaning for the four parties. PPS and 
PSIUP leaders remained essentially inward-looking, obsessed with keeping anyone who 
they considered a former fascist or collaborator from their parties. The PSIUP initially 
barred all erstwhile members of Mussolini’s PNF from joining – a truly ‘draconian’ 
measure given that membership in that organisation had almost become a pre-requisite for 
finding a job in the later days of fascism.11 PPS leaders likewise made it quite clear that 
‘we do not want to see people who have placed themselves at the service of Hitlerism in 
our ranks’,12 as repeated campaigns to ‘verify’ the past allegiance of party members 
attested to.13  
The Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French socialists had far fewer 
qualms about the political righteousness of their own rank and file, but rapidly started 
worrying about the kind of people their communist rivals took in. As early as June 1945, 
Vincent Auriol – SFIO Executive member and speaker of the National Assembly –  noted 
how the PCF was recruiting ‘intensively’ and ‘indiscriminately’, quoting examples of 
former pétainistes or miliciens [members of the para-military militias upon which the 
Vichy regime had relied to fight the Resistance] bribing their way into the shelter of PCF 
membership.14 The ČSSD leadership received similar reports. In rural Bořetice (near the 
Austrian border), for example, between ten and fifteen disillusioned communists were 
seeking access to the ČSSD out of discontent over the KSČ’s protection of and support for 
‘some bad people’ locally.15 
                                                          
11 Paolo Mattera, Storia del PSI, pp. 133-134.  
12 ‘Zebrania Koła P.P.S. przy f-mie Scheibler i Grochman’ [27 April 1947], APŁ, DK PPS Śródmieście 
Lewa, 13, fo. 35.  
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PPS: XXVI Kongres [August 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2090, 235/I-12; XXVII Kongres 
[December 1947], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2090, 235/I-25.   
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15 Župní Sekretariát ČSSD Brno to Blažej Vilím, 1 September 1946, Archiv ČSSD, Fond č. 71, Část II 
Československá sociální demokracie (1945-1948), VIII Ústřední Sekretariát, 200 Korespondence 
Generalního Sekretariátu 1946, fo. 456. This seems not to have been an isolated case. For even in parliament, 
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Nowhere were such bad people more prominent, according to the ČSSD and the 
SFIO at least, than in the communist-controlled security forces doing the dirty work of 
purging. The French socialists were particularly apprehensive of the so-called ‘patriotic 
militias’, armed resistance bodies that had outlived the war, attracted many ‘belated 
“resisters”’, and carried out searches, arrests, and even executions.16 At the first post-war 
SFIO congress, several speakers complained bitterly about the patriotic militias. Having 
seen their ranks swell exponentially by the post-liberation entry of ‘fifth columnists’, of 
former members of the fascist French Popular Party, and of erstwhile Gestapo informants, 
the militias had in many places grown into, in the words of the congress delegate for the 
Ardèche, ‘no more than a bunch of gangsters’. What was more, the communist command 
of these gangs often rendered them ‘an instrument in the hands of a political party’.17 
Before long, therefore, the SFIO sided with its non-communist coalition partners in 
demanding that the militias were disbanded and gave way to a regular police force under 
state control. 
Although the security services were firmly under state direction in Czechoslovakia, 
the ČSSD considered itself facing the same problems in many ways. Much like the SFIO, 
after all, the party became increasingly wary of those communist-dominated forces, 
consisting of all sorts of unreliable elements, in charge of the purge. Defending his record 
at the November 1947 ČSSD congress, Zdeněk Fierlinger conceded that the National 
Security Corps (SNB) had initially been made up of a motley crew of employees of the 
pre-war and Protectorate security services, former partisans and ex-servicemen, as well as 
a variety of ‘adventurers’. Despite his protestations that the SNB had now been purged of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
ČSL deputy Alois Rozehnal accused the Czechoslovakian communists, much like their French counterparts, 
of sheltering former collaborators. See: Frommer, National Cleansing, p. 320. 
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SFIO: Congrès national extraordinaire des 9, 10, 11 et 12 novembre 1944’, FJJ. 
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‘unwanted elements who had frequently entered it with the help of their party cards’,18 
however, complaints of communist wrongdoings continued to pour in. Accordingly, the 
ČSSD year report for 1947, published after the party congress had ousted Fierlinger as 
Secretary General,  had to conclude that the ‘continuously accumulating complaints’ about 
‘excessive political manipulation’ and ‘the abuse of the security apparatus’ were 
‘unfortunately justified’.19 
With violence reaching near- or actual civil war levels in post-war Italy and 
Poland,20 the PPS and the PSIUP were even more alarmed by the atmosphere of 
lawlessness reigning in their countries after liberation. Yet, the two parties attributed this 
state of affairs to extremism on the Right rather than on the Left. As early as July 1944, 
Pietro Nenni was expressing his ‘restlessness’ at ‘reactionary’ efforts to put the police and 
the army at the service of the monarchical camp. Attempts to violently intimidate the 
people ahead of the elections, he warned, could only result in civil war.21  
This fear of the armed or security forces becoming a weapon in the hands of the 
Right was to stay with the PSIUP right through the post-war period. Even with the Italian 
Left at the height of its power under the Parri government, Nenni had to acknowledge that 
it remained ‘very difficult to completely eliminate certain forces that have survived the 
fascist disaster: the army, policemen, etc.’.22 Once the Left was out of government again, 
accordingly, socialists quickly came to see the police as an arm of the DC. In the run-up to 
the April 1948 elections, Sandro Pertini accused the police of bias after it had not 
                                                          
18 ‘The Mission of Social Democracy in the New State’ [November 1947], ANM, Fonds Zdeněk Fierlinger, 
Karton 40, Sjezd soc. dem. v Brne.   
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Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 93-110. On Italy: Claudio 
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21 Pietro Nenni, ‘Motivi di inquietudine all’interno’, Avanti!, 15 August 1944. 
22 ‘Comitato Centrale’ [17 October 1945], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc. 2189, p. 18.  
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intervened when he was heckled by a DC member during a rally in Brindisi. ‘[E]xtremely 
serious’, moreover, was recent police behaviour in Puglia province. Following up ‘in an 
absolutely disproportionate manner’ on arrest warrants issued back in October and 
November 1947, ‘hundreds and hundreds of policemen’ had been ‘forcing doors with the 
butt of their rifles’ without having as much as a search warrant. The city of Gravina, one of 
the Left’s strongholds in the region, was ‘in a state of siege’. But ‘terror’ was reigning 
throughout the province, with people having ‘the impression of being confronted with 
punitive fascist expeditions’.23  
PPS leaders were horrified too by the ‘intimidating situation’ created by those 
‘terrorist gangs’ roaming the forests and countryside of post-war Poland.24 This often 
denoted the anti-communist offshoots of the wartime Polish underground, most notably the 
Freedom and Independence (WiN) and the National Armed Forces (NSZ), that were 
engaged in guerrilla warfare with Polish and Soviet security forces. Much like the PSIUP, 
the PPS was soon to identify these organisations with its right-wing political rivals. 
‘[R]eactionary-fascist elements’, a March 1946 resolution of the party’s Central Executive 
Committee read, were striving ‘to anarchise economic life and political relations and 
thereby undermine the foundations of the democratic system in Poland’. Some of such 
‘illegal reactionary-fascist organisations’, it continued, were now throwing their weight 
behind the PSL. The NSZ and the WiN, for example, had declared ‘their backing and 
support for the PSL in the elections, instructing their members in that spirit, [and] 
organising special terrorist gangs to that end’.25  
                                                          
23 ‘Comitato Centrale d’Intesa per la libertà elletorale’ [10 March 1948], Fondazione Nenni, Rome [hereafter 
FN], Carteggio Nenni, Busta 47, Fasc. 2034.    
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Komitet Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/2, fo. 28. 
25 ‘Uchwała Centralnego Komitetu Wykonawczego’ [2 March 1946], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 
Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/2, fos. 30-35.  
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 Unlike their Italian counterparts, though, PPS leaders did view the state security 
services as an ally in the struggle against this fascist danger. That these services indulged 
in abuses far greater than in Czechoslovakia or Italy, including mass round-ups, torture, 
and summary executions, was something they were willing to accept. To be sure, there was 
criticism that the security forces were dominated by communists, were frightening the 
population by chasing non-existent conspiracies, and were creating discontent by arresting 
workers.26 On the whole, however, the PPS leadership defended the violent and repressive 
methods used by the security services as a necessary evil. In a congress speech that won 
the special acclaim of Henryk Świątkowski, PPS Supreme Council member Kazimierz 
Dębnicki attacked the ‘oppositional relics’ still determining the socialist masses’ attitudes 
towards the security services. ‘We know that there are transgressions [and] crimes, that 
there are improper [and] irresponsible people [within the security services]’, he argued, 
‘but we must not lose sight of the most important issue, that there is not only the reaction 
in Poland, that there are not only malcontents, but that the counter-revolution is around us’. 
Instead of complaining about the security services, therefore, provincial and local party 
branches ‘should send activists, capable people’ to reinforce its ranks. For the security 
apparatus constituted ‘a critical protection of our young people’s democracy’.27 
 The Polish socialists wanted their people to get involved not just in the struggle 
with but also in the prosecution of counter-revolutionaries. During a meeting with 
representatives of the Łódź provincial PPS, Osóbka-Morawski responded positively to a 
request for popular tribunals to be convened, indicating that he had already instructed the 
Ministry of Justice to draw up the relevant decrees.28 The PSIUP shared this preference for 
popular tribunals. In late 1944, Nenni wrote that the popular masses desired ‘justice more 
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than bread’.29 Thus far, however, the ‘bureaucratic organisation’ of the purge had allowed 
King Victor Emmanuel to ‘spend his days in peace’ and Pietro Badoglio to ‘play bocce 
ball in Rome’. Italy, insisted Nenni, would do better to follow the example of France in 
this respect, where post-war retribution lay in the hands of ‘people’s courts’. Even if that 
might result in the occasional innocent man spending a couple of days or weeks in prison, 
he conceded, that was still better than ‘a Nazi-fascist criminal’ being at large.30  
 If the Italian and Polish socialists relished the prospect of popular tribunals, though, 
the Czechoslovakian social democrats and French socialists rapidly grew disenchanted 
with the reality of popular involvement in the purge. As early as April 1945, Robert 
Coutant was pointing towards ‘defects’ in the newly-created Courts of Justice. Juries 
‘know nothing of the case before them’, he lamented, ‘and they are overly influenced by 
the testimonies of “resisters”, which [...] have often been bought, and by the arguments of 
counsel’. After citing local examples of juries adopting ‘a wrong opinion’ on cases, he 
called for the establishment of Martial Courts ‘to mitigate this shortcoming’.31  
It did not take very long either before the ČSSD began seeking to limit the ambit of 
the Czechoslovakian Extraordinary People’s Courts – charged with the prosecution of 
‘Nazi criminals, traitors, and their accomplices’ in June 1945. By late 1946, the social 
democrats were intimating that these popular tribunals, which were the subject of repeated 
meddling by such communist-dominated organisations as factory councils and local 
committees,32 had run their course. The ČSSD, accordingly, agreed to renew the mandate 
of the Extraordinary People’s Courts until May 1947 ‘only under the condition that this 
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31 Commissaire de Police to Directeur des Reseignements Generaux [Réunion socialiste à Marly], 6 April 
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would definitely be their final term and that all unfinished cases would be referred to 
ordinary courts’.33  
This desire to return to judicial normality as soon as possible must be seen in the 
light of communist endeavours to politicise the legal settlement of the purge. The ČSSD 
expressed its misgivings over the communist-inspired agitations and strikes after the 
National Court, created at the same time as the Extraordinary People’s Courts to deal with 
the most prominent Czech collaborators, handed lenient sentences to five former 
Protectorate ministers in July 1946. Though the social democrats had ‘made no secret’ of 
their feelings that the sentences were ‘disproportionally low’, they could ‘not agree’ to 
attempts ‘to overturn a verdict of the National Court by means of demonstrations’. The 
National Court, after all, was ‘a popular tribunal’ too ‘in which six lay judges, all victims 
of Nazi persecutions, were represented alongside one professional judge’. Its verdict, 
moreover, was in line with the Great Retributive Decree that the government had adopted 
in the revolutionary period immediately after liberation. To ‘tread upon revolutionary laws 
we have enforced ourselves’, the ČSSD warned, ‘could jeopardise the further effectuation 
of the purge as no one would dare to become member of a tribunal [...] when its decisions 
are not respected’.34 
In very similar terms, the SFIO denounced the PCF’s response to not getting its 
way in the trial of several Vichy admirals during the summer of 1946. After the charges 
against one of the accused were dropped on account of his poor health, the communist 
delegates to the High Court of Justice, established in November 1944 to prosecute the 
heavyweights of the Vichy regime, refused to show up for jury selection. As the law that 
                                                          
33 ‘Zpráva o činnosti Československé Socialní Demokracie k XXI. řádnému sjezdu v Brně 14.-16. XI. 1947’, 
Archiv ČSSD, Fond č. 71, Část II Československá sociální demokracie (1945-1948), I. Sjezdy čs. socialní 
demokracie, 112 XXI. Sjezd konany 14.-16. listopadu v Brně, p. XL. 
34 ‘Zpráva o činnosti Československé Socialní Demokracie k XXI. řádnému sjezdu v Brně 14.-16. XI. 1947’, 
Archiv ČSSD, Fond č. 71, Část II Československá sociální demokracie (1945-1948), I. Sjezdy čs. socialní 
demokracie, 112 XXI. Sjezd konany 14.-16. listopadu v Brně, p. XXXV-XXXVI. 
166 
 
had instituted the High Court of Justice stipulated that all of its juries were to reflect the 
parliamentary balance of power in a proportional manner, this rendered jury selection 
impossible altogether, leaving its socialist president, Louis Noguères, with no choice but to 
release all defendants under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. At the August 
1946 SFIO congress, Noguères hit back at the anti-socialist press campaign that the PCF 
unleashed over this affair. ‘The party and me’, he argued, ‘consider it wrong not to respect 
a law one has voted for’. What was to ‘become of the regime in France and of democracy’, 
after all, ‘when a party does not respect a law it has accepted’? The ‘truth’ was that the 
communist attitude was ‘purely fascist’. For ‘it is fascist to not want to respect a law, to not 
want to apply the law, and to want to impose another’.35 
Noguères’ point in fact goes right to the heart of the distinction between the two 
sets of parties when it came to the purge. According to the Czechoslovakian social 
democrats and the French socialists, on the one side, the remnants of fascism were to be 
found chiefly within the communist parties. Both in the people they attracted and in the 
attitudes they adopted, after all, the communists were reminding them of the violence and 
unconstitutionalism that had characterised fascism. For the Italian and Polish socialists, on 
the other, fascist leftovers were to be found everywhere but on the Left. In their view, the 
deep wounds that two decades of right-wing dictatorship had wrought within the body 
public could only begin to be healed by a root-and-branch purge of all those associated 
with fascism.  
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Re-Orienting the Disoriented 
 
The purge constituted but one dimension, though, of the moral reconstruction effort 
undertaken by the post-war European socialist parties. A second, and perhaps still more 
important, task the four parties set themselves was to take by the hand those social groups 
that had been left disoriented by the fascist experience. In this respect, socialist leaders 
worried about moral decay amongst two groups in particular. Firstly, they often lectured 
women for having their priorities all wrong. Secondly, they continuously scolded 
youngsters for their depraved behaviour. Behind these essentially similar grumbles, 
however, went entirely different motivations for wanting to re-orient women and 
youngsters. The PPS and the PSIUP, on the one hand, were driven primarily by broader 
political concerns – they hoped to buttress democracy by bolstering these vulnerable and 
malleable groups against the temptations of the anti-democratic Right. The ČSSD and the 
SFIO, on the other, were driven largely by more narrow electoral concerns – they were not 
so much striving to win women and youngsters for democracy as to make them vote for 
their parties. What really accounts for the divergence between the four parties, then, were 
deeper-seated beliefs about the societal foundations upon which fascism had built. 
 Women presented (overwhelmingly male) socialist leaders with a challenge in more 
than one way. First and foremost, the social consequences of war had handed women the 
key to election outcomes. The much higher death toll amongst men as well as the 
predominantly male dislocation caused by military conscription and forced labour in the 
Reich, after all, meant that women significantly outnumbered men across post-liberation 
Europe. This constituted a major cause for concern for socialist leaders, who, all their 
historical struggles for (male) universal suffrage notwithstanding, had frequently been 
ambivalent at best about female suffrage. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
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many leading socialists had still dismissed female suffrage on the ground that women were 
irrational creatures, who stood under the influence of clerics, and would be an easy prey 
for Catholic and conservative parties at election time.36 Although socialist parties did 
embrace the cause of female suffrage during the first decades of the twentieth century, it 
remained far from a priority and even France, with its proud Republican traditions, only 
gave women the vote in 1945.37 In fact, with women now fully enfranchised, lingering 
anti-women prejudices resurfaced amongst post-war socialist leaders. Counselling against 
calling elections at the shortest possible notice in November 1944, André Le Troquer – 
later to become the SFIO’s Minister of the Interior within the Gouin government – gave a 
good example of this. ‘Without the counterweight of male prisoners [of war] and 
deportees’, he warned, ‘the female vote [...] might provide us with the greatest of 
surprises’.38  
 Secondly, women made up an ever-increasing segment of the industrial workforce. 
The war had already seen many women entering factories to take the jobs vacated by men 
and the post-war battle for production witnessed further attempts to pull women towards 
productive work. The ČSSD leadership, for example, lamented the difficulties in quickly 
getting available manpower to work there where it was needed. ‘This also applies to 
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women’, it declared, who were to be ‘guaranteed the possibility of finding a job’ in new 
legislation.39 If socialist leaders were all in favour of women enrolling in industrial life, 
however, they often grappled with the attitudes and demands female workers brought to 
factories. Łódź PPS leaders more than once found women, together with youngsters, to be 
the driving force behind wildcat strikes, with their ‘cries directed against low wages, 
various technical shortcomings, generally poor living standards, etc.’ dominating turbulent 
strike meetings.40 
 For socialist party and trade union leaders, as a result, the female voter or worker 
often represented the epitome of the misguided constituent, whose single-minded 
obsession with bread-and-butter issues had rendered her oblivious to the bigger political 
picture. In explaining the yes-camp’s defeat in the May 1946 constitutional referendum, for 
example, Mayer drew a sharp distinction between male and female no-voters. Whereas 
‘many men in rural areas’ had voted no because they believed the political falsehoods that 
the no-camp had spread about the Constitution, he told a SFIO meeting in Cambrai, 
women who had rejected the Constitution did so frequently because they were  
‘dissatisfied about ravitaillement’.41  
The PPS leadership likewise maintained that ‘not all arguments that convince men 
strike a chord with the woman’s psyche’, whilst listing education, care for mother and 
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child, welfare, and labour protection for women amongst the ‘issues which interest them 
above all’.42 Yet, socialist leaders had precious little to offer on such socio-economic 
issues until the reconstruction effort was completed. For that reason, it was imperative that 
they made women aware of the political achievements making up for low living standards. 
‘If the woman has to decide over the fate of the state with her ballot paper’, as a report of 
the ČSSD’s Women’s Commission put it, ‘she must be politically conscious, freed of all 
pettiness, then she will choose for democracy and the path of socialist progress’.43 
If all four parties agreed that women had to be educated politically, though, they 
had very different motivations for wanting to do so. For the ČSSD and the SFIO, it was all 
about broadening the appeal of their own parties. They were after the woman vote first and 
foremost and tailored their efforts to that end. After its second election defeat in 1946, the 
SFIO committed to stepping up its propaganda amongst women through women’s groups 
and local party sections.44 The ČSSD even wanted a woman party representative to be 
present in ‘all associations, corporations, companies, offices, etc.’, with the express goal of 
translating ‘this well-organised extra-party work [...] into party work’.45  
The target of such party work amongst women was to present the party as the 
unrivalled champion of the woman’s cause. Speaking to local party members in Escaudain, 
Rachel Lempereur, the leader of the Socialist Women in the North of France, argued that 
women should choose the SFIO because of its ‘proven’ track record on social affairs. ‘It is 
thanks to the action of socialism that workers have gained certain ameliorations’, she 
declared, quoting the law of 40 hours, collective contracts, and paid holidays as 
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examples.46 The ČSSD, for its part, was keen to point out that it was the great protagonist 
of a progressive and women-friendly tax system. After having proposals first to triple the 
tax-free allowance and thereafter to double the tax deduction for married couples and their 
children refused by all of its coalition partners, the party published a poster calling out the 
communists specifically for sustaining a tax regime that hit the weakest groups unduly 
hard.47 
For the PPS and the PSIUP, the outreach to women was to serve altogether 
different than party-political purposes. Their prime aim was to free women from political 
isolation. According to Basso, for example, the socialist factory cell constituted a ‘school 
of politics and socialism’ for women who did not dare to join their local PSIUP section ‘for 
fear of the priest’s reprisal’.48 Far from instructing the rank-and-file activists in charge of 
this educative effort to dwell upon the party’s achievements, however, he urged them to 
take a ‘non-sectarian’ approach. For ‘like we cannot expect to immediately make an 
illiterate appreciate Divine Comedy [Dante’s most famous poem]’, it could not be expected 
that hitherto ‘apolitical’ women would ‘immediately convert to socialism’.49  
The PPS also noted how ‘work amongst women’ encountered ‘a series of obstacles, 
both technical [the difficulties in drawing women, as homemakers, into party meetings 
outside of working hours – JG] and those stemming from the centuries of women’s 
exclusion from political and social life’. Alongside the more traditional objectives to 
organise women within the party and to press women’s most urgent social needs, therefore, 
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the PPS Women’s Council also set itself the goal of ensuring ‘the most active participation 
of women in the build-up of a socialist system’. This involved not only ‘the political and 
organisational education of women by means of discussion clubs’, but also ‘the promotion 
through women of the education of the youth in a socialist spirit’.50 
The post-war morality of youngsters often caused socialist leaders still more 
profound misgivings than that of women. For if the fascist and collaborationist regimes had 
merely prolonged the political disorientation of women they actively targeted the youth for 
indoctrination. Local party activists and leaders in particular sounded alarm over how 
dictatorship, war, and occupation had contaminated youngsters. Fascism ‘has polluted the 
conscience of youngsters’, a Sesto San Giovanni socialist wrote to the local PSIUP weekly, 
by ‘diverting the minds of young people from the path of good sense and of humility’. This 
lack of customs found its reflection in the long list of perversions local socialists in each of 
the four countries identified with the youth, including alcohol abuse,51 marauding,52 
prostitution,53 and an attitude of easy gain.54 For that reason, party leaders should ‘look 
after our youth’, as one Łódź socialist put it, ‘which is demoralised after the war’.55 
All concurring that fascism had brought on a serious moral crisis amongst 
youngsters, though, the four parties were very much at variance over the depth of the 
political imprint fascism had made on young minds. For the ČSSD and the SFIO, the 
political dependability of the youth was never really in question. To be sure, the French 
socialists bewailed their losses amongst youngsters in the November 1946 elections, but 
were quick to accept responsibility for them. The SFIO, several of its leaders agreed, had 
                                                          
50 ‘Sprawozdanie na XXVII Kongres we Wrocławiu, 14 – 17 grudnia 1947 roku’, AAN, Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna, XXVII Kongres, 2029/3, 235/I-27, fo. 44, p. 84. 
51 Jař. Průcha, ‘Otevřte oči!’, Nový Den, 30 August 1946.   
52 Kz, ‘Není lehké být kacířem!’, Nový Den, 3 April 1946. 
53 ‘La section du Parti Socialiste de Marville et son action dans le domaine de la moralité publique’ [2 August 
1945], ADN, CRR, 19 W 37108 2.  
54 ‘Note de Renseignements’ [Réunion organisée par le Parti Socialiste à l’occasion du 40ème Anniversaire de 
fondation de la Fanfare Ouvrière de Saint-Amand], 25 August 1946, ADN, CRR, 28 W 38451 2. 
55 ‘Protokól zebranie Koła PPS przy Państwowych Zakladach Przemysłu Wełnianego Nr. 1’ [11 March 
1947], APŁ, DK PPS Czerwona, 11, fo. 60. 
173 
 
not had a youth policy whilst ‘the mystique’ of working-class unity, which had still been a 
strong socialist attribute in the 1936 elections, had driven many young voters to the 
communists this time around.56  
For the Czechoslovakian social democrats, Fierlinger also affirmed that the youth 
was of sound political convictions. ‘The occupier’, he wrote, ‘has tried to subvert [the 
youth’s] spiritual foundations at the roots [...] to eradicate from Czech culture and history 
everything that binds us to the national tradition, to poison our youth with fascist venom, 
and to make of it a characteristic minion of the regime’. But this plan ‘to Nazify the Czech 
youth’, he insisted, had failed. For ‘[o]ur youth has proven by its actions’, both by 
spontaneously joining the (anti-German) Prague uprising of May 1945 and by its 
willingness to contribute to the battle for production, ‘that it has retained its healthy 
core’.57    
 Nothing fundamentally wrong with the young, accordingly, the two parties set 
about to attract as many youngsters as possible to their parties. In both countries, this 
involved strong competition with the communists, who dominated much of youth politics 
through such (officially non- or cross-party) transmission belt organisations as the 
Czechoslovakian Youth Union (ČSM) and the Union of the Republican Youth of France 
(UJRF). The ČSSD’s Youth Commission complained that the guidelines of the ČSM, 
declaring a whole range of activities to be the special realm of that organisation, 
constituted an impediment to the creation of a proper social democratic youth movement 
and petitioned the ČSSD congress to address this question.58  
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Not bound by membership in any cross-party youth organisation, the SFIO had 
more latitude to pursue its own agenda amongst youngsters. As so often, its propaganda to 
this end took a distinctly anti-communist shape. Though attacking both the MRP youth 
organisations for serving the ‘politics [...] of the clergy’ and the ‘essentially communist’ 
UJRF for placing ‘the designs of a party ahead of the interests of the youth’, a speaker of 
the Young Socialists only elaborated on the communist wrongdoings during an election 
rally in Feignies (on the Belgian border). Education should be free until the age of 18, he 
argued, and include a period of professional apprenticeship. The communists, however, 
were opposed to apprenticeships because they wanted ‘to throw youngsters into the battle 
for production as quickly as possible without caring for their health and their faculties’. 
‘[R]easonable people’, he concluded, ‘agree with the socialists in condemning 
Stakhanovism’.59 
For the PPS and the PSIUP, on the other hand, the moral crisis afflicting youngsters 
was but a symptom of their political unsteadiness. Basso repeatedly mentioned the youth in 
the same breath with women as a politically disoriented group.60 Even amongst youngsters 
flocking to the PSIUP, he lamented, there was ‘a high percentage that certainly does not 
have an adequate class consciousness’. This included youngsters ‘still paying involuntary 
tribute’ to their fascist formation ‘in the form of anti-communism’, youngsters who had 
arrived at anti-fascism ‘through sentimental impulses or vague humanitarian aspirations’, 
as well as youngsters blind to the class antagonisms underlying political struggles.61 In a 
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similar vein, Nenni warned young workers in particular that the war-induced bankruptcy of 
fascism did not mean that the capitalist interests it had served had also been defeated. ‘We 
have to foil’, he declared, attempts to have people believe that ‘fascism, from 1922 to 
1939, represented a genuine effort of reconstruction [...] and an endeavour to solve the 
problems of our country on the national and international level’.62    
PPS leaders were extremely worried too by the Polish youth’s apparent 
susceptibility to what they considered to be fascism. ‘The bitter experience of [the last] 
five years has taught us’, an outgoing secretary of one of the PPS youth organisations told 
the August 1945 party congress, ‘that the youth can be a wing and a bulwark of fascism’.63 
What was worse, the youth’s exposure to inimical influences appeared to have continued 
into liberation. After the student demonstrations of 3 May 1946, on what had been the 
Constitution Day national holiday in pre-war Poland and was to become the focal point of 
anti-regime protests in People’s Poland, Józef Cyrankiewicz expressed alarm at ‘the mass 
base’ that ‘reactionary groups of students’ had formed within ‘schools, the scouts, etc.’. In 
its current state, he warned ‘the academic youth could provide us with a cadre of judges 
and prosecutors of the pre-war type’. It was necessary, therefore, to intervene vigorously in 
higher education: all academics that had participated in the demonstrations were to be 
expelled from universities and new professors should henceforth be appointed by the 
Senate only.64 Such measures notwithstanding, the PPS leadership remained deeply 
anxious about youngsters’ political mindset. Poland’s social revolution, Lucjan Motyka 
still had to concede at the December 1947 congress of the PPS, often met ‘with much 
larger opposition amongst the youth than the older generation’. This was due, he argued, to 
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‘the influence of nationalist-reactionary education in the pre-war and war years and a 
significant emotional deference to pseudo-patriotic platitudes’.65 
The key to the four parties’ widely divergent attitudes towards women and 
youngsters, then, lies in the severity of their countries’ dictatorial experience. For the 
Italian and Polish socialists, on the one side, the moral and political re-education of women 
and youngsters, having never or hardly known anything but dictatorship, was going to be a 
lengthy process. Already in the 1930s, Basso had written that ‘we must accomplish a long 
and slow penetration of ideas and of moral re-education, especially amongst the young’.66 
The PPS leadership, for its part, explained how the ‘serious havoc’ the occupation had 
wrought to ‘the morality and mental robustness of Polish society’ was all the deeper as the 
Nazis had been thriving in the ‘fertile ground prepared by the long years [...] of the 
depraved methods of the Sanacja clique’.67 For the Czechoslovakian social democrats and 
the French socialists, on the other, the moral disorientation amongst women and youngsters 
was merely an unfortunate and temporary by-product of the occupation. There was no 
reason, therefore, to start from scratch in re-educating these groups. Whereas the SFIO 
insisted that ‘the Third Republic has accomplished an admirable work as regards 
schools’,68 after all, Bohumil Laušman even argued that ‘the Czechoslovakian school has 
always been our pride’.69 
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The Morals of Labour 
 
There was thus a clear fault line between the four parties’ appraisals of the political 
leftovers of dictatorship, war, and occupation, with the PPS and the PSIUP obsessing over 
the vestiges of fascist and authoritarian regimes in the hearts and minds of their people and 
the ČSSD and the SFIO far more confident that their countries’ social fabrics had been 
able to withstand the fascist challenge. Things were often the other way around, however, 
when it came to the socio-economic morals that fascism had left behind amongst the 
workforce. Though all four parties agreed that the spirit of self-preservation engendered by 
the wanton oppression and exploitation of the war years had to be replaced by a national 
solidarity as soon as possible, they were much at odds over how badly this socio-economic 
demoralisation had affected the industrial working class. The Czechoslovakian social 
democrats and the French socialists increasingly came to reproach their workers for 
standing in the way of an economic revival by pursuing a narrow and self-interested 
agenda. For the Italian and Polish socialists, inversely, the moral crisis, even if defined in 
socio-economic terms, remained a middle-class phenomenon above all. This was part of a 
wider debate about the social constituencies upon which democracy and socialism could 
draw, which will continue into the second part of this thesis.  
 Socialist leaders were very quick to identify the need for a thorough ‘moral 
cleansing’ of the national community in terms of ethics. ‘Eight days since my return to 
France’, wrote Léon Blum in his first article after being liberated from foreign internment, 
‘I confess that I am full of disappointment and concern in this respect’. He was under the 
impression of finding himself in a ‘corrupted’ atmosphere. ‘I get the feeling of a sort of 
tired convalescence, nonchalance, [and] laziness’, he lamented, ‘which constitutes an 
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environment conducive to the development of all infections’.70 The origins of these moral 
shortcomings, according to the SFIO leadership, lay in the divisive effects of the 
occupation. Not only had it dispersed the French population over a vast geographical area, 
after all, it had also seen both ‘virile’ and ‘reprehensible’ habits leave their ‘footprint on 
individuals’. If ‘liberation has bit by bit brought together separated brethren’, then, ‘the 
moral unity between them has not yet been re-created’.71 
 One of the worst manifestations of this lacking moral unity was what party leaders 
often described as ‘regional selfishness’. With national steering all but non-existent during 
the final months of war and the first months of liberation, local and regional 
administrations had become the focal point of many vital provisions and services. Crucial 
as their activities may have been in keeping the population fed and production going, 
however, party leaders quickly came to resent the engrained localism or regionalism of 
such administrations as they struggled to enforce a national distribution system. Speaking 
about ravitaillement to socialists in the North of France, Coutant deplored ‘the impervious 
walls’ that prefects had erected between departments and called for sanctions against those 
‘not acting for the good of the collective’.72 For the Plzeň ČSSD, meanwhile, Ivan 
Hollman complained that ‘the required solidarity’ was ‘lacking altogether’ amongst some 
local administrations. With ‘narrow selfishness, indiscipline, [and] a view to [strengthen 
their] appeal’, he argued, these administrations sought ‘to improve supply in the area under 
their jurisdiction at the expense of other regions’.73 
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 But the problems of regional selfishness definitely made their most lasting impact 
in post-war Italy. Still by mid-1946, Franco Mariani was insisting on the need ‘to combat 
regional and provincial egoism’. In the provision of milk, for example, some provinces did 
not have to ration at all, whereas a city like Genoa was so desperately short of supply that, 
for three days every week, it could ‘only give milk to the old and to babies, and many 
times [in the form of] half milk and half water’.74 Such regional selfishness, moreover, was 
hardly confined to the unpurged provincial authorities. At the first congress of Milano area 
liberation committees, Rodolfo Morandi attacked local liberation committees and factory 
councils, otherwise cherished by the Italian socialists, as we will see, for acting as if their 
‘community and factories are separate entities’. Circumstances ‘momentarily benefitting’ 
the inhabitants of a commune or the workforce at a factory, he admonished, ‘can worsen 
the living standards of the collective if they annul the efforts aimed at restoring a common 
standard within society’. At present, Morandi lamented, the list of liberation committee 
and factory council infractions upon these efforts was ‘endless’: ‘allowing breaches in 
rationing discipline within communes because there are stocks, selling workers factory 
products under their price, and [...] a large company producing chemical fertilisers 
bartering in grain that should be delivered to the masses’. Liberation committees and 
factory councils, he concluded his criticism, ‘have to consider themselves factors in the 
national reconstruction, elements of a unitary system in the interest of the people, not 
aggregates that isolate themselves from the collective’.75 
 But that was about as far as the PSIUP was willing to go in condemning the morals 
of the working class. The PPS, though sometimes disparaging of the effort workers put in 
during the battle for production as we have seen, likewise only seldom accused workers of 
lacking solidarity. For the ČSSD, on the other hand, regional selfishness was but one of 
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multiple socio-economic indiscretions on the part of the working class and their local, 
frequently communist, representatives.  
In an angry article in the party’s national daily, Laušman listed many more. He 
started by insisting that factory councils had to draw a line between the pre-war capitalist 
company and the post-war nationalised company, for workers in the nationalised sector 
had to understand that their fate was linked to the prosperity of their firm. ‘We have to 
approach’, he continued, ‘the new social order as pristine, more sincere, and more virtuous 
people’, certainly not as ‘liars, cowards, jerks, [or] pushovers’. Of late, however, there had 
been ‘phenomena in our [public] life that give at least cause for concern’. Laušman went 
on to enumerate five examples of factory management and workers placing their sectional 
interests ahead of the collective good, including management at an unprofitable factory 
inciting its workforce to go on strike against the government’s decision to close the plant, 
bosses placed under government surveillance for mismanagement urging their personnel to 
start a protest action, and anti-fraud inspectors being banished from a factory on the 
command of a ‘political’ [often used as code for communist – JG] official. ‘The new social 
order’, he concluded, ‘necessitates respect for the law right from the Minister of Industry 
through any managing director up to the last worker’.76  
 The SFIO leadership often berated workers for losing sight of the commonweal too. 
What party leaders described as ‘corporatism’, groups of workers seeking sectional gain at 
the expense of the collective, became an increasing problem as the communist-dominated 
trade unions abandoned their erstwhile moderation over the course of 1947. Worse, 
employers often seemed willing to make common cause with their workforce’s 
corporatism, especially if it might serve their longer-term interests.77  
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All of these factors played a role when Parisian press operators went on strike in 
February 1947 demanding that their salaries would be linked to inflation. Already before 
the strike broke out, SFIO Executive member André Ferrat counselled forcefully against 
giving in to the demands of the press operators. ‘We cannot allow’, he insisted, ‘that a tiny 
part of the working class, whose wages are high, is concerned with its personal corporative 
interest more than with that of the working masses’. He warned his fellow party leaders, 
moreover, ‘that big business encourages the demands of press operators to take control of 
the press, particularly of the socialist press which is in danger [as it was experiencing 
severe financial difficulties]’.78 When the strike did occur, accordingly, the SFIO 
leadership was unanimous in denouncing it as ‘unjustified’. Mayer was especially scornful 
of the rank-and-file socialists who had partaken in the strike. ‘Because they are members 
of the Socialist Party’, he argued, ‘they have additional duties’. But rather than seeking the 
counsel of the SFIO Executive before going on strike, they had undermined ‘worker’s 
action and the worker’s movement [by] impeding the [anti-inflationary] politics of the 
Government’. (Socialist) press operators, Mayer summed up, had demonstrated ‘their 
inability to rise to the level of the Nation. They are not practising syndicalism, but 
corporatism’.79  
If ČSSD and SFIO leaders regularly decried their workers for their self-
centredness, the PPS and the PSIUP identified this trait chiefly with the lower middle 
classes. These groups, argued the PPS leadership, exhibited ‘a particularly low level of 
social awareness’ by failing to understand that their own ‘objective’ interests united them 
with other groups ‘opposed to the capitalist system’. Their ‘aversion to productive work’, 
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their ‘search of an easy income through secret trade or scalp’, and their ‘pointless, 
malignant, and thereby detrimental criticism of the social efforts to re-build the state 
apparatus’, were all ‘characteristic phenomena of the current moral crisis’.80  
The PSIUP was very much alive to the political implications of such artificial 
socio-economic barriers between the classes. For fascism might have been the ‘the political 
superstructure of the interests of monopolistic capitalism’, Nenni wrote, ‘the typical fascist 
[...] is the educated supervisor horrified at the idea of being a white-collar proletarian who 
firmly believes in the paternalistic function of the middle classes’.81 With such people 
continuing to resist their inevitable proletarianisation, he approvingly quoted Action Party 
theorist Guido Dorso, the dictatorship of the proletariat had now become a necessity from a 
Marxist point of view.82 
The ČSSD, conversely, was soon to grow wary of the dictatorial action that the 
proletariat was undertaking against middle management. Six weeks into the liberation, 
Laušman called for ‘peace’ to ‘finally’ return to factory life. The purge, he insisted, ‘must 
come to an end in order for labour, which has to turn the Republic into a happy home for 
all working people, to become a joy’.83 What seems to have underlain this desire to halt the 
industrial purge so abruptly was the party’s growing belief that it was being abused by 
workers and their communist enablers. In Plzeň, for example, the ČSSD objected to the 
KOR’s proposal to remove one engineer Josef Šmolík from the management at the city’s 
waterworks. The complaints against him, as KOR readily acknowledged, were ‘not of a 
political nature’, but concerned his ‘aggression and morbid ambition’. Josef Janouš refused 
to accept these as sufficient grounds for dismissal, however. ‘The current purge of traitors 
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and occupiers from all companies does not mean’, he remonstrated, ‘that those people who 
are not guilty of anything, but have been appointed as director and are forced to execute 
various commands, should also go’. Instead of ‘benefiting it’, after all, that would ‘only 
hurt the public economy’.84  
Although the SFIO did call for a more strenuous cleansing of the industrial 
apparatus, its main focus, as per usual, was to attack the communists for undermining these 
efforts. ‘The purge of the mines has been compromised by the communists’, Augustin 
Laurent told a party meeting in Cambrai, ‘who have given important posts to formerly 
collaborationist engineers’.85 During the October 1946 election campaign, this row went 
public, as Laurent exchanged open letters with Léon Delfosse, the communist leader of the 
CGT in the mines of the North. After Delfosse had accused Laurent’s ‘very close friend’ 
Francis-Louis Closon – appointed by De Gaulle as Regional Commissioner of the Republic 
for the North of France after the liberation – of saving several ‘less marked’ collaborators 
from the purge, Laurent hit back at the communist role in the inadequate purge of the 
mines. ‘[M]ore than Closon’, he argued, ‘Marcel Paul [the PCF’s Minister of Industrial 
Production], [Auguste] Lecoeur [the PCF’s Under-Secretary of State for the Mines], [and] 
Delfosse [alongside his trade union role also the Vice-President of the nationalised mines 
in the Nord-Pas de Calais region] [...] are the masters of the situation’. But ‘not only do 
they not purge’, they wanted to place ‘culprits [...] at the highest posts in the hierarchy of 
the most important nationalised sector’.86 
For the Italian socialists, though, the industrial purge had to cut far deeper than that. 
Writing to Nenni, PSIUP parliamentary deputy Giovanni Tonetti recounted the indignation 
amongst workers in his Veneto constituency over the leniency meted out to 32 of their 
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collaborationist colleagues. This group, which included former squad members, had first 
been suspended with pay and now, under new dispositions, had to return to the workforce. 
‘Workers say’, Tonetti wrote, ‘at [the Ministry of] Justice there is Togliatti, at [the 
Commission for] the Purge we have Nenni, [and Mauro] Scoccimarro [the PCI’s Finance 
Minister in the Parri and first two De Gasperi governments] is there for the confiscation of 
the profits of the [fascist] regime, and yet nothing concrete and satisfactory has been done 
thus far’. It ‘is all fine to tell [workers] that our comrades in Government do what they can, 
not what they would want, that the presence of representatives of the bourgeois reaction in 
Government [and] the obstructionist action of the intact bureaucratic apparatus creates a 
situation in which the socialist and communist presence in Government does not allow for 
the positive work of repressing fascism, but is limited to preventing the installation of a 
reactionary capitalist-militaristic regime’, he continued, ‘but they remain perplexed’.87 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen in this chapter that post-war reconstruction had strong moral connotations 
for each of the four parties. Yet, the parties had a fundamentally different understanding of 
what moral reconstruction was supposed to be about. For the PPS and the PSIUP, on the 
one side, moral reconstruction was crucial from a political point of view. The purge had to 
be severe and the re-education of disoriented groups thorough, accordingly, to fully cleanse 
post-war society of everything they associated with fascism. The working class, though, 
except for those workers who had actively collaborated with fascists, could be forgiven 
some socio-economic digressions, as the proletariat constituted the only social group to 
come out of the fascist experience politically unscathed. For the ČSSD and the SFIO, on 
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the other, moral reconstruction was mainly of socio-economic significance. They were by 
and large confident that their societies, after an initial purge of the foremost collaborators, 
could pick up where they had left off before the occupation. For this to happen, though, the 
socio-economic vices that had outlived the war and that were being fostered by the 
increasingly unruly communists had to be uprooted as soon as possible.  
 What set the four parties apart in questions of socio-economic reconstruction, 
hence, were neither the bread-and-butter demands formulated at their grassroots nor the 
productivist discipline and sacrifice commanded by their elites. It was socialist leaders’ 
opposite perceptions of the moral well-being of the societies they operated in that account 
for the divergences that have come to the fore thus far. For the Italian and Polish socialists, 
fascist vestiges were still omnipresent in post-war society. Osóbka-Morawski’s remarks at 
the start of this chapter already showed that. And at the first post-war PSIUP congress, 
Nino Gaeta – the foremost socialist in post-war Napoli – hit back in similar terms at 
grassroots complaints that the shortcomings of the purge and the rise of the neo-fascist 
Front of the Common Man meant that the party had failed to liquidate fascism. He asked 
the congress whether ‘we really have to believe that the process of liquidating fascism can 
be realised from one day to the next? We have overthrown fascism, but we have not yet 
eradicated it from the country and we cannot yet eradicate it from the country’.88 
 If we contrast such statements with the proclamations the Czechoslovakian social 
democrats and French socialists made about their societies, the depth of the divide between 
the two sets of parties becomes fully palpable. Already in November 1944, André Philip 
heaped praise on the French people for its orderly transition from the spiritual ruins of 
Vichy to restored Republican order. It was ‘a true miracle’, he declared, ‘that, in that total 
anarchy in which we found ourselves [at the moment of liberation – JG], the French 
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people, after everything they have had suffered, have managed to traverse that period with 
so little turmoil and so few mistakes’.89 Speaking at the November 1947 ČSSD congress, 
Laušman went even further than that. ‘The Second World War has clearly shown’, he 
exhorted, ‘that no European nation was as a whole as immune to the fascist venom as ours 
and that no nation emerged from the wartime moral and political crisis so orderly and 
effortlessly as ours’.90 The origins of these profound differences between the two sets of 
parties lie in their widely divergent appraisals of the political legacy of the interwar years, 
to which we will turn our attention in the first chapter of the second part of this thesis.       
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Part Conclusion: Socio-Economic Reconstruction 
 
In questions of grassroots-elites relations, the socialist parties are the great unknown 
amongst the three political families that dominated the post-war coalition governments. 
Whereas historians have devoted a great deal of attention to the internal dynamics within 
communist and Christian democratic parties,1 there are no comparable studies on 
interactions between leaders and rank-and-file workers within the post-war European 
socialist parties. It is perhaps because of this unknown status that historians, especially 
those bemoaning communist leaders for their failure to capitalise upon a revolutionary 
‘window of opportunity’, tend to suggest that the post-war socialist parties were more in 
tune with the sentiments at their grassroots than their communist counterparts.2 Softer on 
the working class yet sterner on the purge, the socialist parties were in their view the 
embodiment of the radical spirit that purportedly engulfed Europe in the aftermath of the 
Second World War.   
 As we have seen in the three previous chapters, however, such claims are based 
largely on anecdotal evidence and come undone under closer scrutiny. In fact, the analysis 
of grassroots-elites relations in the four socialist parties under review in this thesis has 
revealed many parallels with the internal dynamics within communist and Christian 
democratic parties. Much like their communist, Catholic, or non-party colleagues, rank-
and-file socialist workers were concerned far more with bread-and-butter issues than with 
any question of high politics. Much like their communist counterparts, socialist leaders 
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demanded discipline, sacrifice, and a productivist ethos of the working class. And much 
like their Christian coalition partners, socialist parties were deeply concerned about the 
moral crisis brought on by the experience of dictatorship, war, and occupation.   
 If there were so many similarities between the three party families in questions of 
socio-economic reconstruction, our analysis of the internal dynamics within the four 
socialist parties under review in this thesis allows us to make some broader generalisations 
about relations between grassroots and elites in post-war Europe as a whole. First and 
foremost, these concern the issue of class struggle. Many left-leaning historians have 
depicted the first post-war years as a radical ‘window of opportunity’, during which a 
strongly politicised working class sought to wrest workplace and ultimately political 
control from the bourgeoisie.3 That these efforts came to nothing, as we have seen in the 
Introduction, such historians attribute in no small part to the hesitant and contradictory 
attitudes adopted by post-war labour elites. In this respect, the ‘window of opportunity’ 
narrative strongly resembles the ‘unfinished revolution’ narrative that features prominently 
in the left-leaning historiography of the turbulent years following the First World War4 – 
with the difference that Stalinist communists replaced reformist socialists as the main 
villains of the tale. 
 In our analysis thus far, however, there has been very little to substantiate this 
‘window of opportunity’ narrative. In fact, (socialist) workers often made it clear that 
politics was the furthest thing on their mind in the struggle for day-to-day survival. This 
was reflected in their attitudes towards the question of worker self-management – that 
chief darling of the left-leaning historians of the first post-war years. Whereas they portray 
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worker outrage over the ‘persistence of managerial hierarchies’ as one of the main reasons 
for the wildcat strikes that swept post-war Europe,5 nothing of the kind is borne out by the 
views (socialist) workers in the four cities took. PPS Chairman Kasimierz Rusinek indeed 
seemed much closer to the mark when he concluded that at the root of strikes lay the 
lacking supply of basic necessities ‘almost everywhere’, in some cases the ‘vagueness’ of 
pay constructions, and only in the last place the ‘inadequate demarcation between 
management and factory council competencies’.6 
 That bread-and-butter issues always topped more ‘political’ concerns on the agenda 
of the post-war working class finds further confirmation in worker attitudes towards the 
purge. In line with Pietro Nenni’s claim that the masses desired ‘justice more than bread’,7 
historians have concluded that a ruthless purge was a top priority for the working class.8 In 
reality, however, the question of the purge did not nearly arouse the same sentiments 
amongst workers as subsistence concerns. In post-war Milano, for example, workers 
repeatedly petitioned the authorities to re-instate purged (for collaboration) factory owners. 
In the face of looming unemployment, their promises to bring in vital orders through their 
connections in the old boys’ network of industrialists or their good relations with the Allies 
counted for more than any qualms about their political reliability.9 
The only item on the agenda of the post-war working class that qualifies as 
‘political’, as understood by historians in the ‘window of opportunity’ tradition, was 
undoubtedly its egalitarianism. Indeed, some of the best work in this school of thought 
describes how egalitarian conceptions kept informing worker resistance to Stakhanovism 
                                                          
5 Pittaway, The Workers’ State, p. 67. 
6 ‘Protokuł posiedzenia Centralnego Komitetu Wykonawczego P.P.S.’ [14 May 1946], AAN, Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna, Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/2, fo. 46. 
7 Pietro Nenni, ‘La volontà del paese’, Avanti!, 26 October 1944. 
8 See e.g. Dick Geary, ‘Social Protest’, p. 21; Behan, The Long Awaited Moment, pp. 156-167.      
9 Ganapini, Una città, la guerra, pp. 203-204.  
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into the 1950s.10 Both in their basic egalitarianism and their internal jealousies, the four 
labour communities we have dealt with bear many characteristics of ‘moral economies’ – 
labour communities guided at least as much by moral norms of what constitutes legitimate 
and illegitimate economic behaviour as by absolute levels of deprivation.11 It was the 
repeated violation of the egalitarian norms of the post-war working class that sparked the 
spontaneous outbursts of worker protests and strikes that each of the four cities witnessed 
with increasing frequency. Yet, it would be a mistake to view in these outbursts a 
developing proto-revolutionary situation. For, in moral economies, collective action is 
usually defensive: directed at restoring previous living standards rather than overturning 
the existing order.12 
If there is so little evidence for a post-war revolutionary ‘window of opportunity’, 
then, how did it become part of conventional wisdom on post-war Europe? In part, this 
must be attributed to the political orientation of its main proponents. Many labour 
historians are well to the left of mainstream social democracy and want to believe there 
was an alternative to (state) capitalist restoration in post-war Europe. Yet, wittingly or 
unwittingly, these historians have confounded the hardened local activists of the post-war 
labour movement, the sort of people that would be enthusiastic about self-management or 
intransigent over the purge, with the post-war working class as a whole. More than 
anything, it is this distortion that accounts for the widespread view, which is by no means 
                                                          
10 Peter Heumos, for example, has pointed out how industrial workers in communist Czechoslovakia 
denounced Stakhanovism as ‘a cult of personality’ and tried to circumvent the divisive effects of labour 
competitions by arranging that workers and even entire factories took turns ‘winning’ these competitions. 
See: Peter Heumos, ‘“Der Himmel ist hoch, und Prag ist weit!” Sekundäre Machtverhältnisse und 
organisatorische Entdifferenzierung in tschechoslowakischen Industriebetrieben (1945-1968)’, in: Annette 
Schuhmann (ed.), Vernetzte Interpretationen: Gesellschaftliche Subsysteme in Ostmitteleuropa und in der 
DDR, (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), pp. 21-41, 25-31.  
11 The theory of the moral economy was first elaborated by E.P. Thompson in his ‘The Moral Economy of 
the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, Past & Present, 50 (1971), pp. 76-136.   
12 Jeffrey Kopstein gives a good summary of the main tenets of the moral economy theory in: ‘Chipping 
Away at the State: Workers’ Resistance and the Demise of East Germany’, World Politics, 48/3 (1996), pp. 
391-423, 394-395. 
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limited to historians with a clear left-wing profile, that the working class emerged from the 
Second World War politicised and radicalised.13    
The fact of the matter, as we have seen in the three previous chapters, is that there 
was often a profound disconnect between these hardened activists and the people they were 
supposed to represent. Nowhere was this disconnect more marked than in the relations 
between the post-war labour movement and women. Charged with feeding the worker 
family, women often bore the brunt of the extreme material shortages of the first post-war 
years. Yet, their bread-and-butter grievances mostly fell upon deaf ears amongst male 
labour elites. Gareth Pritchard points out how the male activists dominating the Antifa 
liberation committees in post-war Germany, often hailed as a prime example of a 
libertarian and participatory socialism in the ‘window of opportunity’ literature,14 
considered such grievances ‘trivial’ and viewed them as a token of women’s ‘political 
backwardness’.15 In typical style, one prominent activist bemoaned the ‘petty demands’ 
women made: ‘One woman wants a flat, another a loaf of bread or a job for her son, yet 
another complains that her neighbour has more potatoes than she does’.16       
It was exactly these kinds of issues that also divided male elites and female 
grassroots in the four parties under review in this thesis. There was a deep rift between 
provincial and national socialist leaders boasting about such political achievements as 
nationalisations, economic planning, or even democracy itself and the rank-and-file women 
                                                          
13 It is a token of how pervasive this dimension of the ‘window of opportunity’ narrative is that ‘mainstream’ 
historians often struggle to explain how the radical challenge to a (state) capitalist restoration unravalled so 
quickly, but never question its existence. The following quote by Norman Naimark, illustrates this point 
vividly. Discussing the first post-war years, Naimark insists that ‘Mark Mazower has correctly noted that 
there was both justifiable euphoria on the left and remarkable resilience on the right. There was a surge of 
communist and socialist support, as well as a steady reassertion of conservative power. There was revolution 
and there were attempts at restoration. And this holds for both eastern and western Europe’. See: Naimark, 
‘Stalin and Europe’, pp. 32-33. He refers to: Mazower, Dark Continent, pp. 294-295.    
14 See e.g.: Rebecca Boehling, A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in 
Postwar Germany: Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart under U.S. Occupation, 1945-1949, (Providence, R.I.: 
Berghahn Books, 1996); Niethammer, Borsdorf & Brandt (eds.), Arbeiterinitiative 1945. 
15 Pritchard, Niemandsland, p. 161. 
16 Quoted in: Ibid. 
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(and doubtlessly many men too) perceiving little or no improvements in their material 
situation. And when male socialist leaders were confronted with expressions of female 
discontent, they tended to be extremely dismissive too. Whether it was local PPS officials 
denouncing female strikers as ‘hysterical women’17 or the SFIO press repeatedly 
displaying ‘a barely disguised contempt’ for women voters,18 the post-war socialist parties 
certainly showed little sign of having surmounted their nineteenth-century prejudices.  
In these circumstances, the premise underlying the ‘window of opportunity’ 
narrative – that the working class and the Left more generally came out of the war in a 
strengthened or even dominant position – seems very questionable indeed. Not only did the 
centrality of food in the post-war economy place industrial workers at the mercy of 
peasants, after all, the lingering misogynism amongst socialist (and communist) leaders 
also went a long way towards alienating the majority female vote. Alhough they did not 
immediately recognise it themselves, the four parties therefore actually started the process 
of political reconstruction from a position of weakness.  
  
                                                          
17 Quoted in: Fidelis, Women, Communism, and Industrialization, p. 73. 
18 The quote concerns a report in the SFIO daily Le Populaire ‘sneer[ing] at “one young blond” in an 
extravagant fox fur, who revealed, when questioned, that she had unwittingly voted for two former Vichy 
supporters’ in the April 1945 local elections. See: Joan Tumblety, ‘Responses to Women’s Enfranchisment in 
France, 1944-1945’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 26/5 (2003), pp. 483-497, 488. And after the 
November 1946 parliamentary elections Le Populaire lamented that ‘elections today hardly seem to interest 
anyone, especially women who, mostly, don’t know what it is all about’. Quoted in: Duchen, Women’s 
Rights, p. 36.  
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Chapter 5: The Lessons of the Past 
 
By late 1945, the schism that would tear post-war Italian socialism apart was beginning to 
take shape. Having been accused by some of the party’s future secessionists of 
subordinating the PSIUP to the PCI, Pietro Nenni rejected their claims that ‘Italy would be 
the only country in Europe where there is no great socialist party’. It was all fine for 
Giuseppe Saragat to argue that the socialists led the government in Belgium, he told the 
PSIUP Executive, ‘[b]ut that was also the case before the war and they have regained a 
position that is in certain respects analogous to that’. In fact, across the continent ‘we are 
witnessing a resumption of situations that already existed before. In Norway, the socialists 
were in power and have returned. In Sweden, they were in power and have remained’. It 
could not be held against the PSIUP, he argued, that ‘the situation [for socialist parties] is 
more favourable in other countries’. For the Italian socialists, after all, the sole frame of 
reference remained ‘1919-20, when we were the only party of the working class, when the 
impetus of the entire working class was behind us, and when, despite all that, we not only 
failed to resolve certain problems, but even failed to frame them’.1 
Such historically informed perceptions of national vicissitudes were more than once 
a decisive factor in socialist attitudes towards political reconstruction. The past had taught 
the four parties a plethora of political lessons: what form democracy should take, which 
social constituencies could be relied upon, and which political parties to work with. Yet, 
these lessons varied considerably from country to country and from party to party. The 
PPS and the PSIUP, on the one hand, were haunted both by their countries’ dictatorial 
pasts and by their own role in the demise of democracy in the 1920s. To counter the still 
omnipresent ‘fascist’ threat, the working class had to present a united front this time 
                                                          
1 ‘Seduta pomeridiana’ [18 October 1945], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc. 2189, pp. 5-7.    
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around. The ČSSD and the SFIO, on the other, were confident of their countries’ 
democratic traditions and of the broad political consensus around them. For the parties to 
finally prevail in the democratic contest, however, it was crucial that socialism broke free 
from its historical working-class ghetto and reached out to other social groups. 
 This chapter seeks to retrace how the widely divergent lessons the four parties drew 
from their respective national histories shaped their approach towards rebuilding 
democracy. There are two dimensions to this. In the first place, the experience of party-
political rivalry and cooperation during the interwar years pulled the parties in opposite 
directions. Whereas the ČSSD and the SFIO had found democracy to be in safe hands with 
the centrist and centre-right parties, the PPS and the PSIUP concluded that a close-knit 
alliance between communists and socialists represented the only hope for democracy. 
Secondly, history had left the parties with polar impressions of the democratic maturity of 
their people. If the ČSSD and the SFIO felt that centuries of freedom struggles had instilled 
democratic beliefs amongst wide sections of their societies, the PPS and the PSIUP 
despaired that their recent pasts had demonstrated that there was no popular bulwark of 
democracy beyond the working class. It was these widely divergent historical lessons that 
lay at the root of the two sets of parties’ strongly divergent conceptions of democracy, 
which we will outline in the extended conclusion to this chapter.        
 
Unity and Disunity 
 
At the moment of liberation, none of the four parties advocated simply reverting to the pre-
war ways of doing politics. Even the ČSSD, which had participated in governments almost 
throughout the interwar First Republic, insisted that Czechoslovakia ‘cannot and must not 
return to 1938’. Instead, it was to ‘implement a radical transformation in its political, 
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economic, social, and cultural system’.2 The concept of unity frequently played a key role 
in such considerations. Each of the four parties agreed that the political disunity and party 
fragmentation of the interwar years, particularly on the Left, had contributed a great deal to 
their inability to achieve a socialist transformation. By the war’s end, accordingly, they all 
found themselves in some sort of partnership with the communists. Working with a party 
of questionable democratic credentials, which was competing for the same voters, quickly 
proved a challenge, however. Whether the communist alliance outlasted the heady days 
following the liberation, therefore, depended on how the four parties assessed their 
historical experience of surviving on their own.  
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the impetus for working-class political unity 
emanated chiefly from the socialists. Uninhibited by Moscow-ordered moderation, it was 
them much more than the communists banging the drum for the single working-class 
party.3 ‘Aware of the irresistible strengths that the working class will draw from its union’, 
a PSIUP resolution of August 1943 read, ‘the Socialist Party intends to realise the fusion of 
socialists and communists in a single Party based on a clear understanding of the 
revolutionary purposes of the proletarian movement’.4 For the time being, however, the 
communists preferred national to working-class unity, as the PSIUP was to find out the 
                                                          
2 ‘Program akčního výboru Československé sociální demokracie’, Archiv ČSSD, Fond č. 71, Část II 
Československá sociální demokracie (1945-1948), I. Sjezdy čs. socialní demokracie, 111 XX. sjezd konany 
19.-21. rijna 1945 v Praze, p. 5. 
3 Alongside a post-liberation revolutionary ‘euphoria’, tactical considerations may well have played their part 
in the socialists’ ‘fusionism’ too. Peter Heumos, for example, argues that the Eastern European socialist 
parties hoped to outflank the communists amongst the working class by preaching ‘greater socio-political 
radicalism’. As for the French socialists, Wilfried Loth claims that their endeavours to achieve ‘working-
class unity’ were inspired in large part by their desire to benefit, by association, from the prestige that the 
communists had gained as the driving force of the French Resistance. See: Peter Heumos, ‘Arbeiterschaft 
und Sozialdemokratie in Osteuropa 1944-1948’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 13 (1987), pp. 22-38, 30; 
Wilfried Loth, ‘Die französische Linke und die “Einheit der Arbeiterklasse” 1943-1947’, Vierteljahrshefte 
für Zeitgeschichte, 35/2 (1987), pp. 273-288, 275.   
4 ‘Dichiarizione politica del partito socialista’ [25 August 1943], Orientamenti: Bollettino di Commento e di 
Indirizzo Politico, 18 January 1948, p. 4.  
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hard way when the PCI ‘seriously compromised’ the two parties’ Unity of Action Pact by 
entering the second Bonomi government without the socialists.5 
 These dynamics were to repeat themselves in other countries. During the final 
stages of the war, several ČSSD leaders called for a merger with the communists in the 
near future, with Bohumil Laušman even going so far as to claim that the ČSSD had 
‘fulfilled its historical mission as a reformist party’ and that it would be ‘impossible to 
reconstitute it in the long run’.6 Yet, fusion was not on the agenda of the Muscovite KSČ 
leadership at that time. The uncoordinated September 1944 merger of the underground 
organisations of communists and social democrats in Slovakia, hence, came as ‘an 
untimely [and] unpleasant surprise’ for communist leaders – one to which they would later 
partially attribute their electoral setbacks in Slovakia.7  
In its efforts to further the cause of working-class unity, the SFIO likewise met with 
initial communist reluctance. Still during the clandestine period, the socialists had 
approached the PCF with a proposal to form a ‘Committee of Understanding’ that was to 
‘study the problems of worker unity, thereby paving the way for it’. ‘What an example for 
France and for the world [it would be]’, the proposal concluded, ‘if we could one day say 
that [...] the two parties of the working class have, in the underground struggle, laid the 
groundwork for the unity of tomorrow!’ Though it was regrettable that the communists had 
rejected that proposal, Daniel Mayer told the November 1944 SFIO congress, ‘I believe the 
congress will be almost unanimous in saying that the offer we made back then has not 
                                                          
5 Lelio Basso, ‘Atene a Roma’, Avanti!, 10 January 1945. 
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=0b0bd04f656ede422e35133bb6b38305 (last consulted: 
22 March 2015).  
6 Quoted in Kaplan, ‘Tsechoslowakische Sozialdemokratie’, p. 296f. 
7 Ibid, p. 282. With approximately 40% of the vote, the communists did spectacularly well in the Czech lands 
during the May 1946 parliamentary elections. Yet, in Slovakia, in spite of the fact that the party landscape 
there was basically limited to two parties, they only managed 30% against the 61% for the nationalist and 
centre-right Democratic Party.     
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lapsed, that [...] we have the right and the duty to repeat it publicly to the Communist Party 
at this forum’.8  
The communists did accept this time around and the Committee of Understanding 
met for the first time in December 1944. In fact, even though the single working-class 
party was to remain elusive, all four parties eventually managed to tie themselves to the 
communists in an official alliance: the PSIUP and the PCI agreed a new Unity of Action 
Pact in October 1943, the ČSSD, the KSČ, and the National Socialists of the ČSNS 
established a Socialist Bloc in June 1945, and the PPS and the PPR formed a United Front 
in November 1946. 
The practical experience of cooperating with the communists both in such 
partnerships and in national government, however, would quickly dampen the four parties’ 
enthusiasm for a speedy unification of the two wings of the labour movement. Before long, 
the socialists were striking an altogether different tone about the timeliness of a united 
working-class party. ‘We must not keep the problem of the fusion and of the new party at 
the centre of our discussions’, Nenni told the PSIUP Central Committee in October 1945, 
‘because that is not the problem of the moment’.9  
In the SFIO leadership, meanwhile, the opponents of a single party, amongst them 
Augustin Laurent, André Le Troquer, and André Philip, had gradually gained the upper 
hand over such initial advocates of an (eventual) socialist-communist merger as Daniel 
Mayer or Jules Moch. After a majority within the SFIO Executive had already voted down 
a plan to run the upcoming local elections on a common platform with the communists in 
                                                          
8 ‘Parti Socialiste – SFIO: Congrès national extraordinaire des 9, 10, 11, et 12 novembre 1944’, FJJ, p. 27.  
URL: http://flipbook.archives-socialistes.fr/index.html?docid=49328&language=fra&userid=0  
(last consulted: 22 March 2015). 
9 ‘Comitato Centrale’ [17 October 1945], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc. 2189, p. 25. 
199 
 
March 1945,10 the socialist representatives to the Committee of Understanding took the 
question of ‘organic unity’ off the table altogether by June of that year.11  
The PPS more and more veered towards party-political autonomy from the PPR 
too. To be sure, the programme that socialist leaders put before the August 1945 PPS 
congress had still envisioned future ‘organisational-political unity’12 and the communists 
made sure that a commitment to a single working-class party formed part of the United 
Front agreement that the PPS and the PPR entered into in November 1946. In the face of 
ever-increasing communist pressure for a merger over the year that followed the creation 
of the United Front, however, the socialists did all in their power to hold off and postpone 
unification.13     
In view of their later trajectories, the four parties actually articulated remarkably 
similar misgivings about their communist allies. In the first place, these concerned what 
they experienced as the roundly disloyal attitudes of the communists towards their socialist 
partners. Looking back on the campaign for the May 1946 parliamentary elections, Zdeněk 
Fierlinger lamented how the ČSSD had come under attack not only from the Right, ‘where 
the initiative we showed in the implementation of the great socialist reforms and 
nationalisation was naturally not received sympathetically’, but also from the Left, where 
the communists resented ‘the idea of an existing strong Social Democratic Party’. In 
Slovakia, for example, the communists had accused the social democrats of ‘splitting the 
socialist forces’ after the resurrection of the Slovak wing of the ČSSD in January 1946. As 
                                                          
10 ‘Comité Directeur’ [13 March 1945], OURS, ‘Procès-verbaux des réunions du Comité Directeur du 
congrès de Paris, 9-12 novembre 1944 au 37e congrès national, 11-15 aout 1945’, pp. 105-107. 
11 ‘Comité Directeur’ [14 June 1945], OURS, ‘Procès-verbaux des réunions du Comité Directeur du congrès 
de Paris, 9-12 novembre 1944 au 37e congrès national, 11-15 aout 1945’, pp. 135-139.  
12 ‘Projekt Uchwała Programowa XXVI Kongresu’, AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, XXVI Kongres, 
2029/1, 295/I-7, fo. 12a. 
13 In April 1947, for example, the PPS rejected out of hand a PPR proposal to announce the unification of the 
two parties during the May Day celebrations. And at the December 1947 PPS congress, Julian Hochfeld 
presented a set of programmatic theses that foresaw a PPS-PPR merger only as the end result of a pan-
European process of communist-socialist rapprochement. See: De Graaf, “The Usual Psychological Effects 
of a Shotgun Wedding”, p. 149; Kersten, The Establishment of Communist Rule, pp. 425-428.   
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the elections neared, Fierlinger declared, such ‘conflicts within the workers’ ranks’ had 
only grown deeper.14 
The French socialists were likewise incensed by communist tactics vis-à-vis their 
party. After a series of PCF press attacks upon the SFIO, tensions between the two parties 
reached boiling point by the turn of 1945. For many within the SFIO Executive, the time 
for an ultimatum had come: if the communists were to continue their attacks the socialists 
would walk away from the Committee of Understanding. Philip summed up the general 
mood arguing that the socialists had to either ‘[make] peace or [wage] war’ with the 
communists, for ‘we seem to be victims of an inferiority complex by continuously acting 
in accordance with the attitude of others’.15 It is indicative of how exasperated even the 
erstwhile supporters of socialist-communist unity were that Mayer largely echoed Philip’s 
sentiments during the following reunion of the Committee of Understanding. He told the 
communists that the meeting would be ‘decisive’: ‘either we maintain the Committee of 
Understanding and develop fraternal relations or we suppress it and choose war, but the 
ambiguity has to stop’.16 
Albeit in far more veiled terms, PPS leaders also admonished their PPR 
counterparts not to turn socialist-communist cooperation into a one-way street. ‘When one 
speaks of “unity” [but] seeks to impose supremacy’, socialist Minister of Labour and 
Social Security Jan Stańczyk told a joint PPS-PPR plenum, ‘unity can collapse’.17 And 
even the Italian socialists, in many ways blessed with the most moderate communist party 
                                                          
14 ‘The Mission of Social Democracy in the New State’ [November 1947], ANM, Fonds Zdeněk Fierlinger, 
Karton 40, Sjezd soc. dem. v Brne, pp. 18-19.   
15 ‘Comité Directeur’ [26 December 1945], OURS, ‘Réunions du Comité Directeur du 21 août 1945 au 21 
août 1946’, pp. 116-117. 
16 ‘Comité Directeur’ [9 January 1946], OURS, ‘Réunions du Comité Directeur du 21 août 1945 au 21 août 
1946’, pp. 119-120.  
17 ‘Protokół z wspólnego posiedzenia CKW PPS i KC PPR’ [28 September 1945], AAN, Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna, Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/6, fo. 28. 
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in post-war Europe,18 complained about communist animosity. Palmiro Togliatti’s recent 
equation of the PSIUP with ‘those struggling against the PCI’, Nenni told a post-election 
gathering of the two party leaderships in June 1946, ‘has had a negative backlash within 
socialist circles’. The Unity of Action Pact, he continued, had to be ‘adapted [...] to the 
present situation, stripped of ideological content, and brought to the level of concrete 
action’.19  
Such ideological concerns were the second main reason for socialist parties to 
abandon their initial fusionism. All of the communists’ affirmations that they were now 
committed to a multi-party system and a national road to socialism notwithstanding, 
lingering apprehensions over their democratic sincerity and their international allegiances 
were quick to resurface amongst the socialists. In Eastern Europe, as we have seen, such 
apprehensions had their basis in everyday practice. But even in Western Europe, where the 
communists did by and large play by the democratic rulebook during the first post-war 
years, socialist leaders had all sorts of misgivings.  
When the French communists published their outline for a single working-class 
party in June 1945, the so-called ‘Charter of Unity’, Vincent Auriol was quick to identify 
worrisome trends. At face value, he told the SFIO Executive, the communist text might 
appear acceptable, but that was ‘not the same after an intensive study’. Stalin and Lenin, 
after all, ‘are presented as the heirs of Marx, the dictatorship of the proletariat is not 
surrounded by guarantees, [and] there is no clarification regarding democratic centralism’. 
In the final analysis, he declared, ‘the communists have not changed and their tactics are 
                                                          
18 Out of all the post-war European communist leaders, PCI Secretary General Palmiro Togliatti is generally 
regarded to have been most genuinely committed to a ‘national road to socialism’. For even at the height of 
the First Cold War, he kept insisting on ‘using peaceful and legal means to further the development of 
Communism in Italy’; doing so ‘despite – and not because of the existence of the Cominform’. See: Silvio 
Pons, ‘Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 3/2 (2001), 
pp. 3-27, 16.  
19 ‘Riunione Direzione e Comitato Sindacale’ [28 June 1946], ISRT, Fondo Foscolo Lombardi, Partito 
Socialista Italiano, Direzione Nazionale, Busta 4, Fasc. 20. 
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the same in all countries: in Belgium, in Italy [...], and in Yugoslavia where Tito has 
suppressed the [non-communist] parties’.20 
Though not going as far as that, Nenni certainly questioned whether the 
communists had really changed. During a June 1945 meeting of the DC and PSIUP 
leaderships, he assured his interlocutors that ‘tactical’ rather than ‘ideological’ motivations 
had been ‘decisive’ in the socialists’ decision to enter into the Unity of Action Pact. ‘We 
are no longer the only party of the working class’, he explained, ‘and have by our side a 
communist party which has worked harder [in the anti-fascist Resistance –  JG] and which 
benefits from the prestige of Stalin and of the popular sympathies for the Soviet Union’. 
With regard to ideology, the PSIUP could only hope: ‘Have the communists definitively 
moved away from the totalitarian ideology or not? Is the dissolution of the Comintern 
real?’ The answers to those questions had ‘not yet been given’.21 
If each of the four parties quickly backtracked on the idea of a single working-class 
party, however, the question of their broader relations with the communists remained wide 
open. And here, for all of their essentially similar experiences with and reservations about 
the communists, the socialists were to move in opposite directions. Whereas the ČSSD and 
the SFIO concluded that there was no basis for continuing their formal partnership with the 
communists, the PPS and the PSIUP both renewed their unity pacts with the communists in 
October 1946. Much more than their post-war relations with the communists, it seems to 
have been the four parties’ conflicting appraisals of whether history offered socialism any 
alternative to the communist alliance that determined this outcome.  
For the Italian and Polish socialists, on the one hand, the foremost lesson of the past 
was that disunity on the Left would only benefit the authoritarian Right. In their view, the 
                                                          
20 ‘Comité Directeur’ [14 June 1945], OURS, ‘Procès-verbaux des réunions du Comité Directeur du congrès 
de Paris, 9-12 novembre 1944 au 37e congrès national, 11-15 aout 1945’, p. 138. 
21 ‘Relazione sul convegno socialista – democratico cristiano’ [1 June 1945], ACS,  Carteggio Nenni, Busta 
87, Fasc. 2188, p. 9. 
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socialist-communist splits of the early 1920s, placing the two parties on a war footing for 
the best part of the following fifteen years, had paved the way for the reaction, for 
dictatorship, and ultimately for fascism. The ‘infighting’ between communists and 
socialists after their 1921 schism, read the political report that the PSIUP Directorate 
presented to the party’s April 1946 congress, ‘was not the least cause of the advent of 
fascism’. On a broader level, moreover, ‘the experience of the last quarter of a century 
serves to demonstrate how, when communists and socialists struggle between themselves, 
[it] is never in the interest of the proletariat, of the popular and middle classes, of 
democracy, but in the exclusive interest of the reaction, in its worst forms, fascism, 
Nazism, [and] Falangism’22 – a reference to the Spanish fascist movement and system after 
Franco’s victory in the civil war from 1936 to 1939.  
PPS leaders similarly attributed their country’s descent into right-wing dictatorship 
to the interwar divisions on the Left. During a December 1946 international conference of 
Central and Eastern European socialist parties, Kasimierz Rusinek reproached the Austrian 
delegate for claiming that ‘the unity of the proletariat’ had ‘practically been realised within 
the socialist party’ in his country. ‘Before the last war’, he exhorted, ‘the Polish socialists 
were of the same opinion and, unable to find common ground with the communists as a 
consequence, had left the initiative to the parties of the Right; the result was the Piłsudski 
dictatorship’.23 
At the root of these fatal divisions, both parties agreed, lay the extreme positions 
that had characterised working-class politics for most of the interwar period. According to 
Rusinek two ‘recipes’ for taking power had existed, ‘and both were wrong’. The 
communists, on the one side, had ‘preached the dictatorship of the proletariat as the only 
                                                          
22 ‘Relazione political della direzione del partito per il XXIV congresso nazionale’[15 February 1946], 
Orientamenti: Bollettino di Commento e di Indirizzo Politico, 18 January 1948, p. 27.   
23 ‘Bericht über die Konferenz der sozialistischen Parteien Zentral- und Osteuropas in Prag von 7. – 9. 
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solution possible’. The socialists, on the other, had ‘believed that “the expropriation of the 
expropriators” would be realised automatically’ and had taken a ‘strictly defensive’ 
attitude towards the bourgeoisie as a result. With the ‘victory of fascists’, he declared, the 
proletariat had ‘paid the price [...] for the political mistakes of the socialists and the 
orthodoxy of the communists, both knowing only one “recipe” without taking into account 
the objective and specific conditions of each country’.24 In similar terms, Nenni lamented 
the two interwar ‘degenerations of Marxism’: a ‘reformist’ degeneration that saw 
‘socialism as the natural outcome of bourgeois democracy’ and a ‘sectarian’ degeneration 
that ‘lumped the entire bourgeois world together’. It was exactly these two currents that 
had dominated interwar socialism and communism, he argued, ‘with disastrous 
consequences in Germany and Italy’.25 
For the sheer magnitude of its impact, the Italian and Polish socialists frequently 
cited the fate of Weimar Germany as the ultimate vindication of their alliance with the 
communists. ‘If there had been a united front [in interwar Germany]’, PPS International 
Secretary Stanisław Dobrowolski explained, ‘Hitler would not have risen to power’. And 
the united front was ‘a life-and-death question for the Polish working class’, too, for 
without it, the country would ‘unquestionably’ be governed by ‘the reaction’.26 Nenni 
likewise defended socialist-communist unity of action with reference to ‘the Weimar 
tragedy’.27 ‘We do not want to do an encore to the Weimar Republic’, he told a September 
1944 PSIUP convention, ‘which was stillborn because it was established on the basis of 
civil war between socialists and communists’.28   
                                                          
24 Ibid, p. 71.  
25 Pietro Nenni, ‘Socialisti e communisti’, Avanti!, 11 July 1944. 
26 XXVI Kongres [August 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2029/1, 235/I-12, fo. 224. 
27 ‘Relazione Nenni’ [September 1944], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc 2186.  
28 ‘Discorso Nenni, Segretario del Partito Socialista Italiano’ [4 September 1944], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, 
Busta 87, Fasc 2186. 
205 
 
If the PPS and PSIUP divided the blame for the interwar socialist-communist 
struggles in their own countries more or less evenly over the two parties, they attributed the 
socialist-communist conflict in Weimar Germany almost entirely to the social democrats of 
the SPD. Their progressive ‘embourgeoisement’ by their non-proletarian coalition partners, 
the Italian and Polish socialists insisted, had not only alienated their party from its 
working-class roots but effectively turned it into an ally of ‘the reaction’. It was for these 
reasons that the PPS and PSIUP remained very suspicious of working with non-proletarian 
parties.    
As early as January 1946, Sandro Pertini warned that government collaboration 
with right-wing parties had unleashed a ‘neo-opportunist tendency’ within the post-war 
PSIUP. He was adamant that socialist leaders, although in coalition with bourgeois parties, 
should ‘never forget the purpose of the working class; they must not forget that they are 
socialists and that, for every measure they take, they have to ask themselves whether it 
benefits the working class or not; otherwise they only bring harm to the Party’. ‘The 
shadow of [Gustav] Noske [Weimar’s social democratic Defence Minister in 1919-20, who 
played a key role in the suppression of the 1919 left-wing uprisings – JG]’, he warned, 
‘hangs over our comrades in government’. If ‘a situation like the current were to continue 
for a long time’, after all, ‘we will one day realise that we have deprived our Party of every 
revolutionary content, of every class and socialist content, to have gentrified it’.29  
Speaking at the March 1946 PPS Supreme Council, Stanisław Szwalbe likewise 
raised strong objections to cooperation with the centre-right. ‘If you meet people saying 
that we should not cooperate with the PPR and should go with the PSL [instead]’, he 
warned party representatives, ‘that means they want to push us into the arms of the reaction 
                                                          
29 ‘Relazione al Comitato Centrale’ [January 1946], in: Neri Serneri, Casali & Errera (eds.), Scritti e discorsi 
di Sandro Pertini, pp. 68-75, 74. 
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again’. The post-war PPS, he concluded, ‘has its revolutionary line and will not let [...] 
power slip from its hands’.30  
For both parties, thus, the most important political lesson of the past was that 
socialists and communists had to close ranks in order for the working class to prevail. 
History taught them that equidistance to the political extremes on the Left and the Right 
often amounted to surrendering to ‘the reaction’. In October 1945, Nenni still gladly noted 
that ‘there is nobody [within the post-war PSIUP] suggesting a centrist politics, [...] based 
on the old slogan: neither revolution, nor reaction’. By simultaneously fighting the 
communists on the Left and the reaction on the Right, after all, the PSIUP ‘would suffer 
the same fate as German social democracy, i.e. we would bit by bit be absorbed into the 
reactionary orbit’.31 By late 1947, however, PPS Central Committee member Julian 
Hochfeld was lamenting that the ‘fatal and tragic mistakes’ that interwar PPS leaders had 
made – ‘who talked of the unity of the working class to be sure, but [only] under the 
banner of the PPS’ – were being repeated by ‘some socialists in Western Europe’. In the 
face of ‘a big reactionary offensive’, he explained, they had come up with the doctrine of 
the Third Force – ‘[positing] that neither the communists, nor the bourgeoisie are any 
good, only we ourselves’.32  
That was of course a barely disguised attack upon the SFIO and its participation in 
a centrist ‘Third Force’ coalition committed to simultaneously fighting off the perceived 
communist and Gaullist threats to democracy in France. Indeed, after the party had 
acquiesced in the removal of the PCF from the French government in May 1947, the post-
war SFIO increasingly came to replace the interwar SPD in the rhetoric of the PPS and the 
PSIUP. Socialist leaders in Poland pointed out that the subsequent developments in France, 
above all the ‘insurrectionary’ strikes of the autumn of 1947, proved that ‘their policy of 
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31 ‘Seduta pomeridiana’ [18 October 1945], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc. 2189, p. 12.    
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collaboration with the Communists is not only hypothetically but categorically the right 
one’.33 In reference chiefly to the situation in France, accordingly, Józef Cyrankiewicz told 
the December 1947 PPS congress that the Polish socialists were ‘wiser than the West 
European socialists by a whole historical period’.34   
Nenni, for his part, questioned the entire premise behind the Third Force. ‘We 
cannot make any concessions to the doctrine of the Third Force’, he told the January 1948 
PSIUP congress, ‘because that is a doctrine that goes against all of our ideologies, against 
all of our positions’. The truth was, he continued, that there was ‘no plurality of forces’ – 
‘there are only two [...]: on the one side the bourgeoisie and on the other the working 
class’. Those socialists believing that the bourgeoisie was fighting communist ‘excesses’ 
rather than the labour movement as a whole, therefore, were making a fatal mistake. For 
history taught that, when push came to shove, the bourgeoisie did not distinguish between 
communists and socialists. ‘In 1934 Austria [when the socialist-led Republican Defence 
League rose up against the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the conservative 
government – JG]’, after all, ‘there was no communist party [as the government had 
already outlawed that party – JG]; only the [Austrian] Social Democratic Party’. But that 
had not stopped ‘the Austrian bourgeoisie’ from fighting the social democrats ‘with canons 
and rifles, massacring unarmed workers’.35 And ‘[i]n the Spanish parliament elected in 
1931 there was only one communist; in the Spanish parliament elected in 1936 there were 
no more than twenty communists’. Yet, ‘the police fought the Spanish socialists, much like 
                                                          
33 This was how Denis Healey described it in his report of the December 1947 PPS congress. Labour History 
Archive and Study Centre, Manchester [hereafter LHASC], Labour Party Archives, International Department 
(LP/ID), Box 13.  
34 Quoted in: De Graaf, ‘“The Usual Psychological Effects of a Shotgun Wedding”’, p. 153.  
35 This latter point amounts to propaganda, as the Republican Defence League was the para-military wing of 
the Austrian Social Democratic Party and of course did have weapons. On the 1934 events in Austria and 
their broader impact upon the interwar international socialist movement, see: Gerd-Rainer Horn, European 
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Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 122-127.    
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it is fighting the communists in some countries today, by means of violence, oppression, 
[and] the physical destruction of working-class militants and workers’ organisations’.36    
If the interwar experiences of such countries as Austria and Spain closely 
resembled those of Italy and Poland, however, they certainly were nothing like those of 
Czechoslovakia and France. In fact, centre-left and centrist bourgeois parties had been the 
closest allies of the ČSSD and the SFIO for most of the interwar period. It was these more 
positive experiences with centrist alliances and with democratic politics in general that 
account for the two parties’ increasingly centrist orientation when democracy found itself 
mounting under pressure during the post-war years.      
Not that the Czechoslovakian social democrats and French socialists were 
overflowing with affection for their centrist coalition partners. In the first place, they 
accused the bourgeois and Catholic parties of being disloyal to and using all sorts of dirty 
tricks against socialism, especially at election time. The ČSSD leadership charged the 
ČSNS with targeting a ‘Goebbels-like propaganda’ at social democracy during the 
campaign for the May 1946 parliamentary elections.37 Its ‘spurious flyers’, claiming that a 
merger of communists and social democrats would follow suit after the elections, had 
‘deliberately created an atmosphere of uncertainty’ around social democracy.38 SFIO 
leaders, for their part, often complained bitterly about the MRP – the charges including its 
                                                          
36 ‘Partito socialista italiano. Congresso nazionale “Roma 19 – 22 gennaio 1948”’, Fondazione di Studi 
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‘vicious’ attacks upon the SFIO39 as well as its ‘desertion’ and ‘betrayal’ of the yes-camp 
in the May 1946 constitutional referendum.40  
 In ideological and socio-economic terms, moreover, the gap between socialism and 
the centrist parties seemed to have widened rather than narrowed. The ČSSD noted how 
the ČSNS, under the influence of bloc-building in international politics, had taken up the 
role of ‘mouthpiece of the Right in Czechoslovakia’.41 Insofar as the ČSNS was ‘the sewer 
to which all of the reaction converged’, as Laušman put it, these tactics had been a 
success.42 The SFIO likewise observed how the ‘Radical Socialists’ [after the official name 
of the Radical Party: the Republican, Radical, and Radical Socialist Party] of times past 
had increasingly become the ‘Radical Reactionaries’ after the war. ‘Since the liberation’, 
after all, the Radicals had ‘demonstrated [...] that, for them, the defence of the Republic 
amounted to no more than defending the last privileges of the bourgeois Third Republic’.43 
The MRP, finally, remained an enigma for the socialists.44 To be sure, it had supported the 
nationalisations and other structural reforms in the economy, but the party’s ‘solutions for 
social and economic problems appear to put it on the road of paternalism and corporatism 
more than on that of social progress’.45 
 What was never really in doubt for both the ČSSD and the SFIO, though, was the 
ultimate democratic reliability of the parties to their right. And, as post-war unity began 
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giving way to socio-political polarisation, that more and more outweighed the misgivings 
the two parties held about their bourgeois coalition partners’ economic policy preferences. 
According to Philip, ‘capitalism [...] as we have known it’, of the type that had historically 
carried the support of the centre-right, would be ‘incapable of reconstituting itself’ anyway. 
‘We are in a transitory regime’, he told the August 1946 SFIO congress, ‘which will lead 
[...] either to democratic Socialism or to an authoritarian and technocratic collectivism, 
taking the shape of a national Socialism or of a national Communism’. It followed that ‘the 
principal enemy at the present moment is no longer only capitalism as we have known it, 
[but] it is totalitarianism, in every form that it manifests itself, and it is authoritarianism’.46  
For the ČSSD, Deputy Secretary General Vojta Erban was increasingly playing up 
the democratic over the economic attributes of socialism as well. ‘We are above all [...] 
aware’, he wrote in October 1946, ‘that socialism and democracy are essentially the same 
thing, because socialism does not only have an economic side but [...] is based on the rule 
of a free people’. Yet, the social democrats also knew ‘very well’, he continued, ‘that 
socialism was, and is to this day, sometimes understood as a mechanic collectivism, which 
does not respect the individual and therefore means subjugation and dictatorship’.47      
In the face of these dictatorial collectivisms, it was imperative that the political 
centre pulled together against the formation of extremist left-wing or right-wing blocs. The 
ČSSD always counselled against left-right polarisation. After the May 1946 parliamentary 
elections in Czechoslovakia, Laušman was quick to dispel press reports that ‘a Marxist 
camp’, consisting of the KSČ and the ČSSD, now held a two-seat majority over ‘a non-
Marxist camp’, encompassing all other parties. ‘[I]f we divide the nation in two blocs’, he 
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declared, ‘we will come to political and civil struggles, and that would be the beginning of 
the end’.48 And even Fierlinger, the main leader of the ČSSD’s left wing, by no means 
advocated exclusive cooperation with the communists. Defending his ill-fated Unity Pact 
with the communists at the November 1947 ČSSD congress, he claimed that the pact had 
never been intended ‘to be limited to two parties only’ but was always ‘to be enlarged to a 
third party, i.e. the National Socialist Party’. There had been ‘no question of forming some 
kind of left-wing bloc’, he insisted, ‘but rather of preventing the creation of a right wing 
one. Nor do we want to isolate any of the other political parties as far as they want to work 
with us at all’.49       
The SFIO was constantly at pains to avoid fuelling polarisation too. For that reason, 
the party refrained from responding directly when, immediately after the new Constitution 
was finally voted through in the October 1946 referendum, the MRP went public with 
demands for a revision. It would be ‘a mistake’, insisted SFIO Deputy Secretary General 
Yves Dechézelles, to ‘rally the Right behind De Gaulle and create an anti-Marxist bloc’ by 
taking these demands, however unacceptable, head-on.50 A similar rationale was behind 
socialist leaders’ lukewarm response to communist overtures to establish ‘vigilance 
committees’, reminiscent of the anti-fascist bodies that had been constituted during the 
February 1934 crisis, in the wake of the creation of the Gaullist RPF in April 1947. For 
fears of providing De Gaulle with an easy target in the form of ‘a socialist-communist 
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bloc’, the SFIO instead opted ‘to unite all republican energies and [...] to invite the 
Communist Party, the Radical Party, and the MRP to make contact with it’.51 
By that stage, however, some party leaders were already pointing out that it would 
be a ‘challenge’ or even ‘paradoxical’ to ‘defend the Republic’ and ‘struggle against 
dictatorship side by side with the communists’.52 And come the time of the August 1947 
SFIO congress, Paul Ramadier was no longer mentioning the PCF amongst the parties 
involved in ‘the work of Republican defence’. Instead, he urged party members to set aside 
any qualms about the ‘clerical tendencies of the MRP’ or the ‘conservative tendencies of 
certain members of the [Radical] RGR’. Those were ‘secondary preoccupations’, he 
declared, ‘the only thing that matters is to know whether we agree on the essential point; 
i.e. the Republican struggle’.53   
In his address to the November 1947 ČSSD congress, which would vote him in as 
party leader, Laušman likewise placed the defence of the democratic republic front and 
centre. After providing a lengthy exposé of how the party had prospered since its 
democratic wing had prevailed over its revolutionary wing in the 1880s, he proceeded with 
a thinly veiled attack on the Soviet inspirations of the KSČ. ‘Czechoslovakian social 
democracy will always be on the watch’, he argued, ‘that nobody anchors foreign ideas and 
tendencies in our nation, which would be in conflict with the deep-seated democratic, 
moral, and progressive sentiments of the citizens of the republic and with its socialist 
foundations’. It was ‘substantiated by our national history’, after all, that the ‘violent 
introduction of foreign models only brings unnecessary and heavy harm to socialist 
endeavours [...] and impedes the road to socialism’. For that reason, ‘we must never allow 
                                                          
51 ‘Comité Directeur’ [23 April 1947], OURS, ‘Réunions du Comité Directeur du 4 septembre 1946 à 30 
julliet 1947’, p. 325.  
52 ‘Comité Directeur’ [18 April 1947], OURS, ‘Réunions du Comité Directeur du 4 septembre 1946 à 30 
julliet 1947’, p. 318; ‘Comité Directeur’ [23 April 1947], OURS, ‘Réunions du Comité Directeur du 4 
septembre 1946 à 30 julliet 1947’, p. 321.   
53  ‘Parti Socialiste – SFIO: 39ème Congrès national des 14 au 17 août 1947 (partie 2)’, FJJ p. 101.  
URL: http://flipbook.archives-socialistes.fr/index.html?docid=52493&language=fra&userid=0  
(last consulted: 22 March 2015). 
213 
 
that our politics are influenced by foreign interests, irrespective of whether these come 
from the Left or the Right, interests that are uncongenial or even run counter to our spirit, 
which diverge from our manifesto’.54 
Much the same arguments underlay the SFIO’s embrace of the Third Force doctrine 
in late 1947. In a propaganda brochure making the case for this new type of coalition, the 
party claimed that the authoritarian designs espoused on the leftmost and rightmost 
extremes of political life contravened a national democratic spirit. There were ‘millions of 
republicans, democrats, socialists, [and] trade unionists’, it insisted, who ‘do not accept 
and do not want to accept either the solution of personal power desired by the RPF or the 
solution of Stalinist dictatorship, both of which would inevitably result in the destruction of 
democratic institutions and the suppression of political liberties’. The brochure cited the 
German, Italian, and, crucially, Soviet experiences as proof that dictatorship ‘cannot 
provide the slightest solution for the problems posed by the evolution of modern society in 
its fundamental relations with the economical, the political, and the exigencies of freedom 
and democracy’. The ‘necessity of a Third Force’ sprang ‘fatally from that observation’; it 
was ‘a historical necessity for our country and for the world, at risk of sinking into 
chaos’.55   
 
Internal Soul-Searching 
 
The four parties traced national democratic traditions not only to their historical 
experiences with party alliances, however. At least as important as the party-political 
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lessons of the past were the lessons history had taught them about their respective 
societies. These two lessons were interconnected in many ways, as the socialists’ 
historically informed perceptions of democratic and anti-democratic social constituencies 
fed into their party-political decisions. The fact, then, that the industrial working class 
formed the only truly democratic constituency for the PPS and the PSIUP was one further 
reason for close cooperation with the communists. Yet, their strong proletarian orientation 
left little room for a genuine outreach to other (disadvantaged) social groups. The ČSSD 
and the SFIO, by contrast, were far more confident of the sound democratic beliefs of the 
middle-class voters who had historically backed centrist and centre-right parties. In order 
to win these groups over to their parties, though, it was imperative that socialism lost its 
sharp proletarian edges. 
 In fact, for each of the four parties the first post-war years represented a period of 
soul-searching about their identity as proletarian organisations. In the post-war context, 
after all, that identity was doubly problematic. In the first place, the socialists were acutely 
aware that the industrial proletariat formed a minority of the electorate in each of the four 
countries and was going to remain so for the foreseeable future. After the yes-camp’s 
defeat in the May 1946 constitutional referendum, Mayer had to conclude that even the 
combined political forces of the working class represented ‘less than one half of the 
country’. ‘[E]specially in times of economic reconstruction and redirection’, he declared, 
‘it is impossible [...] to govern without the consent or the benevolent neutrality of those 
broad segments of the population that are called middle classes, but who make up the 
social majority of the nation in France’.56 
According to ČSSD Secretary General Blažej Vilím, this message had too 
frequently been lost upon interwar social democracy. ‘We have to [...] frankly 
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acknowledge’, he told the October 1945 ČSSD congress, that, in most European countries, 
socialist parties had ‘overestimated the strength of the industrial proletariat’ and 
‘underestimated the significance of other strata of the nation’. The ‘development of the 
political situation in the First Republic’ presented ‘an example’ of this. The failure of the 
Left ‘to become a decisive factor’ in interwar Czechoslovakia, after all, had been due not 
to only of ‘the fragmentation of our socialist movement’ but also to the resilience of ‘a 
series of right-wing parties leaning on farmers and the middle classes’.57  
Secondly, a significant part of this working-class minority had abandoned socialism 
in favour of communism. In October 1945, Nenni noted how the great bulk of the Italian 
working class now backed the PCI, with ‘the ratio between us and the communists 1 to 10, 
if not 1 to 15 or even 1 to 20’ in many industrial zones.58 The ČSSD and the SFIO, for 
their part, often alluded to the defection of the working-class vote to communism as one of 
the causes for their post-war electoral woes.59 And although it is difficult, in the absence of 
free and unfettered elections at both national and factory level, to measure the exact 
balance of power between communists and socialists amongst the working class, the PPR 
had certainly grown from a tiny sect into a mass working-class party.60 
Socialist leaders identified various reasons for their setbacks and the communists’ 
gains amongst the working class. Addressing the PSIUP Central Committee in January 
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1946, Nenni listed a series of ‘factors’, including the prominent role the communists had 
played in the anti-fascist resistance, the prestige the Soviet Union had acquired by its 
military victories, and the ‘Rome or Moscow’ scare campaigns of the Mussolini regime, 
which had created an apparently clear-cut choice between fascism and communism. Above 
all, however, he pointed to the ‘in many respects unfair judgment [...] that reformism [the 
Italian brand of reformism practiced by Filippo Turati and other PSI leaders in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, which had seen the party fighting for a reformist agenda 
but stopping short of actually joining ‘bourgeois’ governments – JG] paved the way for 
[Italian] fascism like [German] social democracy for National Socialism’.61 
The survey that the ČSSD commissioned from the Czechoslovakian Institute for 
Public Opinion Research to analyse its poor showing in the May 1946 parliamentary 
elections came to similar conclusions. In general terms, its report, for which more than 
1.000 voters representative of the electorate as a whole were interviewed, pointed out that 
the ČSSD had lost out to the KSČ because voters were ‘grateful’ to the Soviet Union and 
the Red Army for the liberation of Czechoslovakia, because voters saw the KSČ as the 
more radical option in a post-war ‘tendency to the Left’, and because it had not been 
sufficiently clear what the ČSSD stood for. Yet, those criticisms that seemed to emanate 
directly from workers often concerned the history of the ČSSD. While in government 
under the First Republic, the report summarised such charges, ‘the party had not achieved 
[...] what it could and should have achieved’: it was reproached for having broken 
promises, for having ‘always betrayed workers during strikes’, for having ‘done nothing 
for workers’, and for having teamed up with the right-wing Agrarian Party. One 
respondent complained that the ČSSD, when in power, had not done everything in its 
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power for the working class, whereas another went as far as attributing the party’s losses to 
the ‘reactionary’ behaviour of its interwar leaders.62 
If the four parties faced similar challenges to their working-class identity, however, 
the concomitant soul-searching processes produced very dissimilar results. The PPS and 
the PSIUP, on the one hand, re-affirmed their proletarian character and strove to carve out 
a niche for themselves in the working-class movement. The ČSSD and the SFIO, on the 
other, sought to broaden their platform to include all ‘working people’ and tailored their 
message to that end. The lessons of the past, this time on whether there was any popular 
stronghold of democracy between the working class and ‘the reaction’, once again proved 
a crucial factor in determining these opposite outcomes.     
For the PPS and the PSIUP, these lessons were very clear: there were ‘no bourgeois 
democrats’ in their countries.63 For all of its lofty rhetoric about rights and freedoms, the 
two parties insisted, the interwar years had shown the bourgeoisie more preoccupied with 
its own selfish interests than with the future of the nation or democracy. Pointing out how 
there had been no ‘luxury citizens’ amongst those defending his home town of Gdynia 
against the Germans in 1939, Rusinek was adamant that the Polish bourgeoisie had ‘always 
in history’ valued ‘its own life’ higher than ‘freedom and the life of the nation’.64 Lelio 
Basso was more elaborate. Its profit margins having been destroyed by the consequences 
of the First World War, he explained, the interwar bourgeoisie was no longer able to offer 
the working class the ‘reformist and paternalistic’ concessions it had used to ‘blunt the 
revolutionary desire of the masses’ before 1914. The only way for the bourgeoisie to 
restore its ‘shaky economic predominance’, then, was to forcibly squeeze salaries and 
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recover the costs of war from the working class. In order to halt the accompanying process 
of class awakening amongst the proletariat ‘conservative forces, capitalist classes, 
reactionaries, [and] monarchists have instigated and supported the fascist reaction in Italy, 
Germany, Spain, Hungary, etc’. It followed that a new ‘bourgeois restoration’ in Europe 
‘would only mean new dictatorships, new fascisms, [and] new wars’.65  
In the alleged absence of bourgeois democrats, the PPS and the PSIUP regarded the 
industrial proletariat as the sole group on which a democratic state could be built. To be 
sure, the two parties were well aware that the working class found itself in a numerical 
minority vis-à-vis other social groups and they certainly talked a lot about the need for 
alliances between the proletariat and other underprivileged constituencies. Yet, any 
overtures towards such groups always sprang from a doctrinaire position. Socialist leaders 
in both countries often spoke with contempt about the utter ‘political backwardness’ of 
peasants, who failed to see that their ‘objective’ interests lay with socialism – a topic to 
which we will return in far greater detail in the next chapter. 
Even more contentious than reaching out to peasants, who, for all of their mistakes, 
were at least still manual labourers, was reaching out to the (lower) middle classes. It was 
this question that often dominated the debates between the supporters and the opponents of 
communist-socialist unity of action within the PSIUP. Giuseppe Saragat, the leader of the 
party’s anti-communist wing that would break away at the January 1947 PSIUP congress, 
strongly advocated a genuine socialist outreach to the (lower) middle classes. These 
groups, he reasoned, had been the backbone of interwar fascism and it was crucial for 
democracy to keep them out of the hands of the Right in post-war Italy.66   
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Yet, the supporters of the communist alliance remained extremely wary of attempts 
to create ‘middle-class socialism’.67 They feared that the PSIUP, in seeking to tailor to the 
preferences of the (lower) middle classes, would compromise its proletarian character. ‘It 
is often claimed’, argued Basso, ‘that we can abandon our unitarian line to make room for 
[...] all those middle classes who have proletarianised or are in the process of 
proletarianisation, but who do not join our party because they are afraid of communism’. 
But the ‘rhetoric’, he continued, that there was ‘only one socialism and that all working 
people are equal’ was fundamentally flawed. For if ‘we know that the worker and the 
peasant, who possess nothing and live only from selling their labour [...] are instinctively 
revolutionary [...] and instinctively realise that that their emancipation is a class problem’, 
the same could certainly not be said of the (lower) middle classes. ‘[F]or the petit-
bourgeoisie, for the professional, and often for the state employee too’, after all, ‘the 
problem of emancipation’ remained ‘a problem of individual emancipation’. The only way 
for these groups to ‘acquire a proletarian conscience’ was for them to be ‘firmly guided by 
a strong working class’. That was not going to happen, however, if the PSIUP alienated the 
industrial workers in its ranks by forsaking upon socialist-communist unity. Doing that, 
insisted Basso, could only result in the ‘denaturalisation’ of the party. For by ‘throwing 
wide open the entrance to the middle classes, [...] we will simultaneously throw wide open 
the exit for workers and peasants’.68 
PPS leaders were likewise adamant that their party was a proletarian organisation 
first and foremost. ‘[D]espite our mass nature’, Włodzimierz Reczek told the December 
1947 PPS congress, ‘nobody can deny that we have a pronounced class profile’. That, he 
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argued, ‘is our strength’. The ‘example of those socialist parties that diluted their working-
class composition [and] descended into the bourgeoisie’, after all, ‘teaches how adversely 
that affects their politics, how that blunts militancy, and distorts ideologically’.69     
 That was surely another taunt at the SFIO, which, as we have seen, increasingly 
became the epitome of all that was wrong with anti-communist (Western) European 
socialism for the PPS. In defence of their party’s proletarian orientation, PSIUP leaders 
similarly raised the sceptre of France. Even Alberto Jacometti – by no means the most 
ardent pro-communist within the PSIUP leadership70 – was on message in this respect. 
Orienting the PSIUP towards the middle classes, he warned the April 1946 party congress, 
carried the ‘danger’ of following in the footsteps of the SFIO. For while the SFIO had 
‘gained in the North [of France] and in the belt around Paris, not a single worker has voted 
for the Socialist Party in the Southern band stretching from the Pyrenees to the Alps. All 
the votes of workers [in that area] have gone to the Communist Party. We cannot allow 
that to happen in Italy’.71   
In their efforts to (re-)gain support amongst all segments of the ‘working people’, 
however, the French socialists often felt that they had no choice but to distance themselves 
from the communists. Already in late 1944, Roger Priou-Valjean warned the SFIO 
Executive that the party risked losing the ‘great current of sympathy’ it had garnered 
amongst ‘middle classes, proletarianised white-collar workers, artisans, peasants, etc.’ by 
aligning itself too closely with the PCF.72 And as election results confirmed the 
considerable working-class swing towards communism, the SFIO’s focus increasingly 
shifted to recovering what had historically been, as Moch described it, its ‘classic clientele’ 
                                                          
69 XXVII Kongres [December 1947], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2029/3, 235/I-26, fo. 82. 
70 Jacometti, after all, would later oppose running the April 1948 parliamentary elections on a common list 
with the PCI. And in the backlash following the PSIUP’s abysmal performance in these elections, he replaced 
Basso as Secretary General on an ‘autonomist’ ticket.    
71 ‘XXIV Congresso del Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria, 13 aprile 1946, seduta antemeridiana,’ 
ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 88, Fasc 2193, p. 15.  
72 ‘Comité Directeur’ [21 December 1944], OURS, ‘Procès-verbaux des réunions du Comité Directeur du 
congrès de Paris, 9-12 novembre 1944 au 37e congrès national, 11-15 aout 1945’, p. 47.  
221 
 
– public sector workers.73 In dealing with the demands of public sector workers, the group 
frequently hit hardest by the anti-inflationary policies of post-war governments, Guy 
Mollet instructed his fellow party leaders not to ‘forget about the political repercussions’. 
The ‘world of public sector workers’ constituted ‘the essential bedrock of the Party’, after 
all, with teachers making up ‘our best recruiters’. Yet, there was ‘a real discontent’ at the 
grassroots, which was ‘exploited by the Communist Party’. While it was still impossible to 
give in to all their material demands, therefore, Mollet insisted that ‘in the form and on the 
moral level all reassurances are given to public sector workers’.74  
 In the face of an even more significant working-class surge towards communism, 
the ČSSD similarly opted to reach out to non-proletarian constituencies. That was the 
foremost rationale behind the ČSSD dropping the designation ‘Worker’ from its name at 
the party’s October 1945 congress. According to Vilím, the name change would help ‘unite 
[...] the industrial working class’ and ‘other strata of working people’. For the party had 
‘shown too little interest in other strata of the nation’ before the war, he claimed, 
‘especially in peasants, who were ultimately left with no choice but to join the Agrarian 
Party, thereby strengthening the power of the reactionary landowning clique within that 
party’.75 Evžen Erban, the ČSSD’s Secretary General of ÚRO, likewise declared that the 
new party did not want to ‘restrict itself to the working class only’ but ‘become a party of 
the working people of city and countryside, of salaried workers, and of the self-employed’. 
Though he was adamant that ‘[t]he party should lead the middle classes and not the middle 
classes the party’, he conceded that ‘[t]he working class cannot win its struggle if it does 
not obtain other strata of the working people as an ally’. The ČSSD, accordingly, had to 
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‘clarify to the working class that the victory of socialism urgently requires the winning 
over of the middle classes, which we must not repel with an insular politics of class 
containment’.76  
This far greater willingness, by comparison with the Italian and Polish socialists, to 
reach out to non-proletarian social constituencies had its roots in a fundamentally different 
understanding of national history and national traditions on the part of the ČSSD and the 
SFIO. The past had taught the two parties that the great majority of their populations, 
including the middle classes, were committed to freedom and democracy.  
For SFIO leaders, this went right from the wartime Resistance all the way back to 
the French Revolution. The ‘struggle for national liberation and democratic liberation’, 
declared SFIO Executive member and later Interior Minister Édouard Depreux at the 
party’s first post-war congress, demonstrated ‘that France has remained the country of 
1789 and 1792 [when the First French Republic had come into being – JG], the country 
that has taught the world the use of freedom and democracy and, with that sense of the 
universal that characterises the genius of our people, has proclaimed the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, that imperishable charter of politically emancipated 
mankind’.77  
 ČSSD leaders traced back the democratic traditions of Czechoslovakia even further 
than that. In what must be seen as another warning to the communists, Laušman elaborated 
on a nineteenth-century nationalist narrative concerning the alleged “‘natural 
democraticality” of the Czechs’78 to point out that dictatorship was inimical to the national 
spirit. ‘Our nation may be small’, he told the November 1947 ČSSD congress, ‘[but] it has 
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always stood out in its spiritual fortitude [and] the strength of its convictions [...]. Our 
endeavours were always thoroughly humane, our ideas always progressive and, and this I 
want to stress, socialist. Remember the Hussites [the followers of the fifteenth-century 
religious reformer Jan Hus, who, during their wars with the papal armies of the Holy 
Roman Empire, founded an egalitarian commune in Bohemian Tábor – JG]! Remember 
the democratic theories of state that guided us in the Middle Ages [and] found their 
personification in our great [fifteenth-century] King George of Poděbrady, remember the 
teachings of [seventeenth-century educational reformer John Amos] Comenius and the 
exploits of [nineteenth- and twentieth-century national independence partisans Karel] 
Havlíček and [Tomas Gariggue] Masaryk!’ 
 This was how ‘the whole world’ knew Czechoslovakia, insisted Laušman, and how 
it would remain known ‘for eternity’. For the country, he continued, had ‘never as a whole 
nor in any significant part succumbed to [...] reactionary frenzies or anti-democratic 
temptations’. Instead, it had always been ‘freedom-loving, humane, tolerant, and 
progressive’. The implications for post-war Czechoslovakia were clear. It was ‘self-
evident’, Laušman claimed, that ‘it never was possible, that it is not possible, and that it 
never will be possible in our nation to cultivate a politics foreign to these national feelings 
and beliefs, to our innate worldview’. Every attempt to introduce ‘violent and dictatorial 
methods’, therefore, ‘would have to fail. Our nation cannot simply be enslaved because 
freedom and democracy are in its blood and are its whole life’.79   
If a predilection towards freedom and democracy was shared across the classes, 
however, socialist beliefs certainly were not. And for all of their rhetoric about guiding the 
middle classes towards socialism, the ČSSD and the SFIO more frequently found 
themselves reassuring non-proletarian constituencies regarding their intentions. The 
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desired outreach to the middle classes, then, often came at the price of abandoning socio-
economic radicalism. For if those ‘small proprietors, artisans, [and] small shopkeepers who 
are the Republican spirit’, as Auriol put it, ‘come to the proletariat when freedom [and] the 
Republican institutions are under threat’, they ‘moved to the Right’ when their ‘interests 
are affected [and] uncertainty is knocking at the door’.80  
 It was crucial for the two parties, accordingly, not to deter the middle classes from 
socialism by adopting revolutionary and leftist positions. ‘The grandest left-wing politics’, 
warned ČSSD Central Committee member and chairman of the party’s Commission for 
Tradesmen Pavel Sajal, would hardly be ‘a magnet’ attracting such groups. The middle 
classes, he argued, ‘are not opposed to socialism, but [...] demand democracy, the rule of 
law, and order within and profitability of nationalised firms’.81 Above all, however, the 
middle classes wanted guarantees that their long-term position would be safe under 
socialism, insisted the report that the Commission for Tradesmen submitted to the 
November 1947 ČSSD congress, amid fears that that the ‘independence’ they had been 
promised in the 1945 government programme was ‘limited by time’.82    
 The SFIO sought to assuage similar fears in a propaganda brochure directed at 
artisans and small businessmen. ‘[F]ar from wanting to destroy the middle classes’, it 
insisted, the party had ‘always and everywhere come to their defence’. Had Jean Jaurès not 
written, after all, that ‘socialism is not opposed to small business. It does not concern itself 
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with the proletarians of a single class, because, if that were the case, it would simply be 
replacing a tyranny with a tyranny, an oppression with an oppression’.83   
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen in this chapter that the two sets of parties drew widely divergent lessons 
from their national and Europe’s interwar history. For the PPS and the PSIUP, on the one 
hand, history painted a very grim picture indeed. In this picture, both the working class and 
its political representatives were completely isolated in their struggles for democracy and 
socialism. Time and again, after all, the interwar bourgeoisie had decided to throw in its lot 
with dictators in order to safeguard its economic interests. It followed that class struggle 
would be an inevitable feature of post-war society, requiring the working class to pull 
together and present a united front.  
For the ČSSD and the SFIO, on the other, history offered an altogether more re-
assuring picture. In this picture, the working class and the socialist parties had always 
found non-proletarian social constituencies and centrist parties on their side when 
democracy came under pressure. The main lesson of the past, accordingly, was that 
democracy would survive as long as the political centre ground held. And in the 
increasingly polarised post-war world, that lesson warranted the search for new alliances 
across class boundaries.   
The significance of historical lessons, however, stretched far beyond the mere 
question of alliances – whether political or social. They also crucially shaped the four 
parties’ attitudes towards the key dimension of political reconstruction: the rebuilding of 
democracy. For each of the four parties, democracy had both political and economic 
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connotations. In political terms, it was to guarantee the rights and freedoms we still 
associate with democracy today: free and fair elections, freedom of speech, conscience, 
and association, and the checks and balances between executive, legislative, and judiciary 
powers. In economic terms, it was to usher in ‘structural reforms’ in the economic system: 
the nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy, land reform, and/or 
genuine worker participation in industrial decision-making. If the four parties agreed on 
the overall objective to establish both political and economic democracy, however, they 
certainly did not on the prioritisation of one over the other or on the methods with which 
best to achieve this goal. 
For the Italian and Polish socialists, the institution of economic democracy had to 
precede the re-introduction of political democracy. In their view, it was pointless to 
resurrect political democracy without first emasculating the economic power structures 
upon which bourgeois domination rested. For that reason, the PPS and the PSIUP were 
proponents of what they called ‘popular democracy’ (they also used ‘new democracy’ and 
‘socialist democracy’ to describe this phenomenon): a system in which the working-class 
parties would temporarily be guaranteed a dominant position in government even if the 
electoral arithmetic did not allow for that. During this transitional period, the government 
could implement structural economic reforms, whilst building up a system of direct 
grassroots participation in public life. It was only after the thorough political re-education 
that came with the experience of participation that their backward and disoriented 
electorates would be equipped to face up to the temptations of political democracy again. 
Both parties were very much aware that ‘popular democracy’ involved 
overstepping the confines of political democracy in the short run. But their history had 
taught them that that was the only way to achieve freedom in the long run. The 
programmatic motion that the leadership of the clandestine PSIUP in Northern Italy – 
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which included Basso, Morandi, and Pertini – adopted in November 1944 makes this point 
very clearly. ‘The Party knows’, it proclaimed, ‘that true freedom will be given to the 
Italian people not by the Anglo-Saxon armies, not by the CLN, not by a government of 
concentration, neither by a Constituent Assembly if that is not an Assembly of workers’. 
True freedom would rather be realised, it continued, ‘by the abolition of the privileges that 
derive from property, by the forfeiture of the right that sanctions [these privileges], and by 
the destruction of the economic system upon which bourgeois domination is based’. And 
that was not going to happen as the result of a negotiated process. ‘The freedom of the 
people cannot come from alliances with groups that, even if they talk of socialism and are 
willing to make concessions today, want to salvage capitalism in its substance; neither can 
it be assured by any electoral majority that does not lead to the elimination of the interests 
that stand in the way of [freedom]’. Quite the contrary, ‘[f]reedom can only be achieved in 
a new order proclaimed by the people and constituted outside of existing legality, which is 
a protection and a shield for the supremacy of a class’.84 
For the Czechoslovakian social democrats and French socialists, on the contrary, 
abidance by the rulebook of political democracy was a pre-condition for the establishment 
of economic democracy. In this respect, even though they would not admit to supporting 
‘bourgeois democracy’, socialist leaders in both countries much fostered the political 
legacy of the interwar bourgeois-liberal state. It was electoral majorities that had to decide 
about governmental outcomes and any attempt to subvert this process would obliterate the 
freedom that was at the very core of socialism. Only once political democracy had been 
achieved, economic democracy could be built following a parliamentary and constitutional 
trajectory.   
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Far from advocating the overthrow of existing legality, therefore, the ČSSD and the 
SFIO always insisted on working within the confines of political democracy. It is very 
telling that the two parties always spoke of extending political democracy with economic 
democracy rather than the other way around.85 That was because their history had taught 
them that political democracy could not only survive within the framework of bourgeois 
capitalism, but also make the capitalist system increasingly social. It was this belief more 
than anything – that liberal capitalism, for all of its economic injustices, did guarantee 
‘personal and civic rights’86 and could be transformed from within – that set the 
Czechoslovakian social democrats and French socialists apart from their Italian and Polish 
counterparts.  
The question dividing the two sets of parties with regard to political reconstruction, 
then, was whether socialism could be achieved within the existing institutional structures 
and by legal means. The next two chapters will delve far deeper into the four parties’ 
responses to this question. First, we will compare their attitudes towards the three principal 
institutions of ‘bourgeois democracy’. Subsequently, we will contrast their views on the 
participatory structures that were at the heart of socialist conceptions of ‘popular 
democracy’.  
  
                                                          
85 See e.g.: ‘Program československé socialí demokracie’, Archiv ČSSD, Fond č. 71, Část II Československá 
sociální demokracie (1945-1948), I. Sjezdy čs. socialní demokracie, 111 XX. sjezd konany 19.-21. rijna 1945 
v Praze, pp. 13-14; Guy Mollet, ‘Examen de conscience’, La Revue Socialiste, December 1946, pp 557-662, 
661. 
86 That was at least how the 1945 programme of the ČSSD’s Action Committee put it. ‘Program akčního 
výboru – Československé sociální demokracie’, Archiv ČSSD, Fond č. 71, Část II Československá sociální 
demokracie (1945-1948), I. Sjezdy čs. socialní demokracie, 111 XX. sjezd konany 19.-21. rijna 1945 v Praze, 
p. 9. 
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Chapter 6: Elections, Parliaments, and Constitutions 
 
In August 1947, an article in the ČSSD’s theoretical weekly questioned the course 
Czechoslovakian democracy had taken since the Second World War. ‘The notion of 
political democracy, as understood by the nineteenth-century thinkers and as formulated by 
T.G. Masaryk’, it observed, ‘has changed considerably after the Second World War and 
after the experience of fascism’. In the place of the old slogans of freedom, equality, and 
brotherhood, ‘that is [the watchword] “equal rights for all”, which the bourgeoisie 
completely abused’, had now come the ‘very narrow’ slogan of ‘democracy only for 
democrats’. But it was doubtful, the article continued, ‘whether this narrowing really 
constitutes a step in the right direction and whether it protects democracy from abuse’. The 
meaning of words, after all, ‘ultimately depends on who expresses them and, after the 
experiences with Hitler, who pretended to be the only genuine socialist and democrat, we 
know that it is more important […] which power gives words their actual significance’. 
The new slogan of democracy only for democrats, therefore, not only failed to ‘provide 
any guarantee for democracy’, but also carried within it a ‘danger’. For ‘one powerful 
group’ could easily declare ‘that it only truly and for one hundred per cent represents 
democracy and that it only is entitled to democratic freedoms, whereas all others only 
[have] the democratic obligation to keep silent’.1 
 Historians typically portray the first post-war years as the period during which 
(Western) European socialism unreservedly came to embrace representative democracy as 
‘much more than the political form adopted by the bourgeoisie within the capitalist state’.2 
For if the economic and social instability of the interwar years had still ‘left important 
                                                          
1 V. Sajus, ‘Hospodářská demokracie a nová šlechta’, Cíl, 15 August 1947.  
2 According to Ignacio Walker, this ‘process’, which had its origins in the interwar years, ‘took definite shape 
in the post-war period’. See: Ignacio Walker, ‘Democratic Socialism in Comparative Perspective’, 
Comparative Politics, 23/1 (1991), pp. 439-458, 442.      
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sections of Social Democracy with strong and lingering doubts about the parliamentary 
road to socialism’, the subsequent ‘years of oppression and persecution under a swastika-
dominated Europe’ drove the socialist movement ‘towards the acceptance of pluralist 
democracy after 1945’.3 In these circumstances, ‘virtually all Socialists insisted political 
democracy was an end in itself. The concept included both respect for individual civil 
rights and adherence to a system of political decision making founded on free, universal 
suffrage. Most Social Democrats favoured parliamentary democracy as a constitutional 
system’.4  
Yet, as the above story already hints at, the experience of dictatorship (initially) 
also drove some socialists in the opposite direction. Far from embracing the parliamentary 
road to socialism, these socialists argued that ‘bourgeois democracy’ had failed their 
countries and would, if reconstituted, only usher in new dictatorships. For that reason, they 
advocated a radical, albeit temporary, curtailing of the franchise, the party landscape, 
and/or the rights and freedoms of their political rivals more generally. These anti-
representative sentiments amongst post-war European socialists, however, have hardly 
received any scholarly attention. This is unfortunate, as the question of whether socialists 
should adhere to the democratic rulebook of bourgeois society divided the four parties 
under review in this thesis more than any other question.   
This chapter aims to demonstrate this by comparing the two sets of parties’ 
attitudes towards the three key institutions of bourgeois democracy. In the first place, it 
will analyse their views on elections. Whereas the ČSSD and the SFIO treated election 
results as infallible reflections of the popular will, the PPS and the PSIUP were often 
dismissive of their meaning after decades of dictatorship. Secondly, it will delve into their 
perspectives upon parliamentary activity. If the ČSSD and the SFIO saw parliament as the 
                                                          
3 Stefan Berger, ‘Democracy and Social Democracy’, European History Quarterly, 32/1 (2002), pp. 13-37, 
26-27.  
4 Orlow, Common Destiny, p. 45.  
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chief bulwark of democracy, the PPS and the PSIUP mostly regarded parliamentarism as 
an outdated and overly legalistic form of doing politics. Thirdly, it will address their 
approaches towards constitutions and above all constitutionalism. Whilst the ČSSD and the 
SFIO were adamant that the rule of law was to be upheld at all times, the PPS and the 
PSIUP were more willing to countenance the proletarian parties using dictatorial methods 
in the struggle for political power.  
 
Elections 
 
In the wake of liberation, each of the four parties relished the prospect of elections. With 
the last (free) parliamentary elections dating back (almost) a decade in Czechoslovakia 
(1935) and France (1936) and as far as a generation in Italy (1921) and Poland (1922), 
socialist leaders considered a popular verdict on the state of parties to be long overdue. 
What is more, they fully expected elections to go their way. The 1930s Depression having 
discredited capitalism and the disastrous consequences of the appeasement of, or the 
collaboration with, fascism having tainted many on the interwar bourgeois Right, party 
leaders were confident that an electoral breakthrough towards socialism could finally be 
achieved.  
 Pietro Nenni was exuding such confidence when he told the September 1944 
National Convention of the PSIUP that ‘we have faith in the [still to be elected – JG] 
Constituent Assembly’, for ‘we know that we have the great bulk of the people behind 
us’.5 Much like their Italian and other Western European counterparts, the French socialists 
                                                          
5 ‘Discorso di Pietro Nenni, Segretario del Partito Socialista Italiano’ [4 September 1944], ACS, Carteggio 
Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc 2186, p. 21. 
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came out of the war considering a transition to socialism ‘a dialectical near-certainty’.6 The 
resolution adopted by the November 1945 Supreme Council of the PPS, for its part, 
emphasised that the upcoming parliamentary elections were ‘to be not only a reflection of 
the real social-political balance of power in the country, but also a working people’s trial of 
Polish fascism’. That the entire pre-war ruling class was subsumed under this banner 
became apparent from the long list of charges the resolution levelled against ‘Polish 
fascism’, which included depriving parliament of the right to control the Sanacja 
government, the dissolution of trade unions, and ‘the alliance of the reaction and Hitler in 
1934’ – that is, the ten-year non-aggression pact that the Piłsudski government and Nazi 
Germany had entered into in January 1934. As a result of elections, the resolution 
concluded, the working class would finally be able to ‘realise its fundamental 
programme’.7 
 Yet, this supreme confidence in the outcome of free and unfettered elections would 
quickly dissipate. Within the PPS and the PSIUP, the elation initially surrounding the 
prospect of a popular vote made way for gloom even before the first ballot had been cast. 
Already at the first post-war congress of the PPS, Wincenty Stawiński – the socialist 
member of parliament for Pabianice (near Łódź) – counselled against calling elections 
anytime soon. Finding itself in power in 1918, he reminisced, the party had also called 
elections and lost. To entrust the Polish people with a ballot again, would amount to ‘the 
burial of the achievements of the Provisional Government. We first have to educate Polish 
society’.8 Albeit in slightly less dramatic terms, Lelio Basso also warned against viewing 
                                                          
6 The quote is from Marc Sadoun, who points to the similarities between socialist rhetoric – ‘socialism is the 
master of the hour’, ‘we are the masters at present’, and ‘after Hitler us’ – within the SFIO, the Labour Party, 
and the exiled German SPD respectively. See: Marc Sadoun, Les socialistes sous l’occupation: résistance et 
collaboration, (Paris: Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1982), p. 269. Dietrich 
Orlow provides further Dutch and German examples of post-liberation socialist euphoria. See: Orlow, 
Common Destiny, p. 289f.     
7 ‘Uchwaly Rady Naczelnej’ [4 November 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Rada Naczelna, 
2032/1, 235/II/5, fo. 10a.    
8 XXVI Kongres [August 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2029/1, 235/I-12, fo. 196. 
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the upcoming parliamentary elections as a cure for all of Italy’s political ills. ‘We would be 
making a very serious mistake and expose the country to dangerous delusions’, he wrote in 
August 1945, ‘if we attribute miraculous virtues to the Constituent Assembly; if we think, 
following an old parliamentary mentality, that electoral rallies can resolve a crisis so 
profound as the one tormenting us, can give a democratic conscience to a people that never 
had one’.9 
 What seems to have underlain this pessimism regarding electoral outcomes 
amongst Italian and Polish socialists was a deep-seated belief that their societies were ill-
prepared for the temptations of democratic politics. Whilst almost impervious to 
democratic and socialist arguments, party leaders in both countries lamented, large swathes 
of their electorates were easily swayed by reactionary and populist solutions.  
 This was especially true for the two countries’ large peasant majorities. All of their 
rhetoric about the essential community of interest between industrial proletarians and rural 
labourers notwithstanding, PPS and PSIUP leaders often despaired of the political acumen 
of their peasantry. There were repeated allusions to the utter backwardness of peasants, 
many of whom were lacking basic literacy skills and would believe anything their local 
priest told them. These were people who, in the words of leading Polish socialists, were 
only just ‘returning to humanity’, having been ‘the property of counts and wealthy 
landowners’ for centuries.10 And whereas ‘the message of socialism’ had never reached the 
countryside, soon-to-be-elected PSIUP parliamentarian Bianca Bianchi told her party’s 
April 1946 congress, the ‘almost omnipresent’ Catholic Action [the largest lay organisation 
of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy, which played a significant role in post-war election 
                                                          
9 Lelio Basso, ‘Per una coscienza democratica’, Avanti!, 29 August 1945. 
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=1fb14f1db3eb10586206df1cbf448089 (last consulted: 22 
March 2015).  
10 XXVI Kongres [August 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2029/1, 235/I-12, fo. 131, 269.  
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campaigns – JG] was ‘leading women towards the DC’ and ‘all small villages’ had ‘a 
church denigrating socialism’.11   
 In these circumstances, the crucial peasant vote was unlikely to befall socialism. 
Although PPS and PSIUP leaders did not tire of repeating that peasants’ ‘objective 
interests’ lay with socialism, they had to acknowledge that peasant electoral behaviour was 
frequently determined by far from objective factors. Recounting what he had heard at the 
January 1948 congress of the PSIUP, Léon Boutbien informed the SFIO’s International 
Commission that the ‘many illiterates without political education’ in the largely rural south 
of Italy would vote for ‘no matter who’. Even the PCI had been able to make considerable 
inroads12 in some of the more pious districts by claiming that a vote for the communists 
amounted to a vote for Saint Joseph – a reference to Italy’s founding father Giuseppe 
(=Joseph) Garibaldi, whose image adorned the emblem of the Popular Front.13  
 Basso affirmed that the political understanding of the peasantry did not exceed a 
very basic level. ‘[D]eliberately kept in a state of illiteracy and superstition’, he argued, 
‘rural plebs’ voted ‘against their own interests because they are unable to “consciously” 
exercise their right to vote’. To be sure, when faced with such a simple yes-or-no question 
as “do you approve land reform?” – one of the three questions that had been put to the 
Polish people in the People’s Referendum of June 1946 – peasants would overwhelmingly 
vote yes. But come the time of the next parliamentary elections, Basso continued, those 
same peasants would ‘certainly vote for the candidates of the priests, i.e. for the exponents 
and representatives of the old feudal nobility, [who are] opposed to peasant interests and to 
                                                          
11 ‘XXIV Congresso del Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria’, 14 aprile 1946, seduta antimeridiana, 
ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 88, Fasc 2193, p. 29.   
12 Of course, the PCI’s success in the rural areas of Southern Italy – for it was in the rural South much more 
than in the industrial North of Italy that the communists outperformed the socialists in electoral terms – must 
also be attributed to the radical traditions amongst landless rural labourers in that region. On the PCI and the 
Southern peasantry, see: Paul Ginsborg, ‘The Communist Party and the Agrarian Question in Southern Italy, 
1943-1948’, History Workshop Journal, 17/1 (1984), pp. 81-101.    
13 ‘Réunion de la Commission Internationale du Parti Socialiste’ [17 January 1948], Centre d’Histoire Social, 
Paris [hereafter CHS], Fonds Marceau Pivert, 559API42, 1948, p. 5. 
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land reform in particular’.14 Jan Żerkowski – the PPS chairman of the Parliamentary 
Commission for Cooperatives, Supply, and Trade – likewise cautioned his fellow party 
leaders that peasant enthusiasm for specific socialist policies would not translate into 
electoral support for socialism. ‘We know very well’, he explained, ‘that the small farmer 
and peasant do not come to socialism’. Contrary to what the Congress of Socialist Peasants 
was claiming, socialism was ‘not catching on with the peasant’ – ‘he is taken in by the 
cooperative movement, by the League of Peasant Self-Help, but not by socialist 
ideology’.15 
 Just how much of a mountain the parties had to climb in electoral terms was borne 
out further by election news seeping through from abroad. The results of the late 1945 
elections in Austria and Hungary, both of which had returned the main Catholic centre-
right party with an absolute parliamentary majority, made for particularly terrible reading. 
When, in late November 1945, the PPS Central Committee discussed the trajectory 
towards parliamentary elections in post-war Poland, several party leaders reflected on the 
lessons to be learned from these experiences. Józef Cyrankiewicz insisted that the Polish 
parliamentary elections would be ‘prepared politically and organisationally, so that the 
PSL will not follow in the footsteps of the Smallholders in Hungary’ – i.e. the Independent 
Smallholders’ Party, which had secured 57% of the vote in the Hungarian elections. 
Henryk Wachowicz agreed that the PPS found itself ‘in a difficult situation’. ‘If the PSL 
does not join us [the PPS and the PPR – JG] in a common bloc’, he explained, ‘it will 
receive many many votes’. The Austrian elections, after all, were ‘an example of the 
demagogical grasp of the reaction’.16  
                                                          
14 Lelio Basso, ‘Socialismo europeo (1)’, Quarto Stato, 15 September 1946.  
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=cf99e9daef3d5143ea3b0399083d2f01 (last consulted: 22 
March 2015). 
15 Rada Naczelna [31 March 1946], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2032/1, 235/II/6, fo. 33.  
16 ‘Protokół posiedzenia CKW PPS’ [30 November 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Centralny 
Komitet Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/2, fos 9-10. 
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 According to the Italian and Polish socialists, that grasp reached well beyond 
ignorant and illiterate peasants. PPS Central Committee member Stanisław Skowroński 
argued that ‘the potential strength of the reaction in Poland’ was ‘exceptional’, its 
mesmerism attracting such diverse groups as ‘the petit-bourgeoisie, philistines, the clergy, 
[and] teachers’.17 By October 1945, Nenni had likewise identified a broadening appeal for 
reactionary politics in post-war Italy. Examining the causes of ‘the noteworthy 
intensification of reactionary activity’ since the PSIUP’s September 1944 National 
Convention, when he had still predicted a straightforward victory for the Left in 
democratic elections, he highlighted three phenomena. In the first place, ‘all political, 
social and economic forces’ fearing ‘the tidal wave emanating from below’ were rallying 
around the monarchy. Secondly, the purge had driven a segment of the population ‘to 
conservative or even reactionary positions’. But ‘the most serious phenomenon’ was the 
popular misery ‘creating vast groups of malcontents, who we cannot forever ask to make 
sacrifices, to tighten their belts, etc’.18 
 As such misery hit the working class first and foremost, PPS and PSIUP leaders 
were increasingly fixated on reactionary stirrings in their traditional industrial heartlands. 
Franco Mariani warned of ‘political speculators’ preying upon legitimate worker 
grievances to plunge Italy into chaos before democracy could take root. The same 
‘reactionary and parasitical classes that have subsidised and sustained fascism’, he 
explained, were now hoping to ‘profit from unemployment and misery’ by ‘creating street 
tumults and insurrections’, which would, in turn, be quashed ‘by exactly those Allies [i.e. 
the Anglo-American troops which had assumed control over law enforcement in early 
                                                          
17 ‘Protokół posiedzenia CKW PPS’ [14 May 1946], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Centralny Komitet 
Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/2, fo. 51.  
18 ‘Comitato Centrale’ [17 October 1945], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc. 2189, pp. 13-14.  
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post-war Italy – JG] upon which these reactionary currents have pinned their hopes to 
destroy the nascent democratic structure of our country’.19  
 What was worse, there were indications that dissatisfied workers were turning their 
back on the Left altogether. The many votes for non-party (i.e. neither socialist nor 
communist) candidates in factory council elections, Wachowicz told the PPS Central 
Committee in November 1945, ‘bears testimony to the fact that even the most conscious 
class, the working class, takes a hostile attitude towards us’.20 And, as the parliamentary 
elections drew closer, that became an increasing cause for concern. By May 1946, 
Cyrankiewicz was stressing the need to ‘draw up an economic plan for the working class’. 
For ‘if positive changes [in working-class wages, living standards, etc. – JG]  have not 
been effected by the time of the elections’, he warned, ‘a surprising situation might 
transpire at the last minute, which we must avoid with respect to the PSL. That would 
deprive us of our driving force in the electoral struggle – the working class’.21 
By contrast with the PPS and the PSIUP, the euphoria surrounding electoral 
outcomes lasted rather longer within the ČSSD and the SFIO. Right up to the first 
parliamentary elections in France (October 1945) and Czechoslovakia (May 1946), party 
leaders and activists in both countries had been expecting to come out on top in the 
democratic contest. The ‘overwhelming participation’ in the ‘more than 5.000 electoral 
meetings’, reflected the ČSSD on its 1946 campaign, ‘seduced many of our functionaries 
to too optimistic expectations of the election result’.22 Bohumil Laušman, though claiming 
not to have been amongst ‘the greatest of optimists’ himself, also granted that the ‘reports 
coming in from some provinces’ and the assumption that ‘we would be able to win two 
                                                          
19 Interview Hadfield with Franco Mariani, AdL, Camera del Lavoro, Class. 5.1.3., Fasc. 4. 
20 ‘Protokół posiedzenia CKW PPS’ [30 November 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Centralny 
Komitet Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/2, fo. 10.  
21 ‘Protokół posiedzenia CKW PPS [14 May 1946], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Centralny Komitet 
Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/2, fo. 53. 
22 ‘Zpráva o činnosti Československé Socialní Demokracie k XXI. řádnému sjezdu v Brně 14.-16. XI. 1947’, 
Archiv ČSSD, Fond č. 71, Část II Československá sociální demokracie (1945-1948), I. Sjezdy čs. socialní 
demokracie, 112 XXI. Sjezd konany 14.-16. listopadu v Brně, p. XXVII. 
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non-member votes for every party member’ had made the party ‘overestimate its strength 
by 45-50 seats’ – a result that would probably have seen the ČSSD become the largest 
force in parliament.23  
 SFIO leaders likewise approached the elections to the Constituent Assembly with 
the utmost confidence. Opening his party’s August 1945 congress, Gérard Jacquet – who 
had been the Deputy Secretary General of the clandestine SFIO – professed that ‘times 
have never been more favourable to socialism’. Governments ‘presided by our friends’, 
after all, were being installed ‘around the world’ and ‘our Labour comrades have just 
secured a great success [i.e. the Labour Party’s landslide victory in the United Kingdom’s 
1945 general election – JG]’. In France, too, ‘all eyes are turning towards us’. With ‘offers 
for collaboration’ coming in ‘from all walks of life’, Jacquet concluded, the SFIO had ‘at 
no moment in its history [...] been as powerful as it is today’.24 
 The actual election results, then, were a harsh awakening for the SFIO and the 
ČSSD. Relegated into third and fifth place in parliament respectively, behind both the 
communists and the main centre-right and/or Christian democratic parties, illusions of a 
Labour-like electoral breakthrough were rapidly dashed. Unlike their Italian and Polish 
counterparts, however, the French socialists and the Czechoslovakian social democrats did 
not attribute their electoral woes to an underdeveloped and uneducated society.  
 In fact, party leaders in both countries identified ample appeal for democracy and 
socialism amongst their electorates. According to the ČSSD, the election results were proof 
that the interwar ‘reactionary parties [including the Agrarian Party – the strongest political 
force in the First Republic]’, which had been outlawed for their collaboration with the 
                                                          
23 ‘Volby a čs. sociální demokracie’ [1946], NA, Fonds Bohumil Laušman, III Pisemnosti související s 
ústřední, veřejnou a politickou činnosti B. Laušmana, Karton 34, Souvicející činnosti v soc. dem. 1928-1948, 
p. 8. 
24 ‘Parti Socialiste – SFIO: 37ème Congrès national des 11, 12, 13, 14 et 15 août 1945’, FJJ, p. 7.  
URL: http://flipbook.archives-socialistes.fr/index.html?docid=50026&language=fra&userid=0  
(last consulted: 22 March 2015).  
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Protectorate authorities, no longer enjoyed significant support in Czechoslovakian society. 
The fact, after all, that only ‘a negligible number’ of voters had made use of their right to 
cast a blank ballot, an option introduced to allow people to register their protest at the 
disappearance of the party of their choice, constituted ‘evidence’ that the new order was 
backed by ‘the overwhelming majority of erstwhile followers of these parties’.25 Guy 
Mollet also noted a sea change in popular attitudes in post-war France. In the aftermath of 
the liberation, he declared, there had been ‘an immense call for socialism’, reflected in ‘a 
desire for change, a revolutionary drive’. It was ‘a tragedy’ that ‘the SFIO has been unable 
to respond to that call’.26 
 The ČSSD and the SFIO identified three causes for their failure to capitalise upon 
this favourable Zeitgeist. In the first place, there were the countless organisational and 
propagandistic shortcomings which Mollet dubbed ‘internal causes’ for defeat at the 
polls.27 After their party came a disappointing third in the October 1945 parliamentary 
elections, SFIO leaders listed a raft of problems in these areas. Marius Moutet – Minister 
of Overseas France in both the Popular Front and various post-war governments – 
explained how the disparities in the organisational preparedness of the parties had made 
themselves felt in his Drôme department. Whereas the communists had put up ‘a great 
effort’ with ‘[local] newspapers and a profound organisation’, he lamented, ‘we changed 
our Federal Secretary during the election [campaign]’ and suffered from ‘a lack of 
organisation’.28 Moutet’s and other SFIO leaders’ pleas for the creation of socialist factory 
groups, a better organisation of party propaganda, and the political and administrative 
                                                          
25 ‘Zpráva o činnosti Československé Socialní Demokracie k XXI. řádnému sjezdu v Brně 14.-16. XI. 1947’, 
Archiv ČSSD, Fond č. 71, Část II Československá sociální demokracie (1945-1948), I. Sjezdy čs. socialní 
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1946’, p. 36. 
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training of the party cadre notwithstanding, however, progress was slow. By November 
1946, after a third consecutive election defeat for the SFIO, Mollet was still calling for the 
streamlining of the party’s message, for more use to be made of written propaganda, and 
for the reorganisation of the party’s factory, women’s, and youth groups.29  
 The ČSSD likewise imputed its May 1946 election defeat in large part to 
organisational failings. The party’s Central Organisational Commission identified no fewer 
than twelve deficiencies in the party organisation, including the insufficient development 
of local and factory party organisations, an unqualified party cadre, and the lacking agility 
of national and provincial party leaders.30  
One party arm singled out for particular criticism within both the ČSSD and the 
SFIO was the national party press. Provincial party branches complained bitterly about the 
‘ideological ambiguity’ of their national press organs,31 about their lack of ‘reflection on 
the party line’ and of ‘arguments allowing us to defend our politics’,32 and about their 
‘snobbish’ attitude towards the everyday concerns of the people.33 But even national party 
leaderships, themselves in charge of the party press, were frequently scornful of their own 
newspapers and periodicals. The ČSSD’s Central Organisational Commission 
acknowledged that there were ‘major weaknesses in our press’: the national daily Právo 
lidu was not answering to the ‘organisational needs of the party’ and the provincial ČSSD 
press was not being provided with ‘the unified guidance it deserves’.34 The SFIO 
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30 ‘Připomínky organisačni komise strany k volebním výsledkům’ [1946], ANM, Fonds Zdeněk Fierlinger, 
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leadership similarly found fault with the lacking cohesion between the socialist press and 
socialist ministers,35 whilst Édouard Depreux lamented that the party’s national daily Le 
Populaire ‘does not make enough of our semi-successes’.36  
 Both parties needed all the positive exposure they could get, for they struggled to 
leave a strong mark on their electorates. This was the second main cause to which ČSSD 
and SFIO leaders attributed their electoral setbacks. Squeezed between the communist and 
bourgeois/Christian democratic poles in the post-war coalition governments, socialist 
leaders in both countries often lamented that their parties lacked a clearly defined profile 
other than that of perpetual compromise. After the strong polarisation of the war years and 
the liberation struggle, compromise was hardly what voters were looking for. Zdeněk 
Fierlinger wrote that the ČSSD had entered the parliamentary elections in ‘an unenviable 
position’. ‘We found ourselves [...] somewhere in the centre between the communists and 
the other parties’, he explained, whereas ‘[d]evelopments after every war and every 
revolution have a tendency to move away from the centre’.37 Mollet likewise pointed out 
how it was ‘normal’ that, after fascism, ‘the great bulk of voters are attracted towards 
extremes’. It had been ‘our mistake’, he continued, ‘to suggest that we were not one of 
these extremes’.38 
 What is more, their key intermediary position between the communists and the 
centre-right, in personnel as well as policy terms, had the ČSSD and the SFIO at a 
disadvantage during campaign time. The two parties repeatedly stressed how they had 
fallen prey to their own devotion to national unity and recovery. ‘Czechoslovakian social 
democracy [...] did all in its power to secure national unity and reconcile the political 
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forces’, read the resolution that the ČSSD Central Executive Committee passed after the 
party’s dismal showing in the May 1946 parliamentary elections, but this had come ‘at the 
price of the greatest party-political sacrifices’.39 As the party delivering the Prime Minister, 
after all, the ČSSD had been forced to practise the ‘due restraint’ that had certainly not 
been observed by the other parties during the election campaign.40  
SFIO leaders similarly claimed that their ‘too loyal’41 attitude and their ‘excess of 
honesty’42 had cost them dearly in elections. ‘Without regard for its electoral interests’, 
insisted a manifest the SFIO Executive published in May 1946, ‘the party [...] has served 
national interests first by demanding a massive reduction of the military budget, 
subsequently by delegating its people to the heaviest governmental posts [...], and finally 
by telling the country the truth about our economic and financial problems and putting 
forward rigorous, but necessary, solutions towards these’.43 
 It was in the severe popular discontent about the terrible socio-economic situation 
that the ČSSD and the SFIO found a third major cause for their unpopularity with the 
electorate. If this was one electoral concern they shared with the PPS and the PSIUP, the 
four parties heartily disagreed who was the main beneficiary of the bread-and-butter 
outrage amongst their voters. Rather than the ‘reactionaries’ pointed to by the Italian and 
Polish socialists, it was the communists who stood to gain most from a continued squeeze 
on living standards according to the Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French 
socialists. Even though communist leaders were co-signatories to and vociferous 
supporters of the austerity packages adopted by their governments, they seemed to be able 
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to deflect the blame for the concomitant popular misery on their socialist coalition partners. 
Viewed as parties of government through and through, the ČSSD and SFIO complained 
that they were being punished for the hard choices their governments had been forced to 
make.44 The communists, on the other hand, had managed to portray themselves as the 
great outsiders. They represented, in the words of SFIO Deputy Secretary General Jacques 
Arrès-Lapoque, ‘the dissatisfied’.45  
 This, the ČSSD and SFIO claimed, had everything to do with the communist 
tendency to play on popular grievances with demagogical campaigns. Time and again, the 
two parties accused their communist coalition partners of making false claims or 
completely unfeasible demands, often in direct contradiction to government policies they 
had supported before, to appeal to a particular electoral constituency. This was the case 
with the millionaires’ tax controversy, which rattled Czechoslovakian politics in the 
autumn of 1947 and constituted the catalyst for the defeat of Fierlinger’s pro-communist 
wing at the November 1947 congress of the ČSSD. The controversy revolved around the 
way in which peasants, who had been hit by a severe drought in the summer, were to be 
compensated for their losses. On the same day that Vaclav Majer – the ČSSD’s Minister of 
Food – proposed to raise state-sanctioned grain prices, the communists blindsided their 
coalition partners by putting forward an extraordinary levy on millionaires instead. After 
all other coalition parties voted this down as unworkable, the communists went on the 
offensive: branding the ministers who had voted against the levy ‘defenders of 
millionaires’ in their press and exploiting their domination of the (officially non-party) 
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trade union movement to organise workers’ meetings demanding that the levy would be 
adopted. Far from bullying the party into submission, however, these attacks only made the 
ČSSD more combative. If the communists wanted ‘a dirty campaign’, the party leadership 
concluded, ‘they can have it’.46 
The French socialists described their experiences with the communists in very 
much the same terms. When the PCF, after its November 1946 election victory, published 
an outline for a ‘governmental programme’, the SFIO leadership concluded that the 
communists were far more interested in scoring political points than in solving France’s 
problems. During a meeting of the SFIO Executive, several socialist leaders derided the 
communist programme for being ‘demagogical’, for containing ‘flagrant contradictions’, 
and for lacking ‘any means of realisation’. The PCF, argued Oreste Capocci, ‘continues to 
view the French people as a bunch of moujiks’ – after the backward serfs in pre-
revolutionary Russia.47 Ministerial solidarity, moreover, seemed a concept foreign to the 
PCF. After his first six months as Minister of the National Economy, André Philip dubbed 
his dealings with the communists ‘cruel’. ‘[I]t is very difficult to govern with the 
communists’, he told the SFIO’s August 1946 congress, ‘because they do not bring [...] the 
minimum of intellectual honesty to the table’. In governmental negotiations, after all, ‘they 
take positions geared exclusively towards the next elections [and] put forward demagogical 
propositions with the sole purpose of making their colleagues reject them’. For these and 
other reasons,48 Philip concluded, the SFIO ‘should have the courage to state that we no 
longer want permanent unity of action with the communists’.49 
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The four parties, then, attributed their (anticipated) electoral woes to widely 
divergent causes. The Italian and Polish socialists, on the one hand, felt they were destined 
to lose out in democratic elections. Having hardly known democracy and still imbued by 
decades of unchallenged right-wing propaganda, they argued, their impressionable 
electorates were always more likely to vote for ‘reactionary’ candidates backed by church 
and clergy than for socialists as yet unable to deliver upon socialism in material terms. The 
Czechoslovakian social democrats and French socialists, on the other, primarily blamed 
themselves for their poor showings in elections. Victory had been within reach, they 
insisted, but their parties had not been equal to their organisational task, had failed to 
communicate their programmes in an effective manner, and had allowed themselves to be 
manoeuvred by their rivals. These contrasting renditions of their difficulties at the polls 
were reflected in the four parties’ approaches to elections. 
 The PPS and the PSIUP, believing that divisive campaigning would only disorient 
their electorates, opted for the broadest possible party-political unity. At first, their efforts 
to achieve such unity extended even to the centre-right. In the face of ‘the forces and 
interests’ hoping ‘to nip democracy in the bud’, Nenni wrote in July 1944, ‘the most 
comprehensive national unity is required’. For that reason, both socialists and communists 
had endeavoured to ‘draw the DC into the united proletarian front’.50 But these efforts 
were to no avail. By October, Nenni was warning that ‘the distrust’ the ‘parties of the 
centre’ – this time mentioning the social-liberal Democratic Labour Party alongside the DC 
– were showing communists and socialists was ‘bringing a civil war closer’.51  
For the PPS, Jan Stańczyk was even more alarmist. ‘If we cannot put together a 
bloc of six [i.e. the projected electoral alliance between the four ‘Lublin’ parties – the PPR, 
the PPS, the SL, and the SD – and the two legal centre-right parties – the PSL and the SP – 
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negotiations towards which broke down repeatedly in 1946 – JG]’, he admonished, ‘we 
risk a revolution’. For ‘if only a part of society can muster enthusiasm for us, we will 
definitely not be able to rely on the police to deal with the bands [the term Polish socialists 
used to describe the underground groups fighting the government – JG]’. Because the 
Soviet Union ‘cannot allow that there is a revolution to the rear of its army, it will have to 
crush it – and then our role as government will be finished’.52 
 Of course, neither a civil war nor a revolution ensued after the centre-right refused 
to join forces with the socialist-communist bloc in Italy and Poland. Yet, the emergence of 
a clear political frontrunner to their right (the DC in Italy and the PSL in Poland) in the 
first real electoral test in both countries, only served to strengthen commitment to party 
unity on the left within the PPS and the PSIUP. By the time of the second test, the two 
parties found themselves in a united front and on a common list with the communists.  
The aim of these electoral blocs was twofold. In the first place, they were to prevent 
the escalation of social conflicts at a time of great dangers to democracy. In this respect, 
Julian Hochfeld compared the challenges facing post-war Poland to those of wartime 
Britain. Despite the party’s resolve to press ahead forming an electoral bloc with or 
without the PSL, he claimed, ‘the PPS is not [...] principally in favour of electoral blocs in 
all circumstances and at all times’. Neither, of course, was the British Labour Party. But, in 
1940, with the country under attack from Nazi Germany, that party had agreed to postpone 
the elections and enter government, because ‘everyone realised that, in these 
circumstances, it was not possible to engage in [domestic] struggles [...] to fight elections 
on separate lists’. Poland, insisted Hochfeld, was ‘now fighting a battle equal to, if not 
harder than, that fought by Britain in 1940’. For whereas ‘the whole of British society’ had 
been ‘democratic and disciplined’ during the war, ‘we are a society politically far less 
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mature’. Various issues were ‘still in an explosive state’ and ‘should not be exacerbated’. 
Political unity and social peace, therefore, were ‘indispensable’.53 
 For all of their mollifying effects on burning issues, though, the ultimate raison 
d’être of the electoral blocs the two parties entered into remained winning elections. This 
was less of an issue for the Polish socialists, who were well aware that the communists 
would never allow the real election results to see the light of day. For the PSIUP, on the 
other hand, the electoral significance of unity was paramount. According to Nenni, the 
Popular Front represented ‘the only hope of an electoral victory, without which we would 
see a fatal return to the clerical reaction’. Oreste Lizzadri, the foremost socialist trade 
unionist in post-war Italy, agreed. ‘The division of the popular classes on various lists 
creates distrust and leads to defeat’, he insisted, ‘whereas unity inspires confidence and 
constitutes a guarantee for victory’.54  
 The ČSSD and the SFIO, conversely, responded to their electoral setbacks by 
stressing their independence from all other parties and from the communists in particular.55 
The ČSSD, declared Laušman in the wake of the party’s May 1946 election defeat, had 
made ‘only one mistake’ in its pre-electoral tactics: ‘that we did not draw a stronger line of 
demarcation between ourselves and the communists’.56 The SFIO likewise felt it had to 
disassociate itself from the communists in the struggle for the popular vote. When the PCF 
called for a joint communist-socialist campaign in favour of a yes-vote at the May 1946 
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constitutional referendum, Daniel Mayer immediately issued the SFIO’s provincial 
federations with ‘an absolute ban’ on common propaganda with the communists. Amid 
widespread applause for the Secretary General’s swift response within the SFIO Executive, 
Charles Dumas, who had just returned from the April 1946 PSIUP congress, advocated 
going still further. On the basis of ‘conversations with various foreign socialists’, he 
concluded that ‘not only we should not campaign together with the communists, but make 
very clear what separates them from us’.57 The next parliamentary elections seemed to 
vindicate that position, with the socialists having, as Depreux noted, ‘gained votes from the 
communists there where we have emphasised the differences between them and us’.58 
 There was much more than just electoral considerations, however, to the ČSSD’s 
and the SFIO’s antipathy towards party-political unity. The two parties very much believed 
that democracy was best served by the resumption of ‘normal’ party competition. To be 
sure, they agreed that their countries had seen too much political fragmentation during the 
interwar period and that the number of parties needed to be narrowed down. But if party 
integration was driven to the extremes seemingly desired by some of their opponents, both 
ČSSD and SFIO leaders warned, democracy would emerge less rather than more stable. 
 This was how Fierlinger defended the decision to shelve ‘the idea of one great 
socialist party’, comprising the pre-war communist, social democratic, and national 
socialist parties, that ČSSD leaders had so enthusiastically advocated in the immediate 
aftermath of liberation. This idea, he recounted, had been strong ‘in the days of national 
humiliation’ [i.e. the period after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938-39] and 
‘in the concentration camps’, where ‘[e]very Czech feared the return of the pre-war chaos 
and of the political disunity in which Fascism and Nazism grew strong’. In the end, 
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however, the arguments for a broader, four-party political spectrum, with a communist and 
a social democratic party to the left as well as a Catholic and a nationalist party to the 
centre-right, won the day in the Czech lands. Just ‘[h]ow justified this solution was’, 
insisted Fierlinger, became clear by comparison with the subsequent developments in 
Slovakia, where a ‘political simplification to two parties’ had been tried – a reference to 
the fact that, until early 1946, legal political activity in Slovakia was confined to the 
Slovak Communist Party and the centre-right nationalist and Catholic Slovak Democratic 
Party. In view of the negative experiences with that system, he continued, ‘we also had to 
introduce the four-party system in Slovakia’. But ‘as a result of the fact that the two new 
parties, amongst them our own, are still too weak, political life in Slovakia is still prone to 
superfluously heavy shocks’. ‘The system of four political parties’, then, ‘has clearly 
proved itself to be the better system. It remains our duty to keep it’.59 
 The French socialists were equally quick to question the unitary designs so popular 
during the first post-war years. As we have seen, they had serious reservations about 
communist overtures towards working-class unity. But their misgivings concerned the 
brand of national unity championed by General De Gaulle at least as much. The socialists 
took particular issue with De Gaulle’s contemptuous attitude towards political parties 
whilst he was still Prime Minister. ‘A true democracy’, read a letter the SFIO Executive 
sent De Gaulle to complain about his refusal to meet with delegations of political parties, 
‘cannot live without normal and regular party competition’. No doubt, it continued, 
political parties ‘should be transformed, their number reduced, their methods of 
propaganda overhauled, and the tone of their polemics modified’ and the SFIO had ‘set the 
example for that effort of transformation and adaptation’. ‘But a state without political 
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parties – and we use the plural, [because the existence of] a single party is a sign of 
dictatorship just as much as the absence of parties – is no longer a democratic state’.60 
 
Parliaments    
 
The four parties’ contrasting perspectives on the merits of democratic elections were 
reflected in their attitudes towards the upshot of such elections: the parliamentary balance 
of power. The Italian and Polish socialists, on the one hand, believing that the electoral 
odds were stacked heavily against their parties, viewed parliaments mostly as vehicles for 
bourgeois interests. The legalistic and formulaic methods of parliamentary democracy, 
they claimed, would never give way to socialism in backward societies like theirs. For the 
Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French socialists, on the other, who held their 
electorates in far higher esteem, parliamentary relations were always the point of departure. 
If socialism was going to live up to its democratic credentials, they insisted, the impetus 
for it should come from elected representatives. 
At the root of these widely divergent attitudes towards parliamentary democracy 
lay opposite attitudes towards parliamentary elections and their results. The PPS and the 
PSIUP, after their initial post-war euphoria wore down, considered parliamentary elections 
a nuisance at best, a dangerous, possibly fatal experiment at worst. As early as September 
1945, just months after their government had signed up to organising ‘free and unfettered’ 
elections in Poland, Stańczyk warned socialist and communist leaders against showing too 
much dedication to ‘the form’. Hitler too, he argued, ‘has risen to power by democratic 
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means and had the great majority of the nation behind him’.61 If not going that far, Basso 
was similarly scornful of parliamentary outcomes. Whilst it was crucial for the working 
class to exercise power commensurate with its ‘real political strength’, he insisted, 
‘“political [strength]”, mind you, does not necessarily equate, indeed almost never equates 
“parliamentary [strength]”’.62 
For the ČSSD and the SFIO, conversely, parliamentary outcomes very much 
represented the real balance of political forces. As sacred expressions of the will of the 
people, the two parties insisted, election results were to be respected by those in power. 
After the ČSSD’s drubbing in the May 1946 parliamentary elections, Laušman’s rhetoric 
was all about honouring the result. ‘[I]f the communists ask us whether comrade Fierlinger 
wants to continue as Prime Minister’, he told a ČSSD provincial conference, ‘we will 
answer that we do not want one dekagram more responsibility than the electorate has given 
us’. To be sure, he continued, Fierlinger was a far more suitable candidate for the post than 
communist leader Klement Gottwald, who ‘would command the confidence of the East but 
less so of the West’, or national socialist leader Petr Zenkl, who ‘would command the 
confidence of the West but less so of the East’. Yet, ‘the electorate has decided and that is 
how it has to be’.63  
The French socialists were equally adamant that election results should be abided 
by. When the PCF became the largest party in the November 1946 parliamentary elections, 
the SFIO leadership concluded that the communists should take the lead in a new 
government. Whatever their personal misgivings about the intentions and loyalties of the 
communists, therefore, most socialist leaders felt they owed it to the electorate to support 
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PCF leader Maurice Thorez in his (ultimately unsuccessful) bid to secure a parliamentary 
majority for his candidacy for the Prime Ministry. François Tanguy-Prigent summed up the 
general mood within the SFIO leadership, arguing that ‘the election results show that 
voters want a government presided by a communist’. As a party ‘abiding by universal 
suffrage and anxious to respect democracy’, consequently, ‘we must vote for a communist 
Prime Minister’.64 
The four parties’ divisions over parliaments and parliamentarism went deeper, 
however, than their different takes on the election results producing parliamentary 
outcomes. At stake was the very notion that parliaments, irrespective of their make-up, 
could bring about socialist change in the first place. For the Italian and Polish socialists, 
parliaments were inextricably linked to bourgeois society. The two parties took particular 
exception to the idea, widespread also within the larger European socialist movement, that 
democracy found its expression in freely elected parliaments. Basso bemoaned tendencies 
‘to confound democracy and parliamentarism’.65 In fact, what so many of the PSIUP’s 
sister parties called democracy constituted ‘nothing more than the acceptance of 
constitutional legalism, of bourgeois legalism, i.e. the acceptance of a democratic 
formalism that has nothing in common with the substance of democracy’. The truth was, 
he continued, that ‘society is not founded on laws: that is a fantasy of lawyers’. For laws 
rarely kept up with social developments. Far from ‘having created modern society’, after 
all, the Napoleonic Code had merely given the already victorious bourgeoisie its legal 
outlet.66 Just as bourgeois parliamentary democracy had not been achieved by adhering to 
the laws of feudal society, proletarian popular democracy would never be achieved by 
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adhering to the laws of bourgeois society. For ‘every time that that democracy has made a 
stride ahead in history, it has been forced to turn its back on the law’.67  
If Basso made the theoretical case against parliamentary democracy, Wachowicz 
was more concrete. In his view, bourgeois parliamentary democracy only served to 
perpetuate social inequalities. In the United Kingdom, for example, ‘the worker and the 
Lord [...] notionally have the same right to vote [but], in reality, the Lord is in power – in 
other words, he who has money is in power’. Of course, in a parliamentary democracy, 
‘the working class can organise itself [and] elect its leaders in parliament, but modern 
history knows no examples of the working class succeeding in forming a government’. The 
Danish and Swedish social democrats who had been in government before and during the 
war, after all, ‘only gave [the government] their name, [whilst] failing to implement any 
reforms bringing their countries closer to a democratic system’. In fact, Wachowicz went 
on, ‘democracy must fade away in a revolutionary period’. For when ‘entering into class 
struggle, there is no longer question of democracy, only of class victories’.68 
Not all PPS and PSIUP leaders shared these principal objections against 
parliamentary democracy. In fact, there were many within both party leaderships arguing 
that a parliamentary road to socialism, whilst not an option in their countries, was perfectly 
viable in places like Great Britain and Scandinavia. Such leaders insisted there was no one 
precept for arriving at socialism – it was the social fabric and national history of a given 
country that determined which path to socialism it should take. It was ‘pointless’ to ask, 
argued Nenni, whether socialism would be achieved ‘by the methods of Lenin or 
Beveridge’. For reformist or revolutionary trajectories to socialism were ‘results not 
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causes: a certain type of society produces a certain type of struggle’.69 Welcoming the 
foreign delegates to the December 1947 congress of the PPS, Stanisław Szwalbe expressed 
similar sentiments. After emphasising that Poland’s economic programme was ‘a socialist 
programme’, he expressed the hope that ‘the dealings of our congress [and] the visit to our 
country will convince you that the PPS has chosen a proper socialist path – corresponding 
to the conditions of our country and the needs of our working class’.70 
In this respect, Italian and Polish socialists frequently distinguished between two 
roads to socialism – one where socialism could be the end result of reforms enacted by 
parliaments and one where the economic bases of socialism had to be laid by extra-
parliamentary means. Basso contrasted the feasibility of parliamentary trajectories to 
socialism in various regions. In the Scandinavian countries, he explained, ‘a democratic 
tradition has taken root, the proletariat has long since achieved a relatively high standard of 
living and, through this economic elevation, [it] has acquired political maturity’. In these 
circumstances, parliamentary democracy was ‘doubtless still the most effective method of 
socialist action’. The Eastern European countries, conversely, were ‘almost all 
underdeveloped industrially, with a numerically scarce and profoundly immature middle 
class, and with a vast mass of ignorant an often illiterate peasants’. Sticking ‘purely and 
simply to parliamentary methods’ in such circumstances ‘would mean keeping the old 
plutocratic classes in power indefinitely, would mean postponing for centuries not only the 
realisation of socialism but even the mere elevation of the material and moral living 
conditions of the proletariat’.71  
Drawing on his experiences in the London wartime emigration, PPS Under-
Secretary for Shipping and International Trade Ludwik Grosfeld similarly identified two 
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distinct roads to socialism. Especially during the war, he recalled, ‘very reformist [and] 
very right-wing convictions prevailed amongst socialists in the West’, who refused to 
recognise that the road the Soviet Union had taken since the October Revolution was 
‘irrevocable’. Yet, the PPS had ‘to realise that the Western road to socialism, although it is 
completely different [and] arises under different circumstances, is equally irrevocable’. 
There were thus ‘two different systems and two different methods of socialism, which have 
grown out of different economic conditions’. For all of its ‘hidden games’ [probably a 
reference to Labour’s initial hovering between the London PPS and the Lublin PPS – JG], 
therefore, ‘we must declare [...] that the British Labour Party is a socialist party, which 
seeks to achieve socialism by its methods’.72  
What increasingly angered both the PPS and the PSIUP, however, was that the 
respect they showed for the (North-) Western parliamentary road to socialism was far from 
mutual. During the May 1946 International Socialist Conference in the English resort of 
Clacton-on-Sea, Cyrankiewicz set out to ‘underline the difference between our methods of 
struggle and those used in the West’. Yet, the reception was mostly hostile. ‘[P]ersonal 
attacks’ had appeared ‘even in the left-wing Tribune’, whereas ‘the tone of the accounts’ of 
some sister parties bore witness to feelings of ‘superiority’.73 
On the second day of his party’s April 1946 congress, PSIUP parliamentarian and 
Central Committee member Lucio Mario Luzzato likewise remonstrated against the notion 
that there were no other pathways to socialism than ‘the road of the ballot paper’. To be 
sure, he conceded, the Italian socialists were currently committed to the maintenance of 
‘democratic legality’ (more on the reasons for that in the Constitutions sub-chapter). But 
that did not mean, as ‘a foreign representative’ had claimed the previous day, that ‘the 
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function of a socialist party is as it is’ – that it stopped at the defence of parliamentary 
democracy. For ‘the fundamentals of democracy’ were not merely ‘formal’ or ‘negative’, 
‘only renunciatory in the sense that we affirm that we would in no situation deviate from 
the democratic path. No. You know that it is not like that, because all of you who want 
democracy know that tomorrow, where that is necessary, we would resort to any means the 
reaction forces upon us to defend socialism and the rights of workers’.74   
For the ČSSD and the SFIO, on the other hand, there was an indissoluble link 
between socialism and parliamentary democracy. Right from the outset, then, the two 
parties directed their efforts towards a rapid return to parliamentary normality. They were 
strong supporters of the provisional parliaments, set up in both countries pending the first 
parliamentary elections, as counterweights to almighty provisional governments. 
According to Vincent Auriol, the French Consultative Assembly provided ‘a solution’ for 
socialist grievances about the rightward thrust of the first De Gaulle government. Warning 
that withdrawing support from the government in an ‘anti-constitutional’ regime would not 
make De Gaulle go, he called on socialist delegates to the Consultative Assembly to 
instead be ‘assiduous’ and use their budget-setting powers to weigh upon the government 
in questions like subsidies for faith schools.75 Fierlinger too argued that the creation of the 
Czechoslovakian Provisional National Assembly had been ‘a step in the right direction’. 
For even if its unelected status meant it did not yet ‘give full expression to the real 
principle of parliamentary democracy’, it had given ‘the people [...] a wider representation’ 
whilst maintaining ‘the peace necessary for the further successful reconstruction of the 
State’.76 
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 As the provisional chambers made way for properly elected parliaments, the 
ČSSD’s and the SFIO’s commitment to parliamentarism only grew stronger. The two 
parties were adamant that, as far as they were concerned, parliament was now both the 
foremost arena for and the ultimate arbitrator of national decision-making. They placed 
great emphasis, therefore, on their parliamentary fractions being able to operate free from 
outside constraints. This was the main reason the French socialists put forward to quit the 
‘Delegation of the Left’ – bringing together the PCF, the SFIO, the Radicals, the Human 
Rights League, and the CGT to bolster the Left’s position within the first De Gaulle 
government – almost immediately after the November 1945 legislative elections. At the 
first post-election meeting of the Delegation, where a CGT proposal to give the Delegation 
a permanent character won the approval from all but the socialists, Mayer made it quite 
clear that there was now a higher authority for the SFIO to answer to. As ‘the sovereignty 
of the [Constituent] Assembly has to come to full bloom’, he declared, ‘we must not give 
the public the impression that it is outside of Parliament that decisions are being taken’. 
The socialists, then, would not ‘be bound upon the parliamentary level’. For it was 
‘incumbent upon the elected Constituent Assembly and the government formed by the 
national representation’, read the letter with which the SFIO broke definitively with the 
Delegation, ‘to take responsibility for the conduct of public affairs’.77 
 The ČSSD similarly berated other parties for disregarding their parliamentary 
duties. Just like those of its provisional predecessor, lamented the ČSSD’s 1946 year 
report, the proceedings of the elected Constituent Assembly were initially dictated by the 
needs of the government. A whole range of parliamentary committees was ‘content to 
rubber stamp [...] governmental bills’, whilst deputies failed to ‘fulfil one of their most 
important tasks: that of controlling the state economy and public administration’. For that 
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reason, the ČSSD decided to ‘take the initiative’ and ‘struggle for the improvement of 
parliamentary praxis’.  
A first opportunity to do that presented itself when the newly-formed Gottwald 
government reserved the right to draft a new constitution for itself. In the parliamentary 
debate on the governmental programme, Oldřich John, the vice-chairman of the ČSSD’s 
parliamentary group, immediately protested that ‘we cannot agree that the new constitution 
will be drafted by the government, i.e. for the government by the [communist-dominated – 
JG] Ministry of the Interior – the entire business of drawing up a new constitution should 
instead take place on the parliamentary floor’. At first, the ČSSD’s vigour seemed to falter 
upon parliamentary inertia once more, as the social democrats found themselves isolated 
and outvoted within the parliamentary sub-committee on constitutional affairs. But when 
the ČSSD threatened to take matters to a head and bring forward a motion withdrawing 
support from the constitutional paragraph of the governmental programme, the other 
parties caved. Before long, the government yielded as well, agreeing that ‘drawing up a 
new constitution’ was ‘a matter for parliament’. It was the ČSSD’s perseverance on this 
particular question, insisted the party’s 1946 year report that formed the catalyst for the 
subsequent ‘breakthrough’ in parliamentary assertiveness. For ‘if we can affirm today that 
we were able to eliminate most of our parliament’s shortcomings – it now has its own rules 
of procedure, [its own] economic and audit commissions, [it] energetically summons 
ministers to provide an account of their activities, and [it] has passed a series of private 
members’ bills – the credits for that should go to our parliamentary group’.78 
Much as the ČSSD and the SFIO prided themselves on having bolstered 
parliament’s standing, however, that standing was quick to come under renewed pressure. 
In the face of the socio-political polarisation that accompanied the drifting apart of the 
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post-war coalitions, after all, the two parties’ rivals increasingly took contentious issues to 
the streets.  
In France, such extra-parliamentary pressure initially emanated chiefly from the 
movement around General De Gaulle. The bombshells repeatedly dropped by De Gaulle, 
often in the form of large public conventions, sparked fierce debate within the SFIO 
Executive. There were leaders on the left of the party – most notably Léon Boutbien (who, 
ironically, ended up in the Central Committee of the Gaullist Rally for the Republic in the 
1970s) – pleading for the extra-parliamentary challenge posed by De Gaulle to be met and 
for the Left to start organising counter-rallies. The large majority of the SFIO leadership, 
however, wanted the party to steer clear from street politics. It would be ‘a mistake’, Philip 
told Boutbien after the launch of the RPF, to combat De Gaulle ‘on the terrain chosen by 
him’.79 Roger Priou-Valjean went further. He warned that it was dangerous for socialists to 
claim, as Boutbien had done, that ‘we should operate on the level of the “nation”’ rather 
than on that of ‘the government’. For exactly those types of arguments had been used 
before the war by the counter-revolutionary opponents of the Republic, who distinguished 
between ‘le pays réel’ and ‘le pays légal’ – that is, the notion at the heart of the ideology of 
the far right Action Française movement that the democratic institutions of the Third 
Republic had somehow been imposed on the ‘real’ France. It was ‘on the parliamentary 
level’, Priou-Valjean concluded, that the SFIO should ‘fight its battles’.80  
The socialist commitment to parliamentarism was re-affirmed in the face of that 
other extra-parliamentary challenge confronting France in 1947: that of the increasingly 
communist-led strike movement. As the strikes lost their wildcat character and began 
looking more and more like a concerted attempt to destabilise the government, the socialist 
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attitude towards strikers changed too. When Auriol called for discipline in May 1947, he 
was no longer referring to discipline as a productivist mantra. ‘Discipline’, he declared, ‘is 
above all respect for the law; the law, having been voted in by an Assembly elected by 
universal suffrage, is the expression of popular sovereignty’. ‘Make no mistake’, he 
continued, ‘the day that this or that professional or social group purports to defend its 
interests, however justified these may be, by resorting to agitations or violence, they not 
only neglect the national interest but they threaten to plunge the country in disorder and 
anarchy’. By taking the law into their own hands, after all, these groups were undercutting 
the authority of the democratic institutions the SFIO leadership so cherished. ‘In our 
democratic regime’, Auriol concluded, ‘it is for the representatives of the nation to give 
echo to such claims, and it is government and parliament who, having heard all parties 
[and] having been presented with all arguments, are entitled to decide which measures 
should be taken in the national interest, and only in the national interest’.81 
The ČSSD’s dedication to due parliamentary process was no less strong. This 
became very clear in the conflict between communist Minister of Agriculture Július Ďuriš 
and the Czechoslovakian National Assembly in early 1947. At stake were Ďuriš’ attempts 
to bypass parliament in the enactment of six controversial bills devised by his Ministry. 
Even before the bills could be discussed in government or parliament, the Ministry of 
Agriculture had extracts of them distributed amongst peasants. After that, the communist 
party machine went in overdrive. First, mass meetings were organised across the 
Czechoslovakian countryside, where peasants – who, according to the social democrats, 
‘barely knew’ what was in the bills – ‘pre-approved’ the proposals. This, in turn, was 
followed by a ‘full-blown campaign’ for parliament to pass the bills without amendments. 
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‘To such manipulations of parliament’, insisted the ČSSD’s 1947 year report, ‘we could 
obviously not acquiesce’. Even though the social democrats by and large took a favourable 
view of Ďuriš’ bills, therefore, they sided with the centre-right to pass a parliamentary 
resolution condemning the conduct of the minister.82 
For both the ČSSD and the SFIO, then, the defence of parliamentarism was very 
much a matter of principle. The only way for socialism to retain its democratic character, 
insisted the two parties, was to adhere to the legal and procedural rules of parliamentary 
democracy. With the national and international menace to parliamentary democracy 
mounting over 1947, therefore, the maintenance of parliamentary authority increasingly 
became a life-or-death issue for both parties. In a world ‘heading towards conflict and 
mutual division’ once more, Fierlinger told the November 1947 congress of the ČSSD, 
‘[s]ocial democracy, aspiring to achieve socialism by democratic means, always had to 
look for [...] the right remedy’.83 That remedy consisted of finding ‘socialist solutions, [that 
are] economically and politically viable’, whilst being ‘a driving force behind the 
legislative activities of parliament, the significance of which we have always pointed out 
and emphasised’. At the height of the communist and Gaullist challenges to parliamentary 
democracy in France, Paul Ramadier likewise banged the drum for parliament. For all the 
justified criticisms that could be levelled at the government, he implored on the December 
1947 National Council of the SFIO, this was not a time for parliamentary deadlock. ‘[A]t 
the present moment’, he declared, ‘we must [...] show that the parliamentary regime is 
capable of governing France.84    
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Constitutions 
 
The first task for the freshly elected parliaments in each of the four countries was to draw 
up a new constitution. All four parties were strong supporters of the constitutional projects 
that reached their (intermediate) conclusions in 1946 (France), 1947 (Poland), and 1948 
(Italy and Czechoslovakia) respectively. That did not mean, however, that they took 
similar attitudes towards constitutions and constitutionalism. For the Italian and Polish 
socialists, on the one hand, the adoption of a democratic constitution was a step in the right 
direction but by no means the end point in the political struggle for socialism. If required, 
they insisted, the legal boundaries of constitutionalism could and should be overstepped in 
that continuing struggle. For the Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French 
socialists, on the other, the rights and freedoms enshrined in their constitutions (both in 
their pre-war and post-war versions) were sacrosanct. To violate these constitutional 
principles, they argued, would open the door for tyranny rather than for socialism. 
 Much of this went back to the debate that had divided the socialist movement ever 
since the late nineteenth century: whether socialism could be achieved by piecemeal 
reforms within the context of bourgeois democracy or whether it could only be the result of 
a proletarian revolution outside of existing legality. The ČSSD boasted that it had been one 
of the first European parties to resolve this debate. Already at its 1887 congress in Brno, 
explained Laušman, the party had ‘settled’ this issue in favour of those pleading for a 
democratic road to socialism. This line was confirmed at the subsequent Hainfeld congress 
(1888-1889) of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, which committed social democracy 
across the Austro-Hungarian Empire to electoral and parliamentary politics. ‘And the 
result’, concluded Laušman, ‘was that, only shortly after that, social democracy achieved a 
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tremendous success: that, within ten years, we made the famous breakthrough of [...] 
introducing the so-called fifth curia [which gave suffrage to all men over the age of 24], 
through which we immediately got five Czech social democrats elected to the Viennese 
Imperial Council’.85 
 Within French socialism, the polemics between revolutionaries and reformists were 
rather more protracted. The compromise upon which the SFIO had been founded in 1905 – 
between the guesdistes rejecting any form of cooperation with bourgeois society and the 
jauresisstes embracing republicanism and reform as the road to socialism – remained 
fragile and kept the party out of government for most of the interwar period. Yet, the 
experiences of the 1930s and early 1940s – the February 1934 crisis, the Popular Front 
government, and the Vichy regime – shifted the balance in favour of working within the 
framework of bourgeois democracy. Even if official party rhetoric remained revolutionary, 
the post-war SFIO was firmly committed to upholding the democratic institutions of 
bourgeois France. Defending his new draft of the party’s declaration of principles (which 
e.g. included replacing the principle of ‘class struggle’ with the more conciliatory notion of 
‘class action’) before the August 1945 congress of the SFIO, Léon Blum stressed just how 
crucial political democracy was to socialism. ‘All of us know now’, he insisted, ‘that there 
is an indissoluble link between socialism and democracy; that, without socialism, 
democracy is imperfect, but, without democracy, socialism is powerless’. That, he 
declared, was ‘a truth written in blood’. 
 It is a measure of how far the French and the Italian socialists had already drifted 
apart by this early stage that Nenni returned ‘bewildered’ from the same SFIO congress. If 
something as fundamental as changing the party’s declaration of principles had been 
proposed ‘in the times of [Pierre] Renaudel [one of the foremost advocates of 
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governmental participation in the pre-war and interwar SFIO] or [...] [Jean] Jaurès’, he told 
the PSIUP leadership, ‘it would [have been] debated for five days and five months and 
every word would [have been] subjected to the most thorough scrutiny’. This time, 
however, it appeared ‘as if nobody cared’, which had ‘very much impressed’ Nenni ‘as a 
sign of the party detaching itself from socialist doctrine and turning its back on the 
interests of the working class’.86 For the Italian socialists, after all, reaching out to 
bourgeois society amounted to a vote of no confidence in the revolutionary tendencies 
within the working class. This is how Basso denounced both those socialists ‘viewing 
Italian politics only in terms of party competition’ and ‘the heirs and followers of old 
reformism’. What united them, he insisted, was their ‘distrust in the working class’ and 
their lack of belief in ‘the revolutionary possibility inherent in class politics’.87 
 The post-war PPS was equally dismissive of attempts to reform bourgeois society 
from within. Far from this ‘criticism of reformism’ having been imposed by the 
communists, argued Hochfeld, it was ‘part of [the] good traditions’ of Polish socialism. 
For, already before the war, such leftist party leaders as Cyrankiewicz, Oskar Lange (the 
world-renowned socialist economist, who became the Polish ambassador at the United 
Nations after the war) and Bolesław Drobner (the first Polish mayor of Wrocław and 
deputy to the Sejm, 1944-68) had raised much the same concerns about reformism as ‘we 
express today […] about Blum and his tactics [as well as] about [Ernest] Bevin [Labour 
Britain’s Foreign Secretary, 1945-51 – and a much-despised figure amongst left-wing 
socialists] and his tactics’.88 Those leftists pleading for a more revolutionary politics do 
indeed seem to have been in the ascendancy within the PPS well before the communists 
cemented their dominant position in the aftermath of the Second World War. As the 
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Sanacja regime grew more repressive in the 1930s, after all, the PPS leadership had 
increasingly taken its lead from the revolutionary socialism espoused by leading Austro-
Marxist Otto Bauer.89 Bauer’s claim that the proletariat could, in the face of a reactionary 
threat, justifiably resort to a temporal dictatorship struck a particular chord and was co-
opted in the 1937 Radom Programme of the PPS.90  
It was this issue – the use of dictatorial methods in the struggle for socialism – that 
sparked some of the fiercest debates within the post-war international socialist movement 
and ultimately saw the PSIUP ostracised from mainstream Western European social 
democracy along with the browbeaten Eastern European parties. For the Italian and Polish 
socialists, a proletarian dictatorship, whilst not an end in itself could constitute a political 
necessity in countries like theirs. The PPS was definitely the more extreme case in this 
respect, as it overtly defended the repressive and violent methods the Lublin government 
used against political opponents. In an open letter to the Labour Party – a response to a 
Tribune article castigating the ‘pro-Communist leadership of the [Polish] Socialist Party’ 
for, amongst many other things, ‘making a farce of the promise of free and democratic 
elections’91 – Hochfeld insisted that Poland and the United Kingdom were facing 
altogether different political challenges. If the Tories had won the 1945 general election, he 
argued, Labour would have only had to wait for five years to get another shot at power. 
‘Not so for us’, it continued. ‘We are certain that, if we were to lose power, we would have 
to retake it not from conservatives, but from fascists; and not at the ballot box, but in an 
armed struggle’.92 
 That meant, at least in the short term, that communists and socialists had to be 
guaranteed a commanding position in government irrespective of their true electoral 
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strength. The Polish socialists were well aware that this involved reverting to methods – 
including the falsification of election results, political persecutions, and an excessive 
reliance on the use of force – that, as the party leadership put it somewhat euphemistically, 
‘are not entirely compatible with elements of our traditions’.93 Yet, these same democratic 
traditions, suggested the party programme that was put before the August 1945 congress of 
the PPS, had let down Polish socialism in the past. ‘At the current historical moment’, it 
proclaimed, ‘the Polish Socialist Party should concentrate its efforts in the first place on 
the problem of holding on to government’. That meant that the ‘misguided principles of 
democracy’ held by those socialists wanting to show ‘far-reaching tolerance to political 
opponents’ were to be ‘revised’. For the ‘fascist centres’ that had existed in pre-war Poland 
were not about to resign themselves to the new order and would ‘not shy away from 
deception, sabotage, and assassinations’.94 In these circumstances, insisted chairman of the 
programme commission Feliks Mantel, the PPS ‘cannot forsake the use of force, which at 
the present moment could prove crucial for the victory of socialism’.95 
 More recent scholarship has suggested, however, that the Polish socialists were 
never truly at ease with the blatant violations of constitutionalism on the part of the 
communists and the (communist-dominated) security services. These accounts stress 
socialist efforts, especially after the January 1947 elections, to restore civil liberties and the 
rule of law through the so-called Little Constitution – adopted in February 1947 as a 
temporary replacement for the ‘fascist’ 1935 Sanacja Constitution; a full new constitution 
was only enacted in 1952.96 Whilst such accounts are certainly helpful in debunking the 
old myth that the Lublin PPS consisted exclusively of communist stooges, they seem to 
overstate the extent of ‘socialist humanism’. Hochfeld, for one, was at great pains to draw 
                                                          
93 XXVII Kongres [December 1947], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2029/3, 235/I-25, fo. 220. 
94 ‘Projekt Uchwała Programowa’ [August 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2029/1, 235/I-7, fo. 12.  
95 XXVI Kongres [August 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2029/1, 235/I-12, fo. 254. 
96 See e.g.: Pięta-Szawara, ‘Socialísci w Sejmie Ustawodawczym’, pp. 94-102; Eleonora Syzdek & 
Bronisław Syzdek, Zanim zostanie zapomniany, (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Projekt, 1996), p. 130.   
267 
 
a clear distinction between his ‘Marxist’ humanism and the ‘revisionist’ humanism he 
attributed to Blum – insisting that ‘the jump from the state of necessity [the proletarian 
dictatorship – JG] to the state of freedom’ was ‘by no means simple’.97 And for all of their 
demands that the PPS should exert more influence over the running of the security 
services, socialist leaders strongly supported the principle of reverting to violence against 
the ‘reactionary’ opponents of popular democracy.98  
Perhaps Edward Osóbka-Morawski summed up the PPS attitude towards 
constitutionalism best when he argued that ‘integral democracy is not yet possible in 
Poland’. ‘We have some twenty years of Sanacja rule, of captivity, [and] of massive 
clerical involvement in a reactionary regime behind us’, he declared, ‘that is not a balance 
of power conducive to integral democracy’. The new government, therefore, needed some 
time to level the playing field. If it had ‘offended the democratic conscience and socialist 
morality’ in doing so, concluded Osobka, ‘that is transitory [...]. Five years should suffice 
to level the chances of the reactionary and democratic camps – so that we will not have to 
offend the democratic conscience by the time of the next election’.99 
The post-war PSIUP leadership, conversely, was always extremely careful to 
operate within the margins of constitutionalism. In fact, it often used very legalistic and 
constitutionalist arguments to defend the governmental coalition with bourgeois parties. 
Nenni drew on such arguments to respond to his critics on ‘the self-proclaimed left’ of the 
PSIUP – i.e. those socialists who, yearning for their party to take a much more combative 
stance on such issues as the disempowerment of the liberation committees, were urging an 
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exit from the government. ‘If we allow ourselves to be removed from power today’, Nenni 
told the PSIUP’s Central Committee in October 1945, ‘the perspective of a Constituent 
Assembly as a legalistic solution will disappear’. A new right-wing government, after all, 
would surely repudiate the commitments entered into by the coalition government: 
‘discussions about the date [for elections to] and the content of a Constituent Assembly 
would be kicked into the long grass and we would be heading towards a plebiscite [on the 
monarchy] that would be formulated in such a way as to deliver a pre-determined 
answer’.100  
Three months later, Nenni painted an even more alarmist picture of what would 
have happened had he heeded the advice of his leftist critics. ‘If we had abandoned 
government’, he insisted, ‘the country would find itself in a truly dramatic situation’. For 
‘in Southern Italy, the communist and socialist workers’ movement would already have 
been outlawed, we would already have seen exiles arriving here [in Rome], and we would 
have been mourning the victims of a civil war – which, with the Allies in the country, we 
would have lost before it even began’.101 
In this respect, there were repeated allusions to ‘the Greek scenario’ – where the 
Left had walked out of a government of national unity in 1944, only to find itself facing 
not only the domestic Right but also the Western Allies in an unwinnable civil war. Time 
and again, PSIUP leaders reminded their party that ‘the Greek scenario’ was one to avoid 
at any price. Should the PSIUP embark on the same ‘adventures’ as the Greek Left, 
admonished Nenni, ‘we would sacrifice the lives of our best comrades and, worse still, the 
possibility of making democracy succeed’.102 Such views were echoed even by those who 
had been active within the revolutionary liberation committees. Nino Gaeta, who used to 
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be the socialist vice-chairman of the Napoli liberation committee, warned the April 1946 
PSIUP congress that ‘breaking national unity’ would leave Italy in an even more terrible 
position than Greece. For while Greece had at least been an Allied country during the war, 
Italy was bound by the conditions of its armistice with those same Allies. By practicing ‘a 
different politics than that of national unity’ and ‘adopting sectarian and factitious 
positions’, therefore, ‘we would ruin Italy forever’.103 
When the DC finally undid the national unity government in May 1947, such fears 
only intensified. Speaking at one of the first meetings of the PSIUP Directorate after the 
communists and socialists had been removed from government, Nenni agonised over the 
prospect of opposition. ‘The state apparatus is right-wing’, he declared. Thus far, the Left 
had been able to ‘frustrate’ this apparatus ‘by our presence in government. But in what 
kind of situation will we find ourselves after a couple of months of opposition?’104 With 
left-right polarisation mounting across the continent over the months that followed and 
neighbouring France increasingly finding itself in an insurrectionary state, the situation did 
indeed seem to deteriorate steadily. By November, Luigi Cacciatore was expressing fears 
of worker agitations getting out of hand in Italy too. ‘There is a danger’, he argued, ‘of 
sliding to a situation of the French type, thereafter to a situation of the Greek type’. In 
these circumstances, it was incumbent upon the socialists ‘to rebuild the foundations, 
which are currently diluted, for a democratic development of political life in Italy’.105 
Yet, the PSIUP’s commitment to constitutionalism always seemed to be motivated 
more by expediency than principle. In view of their country’s geo-political position within 
the Western bloc, reasoned Italian socialists, adhering to the rulebook of bourgeois 
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democracy offered far better hopes of survival than engaging in violent struggle with the 
bourgeoisie. That did not mean, however, that they were opposed to the use of force by 
communist and socialist parties if and when they were in a more ‘favourable’ position to 
do so. As other Western European socialists and social democrats began asking more and 
more questions of the methods used in the ‘popular’ democracies in Eastern Europe, then, 
PSIUP leaders stubbornly kept praising ‘the great efforts at renewal to which, after Russia, 
the countries of Eastern Europe have been subjected’ – culminating in the congratulatory 
telegram it sent Fierlinger in the wake of the Prague Coup.106 
For unlike its Western European and, as we will see, Czechoslovakian counterparts, 
the post-war PSIUP refused to draw an absolute distinction between democratic and 
dictatorial trajectories to socialism. Whether a country arrived at socialism by democratic 
and peaceful means or by dictatorship and violence, Basso explained, depended on how far 
into the revolutionary process the proletariat took power. If it did so at the very start of a 
revolution, as in the Russian Revolution, there was bound to be a transitory period of 
repression and violence. But if the proletariat only rose to power towards the end of a 
revolutionary cycle, with the disintegrating old regime practically handing over power, 
democratic rules could be observed. It followed that ‘the differences between democracy 
and dictatorship are formal rather than substantial’. They were ‘different methods of 
struggle’ to be sure, ‘but the application of one over another does not depend on the free 
choice of individuals’. Instead, it was ‘the historical situation in which a revolution 
develops, that is the balance of power between the classes at the moment of a take-over [of 
political power – JG], that determines which method of struggle the proletariat should 
adopt’.107 
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The ČSSD and the SFIO, on the other hand, were adamant that there was a clear-
cut choice between democracy and dictatorship and that true socialists should always opt 
for the former. Right from the outset, the two parties made it quite clear that, as far as they 
were concerned, there was only one road to socialism. Speaking at his party’s first post-
war congress, ČSSD Secretary General Blažej Vilím vowed that ‘Czechoslovakian social 
democracy is and remains the party, which will always pursue a democratic road to realise 
its ideals and construct a socialist state’. The seven-year struggle against Nazi terror, he 
argued, ‘has convinced us of the meaning of political freedom and the value of personal 
freedom’.108 Vilím’s French counterpart, Daniel Mayer, addressed the SFIO’s first post-
war congress in remarkably similar terms. ‘We should be a veritable “social democracy”’, 
he declared, ‘i.e. those who create socialism without losing for a moment the sense of 
freedom and democracy; [...] bringing together at the same time ardent revolutionaries, 
partisans of profound social and economic transformations, and passionate republicans, 
enamoured by the liberty [...] of which we only know the price once we have lost it’.109  
 It was not only their wartime experiences of violent repression and dictatorship, 
however, that account for the ČSSD’s and the SFIO’s commitment towards a democratic 
road to socialism. In defence of their constitutional approach, they pointed at least as much 
to the degenerations of the dictatorial road to socialism, embarked on by the interwar 
Soviet Union. The French socialists were the more outspoken critics of Bolshevism.110 
According to Mayer, the Soviet experience proved that structural socio-economic reforms, 
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seen as the starting point for democratic renewal by the Italian and Polish socialists, did not 
by themselves suffice to liberate man from oppression. To be sure, such reforms as 
nationalisations or the empowerment of factory councils gave freedom ‘its full 
significance, its full meaning’. But ‘[w]e know now that economic transformations are not 
the essential condition [for freedom] and, in any case, do not exactly lead to freedom, 
because there is no freedom in Soviet Russia’.111 Dumas denounced the Soviet road to 
socialism in still stronger terms. ‘We want to create socialism in freedom’, he argued, ‘and 
we cannot say that Soviet Russia is the traditional country of socialism’. For ‘the 
dictatorship that was installed there more than twenty years ago is not the necessary and 
temporary dictatorship described by Karl Marx, but the dictatorship of a new 
aristocracy’.112 
 The Czechoslovakian social democrats, possibly in view of the huge popularity that 
the Soviet Union had garnered in Czechoslovakia by first rejecting the Munich diktat and 
subsequently liberating the country from Nazi rule, practiced more restraint in their 
criticisms of the Soviet model. They did very much insist, however, that this model was 
not applicable in post-war Czechoslovakia. Even those on the pro-communist left of the 
ČSSD agreed that the ‘Czechoslovakian road to socialism’ had to be a democratic one. 
Speaking to workers in Plzeň, Fierlinger explained that ‘we want to secure our revolution 
not by a bloody civil war, but by the democratically expressed will of the entire nation’. In 
doing so, he argued, ‘we will avoid superfluous bloodshed, domestic conflicts, and 
unnecessary economic losses’.113 Evžen Erban similarly stressed how, in post-war 
Czechoslovakia, ‘a new social order’ was being built ‘with retention of the traditional 
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forms of political democracy’. In this respect, he declared, the Czechoslovakian revolution 
had much more in common with the medieval Hussite ‘revolution’ than with the Russian 
Revolution of 1917. The methods used during the October Revolution, after all, were 
‘specifically Russian’ and could not be exported to ‘a state of developed industrial 
capitalism and parliamentary democracy’ like interwar Czechoslovakia.114 
 The notion of nationally specific trajectories to socialism was of course very much 
part of Soviet discourse during the first post-war years and was actively propagated by 
communist parties eager to showcase their democratic credentials. Yet, the 
Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French socialists were quick to question the 
sincerity of the communists’ apparent new commitment to the rule of law. Already at the 
August 1945 SFIO congress, Philip pointed out that communists and socialists had an 
altogether different approach to practicing politics. For the communists, he explained, the 
conquest of power justified the use of any tactical means, regardless of their ‘moral value’ 
or their ‘intellectual contradictions’. The socialists, on the other hand, placed themselves 
within a democratic regime, ‘knowing full well that the proper functioning of that regime 
presupposes [the observance of] a number of moral rules, a number of just rules that are 
accepted by all democrats’.115 Speaking in name of the SFIO’s Northern Federation at the 
party’s August 1946 congress, Eugène Thomas – the socialist Minister for the Postal 
Service in sixteen different post-war governments – was more blunt. Even though 
communists and socialists both used such slogans as ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’, he 
declared, ‘we do not have the same definitions of those concepts’. For ‘we all know that 
the communist party is essentially an anti-democratic party [...] [and] [w]e also know very 
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well that, if the communists were to rise to power in our country, that would mean the end 
of freedom, would mean concentration camps, exile, [or] death for us’.116 
Such assessments of communist intentions were inspired in no small part by reports 
about the situation in Eastern Europe. Even if early post-war Czechoslovakia was by far 
the most democratically governed country in Soviet-dominated Europe, its social 
democrats too increasingly complained about communist violations of constitutional 
processes. Over the course of 1947, the ČSSD became more and more anxious over the 
(communist-dominated) security services’ ever-tightening grip on public life. The party 
vehemently protested when the (communist-led) Ministry of the Interior tried to use a law 
dating back to the Austro-Hungarian period to enforce police presence at all public 
meetings and managed to get the police banned from meetings in all provinces where the 
communists were lacking a majority.117 In spite of such local successes, however, there 
was no halting the forward march of dictatorship. When the communists began calling for 
a wholesale purge of the security services after the ‘uncovering’ of an ‘anti-state 
conspiracy’ in Slovakia in September 1947, the ČSSD once again insisted that the rule of 
law was observed. Although the social democrats were in favour of removing all 
‘reactionaries and anti-democrats’ from public life, Laušman insisted, ‘this purge has to 
take place within the legal framework of the state’. In questions like these, after all, ‘only 
the relevant laws of the republic can decide – we will fight any ulterior motives together 
with all true democrats’.118  
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 But such protestations were to no avail. During an October 1947 meeting of the 
ČSSD’s parliamentary group, deputies raised alarm over recent communist activities. Ivan 
Frlička – the chairman of the ČSSD’s Slovak wing – noted that ‘everything that is 
currently happening in Slovakia is being driven by the KSČ’. The communists, he warned, 
were trying ‘to break the [Slovak] Democratic Party after the Hungarian model’ – i.e. 
through the use of piecemeal ‘salami tactics’, by which the non-communist politicians and 
parties were eliminated one by one. What was worse, Miroslav Sédlak – one of the many 
social democratic parliamentarians who would go on to support Laušman in the November 
1947 party leadership election – claimed to have obtained confidential KSČ instructions 
outlining how the communist domination of the trade union movement could be used to 
erode social democracy from within.119 
As it turned out, however, the communists never really had to apply ‘salami tactics’ 
to Czechoslovakia, as they managed to eliminate the other parties with a single stroke 
during the Prague Coup. It was the shock of seeing a democratic country going totalitarian 
in a matter of days, that accounts for the huge backlash that the Prague Coup caused 
amongst those supporting a parliamentary and constitutional road to socialism. Within 
weeks, the parties condoning the events in Prague would find themselves out of or 
sidelined by the international socialist movement. By April 1948, Léon Blum, in many 
ways the spiritual father of the parliamentary road to socialism, launched a stark attack 
upon the concept of popular democracy. He still started on a conciliatory note, arguing 
how he understood that many ‘honest men’ had wanted to start from a tabula rasa in 1945 
and rid themselves of those usual forms of democracy they considered ‘outdated and 
inefficient – especially the parliamentary form’. But those men, he continued, who 
currently claimed to be building a new, popular democracy upon the ruins of representative 
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democracy, might well one day regret ‘to have worked for authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes’. For by justifying police state methods as a necessary evil, they were rapidly 
approaching the point of no return. Even Rosa Luxemburg, Blum explained, had defined 
the dictatorship of the proletariat as a transitory phase during which interior legality, 
including universal suffrage, would be suspended, but the substance of democracy – 
personal rights and freedoms as enshrined in freedom of the press, freedom of reunion, 
freedom of association and freedom of thought – would be safeguarded. Without that, 
Blum insisted, the dictatorship of the proletariat ‘would be nothing short of a full-fledged 
dictatorship, of a personal or collective tyranny’.120 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen in this chapter that the two sets of parties took completely opposite attitudes 
towards the three key ‘bourgeois’ institutions of elections, parliaments, and constitutions. 
Contrary to what historians of post-war (Western) European socialism have argued, 
therefore, there was no across-the-board socialist conversion to a parliamentary road to 
socialism. To be sure, in their rejection of ‘bourgeois legalism’, the PPS and the PSIUP 
found themselves in the minority within the post-war international socialist movement.121 
But that does not mean we should dismiss their views as completely peculiar to these two 
countries. Within most of the post-war European socialist parties, after all, there was a 
vociferous minority supporting the conception of a ‘popular’ democracy.122     
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 How can we explain that anti-parliamentarianism became a majority position within 
the PPS and the PSIUP when, at the same time, the ČSSD and the SFIO (re-)affirmed their 
commitment to parliamentary politics? First and foremost, we have to return here to the 
four parties’ historical experiences with democracy and dictatorship and to the lessons they 
drew from their own national and Europe’s interwar history. The lessons of the past had 
convinced the Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French socialists that democratic 
socialism could only be achieved through elections, parliaments, and constitutions. For not 
only had their own experiences with ‘bourgeois’ parliamentary democracy been by and 
large positive, the degenerations of both fascist and communist dictatorships also taught 
them that there was no viable alternative to a parliamentary road to socialism. For the 
Italian and Polish socialists, conversely, the interwar experience with parliamentary 
democracy had been largely negative. Far from bringing socialism closer, they stressed that 
it had ushered in right-wing dictatorship in their own and a string of other European 
countries.     
 By themselves, though, historical experiences and lessons cannot account for the 
divergence between the two sets of parties in its totality. Italy and Poland, after all, were 
hardly the only countries that had succumbed to authoritarian or fascist dictatorship in 
interwar Europe. That had been the case in countries like Austria and Germany as well – 
yet the post-war socialist parties in these countries never advocated a radical departure 
from the parliamentary road to socialism. A further crucial factor in the four parties’ 
attitudes towards ‘bourgeois’ democracy, therefore, was their perceptions of the 
democratic preparedness of their own societies. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
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the ČSSD and the SFIO were confident of the sound democratic beliefs of the 
overwhelming majority of their electorates. When the two parties lost elections, 
accordingly, they tended to blame themselves. The PPS and the PSIUP, on the other hand, 
felt that their underdeveloped, rural, and Catholic societies were not yet ready for the 
temptations of democratic politics. For that reason, the two parties felt they could 
justifiably disregard electoral outcomes and eliminate ‘reactionary’ parties even if these 
had majority popular support.   
 To these historically and socially informed perceptions, however, we still need to 
add a third dimension that we have not discussed thus far: the opposite views that the two 
sets of parties took of the merits of representative democracy itself. The ‘bourgeois’ 
institutions of elections, parliaments, and constitutions were of course part and parcel of 
the representative system, but, according to Basso, a new order could not be based on such 
existing institutions: ‘[W]henever a new regime, whether political or social, has toppled the 
existing regime, that movement is condemned to failure if it, to legitimise and justify itself, 
immediately reverts to the institutions of the political, economic, or social regime it has 
abolished. […] All of the political revolutions of the nineteenth century have failed or 
succeeded to the extent that they have taken the precaution of a transitory dictatorship 
between the destruction of the old regime and the legal installation of the new’.123 We have 
analysed the socialist arguments for and against such a transitory dictatorship in this 
chapter. The question remained, however, what would come in the place of the ‘old’ 
institutions of elections, parliaments, and constitutions. It is to that question that we will 
turn our attention in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 7: Democracy from below 
 
In a March 1945 letter to Pietro Nenni, Pier Paolo Fauro – the socialist Italian 
representative at the London headquarters of the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation – expressed his concerns over the PSIUP’s plans for a thorough overhaul of 
industrial relations. At stake was Nenni’s campaign to bestow large competencies upon the 
revolutionary factory councils that had taken control over industrial management in the 
wake of liberation. This campaign, argued Fauro, had dealt with the question of worker 
self-management ‘more from a political than from an economic point of view’. Yet, it was 
in the economic realm that he expected difficulties to arise. ‘I think it is dangerous for the 
economic success of those industries and for their consolidation in the nation’s hands’, 
Fauro warned, ‘to directly give factory councils the power to decide over the technical, 
financial, and commercial problems of their firm’. It was doubtful, after all, if it would be 
possible ‘to find a sufficient number of workers capable to take on these responsibilities in 
the majority of factories’ or that there would be ‘sufficient harmony both within the factory 
council and between [the factory council] and the director of a company to allow for the 
decisions necessary for the prosperity of the firm to be taken with rapidity and authority’. 
In such a situation, Fauro continued, it would be hard to identify the culprit when things 
started going wrong in a factory. It was for that reason that the interwar Soviet Union, 
‘after a fallacious experiment with worker self-management based on councils’, had 
decided ‘to entrust the running of every factory to a single person – the director, chosen, 
but not elected, on the basis of competency’. And even the British Labour Party, 
‘notwithstanding that the cultural level of the British worker is certainly higher than that of 
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the Russian [worker] at the time of the [October] [R]evolution’, had ‘a similar solution in 
mind’ for the administration of the nationalised sector.1        
 Such revolutionary grassroots bodies as liberation committees and factory councils, 
which had taken over most of local and industrial decision-making in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, presented the four parties with opportunities as well 
as challenges, both politically and economically. In political terms, the experience of direct 
democracy offered by such bodies promised to animate electorates disoriented after 
dictatorship and war. At the same time, however, these bodies constituted rivals to the 
authority both of national party leaderships and of the traditional institutions of 
representative democracy. In economic terms, worker self-management was the 
embodiment of the workplace democracy that socialists had historically fought for. Yet, as 
representatives of an increasingly aggrieved workforce, the local organs of worker 
democracy frequently found themselves at loggerheads with the reconstruction 
programmes signed up to by socialist leaders in government. In the face of these pushes 
and pulls of grassroots democracy, the four parties once again took opposite attitudes. The 
PPS and the PSIUP, on the one hand, embraced grassroots participatory bodies as crucial 
vehicles in the struggle for economic and political democracy. The ČSSD and the SFIO, on 
the other, increasingly viewed such bodies as a menace not only to the fulfilment of their 
economic plans but also to the resumption of parliamentary normality.    
This chapter endeavours to demonstrate how the question of grassroots democracy 
was at least as divisive as that of parliamentary democracy. In the first place, it will address 
the political aspects of grassroots participatory bodies. For the Italian and Polish socialists, 
popular participation in public life was key to the democratic and socialist (re-)education 
of their politically underdeveloped populations. For that reason, they insisted on the 
                                                          
1 Pier Paolo Fauro to Nenni, 9 March 1945, FN, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 44, Fasc. 2025, fo. 98. 
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recognition of grassroots participatory bodies as full players in post-war decision-making. 
For the Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French socialists, on the other hand, the 
concept of grassroots democracy was above all a guise for the political machinations of the 
communists. For that reason, they pleaded for the revolutionary committees and councils to 
be submerged into more controllable, top-down political and socio-economic structures as 
soon as possible. Secondly, the chapter will address the economic aspects of worker co-
determination in industry. According to the Italian and Polish socialists, the success of the 
planned economy depended on input from below. That meant the guidance workers 
provided, through such intermediaries as cooperatives or factory councils, had to be taken 
seriously by those in power. The Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French 
socialists, on the contrary, believed their workers to be far too narrow-minded and self-
interested to be entrusted with a real say in the running of the economy. That meant 
industrial governance was to be reserved to those, factory managers as well as trade union 
and political leaders, with a more lucid view of the bigger socio-economic picture. 
 
Confronting the Council Movement 
 
The grassroots participatory bodies that sprang up across Europe at the moment of 
liberation have captured the imagination of many historians.2 As revolutionary liberation 
committees and factory councils filled up the power vacuum left by collaborationist local 
administrators and industrial managers, these historians argue, a new type of society 
seemed in the making. With popular assemblies taking charge of local decision-making 
                                                          
2 The historiographical strand referred to in the current and in the following paragraph has been discussed in 
far greater detail in the Introduction. Some of the key studies include: Horn, The Moment of Liberation; 
Behan, The Long Awaited Moment; Eley, ‘Legacies of Antifascism’; Heumos, ‘Betriebsräte, 
Einheitsgewerkschaft und staatliche Unternehmensverwaltung’; Niethammer, Borsdorf, & Brandt (eds.), 
Arbeiterinitiative 1945.    
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and workers placing their factories under self-management, after all, there seemed to be an 
‘opportunity for radical democratic change, or a “third way”’ – a bottom-up system of 
direct participatory democracy rather than representative parliamentary democracy that 
promised to bridge ‘the gap between national arenas and the local everyday’.3 
 That this radical challenge to ‘“[p]olitics as usual”’4 came undone within months of 
the liberation, as we have seen in the literature review, these historians attribute in large 
part to the hesitant and in many ways contradictory attitudes5 that returning communist 
leaders adopted towards the radicalism at their grassroots. Far from placing themselves at 
the head of the council movement, after all, communist leaderships preached moderation in 
the wake of the liberation: urging liberation committees to surrender their weapons to the 
authorities and seeking to restore ‘order’ on the shop floor by curbing the competencies of 
factory councils. The radical aspirations of the liberation, in this view, were thus sacrificed 
on the altar of Stalin’s post-war outreach to the bourgeoisie and the Western Allies.  
 This strand of historiography, however, has by and large disregarded socialist 
attitudes towards grassroots participatory bodies. The scarce references to socialist parties 
that scholarship on the post-war council movement does provide, moreover, point in 
different directions. Some historians claim that the socialists where at least as, if not more, 
dismissive of grassroots participation than the communists.6 Others argue, though, that 
                                                          
3 Eley, Forging Democracy, p. 295, 297 
4 Ibid, p. 296. 
5 Historians have described the behaviour of the Italian PCI as particularly contradictory. Its leadership’s 
policy, they often claim, was one of doppiezza (two-facedness): of working within a strictly parliamentary 
framework whilst not ruling out a future revolution, or even giving rank-and-file activists the impression that 
an insurrection was being prepared. See e.g.: Donald Sassoon, Togliatti e il partito di massa: Il PCI dal 1944 
al 1964, (Rome: Castelvecchi, 2014); Pietro Di Loreto, Togliatti e la “doppiezza”: Il Pci tra democrazia e 
insurrezione (1944-49), (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991).  
6 According to Geoff Eley, for example, ‘[t]he [British] Labour Government’s main model of reform was 
paternalistic and bureaucratic. A blend of Fabian progressivism (giving people what was good for them) and 
authoritarian trade unionism, it had little room for participatory democracy’. And Charles S. Maier claims 
that the French communists ‘did support new schemes for a workers’ voice in the tripartite management 
boards [...] for the nationalised industries [...]. But they had to retreat in the face of MRP and Socialist 
countermeasures to ensure a more technical supervision’. See: Eley, Forging Democracy, p. 296; Charles S. 
Maier, ‘The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe’, 
American Historical Review, 86/2 (1981), pp. 327-352, 338.  
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socialist leaders took a far more positive view of participatory structures,7 only for them to 
be defeated by communists in government.8  
As is so often the case with scholarly assertions about the post-war socialist parties 
and the grassroots, such claims tend to be based on anecdotal evidence rather than a 
systematic study of socialist attitudes.9 A more thorough analysis of the attitudes the two 
sets of parties adopted towards the question of grassroots participation reveals that the 
positions taken by individual socialist parties varied greatly and that these positions were, 
in any case, never analogous to those of the communists. 
The PPS and the PSIUP, on the one hand, were considerably more anxious about 
the (looming) disempowerment of the council movement than their communist coalition 
partners. The Polish socialists expressed particular concern over the fate of factory 
councils. In view of the ongoing struggle between the Soviet occupiers and the Polish 
underground, after all, there was no scope for resistance-led liberation committees in post-
liberation Poland. Yet, factories abandoned by their German owners or supervisors did fall 
under worker control in the wake of the liberation10 and the Lublin government initially 
encouraged the spontaneously formed worker committees that took over management.   
Right from the outset, though, the socialists found cause to question the sincerity of 
the communist commitment towards worker self-management. The protracted discussions 
about the decree empowering the revolutionary factory councils within the Lublin 
government had already left the PPS with the impression that the PPR was dragging its feet 
                                                          
7 See on the post-war French and Italian socialists: Andrieu, ‘La France’, pp. 134-139.  
8 In contrast to what Maier claims above (see footnote 6 in this chapter), Martin McCauley argues that, 
‘participating in government’, the PCF ‘ignored socialist plans for the nationalisation of large-scale industry, 
economic planning, and co-determination’. See: Martin McCauley, The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949, 
(London/New York: Longman, 1995), p. 48. 
9 Claire Andrieu (see above in footnote 7), for example, seems to base her claims regarding the French 
socialists in large part upon the attitudes taken by the provincial SFIO organisation in the Allier department 
and on a tract written by SFIO Executive member Suzanne Charpy. As we will see below, however, their 
views were rejected by the large majority of the SFIO leadership.    
10 Kenney, Rebuilding Poland, pp. 57-58.  
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on the issue.11 These suspicions were confirmed when the communist-dominated Ministry 
of Industry, within four months of the decree finally being passed in February 1945, issued 
new guidelines stripping factory councils of their financial and technical co-decision rights. 
Speaking at a September 1945 plenum of the PPS and PPR leaderships, Edward Osóbka-
Morawski made it quite clear that the socialists were unimpressed. The significance of 
factory councils, he declared, was ‘often [...] not appreciated’. In the face of ‘tendencies to 
limit the competencies of factory councils’, he reminded the communists that the 
introduction of factory councils represented ‘a major reform’ and that their role could not 
be ‘reduced canteen control etc.’12   
 The PSIUP similarly campaigned for wide-ranging powers to be devolved to the 
Italian National Liberation Committees, which came in the form of both liberation 
committees (CLN) and factory councils (CLNA). According to Nenni, the CLN(A) 
reflected the ‘democratic will of the people’ far better and commanded far greater ‘moral 
authority’ than the average local appointee of the Allied Control Commission.13 Pending 
local elections, therefore, the socialists claimed ‘[a]ll power’ for the CLN.14  
Yet, with the partial exception of the Action Party, such claims found little 
resonance with the PSIUP’s coalition partners and, far from being empowered, the position 
of the CLN(A) was steadily eroded under the first Bonomi government. This was one of 
the issues that contributed to the first major crack in socialist-communist unity of action 
during the post-war years, as the PSIUP refused to follow the PCI in joining the second 
Bonomi government. In the communiqué explaining this decision, the PSIUP castigated 
                                                          
11 See: Jaime Reynolds, ‘Communists, Socialists’, pp. 519-522. 
12 ‘Protokół z wspólnego posiedzenia CKW PPS i KC PPR’ [28 September 1945], AAN, Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna, Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/6, fo. 3. 
13 Pietro Nenni, ‘Tutto il potere ai Comitati di Liberazione Nazionale: Il caso di Firenze’, Avanti!, 9 
November 1944.      
14 The slogan ‘Tutto il potere al CLN’ (‘all power to the CLN’) – an obvious allusion to Lenin’s 1917 dictum 
demanding ‘all power to the Soviets’ – was first coined in the clandestine Avanti! of 26 February 1944 and 
remained the PSIUP’s quasi-official slogan at least until the party joined the Parri government in May 1945. 
See for an explanation of the concept: Pietro Nenni, ‘Tutto il potere ai Comitati di Liberazione Nazionale’, 
Avanti!, 14 October 1944.    
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the Prime Minister for having failed ‘to encourage the truly democratic forces in their 
desire to permeate [and] radically renew [...] the old monarchical state organisation, still 
completely tainted by fascist remains’. Instead, he had ‘doggedly pursued his design to 
humiliate the new organisms that arose in the country through the national liberation 
struggle – true [and] vital cells of democracy – and to restore the old bureaucratic and 
monarchical Italy’.15 
The reason that the PPS and the PSIUP felt so strongly about the disempowerment 
of the post-war council movement was that they had envisioned these councils to play a 
key role in the democratic re-education of disoriented electorates. In fact, the two parties 
considered popular involvement in grassroots participatory bodies a crucial stepping stone 
towards the development of democratic and socialist beliefs in their societies. Providing 
ordinary people with a forum to discuss their everyday problems and take action to resolve 
these, after all, direct participation in such bodies would be a far more effective school of 
democracy than voting for distant representatives in parliamentary elections had ever been. 
For that reason, the Italian and Polish socialists very much fostered the development of 
such local and workplace consultative bodies as liberation committees, factory councils, 
and cooperatives.  
 Much of this went back to the dim views, outlined in the previous chapter, that PPS 
and PSIUP leaders took of their own electorates. Socialist leaders in both countries argued 
that the political backwardness of their societies, deepened by the experiences of 
dictatorship and war, presented them with enormous challenges. In a country where ‘the 
democratic consciousness has always been very scarce and where fascism had free rein for 
twenty years to erode it still further’, explained Lelio Basso, ‘our task is immense’. To be 
sure, worker participation in the anti-fascist resistance and the liberation struggle had 
                                                          
15 ‘La crisi del primo governo Bonomi: Dichiarazione del Partito Socialista al Paese’ [10 December 1944], 
Orientamenti: Bollettino di Commento e di Indirizzo Politico, 18 January 1948, pp. 13-14.  
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‘contributed considerably to the education and the political preparation of the masses’. 
‘[B]ut we cannot deny’, he continued, ‘that, within the same working population, there are 
still vast groups, especially amongst women and youngsters, who do not partake in the 
political struggle [and] who do not show an interest in political problems’. And it was in 
‘this absenteeism, which easily generates scepticism and distrust’, that ‘the roots of all 
anti-democratic movements’ were to be found.16  
For the PPS, Adam Rapacki – the socialist Minister of Shipping in the first 
Cyrankiewicz government – described the political acumen of Polish society in similarly 
derogatory terms. The Polish people, he claimed, ‘emerged from Polish history [...] a little 
anarchical and hysterical, socially still immature, [and] not always understanding that a 
revolution is happening before their eyes’. A socialised economy, then, would not by itself 
‘suffice for the creation of socialism’. What was needed was ‘a socialisation of popular 
consciousness’.17 
It was in this socialisation effort that the PPS and the PSIUP imputed a key function 
to grassroots participatory bodies. Such organisms as factory councils and cooperatives, 
Stanisław Szwalbe told communist leaders in September 1945, ‘have a key educational 
function and the government should rely on them’.18 And if governments were to draw 
upon grassroots participatory bodies, ordinary workers were to be drawn into them. As 
early as June 1944, Nenni warned workers against viewing the various workplace councils 
that had come into being during the liberation struggle as ‘no more than an expedient’ – as 
a means to fill the power vacuum left by fled or expelled managers, to secure the 
successful transition from a fascist to a democratic administration, and to revise the fascist 
                                                          
16 Lelio Basso, ‘Per una coscienza democratica’, Avanti!, 29 August 1945. 
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=1fb14f1db3eb10586206df1cbf448089 (last consulted: 22 
March 2015). 
17 Adam Rapacki, ‘Odcinek spółdzielczy’, Przegląd Socjalistyczny, 1 April 1946, pp. 12-15. Emphasis in 
original. 
18 ‘Protokół z wspólnego posiedzenia CKW PPS i KC PPR’ [28 September 1945], AAN, Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna, Centralny Komitet Wykonawczy, 2037, 235/III/6, fo. 16. 
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management model. Wherever workers took such views, he insisted, it was ‘the duty of 
socialists to immediately raise awareness [...] of the immense importance of councils and 
of their infinite possibilities of development’. For ‘the function of councils’ was ‘not 
provisional, but permanent; not conservative, but revolutionary’. They constituted ‘the 
cells of a new democratic society, which should [...] lead to the amalgamation of the homo 
economicus and the homo politicus’.19 
According to the Italian and Polish socialists, therefore, the true significance of 
grassroots participatory bodies lay in their ability to combine the economic emancipation 
(to which we will return in the following sub-chapter) with the political re-education of the 
working class. Their accessible nature, after all, offered countless people with no 
experience of (democratic) politics the chance to acquaint themselves with some of the 
basic elements of democracy: discussion, compromise, and working together. To overcome 
the ‘political analphabetism’ afflicting large parts of Italian society, argued Basso, ‘we 
should start from concrete problems’. That meant ‘engaging workers, clerks, [and] 
peasants with the problems of their firm [...]; make them discuss [...] salaries, the cost of 
living, [and] food, housing, [and] heating problems; gradually accustoming them to link 
their immediate demands to more complex questions and to move from a particularistic to 
a more general understanding of class relations’. To achieve that, however, it was 
‘necessary to get peasants [and] workers, especially women and youngsters, to attend 
meetings where their problems are discussed – factory meetings, trade union meetings, 
meetings of mass organisations – [and to get them to] participate in elections for internal 
commissions [the official trade union representation within factories], for factory councils, 
for their local CLN [...], for trade union bodies, as well as for the organs of the Youth Front 
and the Union of Italian Women’.20  
                                                          
19 Pietro Nenni, ‘La democrazia dei consigli’, Avanti!, 13 June 1944. 
20 Lelio Basso, ‘Per una coscienza democratica’, Avanti!, 29 August 1945. 
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Julian Hochfeld ascribed similar virtues to participation in the cooperative 
movement, which, after the disempowerment of the factory councils, became the chief 
grassroots darling of the PPS. Cooperatives, he explained, represented ‘consumer self-
government’, with ordinary workers taking responsibility ‘for the satisfaction of their own 
needs’. In that sense, cooperatives were ‘a school of democracy in everyday life – a vibrant 
democracy, [being] cultivated constantly; not a ballot paper once every few years, [...] but 
[consumers taking] an immediate interest [...] in their own affairs’. Cooperatives were not 
merely ‘a branch of the democratic state’, therefore, ‘but its crucial component, in large 
part making up its democratic content’.21     
For the Italian and Polish socialists, this educative function of popular participation 
always outweighed its party-political function. Socialist leaders in both countries 
repeatedly stressed that securing genuine mass engagement with politics was far more 
important than making short-term party gains. That meant the traditional focus on 
recruiting new members was to be abandoned. Nenni indicated the post-liberation surge in 
the PSIUP’s membership, probably the result of quite some members of Mussolini’s PNF 
jumping ship, was unwelcome. Party membership, he argued, was of ‘moral value’ and 
should not be regarded as a necessity to find a job.22 Basso, for his part, emphasised that it 
made no sense to unleash any form of propaganda, let alone socialist propaganda, upon the 
‘apolitical’ masses.23 The work of politicising these groups consisted of ‘day-to-day 
contact with the life of the masses, that is with factory, company, and rural life’ – meaning 
                                                                                                                                                                                
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=1fb14f1db3eb10586206df1cbf448089 (last consulted: 22 
March 2015). 
21 Julian Hochfeld, ‘O istotną treść spółdzielczości’ [November 1945], in: Julian Hochfeld, My socjalisci: Ze 
stanowiska socjalistycznego realizmu, (Warszawa: Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza Wiedza, 1946), pp. 259-260.  
22 Pietro Nenni, ‘Che cos’è e cosa vuole il Partito Socialista’, Avanti!, 23 July 1944.  
23 Lelio Basso, ‘Per una coscienza democratica’, Avanti!, 29 August 1945. 
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=1fb14f1db3eb10586206df1cbf448089 (last consulted: 22 
March 2015). 
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that the PSIUP could no longer ‘simply be an electoral machine, which springs into action 
[only] on special occasions’.24  
The PPS leadership even urged its party activists to treat the January 1947 elections 
to the Sejm as an educational opportunity. ‘We desire that the elections represent not only 
the usual fight for power, that the election campaign is made up not only of agitations’, 
insisted the text that the party’s manifesto commission spread amongst regional party 
representatives, ‘[but] that they are part of [our] educational work, which could lead a 
majority of the nation to an understanding of reality’. For that reason, ‘our electoral action 
cannot be conceived as the usual agitations’, with the sole goal of winning the most votes. 
Instead, it had to be ‘another large-scale attempt to persuade society’.25 
In order to see through the popular conversion to participation first, democracy 
next, and socialism ultimately, then, the PPS and the PSIUP felt they were to re-invent 
themselves as different types of parties – as parties taking their lead from the working 
masses rather than the other way around. That involved the creation of new bodies 
allowing party leaderships to remain in touch with the concerns at their grassroots. As the 
number of paid PPS functionaries rose above one thousand, explained Włodzimierz 
Reczek, the party was looking to avoid ‘the grave ills of German social democracy’, where 
‘paid functionaries detached themselves from the masses, stopped understanding [the 
masses], [and] gave up on activism amongst the masses’. To counter this threat, he argued, 
the PPS had created ‘a system of councils’ – economic, professional, peasant, and 
women’s councils ‘energising broad circles of socialists and effectively controlling 
professional party functionaries’. The fact that these councils emerged ‘quickly and often 
                                                          
24 Lelio Basso, ‘L’aspetto politico dei nuclei aziendali’, Quarto Stato, 30 June 1946.  
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=e23c39b2efef8f1eae37279209501c11 (last consulted: 22 
March 2015).  
25 ‘Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z obrad Rady Naczelnej PPS’ [4 December 1946], AAN, Akta Stanislawa 
Szwalbego, Box 13. 
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as a result of the spontaneous initiative of grassroots party cells’ was testimony to ‘the 
aptness of our decision’.26 
Basso likewise insisted on the need for new forms of socialist engagement with the 
party grassroots. In his view, the local party section no longer answered to the 
requirements of a mass proletarian party. He listed a string of practical reasons, including 
time constraints, inadequate transport links, and in-house duties, complicating efforts to 
draw workers into (mostly evening) sessions of local party sections. But even those 
workers who did attend would be reluctant to take the floor, he continued, ‘intimidated by 
the presence of “notables”’, the ‘lawyers or professors’ who often led local party sections. 
Whilst such notables tended to be ‘able speakers on general issues’, they lacked ‘direct 
contact with the rank-and-file’ – leaving workers with the impression that ‘their personal 
experience [and] their specific problems do not carry real significance’. That, in turn, led to 
‘erroneous party attitudes, a gulf between the opinions of [party] leaders and the demands 
at the grassroots, [and] an insufficient interchange in party life’.27  
It was for these reasons that Basso championed the creation of socialist factory 
cells. ‘If the party takes its decisions in contact with the factories’, he insisted, ‘its 
decisions will never be reckless and will always have the entire working class behind 
them’. For the factory cell activist ‘brings to party discussions not only his personal point 
of view, but an echo of all his colleagues’ voices; and, in turn, imparts upon his colleagues 
the significance and conclusion of the discussions conducted within the cell’. It was only 
by virtue of this ‘continuous exchange of sentiments, reactions, and ideas between [...] the 
qualified minority of party activists and the entire workforce of a company’, argued Basso, 
‘that the [factory cell] activist acquires a genuine influence over [...] the non-organised 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Lelio Basso, ‘Per conoscersi meglio’, Avanti! (Milanese edition), 2 November 1945. 
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=8be4cc201e75fa27ebf46b80f5195499 (last consulted: 22 
March 2015).  
291 
 
masses; an influence [...] that would be sacrificed and lost if the political activism of a 
single company’s workforce was dispersed over various local sections, where members 
lacked direct and daily contact with non-members’.28 
 Hochfeld similarly called for the PPS to be open to the input of non-members. 
Responding to outrage over ‘non-party’ workers (in all likelihood communist stooges – 
JG) calling on the PPS to step up its ‘verification’ effort (i.e. the purge of former members 
of the WRN resistance organisation) during a factory meeting in Wrocław, he defended the 
principle of non-members passing judgement on the PPS. The PPS, he claimed, ‘is more 
than a party, [it is] a movement’. If the party would someday enter elections on its own, 
after all, ‘it will turn out that we have far more voters than members’. And all of these 
people had ‘the right to speak up and to scrutinise [...] the PPS’. Rather than being ‘so 
resentful’, therefore, the PPS should ‘approach the masses with an open mind and tell 
them: “we are your party; by all means control what is going on in our party, because we 
are connected to you and [...] are part of the Polish nation”’.29 
 The Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French socialists, on the other hand, 
were well ahead of their communist coalition partners in demanding the disbandment of 
the revolutionary council movement. In fact, they often viewed this movement as the 
spearhead of the communist challenge to democratic legality.  
That was certainly how most SFIO leaders viewed the French liberation 
committees. The first post-liberation meetings of the SFIO Executive were dominated by 
the question of the Departmental Liberation Committees (CDL) – which, especially in 
Southern France, frequently overrode the authority of government-designated departmental 
prefects by installing themselves as the departmental administration and appointing 
                                                          
28 Lelio Basso, ‘L’aspetto politico dei nuclei aziendali’, Quarto Stato, 30 June 1946. 
URL: http://www.leliobasso.it/documento.aspx?id=e23c39b2efef8f1eae37279209501c11 (last consulted: 22 
March 2015). 
29 XXVII Kongres [December 1947], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2029/3, 235/I-25, fos 216-217. 
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municipal councils. The radicalism practised by these communist-dominated CDL, left 
socialist leaders with serious misgivings about the true intentions of the communists. 
Gaston Defferre, then the mayor of Marseille, complained bitterly about ‘communist 
demagogy’ within the CDL.30 Adrien Tixier, who, as the SFIO’s Minister of the Interior in 
the first two De Gaulle governments, was responsible for dealing with the CDL, demanded 
that all political parties took ‘an extremely firm stand’ – berating the communists in 
particular for failing to support the government.31 Jules Moch even drew a comparison 
between post-liberation France and pre-revolutionary Russia, ‘where the Soviets pursued a 
politics in opposition to that of the Kerensky government and the Duma’.32 The SFIO 
Executive heeded his advice not to allow ‘a third administration alongside the prefectoral 
[and the governmental – JG] administration’, instructing the party’s parliamentary group to 
dismiss the departmental administrations the CDL had already formed and postpone any 
further administrative appointments until local elections had been called.33     
The Czechoslovakian social democrats likewise wanted their liberation committees 
and revolutionary factory councils to be replaced by properly elected bodies as quickly as 
possible. First of all, this concerned the National Committees (NV) – local and provincial 
government bodies that the exiled Czechoslovakian government had called into being in 
December 1944 to replace the ‘alienated’ pre-war administrative apparatus and rule 
liberated (parts of) Czechoslovakia pending the return of the government.34 Even if the NV 
lacked the spontaneous character of liberation committees elsewhere in Europe, therefore, 
their improvised nature offered the communists ample opportunities to strengthen their 
grip upon the state nonetheless. The KSČ readily acknowledged this, its leader Klement 
                                                          
30 ‘Comité Directeur’ [13 November 1944], ‘Procès-verbaux des réunions du Comité Directeur du congrès de 
Paris, 9-12 novembre 1944 au 37e congrès national, 11-15 aout 1945’, p. 3. 
31 Ibid, p. 4.  
32 Ibid, p. 3. 
33 ‘Comité Directeur’ [22 November 1944], ‘Procès-verbaux des réunions du Comité Directeur du congrès de 
Paris, 9-12 novembre 1944 au 37e congrès national, 11-15 aout 1945’, p. 18. 
34 Frommer, National Cleansing, pp. 45-46. 
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Gottwald crediting the NV for providing the party with ‘a clean slate’ as regards the state 
apparatus, for being ‘a thorn in the side’ of its coalition partners, and for constituting ‘the 
main arena for the political struggle’.35 The communist domination36 of these bodies that, 
having been charged with the maintenance of law and order in the area under their control, 
often played a crucial role in sanctioning the abuses of the security services was a cause for 
rising concern within the ČSSD leadership. ‘In many national committees’, claimed the 
party’s 1946 year report, ‘key positions are occupied by people, whose actions only create 
distrust towards the new bodies of popular administration’.37 The ČSSD manifesto for the 
May 1946 parliamentary elections, accordingly, included the demand that the NV would be 
‘founded on a solid basis’ and ‘duly elected’.38  
If the anti-communist message was still implicit here, the ČSSD was more 
outspoken in the question of the revolutionary factory councils. Time and again, the social 
democrats insisted that elections to these councils – which had been installed in the heat of 
the liberation struggle, but were still in place by 1947 – would be held to reflect ‘the 
current balance of forces’ within factories.39 According to the social democrats, after all, 
the present councils were far too one-sided and were constantly being abused for party-
political purposes.40 In terms of their make-up, they put forward much the same arguments 
as they had done against the NV – claiming that, in many factory councils, there were 
‘representatives, who only diminish the significance of these organs’. What caused their 
                                                          
35 Quoted in: Ibid, p. 47.  
36 Benjamin Frommer points out that the communists headed 46% of the NV in the Czech lands in early 
1946, with ‘the Party’s stranglehold on the national committees’ growing ‘even tighter’ after the May 1946 
elections. See: Frommer, National Cleansing, p. 47f.  
37 ‘Zpráva o činnosti Československé Socialní Demokracie k XXI. řádnému sjezdu v Brně 14.-16. XI. 1947’, 
Archiv ČSSD, Fond č. 71, Část II Československá sociální demokracie (1945-1948), I. Sjezdy čs. socialní 
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‘greatest distrust’, however, was that these councils were ‘made up almost exclusively of 
communists’.41     
The ČSSD and the SFIO insisted, accordingly, that the post-war council movement, 
far from democratising political and economic life, often represented the law of the jungle. 
Underneath their severe protests against the communist perversions of grassroots politics, 
however, lay more fundamental objections against direct popular participation in political 
decision-making. Democracy, the two parties proclaimed, consisted of free and fair 
elections and the decisions of elected representatives were not to be challenged from 
below. That meant the political initiative resided with local, provincial, and national party 
leaders rather than with grassroots activists. 
 This was reflected in the arguments the ČSSD and the SFIO employed against 
communist conceptions of local democracy. Right from the outset, the French socialists 
made it quite clear that they were not about to follow the communists in creating ‘a new 
democratic legality’.42 At stake were communist proposals to convoke ‘patriotic’ or 
‘popular’ assemblies – meetings at which the entire population of a given town or village 
could elect local representatives by show of hands. When this had been tried in post-
liberation Corsica, Vincent Auriol told the November 1944 congress of the SFIO, gross 
irregularities had emerged. Lorries had driven ‘from one village to another’ to transport 
‘voters’ to places where majorities were ‘shaky’ and, as a consequence, up to eighty per 
cent of votes cast had been declared invalid in some localities.43 
 It was not only the widespread opportunities for electoral fraud, however, that 
pitted the French socialists against direct democracy in such assemblies. The entire process 
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of electing representatives during public meetings, they argued, violated key principles of 
democratic politics. For one thing, it allowed powerful local actors to bully their way to 
power. ‘[W]e cannot accept assemblies’, insisted Daniel Mayer, ‘where agent provocateurs 
might interfere, or men who go from town to town hurling abuse, sometimes at 
gunpoint’.44 Even if their pressure was less explicit, moreover, the very dynamics of a 
public vote enabled local employers to exert undue influence on its outcome. In this 
respect, argued Auriol, the assemblies corresponded ‘in no way to the spirit of France, to 
that freedom, that secret ballot that the Republic has given all voters forty years ago to 
liberate them from the pressures of rural squires and city bosses’.45 It followed, as Mayer 
put it, that assembly politics was ‘not [...] what democracy looks like’. ‘[F]or democracy’, 
he explained, ‘is expressed in elections with voting booths [and] ballots, and not in so-
called popular assemblies which are no more than a caricature [...] and do not reflect 
democracy at all’.46  
The Czechoslovakian social democrats likewise indicated that the communist 
version of participatory politics was incompatible with their conception of democracy. 
Their protests concerned communist challenges to the decisions of properly elected local 
representatives. This became very clear in the controversies surrounding the elections of 
new NV chairmen (effectively city mayors or provincial governors – JG) after these organs 
had been given a fresh distribution of seats based on the local result in the May 1946 
parliamentary elections. The ČSSD leadership had instructed its municipal sections and 
provincial departments to vote for the candidate of the largest party locally, as long as that 
candidate could ‘guarantee a harmonious cooperation between all parties of the National 
Front’. In most cases, these elections went by smoothly. But in Olomouc and Plzeň, where 
the KSČ had become the largest party, the communists fielded candidates that were 
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‘unacceptable’ to the social democrats.47 When these candidates were subsequently 
defeated, the communists launched a series of strikes and demonstrations to prevent the 
installation of the elected chairman. These challenges to due democratic process met with 
strong social democratic condemnation. The national ČSSD daily castigated the 
communists for trying to pick and choose from democratic outcomes. ‘There is only one 
democracy’, it insisted, ‘and all attempts to subvert the implementation of a democratically 
taken decision by means of public speeches, work stoppages, etc. represent a diktat and an 
intimidation’.48    
 The polemics waged during the Plzeň episode demonstrate how, as far as the ČSSD 
was concerned, this one and only democracy was representative rather than participatory. 
Time and again, the social democrats stressed that they had followed proper channels in 
electing a new mayor. The stipulations issued by the Ministry of the Interior prescribed 
that the reconstituted national committees were to elect a chairman during their first 
session and, by a margin of thirty-one to twenty-three votes, the Plzeň national committee 
had done so.49 ‘For every man of democratic convictions’, argued a commentary in the 
local ČSSD press, ‘that would have been the end of the affair’. But there was ‘a different 
[version of] democracy, communist democracy, for which the guidelines of the Ministry of 
the Interior [...] do not count and Josef Ullrich50 has to become mayor of Plzeň at any 
cost’. To that end, the communists had staged several factory walkouts and assembled a 
crowd outside city hall – threatening the mayor-elect with ‘a defenestration, a lynching, 
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and similar’ if he were to take up his new function. The social democrats were adamant, 
though, that they would ‘succumb neither to violence nor to demonstrations’. For ‘nobody 
else than the rightful national committee’ was entitled ‘to decide over its chairman, and 
certainly not the mob in the street’.51  
What outraged the ČSSD even more than the communist attempt at mob rule, 
however, was the blatant politicisation of (officially non-partisan) workplace organisations. 
The party insisted that the resolution signed by the leader of the provincial KOR as well as 
by the chairmen of all major Plzeň factory councils – claiming that the mayoral election 
had not been ‘in accordance with the will of the people’, calling for a fresh national 
committee vote on the matter, and urging the mayor-elect to hand back the committee’s 
chair to Ullrich in the meantime – lacked ‘any legal standing’’. Factory councils and trade 
unions, after all, had no stake in political appointments such as these – that was ‘a matter 
exclusively for political parties’.52 
 This sharp delineation between the remit of political parties and workplace bodies 
was reflected in the ČSSD’s attitude towards factory cells. When the KSČ, quickly 
followed by the ČSNS, started (re-)building its factory cells in the summer of 1945, the 
social democrats immediately pointed to the dangers entailed in this operation. Now that 
the once fragmented trade union movement was finally united and factory councils had 
been empowered, explained Blažej Vilím at the October 1945 ČSSD congress, factory 
cells could only be a divisive force. In fact, he predicted that the creation of such bodies 
would ‘necessarily’ lead to ‘turf wars’ between factory cells on the one side and trade 
unions and factory councils on the other – as political functionaries, ‘overcome by narrow 
party interests’, would not be likely to resist the temptation to meddle in trade union 
affairs. Yet, the other parties had been impervious to the ČSSD’s arguments, Vilím 
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declared, leaving the social democrats with no choice but to follow suit. From an 
organisational point of view, however, it was clear from the outset that social democratic 
factory cells remained very much secondary to local ČSSD sections. ‘[A]ll of our party’s 
factory cell activists are first and foremost members of municipal sections’, concluded 
Vilím, which was to remain ‘the focal point of our activities’.53 
 Within the post-war SFIO, factory cells were accorded a similarly subordinate role. 
The statutes of the Socialist Enterprise Groups (GSE), adopted at the August 1945 SFIO 
congress, by and large limited their remit to spreading socialist propaganda amongst 
workers and providing the party leadership with information about worker sentiments and 
the economic fortunes of their companies. Neither individual GSE nor the National 
Commission of GSE had any say, accordingly, in setting local and national party policy, 
which remained the exclusive prerogative of the local SFIO section and the national SFIO 
Executive respectively, whilst ‘any incursion into the trade union domain’ was likewise 
strictly prohibited.54  
In the increasingly volatile political and workplace climate of the first post-war 
years, however, it was difficult to restrict the GSE to this narrow brief. By the summer of 
1947, therefore, in the aftermath of a serious falling-out between the SFIO Executive and 
the GSE at Renault, which had supported the strike that ushered in the collapse of 
tripartisme in May, the party leadership set out to tighten its grip upon factory activists. 
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Complaining that ‘certain GSE comrades’ suffered from ‘misconceptions’, Guy Mollet 
reiterated that the GSE’s ‘objective’ consisted of ‘making party slogans to reverberate in 
the social environment of adherents’. Just how much of a one-way street this was supposed 
to be becomes apparent from the new organisational scheme put forward by the SFIO 
Executive, which banned the GSE from as much as discussing party politics. What is more, 
the practice, dating back to the interwar pre-cursor of the GSE, the Amicales Socialistes, of 
allowing non-member ‘sympathisers’ to partake in GSE dealings was to be discontinued. 
‘[T]he GSE should be made up only of party members’, chair of the SFIO’s 
Reorganisation Commission André Ferrat argued, ‘for it cannot be the case that the GSE 
can escape party discipline’.55   
 
Socialising Socialism 
         
On the face of it, the two sets of parties had rather more in common regarding the question 
of worker control of and participation in economic decision-making. In the immediate 
aftermath of the liberation, each of the four parties championed such new bodies of worker 
democracy as factory councils and cooperatives, calling for their creation and 
empowerment as well as for their autonomy vis-à-vis the state. At least in public, therefore, 
post-war socialist leaders insisted that the economy, even if large parts of it were to fall 
under the auspices of the state, would in fact be socialised. 
The economic paragraph of the draft programme the PPS leadership drew up in 
1945, for example, demanded that both the nationalised (i.e. all enterprises employing a 
workforce of more than fifty) and private sector would be subjected to ‘social control’ – by 
‘worker delegates and factory councils’ within factories and through ‘the indirect 
                                                          
55 ‘Comité Directeur’ [9 July 1947], OURS, ‘Réunions du Comité Directeur du 4 septembre 1946 à 30 julliet 
1947’, pp. 455-456. 
300 
 
representation of consumers’ within branch organisations.56 For the PPS, however, worker 
participation in economic life was to reach its apogee in the third sector of the Polish 
economy – the rural and urban cooperatives that were to promote the exchange of products 
between city and countryside. ‘[I]n a socialist Poland’, Szwalbe declared at the August 
1945 PPS congress, ‘we want to socialise rather than nationalise trade’. This was to be 
achieved by ‘cooperativisation’, he argued, which was ‘the highest form of socialisation’.57  
The leadership of the PSIUP, for its part, advocated the wholesale socialisation of 
economic life. The draft resolution that Sandro Pertini prepared for a November 1944 
convention of the (still clandestine) Northern Italian PSIUP called for worker self-
management in both agriculture and industry. ‘[M]unicipal agricultural cooperatives 
managed directly by workers’ were to be created on expropriated estates in the 
countryside. In urban areas, meanwhile, ‘the integral socialisation’ of all state-subsidised 
and monopolistic industries as well as the entire finance sector was to find its expression in 
‘decentralised management by autonomous entities that implement a national plan’.58 And 
such views do not seem to have been confined to the more radical socialist leaders in the 
occupied North. In liberated Rome, after all, Nenni was likewise calling for ‘the 
expropriation and cooperative management of the latifundium’ and ‘the socialisation of the 
trusts and monopolistic industry [...] which should be managed directly by factory 
councils’.59    
If not going as far as that, André Philip did feel the need ‘to clarify’ what the SFIO 
had in mind when it demanded nationalisations. Speaking at the party’s November 1944 
congress, he drew a sharp line between étatisme (a state-controlled economy) and 
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nationalisations. The former, he explained, was ‘no more than the spread of bureaucracy, 
with direction by experts and senior administrative cadres – not that different from 
capitalism itself’. Nationalisations, on the other hand, presupposed ‘regional 
decentralisation, the rejection of every technical dictatorship, and the participation of the 
working class at all administrative levels’.60 The resolution adopted by the congress 
reiterated these points. The ‘socialisation of the commanding heights of the economy’, it 
insisted, ‘should neither lead to state capitalism nor to the bureaucracy of which the current 
monopoly constitutes an example’. To steer clear of that, factories were to be ‘managed by 
workers, in association with experts [i.e. technicians and management] and representatives 
of the general interest [i.e. government representatives], with each of these tripartite 
councils [...] implementing the national economic plan deliberated by the representatives of 
universal suffrage’.61   
The mid-1945 programme of the ČSSD’s Action Committee, finally, failed to even 
mention the concept of nationalisations in its description of the state take-over of the entire 
energy, banking, insurance, and transport sectors, of all large industrial and agricultural 
companies, and of all German and Hungarian property. The document made sure to warn, 
however, of the dangers entailed in this operation. The ‘bureaucratisation’ of economic 
life, it insisted, was to be avoided ‘by any means’. For that reason, the running of 
‘socialised enterprises’ was to be entrusted to ‘local and stakeholder bodies’, which were 
better placed to ‘oversee their proper operation than the central authorities’.62 
In their rhetoric, then, the socialists were certainly amongst the strongest supporters 
of wide-ranging powers for workplace co-decision bodies. Yet, several historians have 
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suggested there was little more to this than rhetoric, as the four parties were very much 
complicit in undermining such bodies. If the Eastern European socialist and social 
democratic parties initially tried to steal a march on the communists by their ‘greater socio-
political radicalism’, argues Peter Heumos, they subsequently went along with communist 
and bourgeois efforts to ‘contain, channel into trade union structures, and disempower’ 
factory councils. The parties, after all, championed ‘the hierarchic-authoritarian company 
model of the Soviet Union’, whilst ‘their economic and technical cadre, which carried 
significant weight within the party apparatus above all in Czechoslovakia and Poland, only 
considered worker participation a motivational tool to increase production’.63 
 The PSIUP and the SFIO come off even worse in academic accounts, which tend to 
position them well to the right of the communists on the question of worker self-
management. With regard to post-war France, for example, Xavier Vigna claims that, 
whereas the factory councils that came into being in the aftermath of liberation could count 
on (limited) support from the communists, they ‘upset those socialist politicians most 
attached to the industrial order of things, including the Minister of Production Robert 
Lacoste’.64 For post-war Italy, meanwhile, Marialuisa-Lucia Sergio suggests that it was the 
PSIUP’s Rodolfo Morandi who contributed most to the curbing of factory councils’ 
competencies – first, in his role as Chairman of the overarching CLN for Northern Italy, by 
stripping them of all powers in questions of (managerial) dismissals and purges and 
subsequently, as Minister of Industry in the second De Gasperi government, by drawing up 
an extremely restrictive legal framework for factory councils that was ‘quasi-opposed’ to 
communist perspectives. ‘[I]n spite of [...] all [their] rhetoric’, she concludes, it were the 
socialists who ‘closed the book on the CLN (especially in their version as organs of 
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company self-management and social control) to return to the rules of parliamentary 
representation and, above all, to affirm a new democracy based on parties’.65      
In its near-exclusive focus on such ‘political’ issues as the purge of former 
collaborators and the disempowerment of the revolutionary factory councils that had 
placed ‘ownerless’ enterprises under worker self-management in the wake of liberation, 
however, such scholarship tends to brush over the macro-economic economic role that 
socialists wanted workplace co-determination bodies to play. As we have already seen in 
some of the oratory outlined above, that role lie predominantly in framing and adapting 
government planning. It was on this particular question that the two sets of parties, 
although their outward rhetoric remained roughly similar, took opposite attitudes once 
more.    
The PPS and the PSIUP, on the one hand, insisted that economic planning could 
only be genuinely democratic if it took its lead from the grassroots. For centrally imposed 
plans, the two parties argued, would inevitably result in the creation of a dictatorial 
command chain and the proliferation of bureaucracy within the national economy.  
As early as February 1946, Jan Topínski – together with Hochfeld probably the 
post-war PPS’ most significant theorist – warned of ‘centralising tendencies’ in the 
administration of Poland’s nationalised sector, reflected in the creation of state-wide 
branch conglomerates and in the state’s steadily increasing role in appointing the 
managerial and supervisory organs within nationalised firms.66 Such a centralised 
economic system lent itself perfectly to what Topínski described in a later article as 
‘directing economic life [...] by command’. He went on to set out the two ‘negative 
consequences’ of the highly hierarchical economic model used in post-war Poland, where 
planning targets were passed on from the Ministry of Industry to the central branch 
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organisation, from there to the lower branch organisations, subsequently to the individual 
companies, and only lastly to the workplace. In the first place, the ‘militarisation of 
dependency relations’ entailed in that model made it impossible to address unforeseen 
local circumstances affecting the fulfilment of the plan. In theory, explained Topínski, that 
was the task of the various ‘sub-centres’ in the hierarchy, that is, the branch organisations 
and industrial management, but the very presence of a superior organ made such sub-
centres reluctant to take forceful decisions, which, after all, might cause them to be blamed 
for the non-fulfilment of the plan. Secondly, the fact that each of these sub-centres had ‘a 
triple function’ – that of transmission belt, that of control organ, and that of executive – led 
to ‘the growth of the clerical and bureaucratic apparatus’. And ‘the more we spend the 
product of the [industrial] worker’s labour on organisational and control bodies’, 
concluded Topínski, ‘the further we get from realising the socialist slogan: the product of 
labour for its producers’.67        
The PSIUP was equally dismissive of top-down planning. In the absence of any 
form of economic planning in post-liberation Italy, Angelo Saraceno – the socialist 
theorist, part of the group of intellectuals close to Morandi who co-founded the Institute for 
Socialist Studies in November 1945 – criticised centralised planning in more general terms 
than Topínski. Yet, the essence of his argument was much the same. Whilst stressing the 
need for planning as part of a larger package of ‘industrial reform’ in the autumn of 1945, 
he was alive to ‘the danger of state socialism, bureaucratic and centralised and anti-
democratic in substance’, that entailed. For that reason, he explained, the Italian socialists 
did not view the plan ‘as a command from the centre’, even if that centre found itself 
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‘under the aegis of a socialist government’. Instead, ‘the possibilities of successful 
planification are directly linked to the functioning of a real production democracy’.68 
According to the PPS and the PSIUP, such a production democracy would see 
workplace co-determination bodies playing a crucial role in economic planning. By means 
of their proximity both to the shop floor and to consumers, the two parties insisted, such 
bodies as factory councils and cooperatives often had a far better idea of what was realistic 
and desirable in terms of planning targets than central planning agencies.  
Speaking at a November 1947 socialist economic conference, Morandi championed 
worker participation in economic planning. ‘The socialist plan’, he argued, ‘is 
implemented through a fundamental democratisation of productive life and a direct worker 
participation in the direction and control of it’. Far from seeking to regulate the working 
class ‘by administrative means’, then, socialist planning would breathe ‘new energies, 
which express and interpret the collective interest, into the economy’. The foremost 
vehicles to awaken and transmit these fresh energies, in Morandi’s view, were workplace 
co-determination bodies. In the quest ‘to make of every company unit and of every worker 
a conscious element of and driving force behind [the plan]’, therefore, he pleaded for the 
extension of works councils to the agricultural and banking sectors, for works councils to 
take on an extra-company role, for their participation in higher planning bodies, and for the 
development of cooperatives.69    
The Polish socialists likewise favoured decentralised economic planning.70 
Topínski, for example, argued that central economic plans had to be ‘laconic in their 
formulations’ and that their fine-tuning was to reflect ‘impulses from the grassroots rather 
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than from higher-up’. In this respect, he attributed a pivotal role to cooperative practices, 
which knew ‘no equal in conveying impulses from interested parties’.71 Following the 
cooperative model, therefore, Topínski advocated the creation of ‘supervisory boards’ for 
every single nationalised factory – on which workforce representatives (selected by the 
trade unions for larger companies and by factory councils for smaller companies), 
consumer representatives (those other companies or cooperatives buying up the factory’s 
produce), and state representatives were each allocated a third of the seats. Even if these 
boards were to be granted wide-ranging powers, including the right to appoint and dismiss 
factory management, there was little risk of them and their appointed managers straying 
from the central plan altogether as far as Topínski was concerned. The state still had other 
means to discipline ‘unruly’ factories through its investment politics, and would anyway 
often find the consumer representatives, who, having to fulfil a plan themselves, were 
dependent on their suppliers to stick to their commitments, on its side. What was certain 
though, he concluded, was that this method of industrial administration was ‘superior’ to 
‘schematic plans’ using ‘a bureaucratic-hierarchic template’ in at least three ways. In the 
first place, the method had been tried and tested within the cooperative movement, where it 
had ‘passed its exam’. Secondly, it reduced the dangers associated with ‘an inflexible [and] 
slow clerical machine’. And thirdly, it allowed for ‘more freedom in social life’ than would 
be possible under ‘the excessive proliferation of the role of the bureaucratic apparatus’.72 
The fact that Morandi and Topínski used such concepts as ‘democratisation’ and 
‘social freedom’ already signals how, for the PPS and the PSIUP, grassroots participation 
in economic planning took on a political at least as much as an economic significance. 
Indeed, liberating workers from the duty of simply having to carry out third-party 
commands, irrespective of whether these came from the capitalist or the state, by giving 
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them a real say over their workplace and over the implementation of government planning 
was a cornerstone of what the two parties understood as economic democracy. ‘In the 
methods of the cooperative movement’, declared one of the resolutions adopted at the 
August 1945 PPS congress, ‘lies the realisation of economic democracy and 
socialisation’.73 For the PSIUP, Saraceno heaped even stronger praise upon factory 
councils. These bodies, he insisted, were ‘the foundation and bedrock of a productive 
democracy, without which every desire of [worker] control would be likely to remain a 
gimmick of formal democracy and get bogged down in a bureaucratic exercise’.74 
At first glance, it would seem as if the ČSSD and the SFIO shared these views. In 
their publicity, after all, the two parties made sure to present themselves as champions of 
grassroots participation in the implementation of economic planning. The ČSSD minority 
within the central trade union leadership, for example, put forward a motion calling for 
‘national committees’ as well as ‘regional and central economic stakeholder bodies’ to be 
involved in lower-level planning. When this proposal fell on deaf ears with ‘the other 
parties in government’, the ČSSD’s parliamentary group was quick to re-launch it as a 
draft law.75 The SFIO’s 1946 ‘Action Programme’, meanwhile, foresaw the creation of 
‘central councils’ – made up of worker, consumer, and state representatives – appointing 
managers and executing plans within each ‘socialised’ sector. ‘[I]nside the [individual] 
company and in the context of the plan’, moreover, factory councils were eventually to 
have ‘all the powers that are today possessed by a board of directors’.76      
 Such rhetorical bravado notwithstanding, the Czechoslovakian social democrats 
and the French socialists in fact took very different attitudes towards worker co-
                                                          
73 XXVI Kongres [August 1945], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, 2029/1, 235/I-12, fos 246-247.  
74 ‘Relazione sulla riforma industriale – I consigli di gestione’ [1945], AdL, Camera del Lavoro, Class. 
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determination in economic administration compared to their Italian and Polish 
counterparts. The ČSSD leadership had limited confidence in workers’ (or workers 
representatives’) abilities to rise above their own narrow concerns and take decisions in 
their company’s and/or the national interest. Already at the ČSSD’s first post-war 
congress, Evžen Erban pointed to the many mistakes that the party had made when it 
‘romantically idealised the proletariat’ in the past. ‘We know from political praxis and 
from socialist theory’, he declared, ‘that the working class alone, without political 
education, comes no further than syndicalism’ – a derogatory reference to the fragmented, 
sector-based forms of worker representation under the First Republic. And the foremost 
vehicle for that political education was not workplace co-determination bodies, which, as 
has been claimed elsewhere, reflected these syndicalist traditions in many ways,77 but the 
freshly-united trade union movement. For the trade union movement, explained Erban, 
‘offers us great opportunities to influence the widest cadres, even their politically most 
backward parts, in a socialist spirit’. To achieve that, he concluded, ‘we must especially 
endeavour for the socialist education of lower-level trade union functionaries, in order for 
the trade unions to be stripped of all syndicalist tendencies and for them to be infused with 
a profound socialist class consciousness’.78       
 Whilst Erban called on trade unions to sort out their grassroots, Bohumil Laušman 
urged industrial managers to do the same. Speaking at a June 1947 conference of ČSSD 
managers within the nationalised sector, he expressed his surprise at the fact that, in some 
companies, ‘every normal agenda item’ was passed by the factory council. The factory 
council, he argued, should neither ‘officiate’ nor ‘do business’. Its role, ‘alongside its 
traditional social and cultural tasks’, consisted of ‘control’ – and that did ‘of course’ not 
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mean ‘the control of each file’, but ‘the right [...] to inspect company records from time to 
time [...] to assess the quality of its management’. What was more, explained Laušman, the 
factory council had the duty ‘to assist management in its currently very difficult tasks’. 
Above all, it was to make sure that ‘the workforce [...] realises what nationalisations mean 
– what they have to offer to our people, but also which obligations they entail for all staff’. 
In the interest of the entire workforce, therefore, the factory council was to undertake ‘that 
there are no freeloaders within the company,  that everybody is trying to work as hard as 
possible, that those who in any way damage production [...] are punished, that there is 
minimal turmoil in the production process, and that technological advances are quickly 
made’.79 
 The ČSSD leadership, however, increasingly felt that the majority of factory 
councils were not fulfilling these tasks. At the party’s November 1947 congress, Václav 
Majer delivered a scathing attack on some of their practices, which sounded much more as 
an assault on the institution itself. To be sure, Majer granted that there were factory 
councils which functioned impeccably. There were ‘others’, though, which ‘delay work 
[...] and burden their companies with superfluous ideas and expenses’. If that already 
seemed like a negation of the consultative powers that the government had granted factory 
councils, Majer was not finished yet. ‘Many factory councils’, he continued, ‘unduly 
interfere in company business, thereby causing conflicts between themselves and 
management and, as a consequence of that, unrest that harms production’.80 
 Where leaders on the left (Erban), centre (Laušman), and right (Majer) of the ČSSD 
were thus united in their scorn for direct worker participation in economic decision-
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making, the post-war SFIO saw some divisions on the issue. There was a group of leaders 
on the left of the SFIO Executive – most notably Suzanne Charpy, Pierre Commin, and 
Jean Rous – looking at grassroots participation in much the same way as the Italian and 
Polish socialists. Charpy hailed the two companies that had been placed under full worker 
self-management after the arrest or flight of collaborationist owners – car-manufacturing 
Berliet in Lyon and biscuit-producing Brun in Grenoble – as examples of socialism at 
work.81 Rous, for his part, championed the ‘democratic’ production regime in Labour 
Britain, ‘where the masses have been associated with the production effort and 
governmental action’.82 Commin, finally, called for ‘the popular masses’ to be able to 
participate ‘in the direction and control’ of economic plans.83 
 Time and again, however, these leaders stumbled upon what Rous dubbed the ‘anti-
participationism’ of the SFIO at large.84 Indeed, the great majority of the SFIO leadership, 
including all of its ministers, were distinctively less enthusiastic about worker participation 
of almost any kind. The divergences between the pro- and anti-participationists often came 
to the fore in discussions over the socialist response to strikes. During the February 1947 
strike of the Parisian press operators, Rous and Charpy pressed for (members of) the SFIO 
Executive to meet with a delegation of socialist strikers – stating that socialist leaders 
should listen to what their rank and file had to say. Such party heavyweights as Mayer and 
                                                          
81 See the reports of the speeches that Charpy gave during her October 1946 tour of the North of France: 
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Philip, however, took a far more hostile attitude towards any exchange of views with the 
socialist strikers, who had failed to ask the SFIO leadership for permission before joining 
the strike.85 The April 1947 strike at Renault was to fray tempers once more. Charpy and, 
to a lesser extent, Rous came out in favour of the strike’s demands.86 What is more, 
Charpy backed the Renault GSE, which had defied the communist-led factory trade union 
command to support the strike. It was the actions of these factory socialists in particular, 
which met with a remarkable brushing-down on the part of Mayer. In their attempts to steal 
a march upon the communists, he argued, the Renault GSE had ‘insufficiently concerned 
itself about the political repercussions of their attitude’. In fact, the communists had been 
‘courageous’ by remaining ‘faithful to the commitments the government and the CGT have 
entered into’. ‘We should not try to surpass the communists on the Left’, he concluded – 
instead, ‘[t]heir language should be ours’.87 
 But even away from the charged atmosphere directly surrounding major strikes, 
proposals for worker’s voices to be heard in economic administration met with derision 
amongst senior SFIO leaders. Time after time, then, Charpy’s calls for a far stronger role 
for workplace co-determination bodies went unheeded. According to Philip, nothing much 
was to be expected of worker control over production. In small and medium businesses, he 
explained, bosses could easily manipulate the workforce – as had been the case at 
Michelin, where workers had been ‘the instruments of management in the black market of 
tires’.88 Oreste Capocci, meanwhile, claimed that workers themselves did not view 
participation within such bodies as factory councils or price control committees as a 
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realistic way out of their socio-economic predicament. Communist trade unionists had 
been urging workers to make use of their rights within such bodies for the better part of 
two years, he pointed out, only for them to abandon these efforts when they realised just 
how ineffective these were.89 Perhaps Moch summed up the socialist argument against 
worker participation best, when he told Charpy that neither the factory councils nor the 
GSE ‘offer us effective support’. It was clear, he argued, that ‘the working class has not 
understood its role. We are faced with a stultification of worker morality, caused by more 
than five years of misery as well as […] by the politics of the Communist Party’.90  
For both the ČSSD and the SFIO, then, economic power necessarily had to reside 
with those at the apex of the economic pyramid: with governments and parliaments in 
questions of macro-economic decision-making, with trade unions in questions of worker 
representation, and with management in questions surrounding the production effort. The 
two parties, accordingly, never conceived of economic planning as a process that was to 
take its lead from the grassroots. As late as June 1947, a leader in the ČSSD’s theoretical 
weekly claimed that the recent Soviet experiences with planning ‘could be of the greatest 
assistance to us’.91 If a SFIO propaganda document on the planned economy did denounce 
‘totalitarian’ forms of planning, the economic model it put forward was hardly less 
centralised and technocratic than that of the Soviet Union. The document after all listed 
‘respect for governmental authority’ – allowing the state to ‘fulfil its role, which consists 
of arbitrating, deciding, and acting’ –  and a ‘professional organisation’ – made up of 
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‘study, liaison, and executive organs’ – as the two key requirements for a planned 
economy.92 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen in this chapter that the two sets of parties took completely opposite attitudes 
towards the question of grassroots participation in political and economic decision-making. 
These attitudes were closely linked to their conceptions of democracy. For the Italian and 
Polish socialists, on the one hand, grassroots participation was crucial to the well-being 
and ultimate survival of democracy. Both in teaching their ‘politically backward’ 
electorates the fundamentals of democracy and in transforming socio-economic power 
relations, they argued, participation was the cure for the ills of the interwar state. For the 
Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French socialists, on the other, grassroots 
participation was to be limited chiefly to voting in elections. Any grassroots challenge to 
the political or economic decisions of properly elected representatives, they insisted, was a 
dangerous affront to democracy.     
 In the last two chapters, two socialist conceptions of democracy have thus clearly 
come to the fore: a bottom-up participatory conception and a top-down representative 
conception. Yet, as we have seen, historians only tend to associate the post-war socialist 
parties with representative and parliamentary politics. For that reason, they have frequently 
misconstrued the attitudes of the PPS and the PSIUP as contradictory or even deceitful. In 
his study of the post-war PPS, for example, Jerzy Holzer detects a fundamental paradox in 
the socialist struggles against the disempowerment of cooperatives in the wake of the 
January 1947 parliamentary elections. ‘The objective of the [socialist] demands’, he 
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argues, ‘was to guarantee societal participation in the administration of the country, but 
they were formulated immediately after the wishes of that society had been overridden in 
the coerced and falsified elections’.93 This argument, however, seems to be based on the 
dubious assumption that the Polish socialists, like their Czechoslovakian and French 
counterparts, viewed parliamentary elections as the apogee of participatory politics. As we 
have seen time and again in the last two chapters, they did not. From their perspective, 
therefore, it was perfectly consistent to acquiesce in or even support the communist 
violations of parliamentary democracy whilst at the same time denouncing their attacks on 
such grassroots participatory bodies as the cooperatives. For it was from the institutions of 
economic democracy rather than from those of political democracy that they expected the 
impetus for democratic renewal to come.  
 The PSIUP, in spite of its close alliance with the PCI in national politics, was often 
very critical of communist attitudes towards the grassroots too. In a September 1944 open 
letter to the PCI, Morandi explained that there was a fundamental difference between 
socialist and communist conceptions of the purpose of a working-class party. Whereas ‘the 
masses expressed their interests within and governed through the party’ in the socialist 
conception, he argued, the communist conception saw the party as an ‘instrument to 
manoeuvre the masses in accordance with the directives assigned to cadres’.94 Such 
objections to the communist model extended well beyond the party level. Indeed, the kind 
of economic system that the Italian and Polish socialists sought to build was in many ways 
the antithesis of the Soviet system. Even if they rarely mentioned the Soviet Union by 
name, a strong rejection of the top-down bureaucratic system that had been introduced 
there after the October Revolution was often implicit in their positions. At the height of the 
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communist-socialist struggles over cooperatives, chief PPS economist Oskar Lange even 
appeared to place the pre-war capitalist system and the communist-backed centralised 
system on the same footing. For now that private capital had been liquidated, he pointed 
out, ‘a danger equally harmful to democracy’ could emerge ‘in the form of economic 
concentration in the hands of the state bureaucracy’.95  
 The post-war ČSSD and the SFIO, conversely, frequently took a more positive 
view of the economic experiences of the Soviet Union. That is not to argue that the two 
parties were proponents of the type of micro-planning – with central organs setting 
meticulous targets for every individual unit in the production process – that had been 
applied to disastrous effect in the interwar Soviet Union. When the Czechoslovakian social 
democrats championed the Soviet model of planning, they were certainly referring to the 
wartime and early post-war Soviet experiment with a more decentralised macro-economic 
planning system.96 For all intents and purposes, however, this remained a technocratic 
model in which decision-making powers resided firmly with experts at the factory and 
ministry level.         
 Once again, the origins of this divergence between the two sets of parties can be 
traced back to their opposite experiences during the interwar years. The more radical line 
on worker self-management and popular participation adopted by the post-war Italian and 
Polish socialists, then, reflected their interwar disillusions with reformism and with 
working within the (economic) system more generally. Roman Bäcker has observed, for 
example, how the interwar PPS’ stance on grassroots participation radicalised as socialists 
were systematically removed from the state socio-economic apparatus by the Sanacja 
dictatorship.97 The Czechoslovakian social democrats and French socialists, by contrast, 
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had become increasingly embedded in their respective state socio-economic institutions 
during the interwar years. Alain Bergounioux and Gérard Grunberg have argued in this 
respect that the Popular Front government brought about ‘a profound change of mentality’ 
within the SFIO, with ‘technicians’ who had been part of or close to the government 
embracing Keynesianism and New Deal economics.98 
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Part Conclusion: Political Reconstruction 
 
In questions of political reconstruction, the historiography of post-war (Western) European 
socialism has often taken a roundly deterministic line. In the first place, as we have seen, 
this concerns the socialist attitudes towards the rebuilding of democracy. Historians have 
repeatedly pointed out that, for the post-war European socialist parties, there was only one 
trajectory to democratic socialism and that this trajectory ran through elections, 
parliaments, and constitutions.1 Exceptions to this rule, as the PPS and PSIUP presented, 
they have tended to dismiss as anomalies or, especially in the Polish case, even as traitors.2 
Secondly, and this is a dimension we have touched upon but not yet discussed in detail, 
historians have much concerned themselves with templates. Comparative histories of post-
war (Western) European socialism have generally argued that there was a clear model for 
socialist parties to follow. This model – of a socialist party at ease with itself in practicing 
a reformist politics and in seeking to create a ‘capitalism with a human face’3 – was 
provided by the electorally most successful parties of the post-war international socialist 
movement: the British Labour Party and the Swedish Social Democratic Party. That the 
large continental socialist parties failed to repeat these successes such studies typically 
attribute to their struggles with ‘the vestiges of a Marxist teleology’.4 For even if most 
parties de facto embraced reformism, many socialist leaders ‘still didn’t hear the music and 
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continued to proclaim their dedication to classic, prewar ideological goals such as 
transcending capitalism entirely’.5   
 In our analysis, however, we have found very little to substantiate the claim that the 
British or ‘Swedish road to socialism [...] became a model for many Social Democrats in 
Western Europe’.6 Even the Czechoslovakian social democrats and French socialists, who 
shared with their British and Swedish counterparts a desire to reach out to non-proletarian 
segments of the electorate, rarely referred to the British or Swedish experience. In fact, it 
was chiefly the parties immediately to the right of the ČSSD and the SFIO that sought to 
emulate the Labour Party in creating a catch-all centre-left or centrist party. In France, the 
Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance (UDSR) – one of the parties that would 
enter into the Radical RGR coalition for the 1946 and 1951 parliamentary elections – was 
initially the main standard bearer of travaillisme (‘labourism’).7 In Czechoslovakia, 
meanwhile, the National Socialist ČSNS, which, much like Labour, rejected Marxist 
notions of class struggle and oriented itself towards a cooperative socialism, ‘repeatedly 
petitioned the Labour Party in the autumn of 1946 to establish intensive relations between 
the two parties’.8 It was not just in Czechoslovakia and France that the Labour template 
seems to have exerted a strong attraction upon centrist parties. For even major Christian 
democratic parties sought to model themselves after the Labour Party.9    
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 The ČSSD and the SFIO, by contrast, took their inspiration from their own history 
rather than from foreign models. Already in mid-1946, and at this early stage his statement 
must not yet be seen as an exclusive reference to the Soviet model, Bohumil Laušman 
rejected all foreign models for the development of socialism in post-war Czechoslovakia. 
‘[W]hen we talk about socialism’, he explained, ‘we do not mean a socialism that copies 
foreign models, but [...] we have in mind a socialism that springs from our own history, 
from our traditions, [...] from the spirit of our people and from the spirit of our nation’.10 
 That the road to socialism had to take its lead from national histories and traditions 
was of course something that the Italian and Polish socialists fully supported. When they 
referred to the British or Scandinavian experiences, accordingly, it was often to point out 
that that model was simply not applicable to their countries. To be sure, the Saragat-led 
minority within the PSIUP did point to the British and, to a lesser extent, Scandinavian 
examples as evidence that socialism could thrive there where it was not associated with 
communism.11 Yet, Sandro Pertini reflected the majority standpoint when he argued that 
‘an educated man’ like Giuseppe Saragat would do better to base his views on ‘the 
objective Italian situation’ than on that ‘in Britain and other countries’. For despite 
Saragat’s claims that the ‘international situation [i.e. Labour’s 1945 landslide general 
election victory – JG]’ showed that there was ‘no longer a danger of a violent return of the 
reaction’, after all, the reality was that ‘we are emerging from a dictatorship imposed by 
violence, that Germany is emerging from a dictatorship imposed by violence, and that a 
dictatorship imposed by violence still exists in Spain’.12  
                                                          
10 ‘Volby a čs. sociální demokracie’ [1946], NA, Fonds Bohumil Laušman, III Pisemnosti související s 
ústřední, veřejnou a politickou činnosti B. Laušmana, Karton 34, Souvicející činnosti v soc. dem. 1928-1948, 
p. 11. 
11 Ennio Di Nolfo, La Repubblica delle speranze e degli inganni: l'Italia dalla caduta del fascismo al crollo 
della Democrazia cristiana, (Florence: Ponte alle grazie, 1996), p. 232. 
12 ‘Intervento al Consiglio Nazionale del Partito Socialista’ [29 July – 1 August 1945], in: Stefano Caretti 
(ed.), Sandro Pertini. Dal delitto Matteotti alla Costituente. Scritti e discorsi: 1924-1946, (Manduria: 
Lacaita, 2008),  p. 149. 
320 
 
 Indeed, the experiences of other countries that had suffered through (or were still 
suffering through) a prolonged period of right-wing authoritarian or fascist dictatorship 
remained the main frame of reference for the post-war PPS and PSIUP alike. This list 
included Austria, Germany, Hungary, Spain, and increasingly also Greece.13 It did not 
include France, however. For all his later criticism of the Third Force, Nenni actually 
acknowledged in 1945 that France had better prospects of democracy than Italy. In France, 
he explained, ‘the vast resistance movements’ had given a fresh ‘impulse’ to political life. 
‘We don’t have all that’, he continued; ‘we have a fascist, nationalist, [and] conservative 
basis, which has received severe blows [...] but which we need to watch from hour to hour, 
from minute to minute, that it does not rear its head again. [...] We have at the centre not, 
like in other countries, a democratic party, but a large Catholic party which is probably the 
strongest party electorally in Italy’.14 It was in this respect that the PSIUP leaders 
increasingly drew parallels between the situation in Italy and in Poland. In Poland too, after 
all, a communist-socialist bloc was facing strong Catholic and nationalist opposition. The 
major difference, of course, was that communists and socialists in Poland had succeeded in 
introducing such structural economic reforms as nationalisations, land reform, and 
planning.15 Far from embracing the British or Swedish road to socialism, therefore, the 
Italian socialists increasingly sang the praises of the ‘Polish road to socialism’.16     
 All of this goes to demonstrate that we need to broaden our horizons in the study of 
post-war European socialism. For, at least during the first post-war years, socialist parties 
                                                          
13 We have seen in Chapter 6 how PSIUP attitudes in domestic politics were shaped by fears of a ‘Greek 
scenario’. Even if the absence of American troops made a ‘Greek scenario’ far less likely in post-war Poland, 
PPS leaders increasingly warned of the dangers of sliding to a Greek situation too. See e.g.: Stanisław 
Szwalbe, ‘Na nowym etapie’, Przegląd Socjalistyczny, 1 March 1947, pp. 3-4, 3.       
14 ‘Comitato Centrale’ [17 October 1945], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc. 2189, p. 24. 
15 See: Emanuele Rossi, Democrazia come partecipazione: Lelio Basso e il PSI alle origini della Repubblica, 
1943-1947, (Rome: Viella, 2011), pp. 271-272. 
16 Nenni did so explicitly in a September 1947 article in Avanti!, whereas Basso cited the Polish experience 
with ‘popular democracy’ as ‘an example’ in a November 1947 meeting of the PSIUP Central Committee. 
See: Pietro Nenni, ‘La via polacca al socialismo’, Avanti!, 7 September 1947; Degl’Innocenti, Storia del PSI, 
p. 90.    
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insisted there was no one-size-fits-all template for success. What might work in one 
country, after all, could well have disastrous consequences in another. In deciding which 
templates to and which templates not to follow, the socialist parties were informed first and 
foremost by their own historical experiences and socio-economic structures. Even if this 
unsurprising fact has largely been lost on historians pre-occupied with a single template, it 
was often quite clear to the post-war socialists themselves. When, in 1957, after the PSIUP 
had finally broken with the PCI, a delegation of the Norwegian Social Democratic Party 
met with PSIUP leaders, the interlocutors no longer used the same concepts. ‘They talk 
about class struggle and Marxism like we used to do thirty years ago’, noted Haakon Lie, 
the leader of the Norwegian delegation; ‘perhaps that is because their socio-economic 
situation resembles that of us back then’.17         
  
                                                          
17 Quoted in: Giovanni Scirocco, Politique d’Abord: Il PSI, la Guerra Fredda e la Politica Internazionale, 
1948-1957 (Milan: Edizione UNICOPLI, 2010), p. 264.  
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Conclusion 
 
It is remarkable how small a role the coming of the Cold War has played in our account. 
To be sure, the four parties made occasional references to the impact or presence of the 
emerging superpower in their half of the continent: with the French socialists underlining 
the importance of anti-inflationary measures in order for their country not to become 
totally dependent upon the Americans or the Polish socialists warning that the Soviets 
might step in if the political parties would be unable to form a broad-based electoral bloc. 
But this was all a far cry from the strongly Cold War-dominated picture that so many 
(socio-) political histories of post-war Europe (as discussed in the introduction) still paint.  
 In fact, superpower pressure does not appear to have been the foremost concern 
within any of the four parties. We have seen that the Polish socialists often thought Stalin, 
who served as quasi-official ‘arbitrator’ between the PPR and the PPS, to be on their side 
in domestic disputes with the communists. The Czechoslovakian social democrats, for their 
part, did not initially view the Soviet Union as a malevolent influence either. In a mid-1946 
conversation with Koos Vorrink – the Chairman of the Dutch Labour Party – a journalist 
of the national ČSSD daily claimed that ‘Stalin and Molotov are better Czechs than the 
Czech communists’.1 In Western Europe, meanwhile, leading Italian socialists did not even 
regard the United States as the major foreign actor in Italian politics. When, on the eve of 
the PCI’s and the PSIUP’s removal from the Italian government, Lelio Basso pointed to 
the American role in the deterioration of relations with the DC, Luigi Cacciatore was quick 
to warn not ‘to give excessive weight to American pressures’. If the United States wanted 
the communists out of the government, he insisted, that was because they were demanding 
                                                          
1 This does not appear to have been an isolated opinion. Vorrink’s report, after all, notes how President Beneš 
told Stalin: ‘I am not afraid of you. I am afraid of the Czech communists, who are overly intent on copying 
Bolshevism’. See: ‘Enkele aantekeningen naar aanleiding van mijn reis naar Tsjecho-Slovakije (27 augustus 
tot 5 september 1946)’, IISH, Archief Partij van de Arbeid, Box 2286, p. 11.  
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an end to the economic deadlock within the coalition. ‘Far more serious’ than any 
American pressure was ‘the pressure from the Vatican’.2       
 Arguably the greatest divide between the historiographical fixation with the coming 
of the Cold War and the reality on the ground, however, is provided by the French case. 
This becomes very clear when we revisit the stormy days of May 1947, when the SFIO, 
during the political crisis that spelt the end for tripartisme, decided to press ahead with a 
new government that excluded the PCF. Traditional diplomatic history has described this 
as one of the high points of the early Cold War, which saw months of American pressure 
for the communists to be removed from the French government pay off.3 Yet, if we look at 
the actual discussions within the SFIO leadership at the height of the governmental crisis, 
an entirely different picture emerges. Whereas the international situation barely figured in 
its deliberations, constitutionalist arguments very much dominated the two sessions that the 
SFIO Executive held on 4 May 1947. All party leaders agreed that the constitution dictated 
that the communist ministers, who had voted against their own government’s economic 
policies, should be dismissed. What divided them, however, was the question of how 
socialist Prime Minister Paul Ramadier should proceed. Those around SFIO Secretary 
General Guy Mollet, fearing electoral disasters if the SFIO aligned itself too closely with 
the parties of the centre and the centre-right, called on Ramadier and the other socialist 
ministers to resign. Yet, the group of socialist ministers, who would go on to win the 
crucial vote on governmental participation at the SFIO’s National Council of May 6, 
considered this a constitutional impossibility. For even though the communists had voted 
                                                          
2 ‘Riunione Direzione’ [3 May 1947], ISRT, Fondo Foscolo Lombardi, Partito Socialista Italiano, Direzione 
Nazionale, Busta 4, Fasc. 21, fo. 16. 
3 Even if few historians would claim, as the PCF itself did after its removal from the Ramadier government, 
that the communist ministers were dismissed on the direct orders of the Americans, diplomatic histories of 
the episode stress that the United States did apply pressure to ‘encourage’ the socialists to form a government 
without the communists. Melvyn Leffler, for example, notes how Jefferson Caffery – the American 
Ambassador in Paris – noted in his diary in early May 1947: ‘I told […] Ramadier no Communists in 
gov[ernment] or else’. Quoted in: Melvyn Leffler, ‘The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the 
Marshall Plan’, Diplomatic History, 12/3 (1988), pp. 277-306, 281. 
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against Ramadier, the ministers insisted, he had survived a parliamentary confidence vote, 
meaning that, constitutionally, he should stay on. Forcing Ramadier to resign, explained 
André Philip, would set ‘a serious precedent’, for that would ‘signify the replacement of a 
constitutional regime with a party regime’. Jules Moch agreed. ‘I want to underline’, he 
declared, ‘that the decisions of the Party are not irreversible. On the other side, we cannot 
ask Ramadier to subordinate respect for the Constitution to the decision of the Party’.4                       
The point here is not so much to emphasise that abiding by the constitution 
outweighed all other considerations for (a majority within) the post-war SFIO. We have 
seen that time and again in this thesis. The point is rather to bring out that what historians 
have often portrayed as (one of) the foremost determinant(s) of socialist behaviour – the 
mounting tensions between the two emerging superpowers and its ramifications upon the 
domestic level – was in fact but a subordinate concern for each of the four parties.         
If the coming of the Cold War was, at least initially, not a decisive factor in 
socialist considerations, however, we need to rethink the merits of the East-West prism 
through which historians have so often studied post-war European socialism and, by 
extension, post-war Europe as a whole. From the perspective of the liberation, after all, it 
makes little sense to place industrialised and democratic Czechoslovakia in the same 
category as rural and backward Poland. Nor is it entirely fair to only weigh the PSIUP 
against its Western counterparts, frequently countries with completely different political 
and socio-economic backgrounds, and subsequently to dismiss the Italian socialists as an 
‘anomaly’. If we really want to understand why socialist parties from one and the same 
‘bloc’ went in opposite directions, we must look across the ‘Iron Curtain’ that still exists in 
historiography. 
                                                          
4 ‘Comité Directeur’ [4 May 1947], OURS, ‘Réunions du Comité Directeur du 4 septembre 1946 à 30 julliet 
1947’, p. 350.  
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With its focus on the set of problems that was common to socialists in East and 
West – the problems of post-war reconstruction – this thesis has endeavoured to do just 
that. What does this focus upon post-war socio-economic and political reconstruction tell 
us about the four parties which remains hidden in studies adopting a Cold War 
perspective?  
First and foremost, it reveals just how strong the continuities between the pre-war 
and post-war years were. Pre-occupied with projecting back the later Cold War divide 
upon the first post-war years, the historiography of early post-war Europe has largely lost 
sight of the longer continuities between pre-war, wartime, and post-war Europe.5 In reality, 
however, far from the moment of liberation representing some sort of ‘Zero Hour’, at 
which the socialists could start from a clean slate, the four parties in many ways picked up 
where they had left off before the war.  
The PPS and the PSIUP, even if they found themselves in national government for 
the first time in their existence, essentially remained anti-system parties. The PSIUP had 
been a revolutionary party ever since its ‘maximalists’ had defeated its reformists in 1912. 
By the end of the First World War, the party was ‘more intransigent, more united, and 
more left-wing’ than most of its European counterparts, having ‘stood out among west 
European socialist parties for refusing to support the war’.6 The subsequent rise of fascism, 
with the active or tacit support of the right-wing parties and the bourgeoisie, only deepened 
the socialist conviction that nothing was to be gained from working within the system.  
Within the PPS, the move away from a parliamentary and reformist road to 
socialism came rather later. It was only after the Sanacja regime became increasingly 
authoritarian in the late 1920s that the party embraced a more radical conception of 
                                                          
5 A notable exception to this rule is Martin Conway’s and Peter Romijn’s volume on the question of 
legitimacy in mid-twentieth-century Europe, which seeks to transcend the artificial historiographical barriers 
between pre-war, wartime, and post-war by focusing on the 1936-1946 period. See: Conway & Romijn 
(eds.), The War on Legitimacy.    
6 Eley, Forging Democracy, p. 170. 
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socialism. Still, much as historians have disputed that the post-war PPS reflected the 
traditions of Polish socialism,7 many of the party’s attitudes had their roots in the 1930s. 
Whether it was by making the first overtures towards cooperation with the communists, by 
adopting a new party programme not excluding a transitory dictatorship, or by 
championing grassroots democracy and worker self-management, the interwar PPS was 
very much on the road towards becoming the post-war PPS.       
The ČSSD and the SFIO, in contrast, considered themselves part of a system that 
was worth defending. For both parties, these beliefs had their origins all the way back in 
the nineteenth century. In its insistence on a robust defence of ‘Republican’ rights and 
freedoms, the post-war SFIO in many ways reproduced the discourse that the French Left 
had employed ever since the formation of the Third Republic in 1870: about the ‘two 
Frances’, a Catholic, monarchical, and authoritarian France and a secular, Republican, and 
democratic France.8 It was this notion that had prompted the French socialists to seek 
alliances with non-proletarian parties in the Republican camp following such political 
calamities as the Dreyfus Affair and the February 1934 Crisis.9 When the post-war SFIO 
perceived the Republic to be under pressure once more, accordingly, the party reverted to 
what it knew best – uniting with its long-standing Radical allies and with the Catholics 
reconciled to France’s secular constitution that made up the MRP against the ‘Caesarism’ 
of General De Gaulle10 and the new foe of Stalinism.  
                                                          
7 Norman Davies, for example, argues that the leaders of the WRN and the London PPS ‘followed the 
mainstream of non-Marxist Polish socialism’, whereas the party that became part of the Lublin government 
was ‘not a continuation of the mainstream PPS, but a tiny splinter group’. He is of course right that the 
Lublin PPS did not initially reflect the interwar PPS. Yet, by alluding to a ‘mainstream of non-Marxist Polish 
socialism’, he completely disregards the developments within the PPS under the Sanacja regime. See: 
Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland’s Present, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pp. 75-81.   
8 On the ‘two Frances’, see: Robert Tombs, France 1814-1914, (London/New York: Longman, 1996), pp. 
145-146.  
9 On how the socialists and Radicals pulled together in the face of such crises, see e.g.: Daniela Neri-Ultsch, 
Sozialisten und Radicaux – eine schwierige Allianz: Linksbündnisse in der Dritten Französischen Republik, 
1919-1938, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).  
10 This was how Léon Blum put it when, in October 1947, he claimed that Republican freedoms were under 
attack from both the Left and the Right: ‘There exists a communist danger against personal and civil liberties. 
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If the post-war Czechoslovakian social democrats frequently drew on a nineteenth-
century discourse too, theirs was one of national unity rather than division. In their view, 
history had pitted an overwhelmingly democratic Czech(oslovakian) nation against those 
wanting to impose ‘foreign’ dictatorial models on it. As it became increasingly clear that 
the communists were seeking to implement a foreign model of their own, therefore, the 
post-war ČSSD drew ever closer to the centrist and centre-right parties with which it had 
historically held up ‘Czech’ values.     
Secondly, a focus upon post-war reconstruction highlights the social realities 
underlying political outcomes far better than a Cold War perspective does. The implicit or 
explicit assumption in many socio-political histories of post-war Europe, as we have seen, 
is that the working class and the Left more generally came out of the Second World War in 
a strengthened position. That the concomitant radical challenge to a (state) capitalist 
restoration unravelled so quickly, such histories often attribute to the coming of the Cold 
War. The defeat of the more radical policies that these accounts tend to impute to the post-
war socialist parties, frequently on the basis of anecdotal evidence, are then taken to 
symbolise the frustration of the radical aspirations of the liberation.   
This thesis has instead demonstrated that the weaknesses in the socialist position 
can be traced back to social realities wholly unrelated to the Cold War. In the first place, 
there were structural factors working against the post-war Left. The social consequences of 
the Second World War put the working class and the parties of the Left at a disadvantage 
vis-à-vis other social groups and non-proletarian parties. The urban working class, as we 
have seen, was hit particularly hard during the final stages of the war and the early stages 
of the liberation. On the receiving end of bombing campaigns, of (hyper-) inflation, and of 
the black market, ordinary workers certainly did not feel their position had strengthened. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
But against the same liberties there exists a Caesarist danger of which we must be aware, before which we do 
not have the right to close our eyes’. Quoted in: Hitchcock, France Restored, p. 85.  
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The same was true for the working-class parties. Having for years or sometimes even for 
decades been the foremost focal point of state repression, left-wing organisations hardly 
emerged from the war in a stronger position than their centre-right rivals. This was what 
Pietro Nenni was referring to when he told the September 1944 PSIUP National Council 
that the post-war DC found itself in a ‘privileged situation’ by comparison with the PCI 
and the PSIUP. For ‘when we were in prison, or in exile, or liquidated’ under fascism, the 
Christian democrats still had their ‘natural centre of activity in parishes, so that [their 
organisation] never vanished [completely]’.11 
The second weakness was more peculiar to socialism itself. Socialist parties, after 
all, tended to struggle more with the socio-economic demands of the reconstruction effort 
than their direct rivals to the left and right. In the face of the manifold economic difficulties 
of the first post-war years, socialist support was squeezed from two sides: with middle 
classes threatened by inflation rallying to the (centre-) right and hungry workers opting for 
the demagogically stronger communists.12 Socialist leaders were aware that the economic 
tide was very much against them. Philip, for instance, repeatedly pointed out that socialism 
presupposed prosperity.13 For the PPS, Julian Hochfeld was more elaborate. ‘Socialism’, 
he explained, ‘does not come to us in easy circumstances’. Instead, the ‘revolution takes 
place in times of crisis [...] on rubble and ruins’. This had immediate political 
                                                          
11 ‘Consiglio Naz. PSI’ [4-5 September 1944], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc. 2186, p. 12.  
12 We have seen in Chapter 6 that the ČSSD and SFIO leaderships claimed that, even if the communists were 
co-signatories to and vocal supporters of the austerity packages that post-war governments implemented, 
their supreme demagogic skills still allowed them to be the main beneficiary of the popular dissatisfaction 
these packages generated. It was not just the Czechoslovakian social democrats and the French socialists 
making such claims. Commenting upon the situation in Hungary in January 1947, Denis Healey explained 
that the social democratic Minister of Industry had recently presented the government’s Three Year Plan – 
which he would doubtlessly have agreed with his communist coalition partners beforehand. As the Plan 
‘inevitably gives priority to capital investment and agricultural development’, Healey noted, it would ‘entail 
[popular] sacrifices which Communist demagogy can easily exploit’. See: ‘Hungary – The Political 
Prospect’, LHASC, Labour Party Archives, International Department, Box 8. 
13 Wilfried Loth, ‘The French Socialist Party, 1947-1954’, in: Richard T. Griffiths (ed.), Socialist Parties and 
the Question of Europe in the 1950s, (Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill, 1993), pp. 25-42, 26. 
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consequences, as ‘the working class is hungry, is dissatisfied [and] all sorts of people prey 
on that’.14     
For the socialist parties, therefore, local socio-economic reconstruction was linked 
intimately to national political reconstruction. Their weaknesses on the ground, after all, 
were replicated in the national arena. Through the prism of post-war reconstruction, we can 
thus formulate an alternative explanation for the rapid decline in the fortunes of the four 
parties under review in this thesis. Contrary to what many socialists believed at the 
moment of liberation, and to what most historians have suggested, their position was never 
that strong to begin with. Far from the Cold War intervening in a decisive manner in their 
fate, hence, that fate was sealed in large part by the social, economic, and political 
consequences of the interwar and war years.    
That is of course not to argue that the coming of the Cold War had no part 
whatsoever in the post-war trajectories of the four parties. Especially for Czechoslovakia 
and Poland, we cannot completely disregard the role played by the Soviet Union. Even if 
the Prague Coup was mostly the work of the Czechoslovakian communists themselves, 
they only really abandoned the idea of a ‘national road to socialism’ after being told so by 
their Soviet overlords at the founding conference of the Cominform. In post-war Poland, 
moreover, Soviet security forces were a constant presence that intervened directly in the 
‘civil war’ between the government and the remnants of the wartime underground. It is 
impossible to imagine Poland going communist without this Soviet intervention. If the 
American role in France and Italy was nowhere near as direct or decisive, it certainly 
figured in socialist considerations. SFIO leaders were perfectly aware that it would be 
easier for France to secure vital American economic assistance if the communists were out 
                                                          
14 Rada Naczelna [31 March 1946], AAN, Polska Partia Socjalityczna, 2032/1, 235/II-6, fo. 14. 
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of the government.15 Nenni, for his part, argued that the socialists had always known that 
the United States were seeking ‘hegemony’ in Europe, going so far as to cast the dubious 
claim that ‘American meddling’ had ‘prevented the materialisation of a popular revolution’ 
in post-war Italy.16     
The influence that the two emerging superpowers wielded in their respective 
‘blocs’, however peripheral to the ultimate party-political positioning of the four parties, 
highlights some of the limitations to the East-West comparisons undertaken in this thesis. 
To be sure, the ČSSD and the SFIO responded in much the same manner to the 
increasingly authoritarian behaviour of the communists. But the fact that the French 
socialists were able and the Czechoslovakian social democrats were unable to remove the 
communists from government had everything to do with their geo-political location. For 
whereas the United States had insisted that the PCF would dissolve its (armed) resistance 
organisations in the wake of the liberation of France, the Soviet liberators of 
Czechoslovakia had allowed the KSČ to entrench its position in the state and security 
apparatus. If, moreover, the PPS and the PSIUP raised similar objections to ‘bourgeois’ 
democracy in principle, their different geo-political positions prompted the two parties to 
take very different attitudes towards the maintenance of ‘bourgeois’ legalism in practice. 
Whereas the Polish socialists knew they would be guaranteed of Soviet backing if they 
overstepped the confines of constitutionalism in their struggles with the ‘reaction’, after all, 
the Italian socialists feared that any departure from a strict legalism and constitutionalism 
                                                          
15 In what was one of the few mentions of the United States in SFIO Executive sessions during the May 1947 
crisis of tripartisme, Jules Moch explained that he was ‘convinced that ravitaillement would be better assured 
by the United States if the communists disappeared from the government’. ‘Comité Directeur’ [2 May 1947], 
OURS, ‘Réunions du Comité Directeur du 4 septembre 1946 à 30 julliet 1947’, p. 345.     
16 ‘Riunione della Direzione’ [18 October 1947], ISRT, Fondo Foscolo Lombardi, Partito Socialista Italiano, 
Direzione Nazionale, Busta 4, Fasc. 21, fo. 74. 
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would plunge their country in a civil war that could only be won by the US-backed 
Right.17     
To a large extent, then, this thesis has dealt with the perceptions informing socialist 
decisions rather than with the actual validity of these perceptions. That begs the question of 
how relevant, beyond demonstrating that there were remarkable differences within and 
parallels across the two purported blocs, its findings are. For, despite the post-war ČSSD 
and PPS adopting widely divergent attitudes towards their communist coalition partners, 
both parties would be forced into a merger with the communists in 1948. Similarly, much 
as the PSIUP and SFIO found themselves in opposite positions from May 1947 onwards, 
both parties would remain well behind the communists in electoral terms for at least the 
following two decades. Did the opposite courses that the two sets of parties embarked upon 
during the first post-war years, therefore, have any longer-term impact?  
There is reason to believe that this is indeed the case. For the Italian and Polish 
socialists, one of the foremost rationales for the communist-socialist united front was to 
keep the communists from reverting to their interwar extremism and sectarianism. The 
Unity of Action Pact, Nenni explained in June 1945, offered ‘the possibility to strongly 
bind to democracy [...] a very strong current in the country, [but] a current which can have 
the tendency to turn its back upon the democratic method’.18 To abandon the Pact, he 
warned his intra-party opponents later that year, ‘would make a part of the working class 
revert to extremist positions’.19 Insofar as the Polish PZPR and the PCI became the most 
moderate communist parties in Cold War Eastern and Western Europe respectively, the 
                                                          
17 This seems to have been one further point upon which the Italian and Polish socialists agreed. In his report 
of the January 1948 PSIUP congress, Hochfeld expressed doubts as to whether the Italian Popular Front 
would obtain a majority in the April 1948 parliamentary elections. If communists and socialists would indeed 
be unable to form a government, he continued, the only way for them to prevent ‘the liquidation of 
parliamentary democracy in Italy’ was to take up ‘the role of a responsible opposition’. See: ‘Sprawozdanie z 
wyjazdu na XXVI kongres Włoskiej Partii Socjalistycznej’ [January 1948], AAN, Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna, Wydz. Zagraniczny, 2244/1, 235/XIX-7, fo. 43.     
18 ‘Relazione sul convegno socialista – democratico cristiano’ [1 June 1945], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 
87, Fasc. 2188, p. 10.  
19 ‘Comitato Centrale’ [17 October 1945], ACS, Carteggio Nenni, Busta 87, Fasc. 2189, p. 21. 
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Italian and Polish socialists may well have succeeded in these designs to temper 
communist extremism. The extent of the socialist role, therefore, in making sure that 
Poland would be the only country in the Soviet bloc not to go through the horrors of 
Stalinist totalitarianism20 or in putting the PCI on the road towards Eurocommunism21 
merits further scholarly attention.        
In the longer run, and especially in post-1989 Europe, though, a legacy of wilful 
and longer-term cooperation with the discredited communists would not work to the 
advantage of socialist parties. For that reason, it is perhaps not surprising that today, out of 
the four countries under review in this thesis, a direct successor of the post-war socialist 
party remains a major player in national politics only in the Czech Republic and France. In 
fact, the ČSSD – which was re-established under the same name in 1989 – is unique in 
post-communist Europe for being the sole dominant centre-left party that is not a 
communist successor party.  
The long-term impact of the decisions the four parties made between the liberation 
and the onset of the Cold War in 1947/48 thus constitutes one theme that warrants more 
research. On the basis of this thesis, two further avenues for future research can be 
identified. The first is socialist moralism. It is truly striking how prejudiced and moralistic 
post-war socialist leaders, who were, after all, still leading nominally progressive 
organisations, often tended to be. Whether it was their deeply dismissive attitudes towards 
women, their obsession with the ‘moral decay’ amongst youngsters, or their general 
assumption that their populations needed to be re-educated, there was frequently very little 
indeed separating socialist leaders from their conservative counterparts on socio-cultural 
issues. A comparative study of the post-war European socialist parties and the question of 
                                                          
20 On how communist Poland, unlike all its Eastern European neighbours, never became a totalitarian state, 
see e.g.: Andrzej Walicki, Polskie zmagania z wolnoscią: widziane z boku, (Cracow: Universitas, 2000).  
21 On the PCI and Eurocommunism, see e.g.: Silvio Pons, ‘The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism’, in: 
Melvyn P. Leffler & Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 3, Endings, 
1975-1991, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 49-71. 
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‘moral reconstruction’ – a theme thus far associated chiefly with Christian parties and 
politicians as we have seen – would therefore certainly be welcome. The second promising 
avenue for future research is the comparative social history of post-war Europe. It is not 
that no research has been conducted on the post-war history of labour and everyday life, 
but much of it has a narrow national focus and remains rooted within the equally narrow 
‘window of opportunity’ narrative. By analysing some of the post-war social phenomena 
with a pan-European scope – spiralling inflation, the black market, and wildcat strikes – 
this thesis has raised serious doubts about the existence of a ‘window of opportunity’. But 
further comparative research into such social phenomena is required to fully explain how 
an essentially restorationist Europe, communist in the East and bourgeois in the West, 
emerged from the stormy post-war years. 
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